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INTRODUCTION
SOMEOF THE BEST PHILOSOPHERS whom I countamongmy
friends are postmodernists. But they do not share my faith. Others of the best philosophers whom I count among my friends
share my faith. But they are not postrnodernists. Decidedly not.
At varying degrees alonga spectrum thatruns from mildly allergic to wildly apoplectic, theyare inclined to see postmodernism
as nothing but warmed-over Nietzschean atheism, frequently on
the short list of the most dangerous anti-Christian currents of
thought as an epistemological relativism that leads ineluctably
goes. When it comes to postmodern
to moral nihilism. Anything
philosophy and Christian faith there seems tobe an agreement
that
East is East, and West is West
and never the twain shall meet . . .

I am not so sure.
I often find myself philosophically closer to my postmodern
friends who do not sharemy faith than to the Christian philosophers who do; and it
is postmodern philosophy that concerns me
here. Some refer to a very broad cultural change when they
speak of a ”postmodern world.” They often focus on the transition from a modern world in which science was king to a postmodern world in which science has lost its hegemony; and they
often suggest that this changeis not limited to intellectual elites
a variety of phebut is a broad-based, popular trend attested by
nomena lumped together under the heading New Age and by
what we might call the new supernaturalism in storytelling, narratives filled with angels and vampires taking their placealongside of science fiction.
Without denying the realityand importance of either of these
phenomena or the postpositivistic philosophies of science that
of scientific objectivity that
challengethesimplisticconcepts
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were partof the Enlightenmentproject, I have reservations about
this analysis of the "postmodern world," From the seventeenth
century on, as Bacon, Hobbes, Descartes, and now Heidegger
have made especially clear, the Enlightenment project was one
of science in the service of technology. And the human race has
never lived more completely under the hegemony of its scientifically grounded technologies than at present. Quibbles about
the nature of scientific rationality and fascination with angels
and vampires are like a little Zen meditation in the midst of a
multinationalcorporation,purelyepiphenomenal.
The computer at which I write about postmodernism declares theglory
of modernity, and its modem, whichgives me instant communication with my Christian friend inMoscow and my postmodern
friend in Melbourne, shows its handiwork.
In an earlier book entitled Slrspicioll a d Faith: The Xeligioz4s
Uses of Modern Atheism, I arguedsomething like this: Marx,
most widely influential
Nietzsche, and Freud are among the
atheists of the last couple centuries. But looked at closely, their
various ways in which religious
beliefs and
arguments about the
practices can be put, with the helpof systematic self-deception,
in the service of quite irreligious interests, both personal and
social, have two striking characteristics: they are all too true all
too much of the time(even if they are not the whole story about
religion, as this trio is all too eager to assume), and they have
striking similarities, in spite of diametrically different motives,
to the critiques of the piety of the covenant people of God to be
found on the lips and in the writings of the Old Testament
prophets and of Jesus, Paul, and James.
So I found myself accusing Marx and Freud of shameless plagiarism (Nietzsche acknowledges the link between his critique
and Jesus' critique of the Pharisees) and proposing that instead
of denouncingthis trio, religiousthinkersacknowledgethe
painful truths to which they point and use them for personal
and corporate self-examination. The opening chapter is entitled
"Atheism for Lent," and atleast a couple of churches developed
Lenten studies aroundthis suggestion.
Looking back I am reminded of Balaam's ass. Better known
for his braying than for his praying, this humble servant of the
Lord (by no design of his own) nevertheless spoke God's word
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of rebuke to another (this time
self-professed) servant of the
Lord, who needed to hear it just as badly as he wished not to
hear it.
Turning to the major postmodern philosophers, I adopt the
same strategy. Such thinkers as Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida,
Foucault, Lyotard, and Rorty are no friendsof historic Christianity. Most are overtIy atheistic, and even when this is not thecase,
God is conspicuously absent from the world as they present it
to us. The atheistic or at least nontheisticcharacter of their
thought is not modified by the religious motifs that emerge in
the later thought of Nietzsche, Meidegger, and Derrida. It is
widely assumed,by friend and foe alike, that the central themes
of the postmodern philosophers and the
central loci of orthodox
Christian theology are mutually exclusive. While this is true of
the (anti)religious postures of the philosophers named above, I
am not so sure it is true of their central themes, the arguments
and analyses developedin the context of their (anti)religiousassumptions. So I have argued for the possibility of a Christian
(or, more broadly, theistic) appropriation of certain postmodern
themes.
This appropriation is a recontextualization in which the
themes in question are removed from the anti-Christian or atheistic settings thatare the horizonsof the postmodernphilosophers and articulated within the framework of Christian/theistic assumptions that are, I claim, their proper home. Thus, for
example, thehermeneutics of suspiciondevelopedby Marx,
Nietzsche, and Freud finds (in Slrspicimz m d Faith) its true home
in the Pauline teaching about the noetic effects of sin, the idea
that in wickednesswe ”suppress the truth”(Romans 1 : I B ) .
As an example of a distinctly postmodern theme, consider
Lyotard’saccount of thepostmoderncondition as ”incredulity
toward metanarratives.” Like ’onto-theology’ (of which more in
due course), ‘rnetanarrative’ is often usedby assistant professors
who have appointed themselves campus terrorists and, alas, by
senior scholars who should be more careful, as a kind of sci-fi
conceptual zapper.You aim it at anytheology archaic enough to
affirm a divine providencein history and vaporize it by intoning
the magic word ‘metanarrative’. In my experience no other postmodern theme, noteven Derrida’s (idfamous ”There is nothing
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outside the text,” generates as much apoplexy among Christian
scholars or as high a degree of certainty that Christianity and
postmodernism represent a dyad like truth and error, light and
darkness, good and evil, and so forth.
There aren’t many senior Christian scholars as knowledgeable
about Derrida as one I recently heard give a paper exploring
possible pointsof convergence between his own Christian thinking and deconstruction. Ignoring the fact that the paper was
about Derrida and notLyotard, another senior Christian scholar
of considerable repute (like the original speaker from my own
Reformed tradition) irately insisted that never the twain could
meet since Christianity is a metanarrative and postmodernism
is defined as ”incredulity toward metanarratives.” A graduate
student in the audience gave a succinct and accurate account of
what Lyotard actually says about metanarratives and then suggested that Christianshave good reason to share his skittishness
exabout them. The objector acknowledged the latter point,
plaining that he had never read Lyotard and had no idea who
Lyotard’s targets were, how he defined ’metanarrative’, and
what his objections to it were.
Even more recently I heard another senior Christian scholar,
once again of considerable repute and once again frommy own
Reformed tradition, taking the metanarrative issue as the nonnegotiable point of irreconcilable opposition between Christian
faith and postmodern philosophy. Christianity is a metanarrative, she insisted.”We know how the story ends.”I immediately
found myself singing (silently, to be sure) a song I had learned
in chiIdhood:
I know not what the future holds,
but I know who holds the futureIt’s a secret known onIy to Him
and saying to myself, ”Yes, in a certain sense Christians know
how the story ends. But in an equally important sense we do
not. And it’s important to keep clear about what we know and
what we don’t.”
So what does Lyotard mean by metanarrative? In the first
place, a philosophy of history, a big story in which we place the
little storiesof our lives as individuals and communities. In this
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senseChristianity isundeniably a metanarrative, a Heilsgeschichte that runs from Creation and the Fall through the life,
death, andresurrection of Jesus tothe Second Coming, the resurrection of the dead, andthe life everlasting. Amen.
But in philosophical discourse,’meta’ signifies a difference of
level and not primarily of size. A rnetanarrative is a metadisof being a second-level discourse not directly
course in the sense
about the world but abouta first-level discourse. Now, undeniably Christianity is a meganarrative,a big story. But the story that
begins with ”Let there be light’‘ and ends withthe “Hallelujah
Chorus” under thebaton of the angel Gabrielis not a metanarrative. The recital of the Heilsgeschichfe in creeds and in sermons,
in lessons and in songs, as well as its enactment in sacraments,
belongs to first-order Christian discourse. It is kerygma, not
apologetics.
There are two other
ways in which the Christianmepnarrative
is not a metanarrative in Lyotard’s sense. One concerns legitimation, the other origination.The issue of legitimation is absolutely
central for Lyotard, the tight linkbetween modernity andrnetanarrative in his mind. Having overthrown various ancient regimes bothof knowledge andof social practice, modernity finds
itself needing to legitimize its ’/new authorities,” and it resorts
to narrative todo so.
There is an irony in this. Modernity has hitched its wagon to
science, a form of discourse that challenges and undermines traditional narratives. But in order to legitimize itself, science needs
a story of progress from opinion and superstition to scientific
truth and on to universal peace and happiness. The Enlightenment project is inseparable from its self-legitimizing metanarratives.
Modernity’s ’hew authorities’’ are socio-political as well as
well as intellectual, and modernity’s big stories concern themselves not only with legitimizingthe truthof its knowledge(science) but alsothe justice of its practices (thestate or the
revolution). Lyotard takes the production of such legitimizing
rnetanarratives by philosophy to be the quintessence of modernity. The Enlightenmentof the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries told a variety of such stories, and hementions, for
example, the story of the emancipation of the rationa1 subject
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(Descartes, Locke) and thestory of the creation of wealth (Adam
Smith). But he focuses analysis on two nineteenth-century versions, Hegel‘s and Marx’s.
Lyotard calls Hegel’s story the speculative narrative, the one
concerned with the “dialectics of Spirit” and the ”realization
of the Idea.’’ It primarily concerns itself with the truth of our
knowledge and seeks to legitimize modern, western humanity
as the absolutesubject whose knowledgeof itself as such is absolute knowing. (As a kind of fringe benefit, we might observe,
the Hegelian story also seeks to legitimize the modern,capitalist
state.) Marx‘s story is the emancipation narrative. It concerns
itself with the justice of our practices and seeks to legitimize
the proletarian revolution that will abolish private property and
usher in the classless society.
At thedescriptive level, Lyotard merely observes a widespread skepticism toward these storiesand the self-legitimizing
project that gives rise to them, defining the postmodern condition in terms of this incredulity. At the critical level, he sides
with the unbelievers who remain outside the temples of Spirit
and the Revolution, and not just by describingthem as the
shrines of unkept promises. The Enlightenment project has not
just been unsuccessful; as a totalizing project it is inherently illegitimate.
’Totalizing’ is another po-mo shibboleth often bandied about
as anundefined hi-tech zapper with which to deep-six anything
that is not PC this week. Aim. Click. Vaporize. But here it has a
rather precise and plausible meaning. In its quest for universal
peace and happiness, modernity has conceived its goal as an
essentially homogenized humanity. As science it has sought to
suppress conceptual difference; and as either capitalism or
communism, it has sought to suppress social difference. Wittgenstein, Lyotard’s clear hero, was closer to the truth in recognizing the plurality of language games humanity plays and in
refusing to award hegemonyto any one of them (or even to the
class to which science belongs, those that concern themselves
with correctly describing the world).
The third andfinal difference between the Christian storyand
modernity’s metanarratives concerns origins. The former has its
origin in revelation, not in philosophy, and most especially not

in modern philosophy, groundedin the autonomyof the human
subject, whether that be the individual as knower (Descartes's
ego cogito), the individual as bearer of inalienable rights (Locke,
Jefferson), or modern humanitycollectively as the fulfillment of
history (Hegel, Marx, popular American self-consciousness as
the city set on a hill). Modernity, not just willing to justify itself
itself given
but eager todo so, is Plato's dialogue of the soul with
outward, world-historical form.Modern,westernhumanity
talks (as philosophy) with itself (as science, technology, and the
state), telling itself the stories thatwill enable itto sleep soundly
(and conquer without qualm) in the serene assurance of being
the uItimate embodimentof both truth andjustice.
Glory, glory, hallelujahOur Truth is marching on!

Christianity has at Ieast as good grounds as Lyotard to be
skeptical and suspicious, skeptical of claims to be the voice of
pure reason on the groundsthat human finitude and fallenness
undermine this ideal, which goes back to Plato's notion of the
soul as divine, and suspicious when (perhaps with Lyotard's
help) modernity's metanarrativesare seen for what they are, the
self-congratulatory self-legitimation of modernity. The Christian
story legitimizes only one kingdom, the Kingdom of God. In
the process it delegitimizes every human kingdom, including
democratic capitalism and the Christian church, just to the degree that they are not the full embodiment of God's Kingdom.
Modernity's metanarrativeslegitimize "us"; the Christian narrative places "us" under judgment as well. In knowing how the
story ends we do ~zotknow which aspects of our work will be
burned as wood, hay, and stubble.
Christianity is not Lyotard's target. Nor is it inherently the
kind of story he criticizes. This is bad newsfor secular postmodernists who want to see Lyotard's critique as one more nail in
the coffin of the Christian God (but why do they need more
nails?). But it is not necessarily good news €or Christian believers. For while Christians may have their own good reasons for
incredulity toward modernity's metanarratives, it does not follow that they are immune to their impact; and while the Christian meganarrative is not inherently a metonarrative in Lyotard's
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sense, it does not follow that it has not been and cannot be used
as an instrumentof epistemic, social, and ecclesiastical self-legitimation. Just to the degree that Lyotard echoes the prophetic
strand of biblical revelation, he becomes good Lenten reading
for Christians. For whenever Christians tell the biblical story in
such a way as to make their systems the repository of absolute
truth or toclaim divine sanctionfor institutions that are human,
all too human, theybecome more modern thanbiblical. To know
how the story ends, biblically speaking, provides no guarantees
that one’s own theories and practices will not need to be significantly overthrown in order to prepare
“a highway for our God”
(Isaiah 40:3).
There is a triple critique involved in the appropriation or recontextualization suggested here. Seen in Christian perspective
there are
1. The critique of modernity, which biblical religion has as much
reason as Lyotard to suspect of pretending to be pure reason
in order to hideits finitude and its fallenness
2. The critique of secular postmodernity insofar as it purports to
have a monopoly on the critique of modernity’s at once complacent and desperate attemptsat self-legitimation and
3. The critique of Christianity (and any other religion) just to the
degree that it substitutes divine revelation for pure reason to
the end of making ”our” beliefs and practices immune to critique, both from within (the critic as heretic) and from without
(the critic as infidel).

’Onto-theology’ is another po-mo shibboleth. Like ‘metanarrative’, it often functions as a one-word refutation of views too
”metaphysical” for postmodern preferences, and all too often it
does so without careful analysis. Ignoring the fact that Heidegger’s critique of metaphysics as onto-theologically constituted
has Aristotle and Hegel as its explicit targets, not, say, Augustine
and Aquinas, and ignoring the fact that thecritique sounds more
Kierkegaardian than Nietzschean,scholars who shouldread
more carefully use this term to dismiss any discourse
naive
enough to affirm the reality of God as a personal and loving
creator and redeemer. Thus ”Overcoming Onto-theology” takes
a closer look at what Heidegger meansby the term and what his
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objections are. It argues (1) that Christian theism is not inherit is as "postmodern" as
ently onto-theological,(2) that at its best
Heidegger in resisting onto-theological tendencies, but
(3) that it
can all tooeasily lapse into the conceptual idolatry that
is ontotheology.
The explicit critique of metaphysics as onto-theology comes in
the forties and fifties; in other words it belongsto Heidegger 11.
But its seeds can be found in Beilzg nrzd Time and even earlier.
"Heidegger's 'Theologische' Jzlgerzdschrzffen" is a review of volume 60 of the Gesnrntntrsgabe, which appeared in 1995 under the
title Phiinomemdogie des religib'sen Lebens, and traces the origin of
the critique in someof Heidegger's earliest lecture courses.
In Beirrg and Time itself the crucial move is what we now call
the hermeneutical turn. Against the claims that human understanding can be pure reason, the mirror of nature, the voice of
being itself, the hermeneutical turn is a radical analysis of the
finitude of human thought. "Hermeneutics asEpistemology" is
devoted primarily to expounding whatcan be called the hermeneutics of finitude in Being a d T h e .
The next six essays explore this turnin greater detail. "Appropriating Postmodernism" addresses anotherway in which postmodernism is often seen to be wholly antithetical to Christian
theism. The finitude of human thought is sometimes expressed
I argue that this
in the slogan:The truth is that there is no Truth.
claim stems not from analyzing the interpretative character of
human thought but from placing that analysis in an atheistic
context. If our thinking never merits the triumphalist title of
Truth mzd there is no other knower whose knowledge
is the
Truth, then the truth is that there is no Truth. But if the first
premise is combined with a theistic premise, the result will be:
The truth is that there
is Truth, but notfor us, only for God. This
is the appropriation or recontextualizing
of the hermeneutics of
finitude I propose.
The following essays explore that hermeneutics in terms of
important predecessors (Kant and Schleiermacher) and successors (Gadamerand Derrida) to Heidegger, always with the question inview: Is not thisanalysis of the finitude of human
knowledge entirely compatible with and
even required by a theistic understanding of our created finitude? "Christian Philoso-
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phers and the Copernican Revolution” develops the argument
of the previous essay by arguing that Christian thinkers ought
to be, precisely by virtue of their theism, Kantian anti-realists. It
is but a short step fromKant to the hermeneutical turn. All that
is necessary is to recognize the historical contingency and plurality of the presuppositions(a priori elements) thatmake our construals of the worId possible.
It was in an essentially Kantian context that Schleiermacher
developed a hermeneutical holism that, over against both Spinoza and Hegel, defined the finitudeof human thought in terms
of the impossibility of all totalizing strategiesfor attaining Truth
as final adequation between mind and world.“Totality and Finitude in Schleiermacher’s Hermeneutics’’ shows how ”postmodern” Schleiermacher is by giving a detailedanalysis of his
construal of construal and then comparing it briefly with Derrida.
Mention of Derrida brings us to Heidegger’s successors, in
particular Gadamer and Derrida, who are mentioned briefly at
the conclusion of ”Hermeneutics as Epistemology.’’ For me
there are two important points.First, Gadamer is not on the list
of usual suspects when postmodernismis under discussion, but
he is an important chapter in the story of the hermeneutics of
finitude. In other words, the critique of such totalizing know1edge claims as metanarratives and onto-theologies is implicit in
other philosophical traditions and is not the unique property
of those who get labeled postmodernists. If one is sufficiently
multilingual, philosophicalIy speaking, one can find the hermeneutical turn in Dewey and Quine, Sellars and Wittgenstein,
Hanson and Kuhn, and, of course, Gadamer and Ricoeur, all of
whom are perspectivists at least to the degree to denying
to
human knowledge the “view from nowhere”as anything but at
the very most a regulative ideal.
Second, against the cIaim that Gadameris the reactionary and
Derrida the radicalson of Heidegger, I argue that they are
equally radical and that appearances to the contrary stem from
the fact that while Gadamer emphasizeswhat we can have, Derrida stresses what we cannot. But the one who says the glass is
half full and the one who finds it half empty are pretty much in
agreement about how much water there is in the glass. Behind
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the differences of rhetoric and vocabulary there is deeper agreement between Gadamer and Derrida than is usually supposed;
or so I argue in ”Positive Postmodernism as Radical Hermeneutics” and “Father Adam and His Feuding Sons: An Interpretation of the HermeneuticalTurn in Continental Philosophy.”
It is often claimed that postmodern philosophies either are
or lead directly to moral nihilism. This is the aforementioned
”anything goes” objection. There may be forms of postmodernism in which ethical categories are displaced by aesthetic
categories, butDerrideandeconstruction,perhapsthemostwidely
discussed form of postmodern philosophy in NorthAmerica, is
not one of them. In three essays I look more closely at the Derridean text in order to show this.
”Deconstruction and Christian Cultural Theory: An Essay on
Appropriation” shows that the play theme in Derrida does not
mean, as is often alleged, that we are the players and can play
by any rules we please. Play is rather something that happens
beyond our control (though we desperately try to control it).
“Laughing at Hegel” shows us a Derrida sympathetic withBataille’s laughter at Hegel’s hubris (just as Kierkegaard’s Climacus thought laughter was the
best refutation of the System’s
silliness). But what is the point of the suggestion that the ultimate horizon of human meanings is unmeaning? Does it mean
that there are no constraints, that we can do as we please? Or
does it mean that no humanmeanings are ultimate and thereis
a certain (unavoidable) hermeneutical violence involved in imposinganysystem
of construals, factual and normative? In
”Derrida as Natural Law Theorist” we find Derrida decisively
opting for the second alternative.
Is there a link between the postmodern and the premodern?
Does the contemporary critiqueof modernity undermine to any
significant degree the latter’s repudiation of historic Christianity? Does the unmasking of pure reason as the offspring of hubris and illusion discredit theproject of religion within the limits
of reason alone? Or, to ask the question differently, does postmodernity reopen thedoor to premodernity? ”Faith as the Overcoming of Ontological Xenophobia” continues the exploration
of Derrida’s thought. In the context of his attempt to distinguish
deconstruction from negative theology, I argue, Derrida opens
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the door (without entering for
it) an Augustinian understanding
of the combined motifs
of creation and
of divine alterity in terms
fall, as developed by, well, Augustine, as well as Aquinas and
Bonaventure.
In ”Divine Excess: The God Who Comes After” I pursue this
theme in greater detail. After summarizing three forms of the
postmodern critique, those of Heidegger, Levinas, and Marion,
I suggest that the God who comes after postmodernism is the
God of Augustine, especially as presented in theConfessions.
I; conclude with “Nietzscheas a Theological Resource,” a nice
titIe for reflecting about the possibilityof a Christian appropriation of postmodern insights.This essay plays two roles. First, the
essays in this volume have been concerned with the hermeneutics of finitude, thatis, the understandingof human understandingasinterpretation
rather thanintuitionand,moreover,
interpretationfromtheperspective
of historically contingent
and particular presuppositions (Kant’s a priori, Heidegger’s preunderstandings,Gadamer’spre-judices).
The discussion of
Nietzsche’s perspectivism and the discussion of objections that
can be raised to it are as relevant to Heidegger and Derrida as
they are to Nietzsche.
Second, hermeneutical philosophy,as I understand it, consists
of two major branches, the hermeneuticsof finitude and the hermeneutics of suspicion. My argument for a Christian appropriation of these, even when developedby postmodern philosophers
with no love for Christianity,is theological. The hermeneutics of
finitude is a meditation on the meaning of human createdness,
and the hermeneutics of suspicion is a meditation on the meaning of human fallenness. Because I have discussed the latter extensively in Strspicio~zand Faith, as mentioned above, I have not
included it in this volume.But the discussionof Nietzsche’s hermeneutics of suspicion in the latter half of this last essay is a
reminder of another whole region
of possible appropriation, this
time with Foucault rather than Derrida as the primary French
postmodernist.
It is perhaps worth mentioning that,as in Augustine, there is
an extensive hermeneutics of finitude and of suspicionin
Kierkegaard as well as in Nietzsche-which is perhaps another
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way to see that there can be a postmodern Christianity as well
as a postmodern atheism.
Some of the essays gathered here were originally presented to
quite specific audiences. No effort has been made to eliminate
the occasional character they reflect. In all of these essays, however, I ultimately have two audiences in mind: my postmodern
friends who do not share my faith and my Christian friends
who
are allergic or even a bit apoplecticwhen it comes to postmodern
philosophy.
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Overcoming Onto-theology
We go to church in order to sing, and theology is secondary.
Kathleen Norris'

NOTLONG AGO I participated in a conference on biblical hermeneutics. It asked about the relation between trust and suspicion
for Christians reading theBible. The keynote addresses byWalter Brueggemann and Phyllis Trible were brilliant. But for me
the highlight of the conference was the workshop led by Ched
Myers, whose radical readingof the gospelof Mark is oneof the
finest pieces of biblical interpretation I have ever read.2 To be
more precise, the highlight was the moment in the
middle of the
workshop when he had us sing.
He was developingthe claim that biblical interpretation in the
service of some relatively closed theological system (there are
many) and biblical interpretation in the service of some species
of historical criticism (there are many) are not as different as
either side would like to think. Both are best understood in
terms of the Marxian analysis of the fetishism of commodities,
for they turn the text into an object to be mastered by the interpreter for the advantage of the interpreter, a source of theoretical
treasure to be accumulated and owned. (Elsewhere I have described this as the King Midas theory of truth.)
In the middleof the argument,Myers stopped andsaid it was
time to sing. But first we would have to clap, and soon all forty
of us were clapping rhythmically.(If you know anything about
Christians in the Reformed tradition, you know that we were
Dakotn: A Syirifunl Geography (New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1993),p. 91.
Binding the Strong "I: A Political Readirzg of Mark's Story of Jesus (Maryknoll: Orbis, 1988).

2

ONTO-THEOLOGY
OVERCOMING

participating in a performative refutationof Hume on miracles!)
Then he began to sing:
0 Mary, don’t you weep, don’t you mourn.
0 Mary, don’t you weep, don’t you mourn.
Pharaoh’s army got drownded.
0 Mary, don’t you weep.

The second time through we all joined in; then he would sing
the verses, and each time we would join in again on therefrain.
I didn’t want the singingever to end. But when it did, Myers
of American slaves singinvited us to reflect on the phenomenon
ing about the liberation of Jewish slaves three thousand years
earlier, a story they had made their story, and he asked us who
Mary might be. We realized right away that first and foremost
she was the mother of Jesus at the foot of the cross. Blissfully
ignoring the realities of time’s arrow, the American slaves were
seeking to comfort Mary with thesong of the Exodus, reminding
her, as it were, of her own song, the Magnificat. Our leader did
not have to point out that by singing the old spiritual and reflecting on it we were making the story of Miriam and Moses
our story too, opening ourselves to be seized once again by its
message of hope (insofar as we are oppressed) and judgment
(insofar as we are oppressors).
Almost immediately I thought of Heidegger’s critique of ontotheology. He thinks it is bad theology because we “can neither
pray nor sacrifice to this god [of philosophy]. Before the c m s n
szli, man can neither fall to his knees in awe nor can he play
music and dancebefore this god” (IDp, 72). It seemed that as we
joined the slaves in their song we had overcome onto-theology
without even trying. For while we were not singing and dancing-that would be too muchof a miracle to expect of Christians
from the Reformed tradition-we were singingand clapping before the God who drownded Pharaoh’s army.
The onto-theological God enters the scene “only insofar as
philosophy, of its own accord and by its own nature, requires
and determines how the deity enters into
it” (ID p. 56). The God
to whom we were singing had entered the
scene without the
imprimatur of the learned, saying, ”I have observed the misery
of my people who arein Egypt; I have heard theircry on account
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of their taskmasters. Indeed, I know their sufferings, and I have
come down to deliver them” (Exodus 3:7-8). We should not be
surprised to read that Miriam sang and danced with tambourines before this God who threw horse and rider into the sea
without consulting fa Ineta f n physicn or the Wissenschnft der Logik
(Exodus 15:20-21).
Miriam and the American slaves did not need to overcome
onto-theology. They were never tempted by it. The situation is
more complex for us, even if (heaven help us) we are ready to
sing and clap, if not quite to sing and dance, with them. We
have immersed ourselves in traditions where onto-theology is at
work, and we have listened as Heidegger has thematized and
named a practice whose purest but byno means only forms are
those of Aristotle and HegeP Perhaps, however, we have not
listened carefully enough. For Heidegger’s term is often bandied
about in a manner not supported by the text.
It will be useful to recall how in the fifties, here in the United
States, the term ’communist’ came to mean “anythingto the left
of my right-wing position.” Then, in the sixties, and no doubt
inevitably, ’fascist’ came to mean ”anything to the right of my
left-wing position.’’ The United States Congress, it turned out,
wasmade up wholly of communists who called themselves
Democrats and of fascists who called themselves Republicans.
The terms ’communist’ and ’fascist’ were not used to inform but
to inflame, not to assist sober analysis but to avoid the hard work
of analysis by resorting to name-calling.
The term ’onto-theology’ is all too often used in this way.
Without too close a look either at how Heidegger uses the term
or at the specifics of the discourse to be discredited, ‘onto-theology’ becomes the abracadabra by which a triumphalist secularism makes the world immune to any God who resembles the
personal Creator, Lawgiver, and Merciful Savior of Jewish, or
Christian, or Muslim monotheism. The only religion that escapes the Lord High Executioners who speak as Heidegger’s
Kant uses the term ’onto-theology’ to describe the attempt to prove the
existence of God “through mere concepts, without the help of any experience
whatsoever,” Critique of P w e Reasoli, A632 = B660. Heidegger’s usage is quite
different.
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prophets is religion thatis pagan/polytheistic, pantheistic, ora /
theistic (with or without the slash).
When this happens, thePascalian character of Heidegger’s criof the Bible
tique is overlooked. It is not directed toward the God
or the Koran, before whom people do fall on their knees in awe,
pray, sacrifice, sing, and dance. It is a critique of a metaphysical
tradition that extends from Anaximander to Nietzsche and includes Aristotle andHegel as high points (WM/1949).4 It is also
of theistic discourses as such, but of
a critique, by extension, not
those that have sold their soulto philosophy’s project of rendering the whole of reality intelligible to human understanding.
Their fault does not consist in affirming that there is a Highest
Being who is the clue to the meaning of the whole of being. It
consists in the chutzpa of permitting this Godto enter the scene
only in the serviceof their project, human mastery of the real.
As a restatement of the ancient question What has Athens to
do with Jerusalem? Heidegger’s critique is a reminder of how
hard it is to sing ”the Lord’s song in a foreign land” (Psalms
137:4), in this case that Greco-Germanic land to which HeidegAs such itis an
ger himself was to become so fatally enarnorede5
invitation and challenge to theologyto be itself, to refuse to sell
of philosophical pottage. Reminding the
its birthright for a mess
theologians of the Pauline question--”Has not God let the wisdom of this worldbecome foolishness?”-Heidegger asks, ”Will
Christian theology make up its mind one day to take seriousIy
of philosothe word of the apostle and thus also the conception
phy as foolishness?” (WM/1949, p. 274; cf. IM p. 6, ”From the
standpoint of faith our question [of being] is ’foolishness’.”).Perhaps this is why a couple years later Heidegger would write,
”If I were yet to write a theology-to which I sometimes feel
inclined-then the word Being would not occur in it. Faith does
not need the thought of Being. When faith has recourse to this
thought, it is no longer faith. This is what Luther understood.”
Aristotle is the paradigm of onto-theology in WM/1949, just as Hegel is
in ID.
For a critique of this infatuation in Heidegger’s work, see John D. Caputo,
DemythoIagizirlg Heidegger (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993).
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And perhaps thisis why Jean-Luc Marion has triedto think God
without Being?
It is thus a mistake, I believe, to identify the God of ontotheology simplyas “the omnipotent, omniscient,
and benevolent
God” or as ”the God who divinely, eternally precontains all
things in a mind so immense that all creation is but a supplemental imago dei, a simulacrumof the Infiniteand Eternal, which
means Infinitely and Eternally the Same,” even with the further
claim that this is an “excessively Eleatic idea of God which has
overrun the biblical traditions ever since Philo Judaeus decided
that Yahweh needed to square accounts with Greek Ontology,
the result being thatGreek ontology settled thehash of Yahweh
and Elohim.”’
There is a lively and legitimatedebate as to whether we
should speak of God in this way. But, at least in the Christian
traditions (I cannot speak for the Jewish and Muslim), the primary motivations for attributing omniscience, including foreknowledge, to God are biblical rather than philosophical,even if
the vocabulary in which the matter gets discussed is, for better
or worse, often Hellenic. Further, Kierkegaard is surely, with
Marion cites the Heidegger passage fromGA 15, pp. 436-37, m God ulitlzouf
Being, trans. Thomas A. Carlson (Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press, 1991),
p. 61. Conversely, Heidegger writes, “Someone who
has experienced theology
in his own roots, both the theology of Christian faith and that of philosophy,
would today rather remain silent aboutGod when he is speaking in the realm
of thinking” (ID pp. 54-55). For Marion’s suspicion that this silence is itself,
ironically, metaphysicaland an expression of the will to power, see God zuifhouf
Being, pp. 54-55, 60.
The first quotation is from Hent de Vries, “Adieu, ?dieu,
I
a-Dieu,” in Ethics
ns First Plzilosaphy, ed. Adriaan T. Peperzak (New York Routledge, 19951, p,
218. The second and third are from John D. Caputo, The Prayers and Tears of
jacques Derridn: Religion zuifhouf Religion (Bloomington:Indiana University
Press, 1997), p. 113. Caputo is speaking here ina Derridean perspective, which
is not the problem; for Derrida’s critique of the metaphysics of presence and
Heidegger’s critiqueof onto-theology are deeplya h n . Another example: when
Levinas expresses his reservationsabout“thefactitioustranscendence
of
worlds behind the scenes,” in Ofherwise fhan Being or B e p z d Essence, trans.
Alphonso Lingis (Dordrecht: Kluwer,1991), pp. 4-5, John Llewelyn says he is
“endorsing Nietzsche’s proclamation of the death of the God of onto-theology”; Ernmanuel Levinas: TIre Genealogy of Ethics (New York: Routledge, 19951,
p. 150. On p. 156 he identifies ”onto-theological transcendence” with “a God
of the Jenseifs,the Beyond.” As if theism were automatically onto-theological.
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Heidegger, one of those who calls Jerusalem back to itself from
God
Athens by contrasting theGod of the philosophers with the
of living faith. But his Climacus presupposes the God just described as onto-theological whenhe says that reality is a system
€or God, though not for us human observers.8In a similar manner, Climacus insists that God is capable of the philosophy of
worldhistory to which Hegel aspires,though we, including
Hegel (as long as the latter has not become God), are not. There
is a metanarrative; it's just that we aren't in on it.9 We may have
access to aspects of it on a need to know basis,but that gives us
far less than philosophy requires for its purposes; for its need
to know is the absolute need posited by objectivity, while the
believer's need to know is the limited need posited by subjectivity.
Kierkegaard helps us to see that the onto-theological gesture
consists not in positing a God who differs radically from us by
satisfying the requirements of Hegel's Logic and Philosophy of
World History, who sees the world synchronically as system
and
diachronically in terms of a grand metanarrative. It consists in
positing such a God as an excuse for making the claim that we
can occupy the divine perspective on the world, at
orIeast peek
over God's shoulder. Spinozalet the cat out of the bag when he
acknowledged that philosophy needsto see the world sub specie
netenzitofis. There is all the differencein the world, thedifference,
say, between Kierkegaard andHegel, or Pascal and Spinoza, between affirming that there is such a point of view and claiming
that we (the intellectual elite, whetherwe call ourselves philosophers or theologians)can embody it. With Kierkegaard andPasx Carlcllrdillg Urlscielztific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, trans. Howard
V Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19921, vol.
I, p. 118.
"Postscrryf,vol. I, pp. 141, 158. While Climacus finds it necessary to emphasize the difference between the human and divine perspectives, he finds no
need to deny the reality of the latter.So, when Caputowrites, "Cast in a deconstructive slant, God is . . . not the eternal but the futural" (Prayers nnd Tears, p.
113), Climacus responds, "For an existing person, is not eternity not eternity
but the future, whereas
eternity is eternity only for the Eternal, who is not in a
process of becomlng? . . . the efernd relates itself as the firture to the yersm ilr CI
yvocrss of b r c o m ~ ~ g (Pusfscriyt,
"
vol. I, pp. 306-7). The implication is that the
phrase "not the eternal but the futural" projects onto God the limitations of
the humancondition.
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cal one could fall on one’s knees in awe before such a God, but
only so long as there is an infinite, qualitative difference between
that God and ourselves. Perhaps onto-theology consists in the
pride thatrefuses to accept the limits of human knowledge.
Thedebates over whetherthere is indeed such a divine
knower and whether such ideas are appropriate to a particular
religious tradition can continue unabated.(They are likely to do
so with or without our permission.) The critique of onto-theology has little if anything to contribute to them.
For it is directed
not at whaf we say about God but at how we say it, to what purpose, in the service of what project. It might seem as if any affirmation of God as Creator, a necessary condition, I should
think, of any authentic Jewish, Christian, or Muslim faith, is an
onto-theological gesture; for it implies that the whole
of being is
ultimately to be understood, insofar as we can understand it,
with reference to theHighest Being.But the believer might
speak as follows:
In affirming God as Creator I am affirming that there is an explanation of the whole of being and I am pointing in thedirection of
that explanation; but I am not giving it, €or I do not possess it. To
do that I would have to know just who God is, and just how and
zohy God brings beings into being out of nothing. But both God’s
being and God’s creative action remain deeply mysterious to me.
They are answers that come loaded with new questions, reminding me in Heideggerian language that unconcealment is always
shadowed by concealment, or in Pauline language that I only see
”through a glass, darkly” (or “in a mirror, dimly,” 1 Cor. 13:12).
My affirmation of God as Creator is not onto-theological because
it is not in the service of the philosophical project of rendering the
whole of being intelligible to human understanding, a project I
have ample religious reasons to repudiate.”’
‘(’Fora sophisticated version of such an argument in thecontext of natural
theology, see Brmn Leftow, “Can Philosophy Argue God’s Existence?’’ in The
Rntiomlify of Belief and the Plurality of Fniths, ed. Thomas Senor (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1995). In conversation, Leftow has put it this way: “When I
offer a version of the cosmological argument I find to be sound, I am trying to
prove the existence of God, not to explain the world.” On theinextricability of
unconcealment and concealment, Heidegger quotes Hamaan as saying, “Lucidity [Deutlicl~krif]
is a suitable apportionment of
light and shadow”; The Princlple of Reasm, trans. Regmald Lilly (Bloornington: Indiana University Press,
19911, p. 9.
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edge as a founded mode of being-in-the-world (BT 113), the notion of assertion as a derivative modeof interpretation (BT 733),
and the distinction between Zuhadenheit, the ready-to-hand,
the present-at-handor objectively present (BT
and Vorl~anderzheit,
YTl5-16, 33).17In other words, we are dealing with a critiqueof
the primacy of the theoretical. As a project of rendering the
whole of being intelligible in accordance with the principle of
reason, onto-theology presupposesand practices the primacy of
theoretical reason.
Heidegger quotes Luther's definition of faith as "letting ourselves be seized by the things we do not see" and adds his own
negative and positive account: "faith is not something which
merely reveals that the occurringof revelation is something happening; it is not some more or less modified type of knowing.
Rather, faith is an appropriation of revelation. . . . Faith is the
beliez,ing-u?zdersta?zdingmode of existilzg in the history revealed, i-e.,
occurrilzg, with the Crucified" (PT p. 10). But this means that since
"theology is constituted by thematizing faith'' (PT p. Il), it "is
not speculative knowledgeof God" (PT p. 15).
This does not mean that faith and theology should be given
thenoncognitivistinterpretationsfamiliarfrompositivist
or
Wittgensteinian contexts. Faith is a "believing-lcn8erst~~zdirlg
mode
of existing," and it stands in relation to something actual. Heidegger's believer surely believes that "in Christ God was reconciling the world to himself" (2 Cor. 5:19). But withLuther,
Heidegger refuses to allow faith to be understood as the yistis
that Plato puts on the lower half of the divided line. We misunderstandfaithterribly if we assumethatthe believer really
wants to be an onto-theologicallyconstitutedmetaphysician,
but, failingto be part of the intellectualeIite, settles for a second
class, "more or less modified type,of knowing."18
Every positive science concerns a domain that is "already disl7 Marion will suggest an even stronger dependence of the lecture on Being
and Time; see God without Being, pp. 66-49.
When Levinas distinguishes his own critique of onto-theology from Pascal's, it is because he surprisingly
assumes that Pascal assimilates faithto opinion on Plato's divided line. See "God and Philosophy," in CoIlected
Philosoyhrcnl Pqwrs, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff,
1987), p. 155. But cf. the reference to "reasons that 'reason' does not know'' on

p. 172.
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closed," prior to any "theoretical consideration," in a "prescientific manner of approaching and proceeding with that which
is."
Science always presupposes this "prescientific belmvior [Verhnlte~z]" (PT p. 7, emphasis added). For theology as a positive science, faith is the "prescientific behavior" in which the Sache that
concerns it is "already disclosed." In the case of Christian theology, what is disclosed is above all "Christ, the crucified God"
(PT p. 9). Of course, faith is dependent on revelation for its positz4m, but that does not mean that faith is simply the assent to
new information.Rather, "existence struck by this revelation becomes aware of its forgetfulness of God. . . . [Bleing placed before God means that existence is reoriented in and through the
mercy of God grasped in faith. . . . [The believer] can only 'believe' his existential possibility as one which human existence
itself is not master over, in which it becomes a slave, is brought
before God, and is reborn. . . . Faith = Rebirtlz" (PT p. 10). It i s
immediately after this account of faith as an existential paradigm shift that Heidegger identifies with Luther's understandPlatonic
reading
whose
ing of faith as opposed to the
Wivkuqsgeschichte has distorted so many discussions of faith
and reason.
Faith is the "appropriation" of revelation, and theology is the
"thematizing" of faith (PT pp. 10-11). Hegel thinks the task of
thematizing faith belongs ultimately to philosophy and that it
consists in transforming faith into absolute knowledge
by translating Vorstellulzgelz into Begriffe. But this is just Plato's divided
line translated into German. Heidegger is too Lutheran to buy
into this project (from onewho professed to be a Lutheran!).He
has learned from another Lutheran (Kierkegaard) thatit trivializes the appropriation of revelation in which existence is reoriented andthe believer rebornbyreplacingthis
task with a
speculative task thatis at once too easy and too elitist tobe anything but an enemy of faith.
So when he tells us "Theology is not speculative knowledge
of God" (PT p. 15), he has two things in mind.First, the task of
theology is not to "found and secure faith in itslegitimacy, nor
can it in any way make it easier to accept faith and remain constant in faith.Theology can only render faith more
difficult'' (PT
p. 12).
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Second, this is because the goal of theology ”is never a valid
system of theological propositions” but rather ”concrete Christian existence itself.” Because faith is both the motivation and
justification of theology, ”this objectification of faith itself properly has no other purpose than to help cultivate faithfulness ititself
self. . . . Every theological statement and concept addresses
ilr its v e r y corltetzf: to the faith-full existence of the individual in
the community; it does ]rot do so subsequently, for the sake of
some practical ‘applicrztion’” (PT p. 12). In other words, because
its goal is the ymxis of the believer as a distinctive mode of existence, ”theology irl its esseme is a practical scierrce.” Unlike ontotheology, theology properly understood is ’innately homiletical,” but not ”due to any accidental requirements which demand, say, that it apply its theoretical propositions to a practical
sphere” (PT pp. 14-15). The apostolic kerygma that ”in Christ
God was reconciling the world to himself” is already the entreaty, ”be reconciled to God” (2 Cor. 599-20).
Theology arises out of a ”prescientific behavior” and has as
its goal what we might call postscientific behavior. It is as if Heidegger is saying, I have found it necessary to deny theory in
order to makeroom for practice. Of course, as we have seen, the
denial of theory is not itsabolition but its Allflzebwrg, its teleological suspension, its reinscription in acontext where it is neither
the Izrchc nor the telos, neither the ferrninzasCI p u nor the terminus
rrd q.’erlz.
This polemic against the primacyof the theoretical is found as
early as the 1920-21 lectures Ei~leifzr~zg
in die Phiirzomerzalugie der
Religiolz. By contrast with the 1927-28 lecture, Heidegger even
denies that philosophy (in thiscase as a phenomenology of religion) should think of itself as a science (GA 60 pp. 3, 8-10, 15,
17,27,29,35). This is because it seeks to be faithful toexperience,
which relates to the world in its Bcdelrtsmnkeit rather than to“objects” (GA 60 pp. 8-16). We have here a clear anticipation of
the distinction between Zthmderzheit and Vorlmzdelzhcit, whose
importance for the later lecturehas already been suggested.
”

It might be objected that in the later, explicit critique of ontotheology, Heidegger links it to calculative-representational
thinking,the essence of modern technology. Thought is too
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closely linked to a certain practice. With Heidegger I, by contrast, it seems that the linkage of knowledge to actionis an important desideratum. So how can the earlier emphasis on the
embeddedness of knowing in doing, both in general and specifically in thelife of faith, be an anticipation
of the later critique
of instrumental reason?
But we must not interpret the distinctionbetween Bedelrfsarnkeit and objects, or between Zz13zmzdedwit and Vorhalzdedzcit only
in utilitarian terms, nor allow the famous hammer of Beilzg arrd
Time to turn Heidegger into a crude pragmatist. We radically
misconstrue our being-in-the-world when we portray it as an
objective pole made up of facts whose only job is to obtain and
a subjective pole whose onlyjob is to mirror these facts.’”Attention to the useof a tool helps us see this; but we need something
like the Aristotelian distinction between praxis and piesis to indicate that our concernful dealings with beings that are positively or negatively meaningful in relation to our projects are
not necessarily instrumental. A theoretical or representational
interpretation of our being-in-the-world is as inadequate to the
“Hammerklavier” Sonata as it is to the hammer, to say nothing
of the word of the Lord which is ”like a hammer that breaks a
rock in pieces” (Jer. 23:29). Or, to put it a bit differently, God is
not a tool; but both asf m c i m z s and as fremcrzd~~rn,
the n~ysfcrirrrn
is Bcdetltsanzkeif and not mere object, is zzrhnndelz and notmerely
vovhnrlderl. Before such a God one can fall on one’s knees in awe.’()
But the onto-theological project commits the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. It abstracts the cognitive dimension of the
religious life and gives it essential primacy. In each of the three
dimensions of its relationto human action it is a danger to faith.
(1) For the sake of absolute conceptual mastery, it seeks to free
I “ Nietzsche writes, “We are not thinking frogs, HOT d ~ j e c t i f i y ~
mgd uegrsterrq
rnechmusm zoith thclr ilrnlrrds rt‘mzJed”;TIzr Gny Sciemx3, trans. Walter Kaufman
(New York: Random House, 1974), 2nd ed. preface, section 3. Emphasls added.
Reference to awe suggests that our concrete being-in-the-world has an affective side that must not be overlooked. In “Hermeneutics as Episten~ology”
(see ch. 3 below), I trace the double reduction in €king mzd T i m from the
merely theoretical to both the practical and the affective, a “reduction”that,
unlike Husserl’s, seeks to recapture the natural standpoint. The account of
Befilldlichkeit in 11729-30 belongs to the early, implicit critique of onto-theology.
“The fear of the Lord IS the beginning of knowledge” (Prov. 1:7).
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knowledge from its rootedness in pretheoretical
practice so that
it can become self-grounding. In this way it gets itself stuck to
the epistemological tar baby that has paralyzed
so much of moas the
dernity. (2) When mathematical physics replaces theology
queen of the sciences, pure theory discovers that ithas wonderful technological applications." Heidegger's critique of God as
the highest value is a reminder that the technological attitude
can rub off onto faith, that piety can degenerate into an instruends
mental religion in which God becomes a means to our
(WNGD p. 105). (3) In its more overtly theological modes, ontotheology finds that ithas cut itself off from the modes of appropriation, singingand dancing, for example, that constitute living
faith.
In relation to Pherzomerzology and Theology, however, there is a
more serious objection. Theology becomes onto-theology when
Jerusalem sells its soul to Athens by buying in on the latter's
project. Within Christian history, the critique of onto-theology
belongs to a tradition of dehellenizing repristination. Heidegger
explicitly links his critique with Luther, and thus, by implication, with a tradition thatlooks back to Augustine and ahead to
Pascal, Kierkegaard, and Bath? He seems to confirm Jerusalem's declaration of independence from Athens whenhe writes,
"On the grounds of its specific positive character and the form
of knowing which this determines,
we can now say that theology
is a fully autonomous onticscience" (PT p. l6)--not, of course,
in relation to the revelation upon which it depends, but in relation to the other sciences.
But a problem arises when he immediately asks specifically
about the relation
of this science to philosophy as the ontological
science. Theology needs philosophy, he says, but neither for its
yositurn, revelational content, norfor some rational legitimation.
".

zI

We have lust seen Heideggerexplicitly deny that "application" is the right

way to thmk the relation of theory to practice in theology.

On the importanceof Luther, Pascal, Kierkegaard, and, in this connection,
both Paul and Augustine, see John van Buren, The Kwng Heidegger: Rwnor of
the Hidderl Kills (Bloomington: Indiana Unwersity Press, 1994); Theodore Kisiel, T h GCIWSJS
of Heidegger's Being and Time (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993); and the essays by Van Buren and Kisiel in their jointly edited
volume Readirzg Heidegger from tlzr Start: Essnys ill His Enrliesf Thorrght (Albany:
SUNY Press, 1994).
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Rather, ”all basic theological concepts . . . have as their ontological
determinants meanings which are pre-Christian and whichcan
thus be grasped purely rationally.” Thus,for example, the theological concept of sin must be understood in terms of the ontological interpretation of guilt,” presumably as found in Beirlg atzd
Time (PT pp. 17-18; cf. LH pp. 229-30). At first Heidegger calls
this relation one of guidance, but then he describes it no fewer
than nine times as ”correction”(Korrektion, Kovrektiv, PT pp. 1920). In this connection he reminds us that faith is ”the mortal
enemy of the form of existence which is an essential part
of philosophy” by virtue of an “existentiell oppositio~zbetween faithfulness
and a human’s free appropriation of his whole existence” (PT
p. 20).
As a Christian thinker, Marionis more than a little nervousat
this suggestion that theology must be corrected by philosophy.
The idea that Heidegger might help free our thinking of God
from the questionof being and its close link with the onto-theological project turns outto be iIlusory.23Under Heidegger’s tutelage ”every theology remains subject to the question of Being.”
By virtue of his own attempts at overcoming metaphysics, he
seems to side with Luther, Pascal, and Barth in their attempt to
overcome the Babylonian captivity of faith to philosophy, but
this is only to substitute a new philosophical master
for the old
ones. When Marion looks the (Trojan) gift horse in the mouth,
what he sees is an ”ontic independence, which implies an irreducible ontological dependence. . . . It seems that the question
of ’God’ never suffered as radical a reduction to the first question of Being as in the phenomenological enterprise of Heidegger.”24 Heidegger
makes
theology
autonomous
vis-a-vis
chemistry, but not vis-&vis Heidegger!
Why shouldn’t Marion be offended? Why should Christian
theology submit itself to correction from a life form that is its
“mortal enemy” and that employs “pre-Christian” and ”purely
rational” concepts as its tools?
Y It is worth noting in this connection that Pseudo-Dionysius points
to a God
beyond being because he is a proto-Kantian who sees ’being’ as a category
of human understanding that is inadequate to the divine reality. See PseudoDionysilrs: The Complete Works, trans. Colm Luibheid (New York: Paulist Press,
1987), pp. 49-50, 53, 63, 135,138, 263.
X God z ~ d h o uBeing,
f
pp. 68-49.
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But perhaps the matter isn’t quite that simple. Let us take a
closer look at the role Heidegger assigns philosophy vis-a-vis
theology to see whether there remainsa possibility of theological appropriation rather than the either/or
of capitulation/repudiation. First, Heidegger says thatthe ontological meanings
philosophy furnishes are ”pre-Christian’’ and can be grasped
”purely rationally.” As already indicated,it is surprising to hear
Heidegger appeal to pure reason. The repudiation of the view
that philosophy can embody the view from nowhere is central
to his critiqueof Husserl and Dilthey, and, indeed, to his whole
corpus. So we can turn our attention to thenotion that Heidegger’s ontology is ”pre-Christian.”
At this stage of the game (the twenties)it is not so much the
pre-Socratics that concern us as AristotIe, who plays a significant
role in the development of the hermeneutics of facticity that bel
(see GA 61, GA 63, and PIRA).
comes ontology in Bcilrg ~ n c Time
But, as Van Buren, Kisiel, and others have shown, Heidegger
draws very heavily on a variety of Christian sources, including
the Pauline epistles, in trying to break the stranglehold of pure
theory on the life of faith. So perhaps the correction to which
Heidegger subjects theology is in significant measure self-correction rather than imperialistic hubris. My account of the critique of onto-theology, both early and late, has focused on just
those featuresfor which this is most arguably thecase, features
that are separable bothde jure and often de facto from the project of thinking being.
Second, Heidegger claims that thecorrective guidance philosophy offers to theology is purely formal, and he invokes the
notion of formal indication (formale Anzeige) that plays such an
important part in his earlier work (PT pp. 19-20).15 Hegel once
told a similar story. The contentsof theology and philosophy, he
solemnly intoned, are the same. The only ”corrective” philosophy supplies concerns its form-and this from a philosopher
whose Logic insists on the inextricability of form and content.
Kierkegaard has taught us to laugh loudly (so as to keep from
under which Hegel seeks to subject
crying) atthispretense
2i For the meaning and importanceof this concept, see all three of the works
cited in n. 22.
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Christian faith to the canons of autonomous human reason. A
similar laugh should greet Heidegger's
"Who me? I'm only concerned with questions of form. All the content comes from the
Christian positzm."
Except . . . Heidegger derives his formal indications, not from
pure reason but hermeneutically; and, as we have just been reminded, the texts he reads are very largely Christian texts. So
once again, we are free to look for those elements that are authentically theological; and once again these may not revolve
around theontological difference. Further, just to the degree that
U
than thewhat
the heart of onto-theology concerns the ~ O Z rather
of discourse aboutGod, there is something formal about what
is
at issue.
Finally, we are told that the "demand" for philosophy to play
a corrective role in relation to theology "is not made by philosophy as such but rather by theology'' (PT p. 20). There may be a
touch of megalomania here.Just as Heidegger later would think
that theNational Socialist movement desperately needed himto
clarify its identity andwould freely turn to him if it understood
both its own andhis greatness, so here he thinks that (Christian)
theology needs him and is most fully itself when it turnsto him
for correction.7"Still, just to the degree thatHeidegger's critique
has genuinely theological origins, as we have been noting, it
makes sense to see "correction" as self-correction and the demand for a critique of onto-theology as arising froma theology
that recognizes its own onto-theological tendencies and sees
these as temptations to be resisted.
My project is to appropriate Heidegger's critique of onto-theology for theistic theology, for religiously significant discourse
about the personal Creator, Lawgiver, and Merciful Savior of
Jewish, or Christian, orMuslim monotheism. Because appropriation is always recontextualizing, it is always both affirmation
and negation; it is a little bit like an Hegelian Alflzebulzg, though
without the implicationof logical or conceptual necessity. That
It.It would seem that Hcidegger had more luck with the theologians than
with the Nazis on this score, as is seen in the work of Bultmann and in volumes
such as The Lrzter H ~ ' ~ d e a~r q~ dyTlleolopy, ed. James M. Robinson and John B.
Cobb, Jr. (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1979).
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is why for each of the three themes just discussed in relation to
philosophy’s ”correction” of theology, I found something to reject (A la Marion), and something to preserve from Heidegger.
This has Jed to the notion thattheology must submit itself to the
discipline of Heidegger’s critique, now understood as prophetic
self-criticism.And thismay seem to run counter to the argument
that the critique of onto-theology concerns its hozu and not its
what, an argument apparently directedtoward getting theology
off thehook of Heidegger’s critique. So let me try to clarify.
When 1 address anissue like this I always have two audiences
in mind, one quite secular (or at least anti-theistic), the other
rather traditionally theological, often in aThomistic or Calvinist
way.27To the first I say, ”The critique in questionis very powerful, but closely examined it does notdo the work you would like
it to do. It does not discredit theistic discourse as such, does not
make the worldsafe from the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob
(and Moses, and Jesus, and Mohammed). It only discredits certain forms that discoursecan/has/does take(n).” To my Thomist
and Calvinist friends I say, ”Don’t get too comfortable. While
the critique in question does not do the work its anti-theist enthusiasts would like it to do, it has a lot of legitimate bite. Moreover, there are good theological reasons to take it seriously, for
it identifies and critiques ways in which the most orthodox
Godtalk becomes idolatrous.”
The main argument of this essay has been addressed to the
first audience. I have argued that both the explicit critique of
onto-theology in the forties and fifties and important anticipations of it from the twenties are directed toward the how rather
than the what of our God-talk and that they have more the spirit
of Pascal than that of positivism. That is to say, they do not provide or seek to provide a philosophical case against belief in a
personal Creator (as is all too often implied); they rather seek
to keep open the space for religiously meaningful God-talk by
resisting the ”metaphysical” tendency, whether found among
Y This is true, for example, in my treatment of the religion critique of Marx,
Nietzsche, and Freud In Suspicimz a d Faith (New York: Fordham University
Press, 1998). I adopt a similar posture In relation to Derrida’s critique of the
metaphysics of presence, which I take to be very closely related to Heidegger’s
critique of onto-theology.
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philosophers or theologians, to imprison theological discourse
within a primacy of theoretical reasonunder the ruleof the principle of sufficient reason. What is necessary to overcome ontotheology is not the abandonment
of theistic belief but the avoidance of this temptationto have God at our disposal, conceptually
speaking.
This reading weakens Heidegger’s critique, I think, only for
those who have hoped it would do for continental philosophy
what positivism once did for analytic philosophy. It still retains
plenty of force not only against such paradigmatically ontotheological systems as those of Spinoza and Hegel but also
against what we might call onto-theologies of the right, more
popularly known as fundamentalisms.While the latter may not
speak the language of sufficient reason and C C I U S m
~ i , they do
treat God as being at their disposal conceptually(it’s scary how
much they know about what God
is up to) and convert this quite
quickly into the project of having the world at their disposal
practically as well. Theocracy legitimizes itself onto-theologically.
Between these extremes we can locate two other sites where
Heidegger’s critique has force against onto-theological tendencies that may not have prevailed so completely but that arenevof the
ertheless very real. Closer tothefundamentalistend
spectrum are those theologies, Protestant and Catholic, that are
sometimes designated ’scholasticism’. This term has negative
connotations precisely when its use points to onto-theological
tendencies to which theistic discourse can but need not succumb. Closer to the other end of the spectrum, ironically to be
sure, are certain invocations
of negative theology. Marion speaks
of the discourse ”that disqualifies or deconstructs the very notion of God; this discourse consistsin speaking of God in order
to silence him, in not keeping silent in order to silence him. . . .
[I]t does not see the difference between silencing and keeping
silent.”2HBut silencing God is one way of having God at our
2H God withouf Being, p- 55. Cf. Feuerbach’s analysis of those who declare God
unknowable so that God’s existence “does not affect or mcommode [them]., . .
The alleged religious horror of limiting God by positive predicates is only the
irreligious wish to know nothing more of God, to banish God from the mind”;
Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Chuisfimity, trans. George Eliot (New York:
Harper & Brothers, 1957), p. 15.
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disposal and protecting ourselves against being seized by what
we do not see. The act of protesting against onto-theology can
become an onto-theological gesture.
As we move away from the extremes toward cases like these
last two, we move into situations that are once
at ambiguous and
closer to home. Because of their ambiguity we need to look
closely to determine just where and to what degree God-talk
becomes the arrogant humanism that puts God at our disposal;
and in light of the distinction between the JIOW and the what, we
should not expect to be able to answer these questions simplyin
terms of propositional content. Because these sites are closer to
home, we need to look closely to see to what degree our carefully crafted critique is directed at ourselves.
So far I have spoken as if overcoming onto-theology means both
learning correctly to identify it and learning to avoid it. But, at
least for the theistic discourses that primarily concern me, learning to avoid means learning to speak of God otherwise than
onto-theologically. Something must be said, however briefly,
about the positive meaning of this overcoming. We can take Heidegger’s implicit slogan ”I have found it necessary to deny theory in order to make roomfor practice” as our key.
For a gloss on the positive meaning of denying theory, I turn
to Wagner’s t o h c q r i n . It can be read as a tenth-century S h m e .
The hero rides into town, takes care of the bad guys, and then
rides off into the sunset, alone. But I propose reading it as a
retelIing of the story of Cupid and Psyche. Motivated by the
desire to rule, Ortrud turns Gottfried, rightful heir to power in
Brabant, into a swan by means of sorcery. She then persuades
her husband, Telramund, to accuse Elsa, the young boy’s sister,
of being his murderer. (This will clear the path to power for
Ortrud and Telramund.) The matter is to be settled by combat.
When no local knight is willing to defend Elsa’s honor, the magnificent Lohengrin arrives in a boat pulled by a swan. Needless
to say, it is love at first sight between Elsa and Lohengrin, but to
her he is more than her hero and husband to be. In language
heavy with theological overtones, she calls him her Retter and
her Erliiser. She gives herself to him totally.
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Mein Held, mein Retttr! Nimm mich hin,
Dir geb’ ich Alles, was ich bin!

Lohengrin, whose name is not yet revealed within the drama,
asks Elsa to promise never to ask his name or country.
Nie sollst du mich befragen
Noch Wissen’s Sorge tragen,
Woher ich kam der Fahrt,
Noch wie mein Nam’ und Art!

Elsa promises solemnly to honor this request
and, at Lohengrin’s request, repeatsher promise toobey his command (Gebof).
He vindicates her by defeating Telramund, and in ecstasy she
repeats ”Nimrn alles was ich bin!”’q
But now Ortrud’s shame addsdesire for vengeance to her lust
for the throne. Standing between Satan and Iago, she plants the
seeds of doubt in Elsa. Her lover came by magic. How does she
know he won’t leave her and disappearjust as quickly? (Doesn’t
every Shane leave a woman behind, weeping?) Shouldn’t she
know his name? At the end of the second act, Telramund, once
again Ortrud’s dupe, accuses Lohengrin of sorcery and publicly
challenges him to reveal his name. Lohengrin says that he will
do so only in response to a demand from Elsa, but she renews
her pledge:
Mein Retter, der mir Hell gebracht!
Mein Held, in dem ich muss vergeh’n!
Hoch iiber alles Zweifels Macht
Sol1 meine Liebe stehn!

For a third time she insists that trusting love shall triumph over
the doubt bornof Wisscn’s S q c .
At the beginning of the final act we hear the familiar wedding
march, and then the lovers are alone in the bridal chamber.Al1q I am assimilating Lol~engrinto a long tradition
of allegorical readings of
the Song of Solomon, according to which the relation of beloved to lover no
longer concerns the relation of woman to man but the believing soul (male or
female) to God. Thus Mary‘s “Here am 1 [me o o ~ i ]the
, servant of the Lord; let
it be with me according to your word” (Luke 1:38) makes her a model, not of
ideal womanhood, but of devout humanity. This is perhaps most easily seen
by hearing her words echoed in those of her son, ”not my will but yours be
done” (Luke 2242).
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most immediately their ecstatic joy is disturbed by Elsa’s request
to know her lover’s name. At first she says it was so wonderful
to hear himsay her name and she wants
to return thefavor. You
can tell me, she says, I won‘t tell anyone else. He warns her that
she is on the
verge of ruining everything and pleads with herto
let love prevaiI over doubt as she has promised.
Then we learn how effective Ortrud’s intimations have been
and what really motivates Elsa’s doubt. She is afraid that some
day Lohengrin will tire of her and leave her. He came by magic,
and she seeks some magic to bind him to her.The ancient linkage between knowing the nameand the ability to conjure, only
hinted at earlier, now becomes explicit..wElsa’s Wisseds Sorge is
not born of self-giving love but of the desire to bein control, to
have Lohengrin at herdisposal
He tells her that he is Lohengrin, son of Parsifal and a knight
of the Grail. The magic that brought him to her would have left
them together forever if she had trusted him.But it requires all
knights to return tothe temple of the Grail once their identityis
known. The swan returns and is restored to Elsa as Gottfried.
But Lohengrin sails away, leaving Elsa to c r y out in anguish and
pass out in her brother’s arms.
In C. S. Lewis’s retelling of the Cupid and Psyche story, the
demands of walking by faith and not by sight are even stronger.
As Psyche tells her sister about the god to whom she has been
married and with whom she lives in a magnificent palace, she
explains, ”Oh, Orual . . . not even I have seen him-yet. He
comes to me only in the holy darkness. He says I mustn‘t-not
yet-see his face or know his name. I’m forbidden to bring any
To makematters worse, allightintohis-our-chamber.’’31
though they are standing right
in front of the palace, Orual can~

X’ Martin Buber interprets Israel’s request (anticipated by Moses) to know
the name of their deliverer as a desire for magical power. Accordingly, he
interprets the famous answer of Exodus 3:14not as “I am who I am” but as
the promise ”I shall be there” with the meaning “you do not need to conjure
Me, but you cannot conjure Me either.“ Kingship of God, trans. Richard Scheimann (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), pp. 104-7. Cf. The Prophetic Faith (New
York: Harper & Row, 1960), pp. 27-29, and Gerhard von Rad, Old Testnrnetlt
Theology, trans. D. M. G. Stalker (New York: Harper & Row, 19621, vol. I, pp.
179-84.
C. S. Lewis, TiII We Hazv Faces (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 19661, p. 123.
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not see it. It is hard to know whetherto say that Psyche’s Godrelation takesplace in hidden inwardness or in hidden outwardness. But even the site of their communion is invisible and inaccessible to her unbelieving sister.
Whether it is just the name thatis forbidden, or in addition to
that the beloved is not allowed to see her lover’s face, the challenge of faithis the same: thebeliever is called upon to sustain a
beautiful and loving relationship through trust in
a lover about
whom she remains significantly (thoughnot totally) in thedark
and who, though he gives himself to her freely, is not at her
disposal. The relationship is destroyed when the beloved succumbs to Wisse~z‘sSurge and insists on Enlightenment, on dissiof mysterywiththelight
of human
patingthedarkness
knowledge, on walking by sight and not by faith.
To be able to resist this temptation, faith must deny theory,
or,
to be more precise, the primacyof insight. For such faith,Plato’s
divided line and Hegel’s modern version thereof as the movement “beyond faith” to knowledge are not the ascent from that
which is inferior (body, senses, episternic risk, opinions available
to the many) to that which is superior (soul, intellect, the certainty of sheer presence, insights
available to the culturally elite);
they are rather the withdrawal from the site at which alone is
before whom one
possible a loving, trusting relation with a God
might sing and dance (or at least clap).
This love, this trust, this relationship-these are the practice
for the sakeof which it was necessary to deny theory.This is not
to abolish theology. It is to see that theology’s task is to serve
this life of faith, not the ideals of knowledge as defined by the
philosophical traditions Heidegger variously calls caIculativerepresentational thinking, metaphysics,and onto-theology.
Who knows better than Pseudo-Dionysius the importance of
silence before the mystery of God? Yet he also knows that the
life of faith is very vocal, and he spends much of his time, especially in The Divine Names, telling us, not how notto speak about
God, but how to speak about God. It is as if he can hear his
audience asking again and again, But if the point of our discourse about God is not to pull (or push) God out of the cloud
of unknowing into the lightof sheer presence, whatis the point
of it? To which he replies, again and again, In a word: praise.
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For praise is an essential component in the practice of faith. We
accompany our "wise silence" with "songs of praise.""' For
Marion it is because God is agape and gift that "predication must
yield to praise." We receive the gift of love in silence. "Only
then can discourse be reborn, but as an enjoyment, a jubilation,
a praise.",3.3
"We go to church in order tosing, and theology is secondary."
One way to see how far we have overcome onto-theology is
to ask how strongly we are inspired by our theology to sing
songs of praise to the God who triumphed over political, eco"Pharaoh's army got
nomic, and culturaloppressionwhen
drownded./I3-'

x Pseuno-Dio?l!/sitr,..: The C o q d e f e Works, pp. 50-51. Dionysius echoes an
older tradition. For example, Cyril of Jerusalem writes In the fourth century,
"But some one will ask, If the divine Being is incomprehensible, what IS the
good of the things you have seen saying? Come now, am I not totake a reasonable drink because I cannot drink the river dry? Of course I cannot bear to fix
my gaze upon the sun in its strength. But is that any reason for not glancing
up at him if I need? . . . I praise and glorify our Maker, seeing that 'Let everything that hath breath praise the Lord' is a divine command. I am now trying
to glorify the master, not to expound his nature, for I know quite well that I
shall fall far short even of glorifying him as he deserves. . . . For the Lord Jesus
comforts me for my insufficiency by saying, 'No man hath seen God at any
time' "; The Crzfechetical Lectures, vol. VI, p. 5 in Cyril of Jcrusal~rna m i Nemsilrs
of EmesrZ, Library of Christian Classics, vol. IV, ed. William Telfer (London: SCM
Press, 1953, pp. 128-29.
God ~oithout Being, pp. 706-7. Cf. Krzysztof Ziarek, "The Language of
Praise: Levinas and Marion" Religion m t d Lifer&rucl, 22, nos. 2-3 (autumn 1990),
pp. 93-107.
?-I This essay was supported by a grant from the Pew Evangelical Scholars
Program, which 1 am pleased to acknowledge with gratitude.
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Heidegger’s “Theologische”
Jugendschriften
EARLYHEIDEGGER is proving to be every bit as interesting as
early Hegel. In both cases the posthumously published JzcgelrdScIZriffelr are of intrinsic interest as well as providing invaIuable
keys to the subsequent writings. Heidegger’s postwar lectures
as Privatdocent in Freiburg (KNS 1919 to SS 1923) have already
appeared in volumes 56-59,61, and 63 of the Gcsanrtazqybc.
Now volume60 appears under thetitle Phiilronzerzologie des religioscn Leberrs. It consists of (1) “Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion,” a lecture course from WS 1920-21 based on
five Nmhsclzriffen (IPR); (2) ”Augustine and Neoplatonisrn,” a
lecture course from SS 1921 based on Heidegger’s manuscript
and three Nnchsclzrifterz (AN); and (3) notes and sketches prepared by Heidegger for a course entitled ”Philosophical Foundations of Medieval Mysticism” (MM). The mysticism course
was scheduled €or WS 1919-20 but canceled so that Heidegger
couldexpand his first ”Basic Problems of Phenomenology”
course.I
Based on various degrees of access to the manuscripts, these
texts have received ,considerable recent attention prior to their
publication.2They can fruitfully be readas belonging to the Ent! Published as GA 58. The volume translated into English under that title by
Albert Hofstadter (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982) IS from SS
1927 and is GA 24.
See Theodore Kisiel, The Gcnesis of H e i d q p r ’ s Being and Time (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1993);John D. Caputo, Demyfhologizing Heidqger (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993); John van Buren, The Yourlg
Heidtggar: Rurmr of the Hiddell Kill8 (Bloommgton: Indiana University Press,
1994); and Theodore Kisiel and John van Buren, eds., Readilrg Heideggu from
the Start: Essays ill His Earliesf TImrgIlf (Albany: SUNY Press, 1994). Earlier
there was the brief discussion in Otto Poggeler, Mnrfirr Heidqger‘s Path of
TIrinkirlg (New York: Humanities, 1987; German original, 1963), and Thomas
Sheehan, ”Heidegger‘s‘Introduction
to thePhenomenology
of Religion,’
1920-21,” Tlrr P ~ s ~ n a l i(July
s f 1979), pp. 312-24.
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steh~rlzgsgesclzichteof Eeizzg azzd Time.3 Equally important, in relation to thelaterHeidegger,
is JohnCaputo’sstory
of how
Heidegger, before the “mythof the single origin” of thinking in
pre-Socratic Greece, finds a dual impetus to thought in early
Christianity and Aristotle. I want to suggest a third context for
reading what TheodoreKisiel calls ”the religioncourses,” not in
the least mutuallyexclusive with the othertwo, namely, Heidegger’s later critiqueof metaphysics as onto-theology.
In ldentity lznd Difference, Heidegger notes thatGod enters into
philosophy, when it is onto-theologically constituted, ”only insofar as philosophy, of its own accord and by its own nature,
requires and determines that and how the deity enters into it.’’
The mainstream of the philosophical tradition that Heidegger
has in mind has as itstask to render the wholeof reality intelligible, to render everything present to the light of reason; and it
makes God into the Highest Being as a means to this its own
end. This imperialism
puts us in touch with a construct, not with
genuine religious experience: ”Man can neither pray nor sacrifice to this god. Before the causa sui, man can neither fall to his
knees inawe nor can he play music and dance before this god.”4
Thiscomplaint (1957) echoes theearlierwarning
(1949) that
Christiantheologyshould
not buyintotheonto-theological
project but should remember the Pauline reminder that the
wisdom of the (Greek) world is foolishness before God.‘ Far from
being a Nietzschean assumption that theology is by its servile
nature willing and eager
to be colonized by philosophy, Heidegger‘s critique is an open invitation to theology to find a way to
be true to itself.
The 1949 appeal to Paul echoes in turn the religion courses
before us, especially IPR. The connecting linkis the 1927 lecture
“Phenomenology and Theology,” whereHeideggerdistinguishes theologyas an ontic science from philosophyas an ontoFor reservations on this approach, see van Buren’s review of Gsiel, “Is It
an Objective or Subjective Genitive?” In ternatiotzal PhiIasophicaI Quarferly XXXV,
no. 4 (December 1995), pp. 483-89.
Identify nnd Difference, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row,
1969), pp. 56 and 72.
In the 1949 Introduction to What Is Metaphysics?, “The Way Back into the
Ground of Metaphysics,’’ in Exzstcntinlisnl from Dostoevsky to Snrtre, ed. Walter
Kaufmann, 2nd ed. (New York: New American Library, 19751, pp. 275-76,
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logical science. Theology has faith as its Alpha and Omega and
"can find sufficient motivation foritself only through faith."
Faith is, as Luther says, "permitting ourselves to be seized by the
things we do not see," but this does not mean that faith is "some
more orless modified [inferior] type of knowing." It has a different motivation. But if faith is not primarily a kind of knowing,
"Theology is not speculative knowledge of God."h At about the
same time, Heidegger writes in Beirzg arrd Time that theology is
"seeking amoreprimordialinterpretation
of man's Being
towards God, prescribed by the meaning of faith itself and remaining within it. It is slowly beginning to understand once
more Luther's insight that the 'foundation' on which its system
of dogma rests has not arisen from an inquiry in which faith
is primary, and that conceptuaIly this 'foundation' not only is
inadequate for the problematic of theology, but conceals and
distorts it."7
Reading backward to the postwar Freiburg lectures, we might
expect to find in the religion courses a theological discourse on
the nature of faith and of theology as its expression-all the
more so when we find Heidegger describing himself to Lowith
right after the second religion course as a "Christian theologimz.''x But this claim is highly dubious, as three considerations
will indicate. First, just two months later he writes to Lowith
that i t 1 the eyes of Husserl, "I myself am no longer even regarded
as a 'philosopher', I am 'still really a theologian.'
Second, as
he turns in his first religion course from methodological considerations to an intensive engagement with the Pauline epistles, he
warns his students not to mistake his phenomenological enterprise with either dogmatic (thatis, systematic) or exegetical theology (p. 67)."' Finally, when we read the lectures, we discover
'")

The Piefy of Thirrkiny, trans. James G. Hart and JohnC. Maraldo (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976),pp. 10-11, 15.
Bernlp nnd Tim, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York:
Harper & Row, 1962), p. 30.
The letter,dated August 19,1921, is found In Karl Lowith, Mrrrtin Hridqgrr
m d Elrrupemr Nilrilism, trans. Gary Steiner (New York: Columbia University
Press, 1995), p. 235-39.
"Quoted by Kisiel m Grtresis, p. 150.
Otherwise unidentified page references In parentheses are to volume 60 of
the Gesnrrzfallsgrrbe(GA).
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an overwhelming preoccupation, not with the proper nature of
theology, but rather, in keeping withGA 56/57, Zrlr Bestimwzzrlzg
der Philosoyhie, GA 58, Grrrndyroblcme der Plriinomenologie, and
GA 59, Phiirmrnerzologie der Armhazwng r r r d des Alrsdnrcks: Theorie
dev philosoyhiscl?en Bcgriffsbildulzg, with the true meaningof philosophy. The theme that thunders through the openinglectures
of IPR like the timpani strokes at the opening of Brahms's first
symphony is not "Theology is not speculative knowledge of
God," but "Philosophy is not a science'' (pp. 8-10, 15, 27, 29,
35). It is philosophy that Heidegger wants to rescue from ontotheology, not because philosophy has a place for God but because it approaches God-and everything else, for that matter-in the wrongway. His concern is to discover what it means
for philosophy to be phenomenology rather t h m scielzce.
The result is a sustained and massive assault on the stranglehold of the theoretical posture on philosophy. Statedin its simplest form the argumentis this: Religious life is typical of life in
general, and, since neither is in the first instance a theoretical
posture, neither can be adequately grasped as the object of a
theorizing subject. This means a decisive break with two of the
deepest sources of Eleidegger's philosophical inspiration, Husserl and Dilthey. If philosophy is not a science, then surely it is
not streszgc Wissenschclff. The primacy of the theoretical, of objectifying acts (judgments), which Husserl posits in his Logical 117w s f i p f i u n s ,the text with which Heideggerwas most concerned,
and reaffirms in Idens, is the very opposite of a phenomenological insight." No part of Being m d Time is adumbrated more
strongly in the religion courses than 733, "Assertion [Judgment]
as a Derivative Mode of Interpretation."
At the same time, while life replaces consciousness as the central themeof phenomenology, thereis a decisive break with both
the positivistic and the Hegelian Dilthey. In the former mode,
See Husserl's approval of Brentano's claim that all mental phenomena "are
either presentations [ Vorstell~~ngen]
or founded upon presentations"; Logical Irzzvsfiyrrtiow, trans. J. N. Findlay (New York: Humanities, 1970), p. 556. Cf. pp.
636-40 and 648-51, and Zclrns Pcrfrrininy to n PIIW Plretmnenolog!y mrd to n PIIP
nomc~~olugrcrrl
Philosophy, First Book, trans. E Kersten (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983), VI1 16-21. In his Jaspers review Heidegger calls Logical
I ~ ~ v e s t i p t i o n"as phenomenology of the theoretical logos" (GA 9, p. 35 =
Wqp7rke17).
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philosophy is a Mefhodeldelzue for the Geis~cs-r~~isserzsclIllffCII,
which
are to attain objective knowledge by means of Verstehe~.In the
Hegelian mode, philosophy itself is the objective understanding
of various historically distinct forms of life and the queenof the
Geis~es-roisse~tsclznfterz.
But both versions of Dilthey are preoccupied with the attainment of scientific objectivity in the face of
historical relativism. Thereligion courses will lay the foundation
for the rejection (# refutation) of this kind of skepticism in WS
1921-22. Philosophy is indeed a radical questioning, but ”theoretical skepticism within the theoretical domain as a skeptical
assertion about the theoretical domainfromwithin that domain” is “not suited for authentic questioning” (GA 61, p. 197;
cf. GA 60, p. 165).12
Of Heidegger’s primaryphilosophicalmentors during this
time, it is Kierkegaard who comes to the fore. Philosophy is indeed reflection and not the immediacy of life, which Heidegger
now calls factical life experience or, simply, factical life. But the
goal is not to reflect oneself out of the subjectivity of one’s embedded involvement in the world (as Uuzzvelt, MitweIt, and Selbsf w e l f ) so as to become objective, but by means of reflection to
awaken oneself from the everyday complacency of worldly life
to a full realization of its difficulty and challenge. Philosophy
could be science only if it became a worldless ego in possession
of eternal (iiberzeiflidr)truths (pp.15, 35). But factical life experience, as a worldly temporality thatis not to be construed fundaof departure andits
mentally as knowing (p. 9>,is both its point
goal (p. 15).If phenomenology is to be the hermeneutics of facticity in general, the genitive is subjective and not just objective,
for %errneneutics is factical life caught in the act, vigilantly
caught in the act of interpreting itself. . . . [Flactical life does the
interpreting as well as the 1iving.”l3Thus, to take the case of
religious life, theology has theIife of faith as both its presupposition and its purpose.
The impetus toward scientific objectivity is just one of the
ways factical life seeks to secure itself against the uneasiness
l2Cf. Heidegger‘s rejection of the debate over the reality of the external
world in Beif18 and T i m , 743.
I ’ David Farrell Krell in Rerrdirzg Hrzdqger from the Start, pp. 364-65.
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(Betwn&igulzg) of historical existence (pp. 45-65; cf. pp. 9, 2718).Far from having a special privilege, as Platonists like Husserl
and Dilthey assume, this posture fails to open access to the
things themselves. In objectifying history it negates history, and
in finding historical context for troubled life ( d m bekiirnlnerte
Lebelz) it manages tooverlook its significance (p. 51). As Heidegger had alreadymade clear in his Jaspersreview,l4 psychologism
and historicism are dangerous, not as relativism but as objectivism.
Accordingly, it is the task of phenomenology to free philosophy from both the metaphysical and the epistemological concerns that are driven by the assumption that objectivity is our
highest calling. The debates over realism and idealism (p. 13)
fade away when we realize that prior to a motivated but misleading abstraction, we do not experience ourselves as subjects
making ‘S is P‘ judgments about objects, but as factical, that is,
historical life in a threefold world that can be summarized, not
as a manifold of objects, but as Bedeutsamkeit (pp. 11-16). One
would be tempted to say that the world is in the first instance
not fact but value, if the concept of value had not already been
distorted into the object of theory from Plato toneo-Kantianism
(p. 16).
Against the background of this assault on the primacy of
theory, judgment, and objectification, methodological considerations about formal indication as the proper modeof phenomenological conceptformation and an intensive reading of the
Pauline epistles, especially 1 and 2 Thessalonians, are the foci
around which IPR forms an ellipse.
In the attempt to reinvent phenomenology in order fully to
realize its radical potential, Heideggeris preoccupied with questions of method. He canceled MM in order to devote himself
single-mindedly to such questionsin his first “Basic Problems’’
course. It is just as well. On the basis of the notes he prepared
for MM it is fair to assume thatstudents coming to learn about
medieval mysticism would have been disappointed to find
themselves mired in abstract attempts to answer the question
What is philosophy? That, indeed, is just what happened a year
l4

See n. 11.
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later in IPR. The students complained, apparently to the dean,
that there was nothing about religion in the course. So Heidegger had to break off his methodological reflections and turn to
the readingof the Pauline epistles.He began with Galatians, but
no sooner had he begun (pp. 67-74) than he returned to questions of method (pp. 75-86), and he began his expositions of 1
Thessalonians with moreof the same (pp.87-92).
If phenomenology as the hermeneutics of facticity is neither
the immediacy of life nor scientific concept formation, what is
it? In a word (or two): formal
indi~ati0n.l~
The presupposition of
this methodological move is Heidegger's revision of Husserl's
notion of intentionality.Husserldistinguishestwomodes
of
meaning: empty intentions, such as memory or imagination, to
which intuited presence does
not belong, and fulfilled intentions, suchas perception, in which the intended
"object" is present to intuition. Heidegger speaksof sense in three dimensions:
GehnZfssinTz,or contentsense; Bezugssim, or relational sense;and
Vollzugssi~zn,or enactment/ful€illment sense.The distinction between Gekalt and B e z q is (almost) the familiar Husserlian distinction between the content of an intentional experience (ared
barn) and the mode
of intentionalrelation to it (perception,
memory, imagination, etc.). Vollzug hints at the Husserlian distinction between empty and full or fulfilled intentions. But in
keeping with the challenge to the primacy of the theoretical
posture, perception is not the model, so fulfillment is not the
presence of the content to an observer but an execution, actualization, or enactment byan agent. Perceptionor intuition would
be a particular, somewhat thin, mode of enactment. But because
it is not a privileged mode, enactment has a temporal sense as a
process rather than as a present moment. Whereas fulfillment
is
an achievement word for Husserl, it is a task word for Heidegger.
Equally important is theKierkegaardiantwistthistriple
schema is given.Gehalfssim obviously concerns the Whatof experience. But Heidegger, echoing Johannes Climacus, insists that
-

-

Kisiel argues that this notion, which goes back to KNS 1919, is the heart
and soul of early Heidegger, including Beillg lznd Time. See Genesis, pp. 152,
172, and 218, and Reading Heidegger from the Start, p. 177.
li
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nizes that Socratic Religiousness A and Christian Religiousness
B take place in the same region, a region of decision unsecured
by certainty and presence, by comparison with the speculative
postures of Plato and Hegel. But he also insists on the radical
difference between A as religious immanenceand B as religious
transcendence, precisely because he insists thatthe How of exisof Christence is inseparable from its What.It is the Gehaltssi~r~
tianity that makes its Bezrrgssim and Vollzugssimz so decisively
different from anything found in ancient Greece. By contrast,
Heidegger, who turns to
the life world of Aristotelian ethics after
exploring that of the Pauline epistles, is formal to the point of
erasing the difference between the two. He fails to remark, as
Caputo putsit, that ”thebiblical narratives are not atall oriented
to the phronirnos,” that while Aristotle’s was “a hermeneutics
of the best and the brightest,” it was ”of just these well-to-do,
respectable gentlemen that the biblical experience of life was
most suspicious.’’19
The ambiguous character
of Heidegger’s separation of content
from form can also be seen in its link to the methodological atheism of phenomenology. It is not until WS 1921-22 that Heidegger explicitly describes philosophy as ”a-theistic in principle’’
(GA 61, pp. 196-97). Whereas heat first speaks simplyof philosophy’s Atheismus, three factors make it clear that this is a methodological and not a substantiveatheism. First, in a second
reference he describes philosophy as ”a-theistisch in principle.”
Given the sustained critique of the theoretical posture, the hyphen makes the claim that philosophy is not-theistic echo both
his earlier claim that it is worldview neutral (as distinct from
both theism and atheism) and Climacus’s claim that Christianity
is not primarily a doctrine. Second, the two references to philosophy’s atheism areembedded in notes about philosophy as
skepticism, not as a dogma butas a posture of radical questioning (GA 61, pp. 196-98), echoing once again the claim in IPR
that it is worldview neutra1. Finally, Heidegger writes, “The
questioning posture[FragIichkeit] is not religious, but may nevertheless first lead into the situationof religious decision. I am not
religious insofar as I philosophize, but as a philosopher I can
~-

Iy

-

Denzythologlziq Heiclegger, pp. 62-63 in relation to p. 51.
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also be a religious person. The trick [in that case] is to philosophize and thereby to be authenticallyreligious” (GA 61, p. 197).
This triply methodological character of philosophy’s atheism
it
has a Kierkegaardian rather than Nietzschean character (as
indeed grows outof a period of intense reading of Kierkegaard
prior to the immersion
in Nietzsche in thethirties). It echoes the
claim of Climacus’s that he is not a Christian, though he seems
obsessed with rescuing Christianity from Hegel and all other
speculative thinkers. For him it is not a matter of affirming,
much less arguing for, Christianity, but rather of finding the
right region for any possible encounter with its claims. Seen in
this light, Heidegger’s WS 1921-22 claim that philosophy is atheistic in principle is only a bold rhetorical reaffirmation of
what he had been saying all along, including the previous year
in IPR, about phenomenology as formal indication.
of philosophy is atheisHeidegger will repeat that this notion
tic.20Taken together with thenotion thatit is the rightof philosophy to ”correct” theology,” this claim will evoke a protest from
is a formof intelJean-Luc Marion that Heideggerian philosophy
lectual imperialism. From a theological point of view, the imposition of a philosophical a priori on our God talk is idolatrous
since it requires that God fit into categories developed atheistically, that is, without reference to God.22
The issue is too complex to be treated adequately here, but if
we read Heidegger’s later declarations of philosophy’s atheism
in the light of his 1919-23 Freiburg lectures, it is clear what his
basic line of defense will be. First, phenomenology does not
”correct” theology by dictating to the latter what its content
must be. Like Kierkegaard, it only “corrects” theology when it
wanders from its proper region (existence sphere or stage) to
become speculative theory, thereby cutting its linkto preaching
In “Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Anstotle,” p. 367; in
History of the Concept of Tinle: Prolqprnem, trans. Theodore Kislel (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 19S5), pp. 79-80 (GA 20, pp. 109-10); and in The
Mutnyhysicnl Fozrdatiotzs of Logic, trans. Michael Heim (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1984), p. 140 (GA 26, p. 177). Cf. The Comept of Titne, p. IE,
”The philosopher does not believe.”
“Phenomenology and Theology,” pp. 19-20.
22 God witholct Belng, trans. Thomas A. Carlson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), chs. 2-3.
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life as Bedrdngnis, Leidell, Not, Triibsal, and mgehezue Sclzwierigkeif
(pp. 98,100,109,111,120-21,124).
As phenomenologists, however, we neither become caught up
in eschatological fervor nor become historians of chiliasm. "We
leave the content completely aside" (p. 116) in order to indicate
formally the meaning of Christian factical life. We discover just
how formal formal indication can be when Heidegger tells us
three times what the upshotof his Pauline studies is: "Christian
religiosity lives temporality as such" (pp. 80, 104, 116). Everything specifically Christian has disappeared,as it is supposed to
in formal indication, and we are on ourway to Being arzd Time,
where death will replace the secondcoming of Christ as the future that will certainly come (but ata time uncertain) and whose
corning calls us outof complacent everydayness.
But is Heidegger simply playing the gameby his own clearly
announced rules? He tells us that Christian expectation is not
ordinary expectation. One reasonis that the When of the eschaton is not available to knowledge (p. 102). But that only means
that it is more like waiting for the endof the war, whoseconclusion we cannot predict, than like waiting for Christmas, when
we know exactly how many shopping days left.
are Another reason is that Christian expectation involves serving God, so that
"each stands alone before God" (p. 112). No reader of Kierkeof such a situation.But
p a r d will underestimate the weightiness
even if awaiting the coming
of God has an ultimacy that awaiting
the soldier's return from war does not have, does it warrant the
claim that we are dealing with a future (like death in Being mrd
Time) that will never be present, that Christian expectationconcerns only my present tasks before God rind m t a future event
for which I long and which 1 expect some day toexperience (pp.
114,117)?30
There is a double problem here.First, there is a non sequitur.
In order for Christian hope to motivatebelievers to "keep awake
and be sober" today, it is not necessary to eliminate their belief
that Christ will actually return onsome tomorrow. As any child
can tell us, even the coming of Santa Claus, whose arrival time
can be known quite precisely, can motivate strenuous behavior.
See Sheehan's summary, "Heldegger's 'Introduction,'

"

pp. 321-22.
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"You'd better watch out. You'd better not cry. You'd better not
pout. I'm telling you why. Santa Clausis coming to town." Second, this either/or (it is either about now or about somefuture
event), whichis false in itself, is entirely foreign to thetexts Heidegger is reading; and heis methodologically committed,not to
strong misreading, but to letting the text show itself from itself.
The nagging suspicionis that an interpreter who
was not guided
by an agenda, a worldviewif you like, quite different fromand
even hostile to Christian faith would notfind it necessary to impose this either/or and deny that early Christian hope was the
awaiting of a future event, however indefinite both its When
and
its What might be. Here it looks as if formal indication "corrects" theology's Gehaltssiszsz, anticipating Bultrnann by insisting
on an "existentialist" understanding of the parousicl rather than
an historical understanding. No one familiar with the debates
set off by Bultmann's demythologized, existential theology can
deny that the issues are substantive and
not merely formal. Perhaps if Heidegger had taken his own emerging understanding
of the hermeneutical circle more seriously he would have been
less optimistic about the possibility of a content neutral formal
asks Jaspers "how far formal considerations
indication. When he
prejudice the observation of concrete material" (GA 9, p. 27; cf.
p. 42)' his question comes back to haunt him.
It will be necessary to be brief about the Augustine course. In
it Heidegger gives a double reading that seeks to rescuea Pauline, "Protestant" Augustine from a Plotinian, "Catholic" Augustine. Put slightly differently, Heidegger explores a tradition
that runs from Augustine through Luther to Kierkegaard and
includes the medievalmystics and that resists the onto-theological synthesis of early Christianity with either Plato or Aristotle
(p-159; cf. GA 58, p. 205; GA 9, p. 6).
At the sametime he seeks to rescue Augustine from the historical objectivism of such modern readers as Troeltsch, Harnack,
and Dilthey.The goal is to understand Augustiniansubjectivity,
which is sharply to be distinguished from Cartesian
subjectivity,
since the Tatter is but the flip side of the objectivism that hides
the difficultyof factical life (pp. 298-99; cf. GA 58, p. 205).
The Augustinian subjectivity Heidegger seeksto rescue from
both ancient metaphysics and modern historicism is the enact-
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rnent of an understanding of life as c u m (care, disquiet), as few
fafio (trial), and as molesfin (dissatisfaction). Factical life is
“Bekiimmerung urn das Sei11 seiner selbst” (p, 245) or ”radikale
Selbstbekiimmerung vor Gott” (p. 242). In Heidegger’sdroll
summary,Augustine makes it clear ”dass das ’Leben’ kein
Spaziergang ist” (205). It is important to recognize that these
accounts come from a reading of Book X of the Confessions,
where Augustine speaks not of the journey to conversion and
faith but of the life of faith itself. The one who asks, ”But what
do I love when I love my God?” (ch. 6) and then “What, then,
am I, my God? What is my nature?”(ch. 17),concluding ”quaestio mihi factus sum” (ch. 33) is a believing soul, and indeed a
bishop.
And yet, Heidegger thinks, Augustine openshimself to an invasion of Greek thinking that undermines this unrest when(1)
he acknowledges his desire for the blessed life (beafa vita), (2) he
invokes the distinctionbetween l r f i and frui (use and enjoyment)
in this connection, suggesting an endto striving, and ( 3 )he identifies the God of the blessed life with the highest truth, beauty,
and goodness, suggesting an essentially contemplative relation.
In doing so he succumbs to the fatal onto-theological interpretation of Romans 1:20 that had been the Trojan horse in which
Greek theory had breached the walls of Christian factical life
(pp. 264,281).
Perhaps there are places where Plotinus crowds out Paul in
Augustine’s thought; but this is not one of them. It is true, his
restless heart yearns for rest, but the eschatological motif is too
strong to permit him
to import it into thislife in any mode more
than partial and anticipatory, like the Paulinejoy in the midst of
suffering. He is consistently clear that the becrfa vitn for which he
longs is to be found in the life to come and not in the here and
now. For Heidegger to begrudge him thishope is equivalent to
saying that the only courageous soldier is the one without hope
that the war will end, that the onlyway to be serious about the
difficulty of factical life is to assume thatit is the truthnot only
about time but about eternity as well. But surely this would be
to allow what is supposed to be formal indication to dictatean
essentially Nietzschean content to Christian faith.
Further, it is far from clear that Augustine’s reading of Ro-

mans 1:20 is an onto-theological reading. For Paul, the point of
the claim that the invisible nature of God can be clearly seen in
the things God hasmade is not that philosophy'sdream of total
intelligibility is possible but that idolatryis without excuse. Similarly, whenAugustine invokes Romans 1:20 in De Doctrim
Christimza, a locus classicus (repeatedly cited by Heidegger) for
the distinction between using the world and enjoying God, the
point of the ascent from created things to their Creator is not
that thought can achieve its desired universality by means of
what is highest but rather thatit would be foolish for us to seek
our happiness in anything lower than "that God of gods . . .
than which there is nothing better or more s~blime."'~
The text
functions, for Augustine, to call us from our fallen absorption in
the good things of the world (a central theme of Cmzfcssions,
Book X), to the strenuous task of seeking a happiness beyond
the limited and temporary happiness they can provide.
Perhaps it is a jclix c d p o that Heidegger misreads Augustine
here. For it leads him to appeal to Luther's quite unambiguous
repudiation both of the synthesis of Greek philosophy with the
gospel of grace and of the readingof Romans 1:20 on which it is
based. Indeed, it is precisely to save Augustine from himself, as
Heidegger sees it, that he draws on his intensive reading of Luther in AN (pp. 47-48,97,281-82; cf. pp. 308-10 in MM). There
is something quite wonder-ful in seeing a philosopher who insists on the a-theistic character of philosophy appealing to perhaps the most vigorously anti-philosophicaltheologian prior to
Karl Barth to help him get straight about the right path
for philosophy. But when we notice how Heidegger seeks to appropriate theanti-scholastic polemic of Luther's early commentaries
on Romans (1515-14) and Galatians (1519), along with the distinction between the theology of glory and the theology of the
cross from the Heidelberg Disputation of 1518, we understand
more fully how he could tell his hearers in IPR that while phenomenology is not theology, it opens a new way for theology (p.
67). First the theologies of Paul, Augustine, and Luther play a
key role in challenging philosophy's traditional flight from the
2; Augustine, Teaclzrllg Clznstianity, trans. Edmund Hill, 0.P (Hyde Park, N.Y.:
New City Press, 19961, vol. I, pp. 3-7.
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earth of factical life to the etherof pure theory; then the resultant
phenomenological, a-theistic philosophy serves as a guide and
prod to contemporary theology to remain faithful to its biblical
origins and not sell its soul to Greek gazing. The goal of this
circular relationship between theologyand philosophy is to destroy by deconstructing the tendenciesof both theology and philosophy to fall into onto-theological discourse, theGevede of the
learned.28

2x I am indebted to John van Buren for helpful comments on an earlier draft
of this essay.
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Hermeneutics As Epistemology
Now no more useful inquiry can be proposed than
that which seeks to determine the nature and scope
of
human knowledge. . . . Neither ought it to seem such
a toilsome and difficult matter to define the limits of
[human] understanding.
Descartes’
For I thought that the first step toward satisfying several inquiries the mind of inan was very apt to run
into, was to take a survey of our own understandings,
examine our own powers, and see to what thingsthey
were adapted. . . . Whereas, were the capacitiesof our
of our
understandings well considered,theextent
knowledge once discovered, the horizon found which
sets the bounds between the enlightened and dark
parts of things; between what is and what is not comprehensible by us, men would perhaps with less scruple acquiescein the avowed ignorance of the one, and
employ their thoughts and discourse with more advantage and satisfaction in the other.
Locke?
I know no inquiries which are more important for exploring the faculty which we entitle understanding,
and for determining the rules and limits of its employment, than those whichI have instituted.
Kants
Rules for the Direction of the Mind, in The Philosophical Works of Descnrtes,
trans. Haldane and Ross (New York: Dover Publications, 1955), vol. I, p. 26
(discussion of Rule 8).
An Essay Concenling H m l a n Understanding (New York: Dover Publications,
1959), vol. I, p. 31 (introduction, section 7).
Critique of Pure Rensorz, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 19611, A xvi.

48

OVERCOMING ONTO-THEOLOGY

RICHARDRORTYANNOUNCES the end of epistemology in part 3
of PI?ilosoyhy mcl flw Mirror of Nafrrre, entitled ”From EpistemoIogy to Hermeneutics.” He makes itclear that he is not offering,
with help from Quine and Sellars, a new and better epistemology but a complete abandonment of the whole idea of a theory
of knowledge, for which no legitimatetask can be identified.4
What Rorty repudiates as epistemology he
associates strongly
with Descartes, Locke, and Kant. As is clear from the above citations, the threeof them contribute toward identifying epistemology with the broad, generictask of reflecting on the nature and
limits of human knowledge. It is entirely unclear why Rorty
identifies as epistemology not this generic task but certain features of the specific way these three and others go about it; ultimately this identification is seriously misleading.
Among the most important of the specific notions that Rorty
identifies with epistemology are thefollowing:
The notion of knowledge as accurate representation, as correspondence. It is here that the “mirrorof nature” image plays its
role.
The demand for certainty in knowledge.
The notion of epistemology as a neutral, a priori tribunal whose
task is to show how to achieve the desired apodicticityof accurate representation.
The special role of privileged representations as providing the
foundations of knowledge so construed. Sellars’s critique of the
myth of the given and Quine’s argument for the contingency
of necessity, along with Kuhnian philosophy of science and its
argument against the possibilityof theory free data-these are
all attacks on the notion of “representations which cannot be
gainsaid.”b5

It is clear that where Rorty says ”epistemology” one might
precise, “the Enlightjust as well say “modernity” or, to be more
enment project’’ or, to be still more precise, ”foundationalism.”t)
.’ hchard Rorty, Philosophy ami the Mirror uf Nntllre (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 10, 180, 210, and 315.
j kid., p. 315.
“By ’foundationalism’ I shall always mean the strong variety that requires
foundational apodicticity from privileged representations “which cannot be
gainsaid.” See n. 9.
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Over against the foundationalist epistemologies of modernity,
whose twentieth-century paradigmsare to be found inRussell’s
knowledge by acquaintance and Husserl’s intuition of essences,
Rorty offers a paradigm shift to an understanding of understanding thathe calls hermeneutics. It is holistic, historicist, and
pragmatic; it construes truth as conversational agreement, rationality as practical, self-corrective capacity, and intuition as linguistic capacity.
But hermeneutics, so conceived, is a reflection on the nature
and limits of human knowledge; for it is no longer limitedto the
interpretation of texts but interprets all cognition as interpretation. In terms of the natureof knowledge, it emphasizes the emin
historically particuIar and
beddedness of knowledge
contingent vocabularies (Rorty calls them ”optional”); in terms
of the limits of knowledge, it emphasizes our inability to transcend that embeddedness in order to become pure reason or
absolute knowledge or rigorousscience. In other words, lrennem r f i c s is epistemology, generically construed. It is a species diametrically opposed to foundationalist epistemologies, but it
belongs to the same genus precisely because like them it is a
meta-theoryabout how we should understand the cognitive
claims of common sense, of the natural and social sciences, and
even of metaphysics and theology. By failing to distinguish the
generic epistemological task from thespecifically modern foundationalist projects, Rorty obscures the fact that hermeneutics is
not the replacement of epistemology as such but the replacement of one type of epistemology with another.
The issue of self-reference ariseshere. Especially because
Rorty denies thatepistemological reflection can occur in a privileged space prior to that
of first-order knowing and immune
from the conditions of the latter, hermeneutics must be understood to be a theory about itself and not just about variouskinds
of first-order knowing, If hermeneutics presentsitself as a particular language game whose truthconsists not in accurate representation but in conversational agreement, it is hard to see how
it falls immediately into performative or self-referential contradiction.
But isn’t hermeneutics hopelessly relativistic? Yes and No. As
already noted, hermeneuticalhistoricism offers no hope thatwe
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mode” of being-in-the-world in 713 of Beilzg and Time, and by
entitling fi33 ”Assertion as aDerivative Mode of Interpretation.”
If knowing is ”founded” and assertion is “derivative,” theoretical cognition has precognitive presuppositions that can nevertheless be called understanding and interpretation.
There is a religious backgroundto Heidegger’s protest against
the primacy of the theoretical that dominates so much of the
philosophicaltradition.
His philosophy of religion lecture
courses of 1920-21 are a sustained argument that the
life of faith
is not primarily aconcern over the correctness of assertions.” He
summarizes his findings ina lecture first given in 1927, the year
Being and Time was published. After quoting Luther, “Faith is
permitting ourselves to be seized by the things we do not see,”
he claims that faith ”is not some more or less modified type of
knowing” and that theology ”is not speculative knowledge of
God.”l6
But in Being mrd Time he makes a more genera1 argument for
the founded character of knowing and the derivative nature of
assertion. It involves a double movement from the secondary to
the primary: from theory to practice and from theory to affect.
For Husserl, the phenomenological reductionabandons the natural standpoint of empirical consciousness in the midst of a surrounding real world. By bracketing the question of the relation
of thought to reality, the phenomenologist
is to focus on the
ways in which the contentsof consciousness, whatever their ontological status, are given to pure or transcendental consciousness, that is, consciousness that intends a world of which it is
not a part. But for Heidegger the task is not a move from the
natural standpoint to a realm of pure consciousness where presuppositionless, apodictic intuitionsof essences can occur; it is a
move from all theoretical postures (scientific, theological, philosophical, etc.), now understood as abstractions from primordial,
everyday experience, back to the fullness of the natural standl.i Eideitung in die Phiinomendogie der Religion (WS 1920-21) and Allgustinus
u r d der Neqdatonisrnus (SS 1921) in Gesamtausgabe (GA), vol. 60, Phiilzonrenologle
des religiiisen Lebem (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1995). Seechapter 2 of this
volume.
I h ”Phenomenology and Theology,” in The Piefy of Thinking, trans. James G.
Hart and John C. Maraldo (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), pp.
10 and 15.
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point, or to be moreprecise, to a reflective understanding of the
natural standpoint in all of its practical and affective concreteness.
Following a tradition that goesback to Plato and his own Orphic-Pythagorean religious roots, Husserl’s reduction is a rite
of purification. By contrast, Heidegger’s reduction is a rite of
repentance and conversion, turning away from the cult of such
self-purification.The tradition we can call Platonic, though it has
a wide variety of footnotes, is a kind of Gnostic or Manichean
dualism that treats embeddedness, the epistemological form of
embodiment, as intrinsically evil. Heidegger’s theological analogue is the Jewish or Christian affirmation that embodiment,
and thus embeddedness, is good because it is part of God’s creation. It is a sign of our finitude, but it is not evil; and every
attempt to flee that finitude is a self-defeating,Luciferian hybris
that says, ”I will make myself like the Most High” (Isa. 14:14).
Heideggerian hermeneutics is a three-story universe in which
assertion is doublyderivative; it rests upon interpretation thatin
turn rests upon understanding. In attempting to understand
what it means tosay that both understanding and interpretation
are more basic than assertion, we can deliberately adopt two
hypotheses to serve as heuristic pre-understandingsto guide us.
In the process, of course, they will be put to the test.
The first will be the hypothesis that Heidegger seeks to dethrone the theoretical in the same way that speech act theory
does. In Austinian language, makingan assertion is performing
a constative speech act, one whose raison d’Gtre and primary
virtue relateto the truthof falsity of what is said. But this is only
one of the many things we can do with words, one of the many
illocutionary acts we can perform by the locutionary acts of uttering or inscribing sentences. Others, such as promising, commanding, comforting, complaining, and so forth, have different
rationales and can fail to be apt other than by being false.
Heidegger’s account has obvious affinities with speech act
theory. He speaks the languageof assertion ( A u s s q e ) and judgment (Urteil) rather than the Platonizing language
of proposition
(Satz). The foundation of language (Syrache = lmzgue = language as system) is discourse (Rede = parole = language in use)
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and not the reverse (p. 203/160). The logos (semantic field, intelligible space) to which he links assertion is an earthly and temporal logos rather than a heavenly and eternal one (pp. 195-96/
153-54). Furthermore, he makes it equivalentto "categorical
statement" and "theoretical judgment," and in doing so links it
tightly to constative speech acts and thus to truthas correctness
(pp. 196/154,200/157).
But there is a crucial difference. Speech act theory challenges
the conthe primacyof theoretical reason by making assertion or
stative speech act just one of the many things we can do with
words. Among many other illocutionary acts, which do not have
correct information or accurate representation astheir essential
mission, assertion has no special privilege. At the same time,
there is nothing in speech act theory to resist the Husserlian
move that makes theoretical intentions primary and basic to all
nontheoretical intentions.17
But such a resistance is explicitly present in Heidegger's account, precisely when he insists that assertion is "a derivative
form in which an interpretation has been carried out" and that
"in concernful circumspection there are no such assertions 'at
first' [zur~iichst].
. , . Interpretation is carried out primordially
[truspriitzglich] not in a theoretical statement but in an action of
circurnspective concern-laying aside the unsuitable tool, or exchanging it, 'without wasting words'. From the fact that words
are absent, it maynot be concluded that interpretationis absent"
(p. 200/157); for the interpretation is expressed in the action
even in absence of any assertion. Assertion is not just one mode
of interpretation among many; it is less basic than some mode
of interpretation it presupposes.
Heidegger immediately (re)introduces his distinction between
and the present-at-hand (Vuvthe ready-to-hand (Zt~hnndenheif)
See Husserl's Logicd Investigations, trans. J. N. Findlay (New York: Humamties, 19701, pp. 556, 636-40, and 648-51. Heidegger approprlately calls Logicnl
I t m s t i p f i o t l s "a phenomenology of the theoretical logos" (GA 9 35 = W e p r m ken). See also Idms Pertnirlitlg fo 0 Prrre Pkerrornennlogp urrd to a Phenonrello2ogrcul
Philosophy, First Book, trans, E Kersten (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983),
77116-21. It is difficult not to read Wittgenstein's critique of his own Trnctatlls
as other than as at least the intention of such a resistance. See PIdosophIcal
I n z w s t i p t i o ~ strans.
,
G. E. M. Anscombe (Oxford:Basic Blackwell,1958),section
23.

1 IERMENEUTICS AS EI’ISTEMOLOCY

57

Imlzdedwif) as crucial to his point. If I see what is before me as
merely present-at-hand or objectively present, I see it as a fact
about which true or false assertions can be made? If it see it as
ready-to-hand, I see it, to use his most famous example, as a
hammer available for my use, or perhapsfor some reason unusable. The world initially gives itself to us in this latter mode,
on Heidegger’s view, and it requires a severe abstraction from
experience to see things as objectiveZy present, as what is merely
the case, as facts or events waiting to be accurately represented:
”The kind of dealing which is cIosest to us is as we have shown,
not a bare perceptual cognition, but rather that kind of concern
to use; and this has its
which manipulates things and puts them
own kind of ’knowledge’ (p. 95/67) or sight (pp. 98-99/69).lY
In light of this distinction, Heidegger makes his point this
way. If what we interpret
”

becomes the ’object’ of an assertion, then as soon as we begin this
assertion, there is already a change-over in the fore-having. Something veady-fo-har~dwith which we have to do or perform something, turns into something‘about dzich’ the assertion that points
it out is made. Our fore-sight is aimed at something present-athand or objectively present in what is ready-to-hand. Both by and
for this way of looking at it, the ready-to-hand becomes veiled as
ready-to-hand. . . . Only now arewe given any access to properties
or the like. . . . The as-structure of interpretation has undergone a
modification. (p. 200/157-58)

How shall we interpret this distinction and the
“modification”
it signals? If we take as our d u e Heidegger‘s claim that prior to
assertion is a mode of interpretation that can occur “without
wasting words” and from which ”words are absent,” we can
give ourselves a secondheuristichypothesis,thistimefrom
Rorty. In his attack on the ”mythof the given,” Sellars seems to
argue that there is no prelinguistic awareness, and Rorty seeks
to show why this is not “unfair to babies,” since babies clearly
have pains and some sort of awareness of colored objects. Sellars
I ” Where Macquarne and Robinson translate zlorhnrdeu as ‘present-at-hand’,
Stambaugh renders it as ’objectively present’. What Heidegger has in mind is
very much like the facts of the early Wittgensteln, that which is simply the
case, so I shall go with Stambaugh‘s translation from here on.
I ” The scare quotes arein the German original.
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and Rorty distinguish "awareness-as-discriminative-behavior,"
which children, rats, amoebas, andeven computers may be said
to have, from awareness"in the logical space of reasons, of justifying and being able to justify what one says" (Rorty, quoting
SeUars), which is found only among language users. "In this
latter sense awareness is justified true belief-knowledge-but
is the ability to respond to stimuli.'''0
in the former sense it
It is Sellars's view that prelinguistic discriminative awareness
is a causal condition of knowledge but not a justifying ground.
On this view "there is no such thing as a justified belief which
is nonpropositional, and no such thingas ajustification which is
not a relation between propositions. . . . [Klnowing what things
are like is not a matter of being justified in asserting propositions.''21 Knowing that such and such is the case presupposes
linguistic competence; knowing what thingsare like does not.
Our second hypothesis can be that Heidegger makes assertion
derivative because, like Sellars and Rorty, he wants to distinguish linguistic interpretation from prelinguistic interpretation.
Let us see if this is how to draw the line between assertion as
derivative and the understanding and interpretation that are the
a priori conditions for the possibilityof assertion.
Interpretation is seeing-as. Every act of interpretation apprehends something as something, as "a table, a door, a carriage,
or a bridge" (p. l89/ 149). It comes as no surprise that a prior
understanding is already at work in every interpretation. We've
been going around in hermeneutical circles for a while now.
What goes beyond the merely formal structure
of the hermeneutical circle is Heidegger's claim that the understanding presupposed by every act of interpretation is our understanding, notof
the table, the door, the carriage,
or the bridge, butof ourselves.
Heidegger calls this self-understanding a kind of 'knowing'
zil Rorty, Philosophy ami the Mirror of Nafwe, pp. 181-83. Heidegger's focus is
on human understanding. He might be willing to extend his analysis of preassertive understanding to ratsand amoebas, but would surely balk at cornputers. But that will not be the issue here.
? I Ibid., pp. 183 and 185. It is worth noting that
in the previous paragraph
Rorty ties knowledge to linguistic awareness, while here he refers to pre-linguistic awareness as "knowing what things are like" (emphasis added). He
might well have put this latter 'knowing' inscare quotes. Heidegger will make
a similar distinction between knowing and knowing. See nn. 19 and 22.

HERMENEUTICS AS EPISTEMOLOGY

59

(p. 184/144; cf. p. 186/146).22 Buthe repeatedly denies that it is
theoretical knowing, the kind of knowing with which philosophy has beenso preoccupied. Thus, understandingoneself does
not mean "gazing at a meaning" (p. 307/263). Nor are we dealing here with the understanding, as distinct from explanation,
with which neo-Kantianism sought
to put the Geisteswissmschaften on the sure path to science (p. 182/143). Nor are we dealing
with introspection, as if the self were some entity objectively
present that couldbe known by an "immanent self-perception"
in which the self would grasp itself thematically (pp. 183-85/
143-45). Self-understanding is "not amatter of perceptually
tracking down and inspecting a point called the 'Self' " as if, to
repeat, the self were something objectively present to itself (p.
187/146-47).
Every act of interpretation presupposes our understanding of
ourselves as thrown projection or thrown possibility inour concernful dealings with things and our solicitude for other persons. Butwe"know"
ourselves as such, not byreflectively
observing these characteristics inhering
in us but by being them.
To be a thrown projection for whom the beingswe encounter in
the world matter is to understand oneself as such, and all explicit acts of interpretation, including self-interpretation, presuppose this primordial understanding.
So far Heidegger would seemto be innocent of the "unfair to
babies" charge. Nothing he has said about understanding
as the
most basic form of "knowing" requires linguistic competence.
Between understanding and assertion there lies interpretation.
Self-understanding as so far specified is mostly unspecified;it is
vague and general. Like the pre-understanding of a whole text
as belonging to a particular genre, it needs to be filled out and
concretized with specific interpretations. Accordingly, Heidegger presents interpretationas the "development" of understandto us are "explicitly"
ing in which the beings which matter
understood (pp. 188-89/148-49). As already noted, each specific interpretation is aseeing-as, an apprehension of something
as something (pp. 189-90/149-50).
?? The scare quotes are in the German original of both passages cited. See
previous note.
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But this "pre-predicative seeing" is not to be identified with
assertion or judgment (pp. 189-90/149); for assertion has been
defined, in part, as predication (p. 196/154). According to our
working hypothesis, pre-predicative here means prelinguistic.
Can weconfirm the suggestion that assertion or judgment
is derivative because it is a linguistic act that presupposes prelinguistic experience? Is it sufficient topoint outthat babies can
interpret the mother's breast as a source of satisfaction and,
when hungry, can interpret the pacifier as a poor substitxte?
The answer depends on Heidegger's understanding of our
primal encounter with things as ready-to-hand. What we encounter in this way we can call "Things 'invested with value' "
or "equipment," but both of these expressions areliable to serious misinterpretation. What is ready-to-hand matters to us in
modes more immediate and concrete than as being objectively
present as possible topics for truthful assertions. As such they
are not bare things, tractarian facts whose mission in life is simply to be the case. In the ways they matter to us they are valueladen facts, something welcome or unwelcome or irrelevant.But
to speak of them as "invested with value" suggests a valueadded interpretation of them as if we first encounter them as
bare facts and only later endow them withvalue. It is not {'as if
some world-stuff which is proximally objectively present in itself were 'given subjective colouring'. . . . In interpreting, we do
not, so to speak, throw a 'signification' over some naked thing
which is objectively present, we do not stick a value on it; but
when something within-the-world is encountered as such, the
thing in question already has involvement
an
. . . which getslaid
out by the interpretation'' (pp. 101/71; 190-91 /150).
Heidegger is aware of the broader Gestalt form of this argument: "It requires a very artificial and complicated frame of
mind to 'hear' a 'pure noise'. The fact that motor-cycles and
wagons are what we proximally hear is the phenomenal evidence that in every case Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, already
dwells nlolzgside what is ready-to-hand within-the-world; it certainly does notdwell proximally alongside 'sensations' " (p.
207/ 164>.23
Y

In developmg his hermeneutic understanding of natural science, Hanson

(p.9) makes a similarly general Gestalt appeal: "one does not first soak up an
optical pattern and then clamp an interpretation on it."
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There is also a danger with describing the ready-to-hand as
“equipment” (das Zcrrg), that which is ”manipulableinthe
broadest sense and at our disposal’’ (pp. 97-98/68-69), as distinct from the object of a theoretical gaze. First, in spite of Heidegger’s famousexample
of thehammer,
we must avoid
identifying equipment with tools; for he also presents the room
as equipment for dwelling and shoes as equipment for wearing.
In addition, hetells us that Naturetoo first comes to us as readyto-hand and not as ”pure objective presence” (p. 100/70). Thus,
for example, the honey is to be eaten, but the angry bees are to
be avoided.
Reference to theangry bees, not a Heideggerianexample,
points to a second danger. Heidegger wants to define the readyto-hand in terms of our activity, our practical behavior in the
world (pp. 98-99/69). But by focusing on what is manipulable
and usable he gives insufficient attention to negative instances
where thevalue in which thingscome already wrapped is negative. It is stretching language too far to speak of angry bees as
equipment.
If we avoid narrowing the notionof the ready-to-hand to that
of tools or the positively useful, we have a concept of things, all
the way from hammers to angrybees, that are meaningful to us
in valuational terms in relation to our practices. We have seen
that Heidegger describes the interpretation at work in these
practices as pre-predicative and pretheoretical. Does this mean
that it is prelinguistic?
We can see in what sense we must answer this question Yes
and in whatsense No if we return to a passage considered earlier: ”Interpretation is carried out primordially not ina theoretical stnfemelzf but in an acfioll of circumspective concern-laying
aside the unsuitabletool, or exchanging it [or rejecting the pacifier], ’without wasting words’. From the fact that words are absent, it may not be concluded that interpretation is absent” (p.
200/157, emphasis added). It is clear that interpretation is prelinguistic in that neither linguistic expression
nor linguistic competence is required for it to occur. So far we must say, Yes, our
hypothesis is confirmed.
But linguistic expression and, a fortiori, linguistic competence,
may very well belong to interpretation; and this means that we
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must say No. If interpretation is notrrecessarily linguistic, neither
is it necessarily prelinguistic. Immediatelybefore the passagejust
cited, Heidegger writes that interpretation, being prior
to assertion, does not have the form of the " 'categorical statement' . . .
'The hammer is heavy' nor the form of a "theoretical judgment" such as "ThisThing-ahammer-has
the property of
heaviness." But thepractice-embeddedinterpretation
of the
hammer as too heavy "may take some such form as 'The hammer is too heavy', or rather just 'Too heavy!, Hand me the other
hammer!' " X
According to Heidegger's epistemology, knowledge has foundations. But at the basis of the linguistic expressions that
are the
bearers of truth or falsity are not those representations that are
epistemically privileged, guaranteed to be true by being given
(Sellars) or necessary (Quine) or self-evident or incorrigible or
evident to the senses (Plantinga).At the basis of our truth-bearing assertions are practices that are not truth bearing, whether
or not they are accompanied by speech acts. Relative to such
foundations, the dominant epistemological ideals of the philosophical tradition from Plato to Husserl, Russell, and the early
Wittgenstein are pipe dreams.
The reason it has been both possible and necessary to speak
of Heidegger as an epistemologist is that such claims plainly
constitute a theory about the natureand limits of human knowledge. It is precisely because his theory opens up a realm of understanding and interpretation prior
to that of truth in theusual
sense that Heideggerlooks for a more primordial conceptionof
truth as unconcealrnent. Justas the claim that assertion is derivative is not meant to abolish assertions but to specify (in a kind of
Kantian manner) the conditions under which they are
possible,
so the questfor a more fundamental notionof truth is not meant
to replace the usual notionbut to specify its conditions.25
"

Cf. the opening paragraphs of Wittgenstein's Pldosophml Investrgatmns,
where he critiques the primacy of the theoretical in the Tructntus in terms of a
simple language game in which "Slab!" means "Bring me a slab!" It would
seem that Heidegger is mistaken in suggesting that linguistic cornrnunication
first arises at the level of assertion (pp. 197/155 and 203/160).
2i See Section 44 of Beirrg nnd Tirne; 0 1 2 the Essence of Truth (19301, in Basic
Writings, ed. David Farrell Krell (New York:Harper & Row, 1977); and PIafo's
Doctrine of Truth (1942), trans. John Barlow, in Philosophy In fhe Twentreth Cen-

I IERMENEUTICS AS EPISTEMOLOGY

63

This account of the radically conditioned nature of our truth
as correspondence, agreement, adequation,
etc., is a humbling of
philosophy's pride in the light of which theempiricist traditions
appear less as the humblersof rationalist hybris than ascorevelers in it.26 While repudiating the value added understandingof
the ready-to-hand,Heidegger insists, "Readilzess-to-hnIzd is the
way in which entities as they are 'ill themselves' w e defined orrfologicocategorically" (p. 101/71). The Kantian reference is unmistakable,
and it means that our theoretical accomplishments, which reduce the world toobjective presence, never get beyond appearances or phenomenal knowledge, whether we construe them
in
rationalist or empiricist terms.
Because of the way Heidegger makes practice foundational to
theory, Dreyfus calls his hermeneuticsa form of practical holism
as distinct from the theoretical holism of, say, post-positivist phiThis providesa nice segueto his own interlosophy of
est in the way Foucault will give foundational epistemological
significance to social practices, similarly denying the autonomy
of knowledge." But it leaves us with a seriously incomplete account of Heidegger's "phenomenological reduction'' from theoretical (constative, truth-asserting) modes of being-in-the-world
to the primordialexperience from which theyare derivative. For
Heidegger treats state of mind or attunement (Befindlichkeit) as
equiprimordial with understanding and
a prior condition of
cognition. Since this is the ontological (a priori) structure that
fwy, vol. 3, ed. William Barrett and Henry D. Aiken (New York: Random
House, 1962).
Hume's appeal to custom and the passions would be an exception. So
would Hempel's reluctant acknowledgment that the verification criterion of
meaning is a policy and not a truth, See "Problems and Changes in the Ernpiricist Criterion of Meaning" in Senrarlfrcs a?rd the Philosophy uf Langlrnge, ed. L.
Linsky (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1952).
17 In doing so he links Heidegger to Wittgenstein
and Merleau-Ponty. See
"Holism and Hermeneutics," p. 7. He might well have followed Rorty and
added Dewey to the list. See the passages cited from Hanson at nn. 10 and 23
above.
2s See Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Michd Fmcatrlf: Bqolrd Sfnrcftrra1ism and Hermelmfics, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983). A
brief introduction to thw motif In Foucault is found in chapters 5-9 of P u u ~ /
K M J ~ L ~ ed.
~ LColin
~ ~ P Gordon
,
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1980).
xi
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expresses itself ontically (empirically)in moods, it becomesclear
that Heideggeris anaffective holist as much as a practical holist.
His “reduction” is from theoretical cognition both to the practices in which beings are meaningful as ready-to-hand and to
the moods in which an equally ”primordial disclosure”
takes
place (p. 173/134).
We are “delivered over” to our moods. They are tightly tied
to the “fhrowmzess” of our existence as thrown projection, our
“fizcticity” (pp. 173-74/134-35). In this respect Heidegger conforms to the tradition that identifies our affective life with passivity, with the passions.But where much of the tradition treats
feeling and emotion as subjective addenda whoseonly cognitive
significance is that they might interfere with
clear thinking, Heidegger stresses the disclosive function of moods as a priori conditions of theoretical thought: they are “prior to all cognition and
volition and beyond their range of disclosure” (p. 175/ 134). In
addition, they are conditions
of the possibility that anything, including ourselves, should ”matter” to us. ”The mood has alreocly
disclosed, i l t every case, Beirzg-ilz-f~ze-z~Ic7rln
ns 1.2 zvl~ole,and makes it
possible first of d l to directo~~eself
towards somethiq” (pp. 176-78/
137-39). Intentionality presupposes mood.
We are not surprised when Heideggertells us once again that
the conditions for the possibility of theoretical (assertive, constative) engagement with the world are pretheoretical. This is because ”the possibilities of disclosure which belong to cognition
reach far too short a way compared with the primordial disclosure belonging to moods. . . , ’To be disclosed’ does notmean ’to
be known as this sort of thing’ (p. 173/124). We should not
compare what is disclosed to one in moods with what one ”is
acquainted with, knows, and believes” or measure it ”against
the apodictic certainty of a theoretical cognition of something
merely objectively present” (p. 175/135-34). It is when the
world shows itself ”in accordance with our moods, that the
ready-to-hand shows itself. . . . By looking at the world theoretically, we have already dimmed it down to the uniformity of
what is merely objectively present” (p. 177/138).
Does this primacy of mood over cognition mean that for Heidegger as for Hume reason “is and ought only to be the slave of
I’
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the passions”?’” Surely notif this means the attempt“to surrender science ontically to ’feeling’ (p. 177/138) in which phenomena are falsified by being “banished to the sanctuaryof the
irrational” (p. 175/ 136). The Stoics, and following them, Spinoza, emphasize the dependence
of the passionson our beliefs.7”
Heidegger clearly wants to give a priority to the passions, but
not simplyby reversing this relationshipso as to make the propositionaI content of our assertions a function of our moods. He
has no interest in a world in which the cat is on the mat for
happy folks but not for sad sacks.
His point is rather that theory commits the fallacy of misplaced concreteness, at least as traditionally conceived. The
world comes to us as value-laden by our moods as by our practices, and we kid ourselves if we think we can reflect ourselves
out of this condition, for “when we master a mood, we do so by
way of a counter-mood; we are never free of moods” (p. 175/
136). Theory has its own mood, just as it is a certain kind of
practice. What is more, we kid ourselves if we think we would
get closer to the way things “really” are if we could strip away
our moods and ourpractices in orderto become pure reason. As
we saw at the conclusion of the previous section of this essay, if
we wish to be in touch with things in themselves and not with
mere appearances, we must let them show themselves to us in
the lightof our moods and ourpractices.
”

And in the light of our prejudices-which brings us to Gadamer.
At the heart of Gadamer’s hermeneuticsis the claim that
the fundamental prejudice of the Enlightenment is the prejudice
against prejudice itself, which denies tradition its power. . . . The
overcoming of all prejudices, this global demand of the Enlightenment, will itself prove to be a prejudice, and removing it opens
the way to an appropriate understanding of the finitude which
dominates not only our humanity but also our
historical con?‘’ Hurne, A Trmtisr of Hlrmalr Nntwa, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960 reprint of 1888 edition), p. 415 (bk. 11, pt. 111, stc. HI).
w For helpful discussion of the Stoics on this point, see Martha Nussbaum,
The Tlzrvapy of Desire: Tlzmy a d P m c t i c ~ i n Hellelristic Eth~cs (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1994).
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sciousness . . . the prejudices of the individual, f u y more than Jzis judgments, constifzrtc the historical reality of his being. (pp. 270, 276-77)31

Heidegger’s account of the hermeneutic circle and of the forestructure of understanding is Gadamer’s point of departure (p.
265). In urging usnot toflee the hermeneuticalcircle, Heidegger
stresses itspositive role: ”In the circle is hiddena positive possibility of the most primordial kind of knowing” (p. 195). Gadamersharesthisemphasis:
“Prejudices are not necessarily
unjustified and erroneous, so that they inevitably distort
the
truth. In fact, the historicity of our existence entails that prejudices, in the literal senseof the word [prejudgments], constitute
the initial directedness of our wholeability to experience. Prejudices are biases of our openness to the world. They are simply
conditions wherebywe experience something.’’32The prejudices
Gadarner seeksto rehabilitate are not uglyattitudes towardpeople who are different from ourselves, but the pre-understandings presupposed by every understanding. Just as embodiment
is a condition for being either Jack the Ripper or Mother Teresa,
so prejudgment is a condition for seeing thosewho are different
from me either asinferior or as my sisters and brothers.
But there are atleast two important differences from Heidegger. First, Gadarner stands in closer relation than Heidegger to
Kuhnian philosophy of science and Rawlsian reflective equilibrium. For rather than reflect on our affects and practices as conditions for the possibility of assertion or judgment, Gadamer
returns us to a theoretical holism in which prior to every judgment (Urteil) there is a prejudgment or pre-judice (Vur-urfeil).
Thus, while Heidegger points to modes of pre-understanding
to
thatarepriortoassertionorjudgment,Gadamerpoints
modes of pre-understanding that alreadyhave the form of judgment (assertion,constative speech act).
In close relation to this first difference is a second. ‘Tradition‘
ceases to be a dirty word. In Robinson and Macquarrie’s ”Index
of English Expressions” in Being atzd Time, the only three subGadamer references in the text will be to Trlrth m d Method, trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, 2nd ed. rev. (New York: Crossroad, 1991).
j 2 Philosophical Hmneneufics, trans, David E. Linge (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 19761, p. 9.
31
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headings areto the traditional conceptionof time, the traditional
need not
conception of truth,andtraditionalontology.One
know Being mzd T i m very well to know that all three signify a
danger from whichwe are to be rescued. Nor is this surprising
in the lightof what Heidegger says about tradition in general:
When tradition becomes master, it does so in such a way that
what it ’transmits’ is made so inaccessible . . . that it rather becomes concealed. Tradition takes what hascome down to us and
delivers it over to self-evidence; it blocks our access to those primordial ’sources’ from which the categories and concepts handed
down to us have been in part quite genuinely drawn. . . . Dasein
has had its historicaIity so thoroughIy uprooted by tradition that
. . . it has no ground of its own to stand on.” (p. 43/21)

It is ironical to hear Heidegger sounding so much like Descartes. Gadamer wants to make a more radical break with the
spirit of the Enlightenment by breaking not only with the substantive content of the Cartesian worldview but also with the
repudiation of the authority of tradition that motivates Descartes’s resort to method.For, to allow ourselves abit of historical freedom,Gadamerviews
Descartes asfollowing Kant’s
advice to grow up by shaking off his ”self-incurred tutelage,”
the ”inability of make use of his understanding without direction from another,”33 only by adopting a thoroughly adolescent
rebellion according to which whatever one’s intellectual parents
say is ipso facto discredited.
One of Gadamer’s subheadingsis “The Rehabilitation of Authority and Tradition”(p. 277). He might well havespoken of the
authority of tradition, for on his view tradition has considerable,
though not absolute, authority.His attitude is like that of Socrates tothe laws of Athens as his parents. Even when one is
sharply critical of tradition, as Gadamer is critical of the Cartesian/Enlightenment tradition, one must recognize
One’s embeddedness in tradition and
one’s indebtedness to it. Tradition is the
primary source of the prejudices without which understanding,
including critical understanding, would not be possible. When
Rorty says that criticism is never possible in terms of eternal
33 Kant, “What Is Enlightenment,” in On Hisfory, ed. Lewis White Beck (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963), p. 3.
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standards but only in terms of those ”of our own day,’’74Gadarner will agree only if ”of our own day” means not “those
currently dominant in our culture” but ”those currently available, thanks, for the most part, to tradition.”
Gadarner’s critics are usually willing to concede ”that there
are legitimate prejudices” (p. 277). But the weight he gives to
tradition has led many, revivinga distinction from the aftermath
of Hegel, to portray Gadamer as a ”right-wing” Heideggerian,
distinct from such “left-wing” developers of Heideggerian hermeneutics as Derrida and Foucault.3sBoth in the Gadamer-Habermas debateand in theGadamer-Derrida debate,”)Gadamer‘s
opponents, failing to pay much attention to tradition as a source
of critique, portray him as tilting too much away from critique
in favor of tradition.
For example, Jack Caputo describes Gadamer’s hermeneutics
as ‘’a reactionary g e s t ~ r e , ’ ’too
~ ~ comforting in relation to the
truth of tradition. He cites the passage from the section entitled
“The Rehabilitation of Authority and Tradition” in which Margolis finds the key to Gadanler’s ”closet essentialism.”That
which has been sanctionedby tradition and custom has
an authority that is nameless, and our finite historical being is
marked by the fact that the authority of what has been handed
down to us-and not just what is clearly grounded-always has
power over our attitudes and behavior. . . . The real force of morals, for example, is based on tradition, They are freely taken over
but by no means created by a free insight or grounded on reasons.
This is precisely what we call tradition: the ground of their validity . . . tradition has a justification that lies beyondrational
grounding and in large measure determines our institutions and
attitudes. (pp. 280-81)33
Rorty, Philosoylly n r d fhe Mirror of Nature, pp. 178-79.
Derrida and Foucault in this light are, respectively, Jack Caputo, Radical Hermeneutics (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1987), and Dreyfus and Rabinow, Michel F O J K L I Z ~ ~ .
A good introduction to the former, with references to the primary sources,
is found in Thomas McCarthy, The Critical Theory of Jiirgen Hnhernm (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1978). For the latter see Diane I? Michelfelder and
Richard E. Palmer, eds., Dirrlogm and Deconstrrldiorl: The G d a m ~ r - D e r r i hEncolrntcr (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989).
Caputo, Rdical H e r n w w t i c s , pp. 5-6.
M Quoted in Caputo’s essay, “Gadamer’s Closet Essentialism: A Derridian
Critique,” in D i a l o p m d Decorlsfrucfion, p. 258, from the older translation,
which I have replaced with the second (1991) edition.
-’.I

’’ By far the best accounts of
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Is this equivalent to the claim that reason is and ought to be
the slave of tradition? Any careful reading of this passage wiIl
notice that it is explicitly an "is" statement, describing whatactually happens. It needs to be read in the light of Gadamer's
to Truth nlrd Method,
warning in the second edition foreword
"My real concern was and is philosophic: not what we do or
what we ought to do, but what happens to us over and above
our wanting and doing" (p. xxviii)."] Also relevant here is Gadarner's very Heideggerian claim about the limits of reflection:
"Reflection on a given pre-understandingbrings before me
something that otherwise happensbehind my back. Somethingbut not everything, €or what I have called the .ivirk~{Izgsgesdlichtliches Bewusstseilz is inescapably more being than
consciousness,
and being is never fully manifest.""^ In other words, the reflection that critically thematizes some presupposition will itself be
guided by a pre-understanding not yet subjected to criticism.
Gadamer agrees with the pragmatists that
we can subject any of
our beliefs to criticism, but not all at once. We are, as a matter of
fact, always given over to our belonging to history, not so absolutely as to be but pawns, but so thoroughly that the dream of
cognitive autonomy is a pipe dream andthe anxiety of influence
a neurosis: "Does being situated within traditions really mean
being subject to prejudices and limited in one's freedom? Is not,
rather, all human existence, even the freest, limited and qualified
in various ways? If this is true, the idea of an absolute reason is
not it possibility for historical humanity" (p. 276).
There isan "ought" implicit in this analysis.Since foundationalist justifications are unavailable, we ought not to seek them;
and since our commitments always exceed what we can rationally justify in any absolutesense, we ought not to pretend differently.
So reason is and ought to be, not the slave of tradition, but
honest about itsineluctable dependence on tradition. Finitudeis
Elsewhere I have shown that Gadamer repudiates the Hegelian strategy
for achieving absolute knowledge as vigorously as he rejects the Cartesian
strategy. See "Hegel and Gadamer" in H q d , Freedorn, rzrzd Modernity (Albany:
SUNY Press, 1992). I am not convinced by Caputo's claim that Gadarner is
more Hegelian than Heideggerian. See RndicaI Hernlemrtlcs, p. 6 and "Gadamer's Closet Essentialism," p. 259.
Io Pldosophlcal Hermeneutics, p. 38.
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not fate. I am not bound over inexorably to this tradition or that
one. The hermeneutical circle always means that one’s foundations, which cannot eliminate tradition infavor of pure insight,
are contingent and corrigible. The earth rests on the back of a
turtle, and it’s turtles all the way down. Where is the excessive
comfort in this unflinching acknowledgementof reason’s inability to become self-sufficient byescapingthehermeneutical
circle?
FinaIly, an all too brief look at Derrida’s ”left-wing” or radical
AlreadywithHeidegger,hermeneuticsgoes
way beyond the interpretation of texts. Everything, including
ourselves, our artifacts, and the worldof nature, is apprehended
in interpretation. The whole world is a text, or better, a library
of texts. Gadamer makes explicit his own commitment to this
ubiquity of interpretation in the opening essays of Philosophicd
Hermejzeutics.41 One of the ways Derrida affirms the universal
scope of interpretation, and thus the textual character
of the
world, is in his (in)famous claim “There is nofhing otltside the
text.,’-ID
There are two meanings to this thesis, one Kantian and one
Hegelian. Neither implies thatwe are free to make up the world
as we go; instead, both signify textuality as
a limit within which
we havewhatever freedomwe have.The Kantian sense is
rnereIy
the affirmation of the hermeneutical circle in its theoretical dimension, the claim that before we say anything, ”Being must
always already be conceptualized.”This ’must always already’
precisely signifies the originalexile from the kingdom of Being
. . . signifies that Being never is, never shows itself, is never present, is never MOZU, outside difference (in all the senses today requiredbythis
word).’’44In its Kantian form, thisdenial of
”

For a much fuller treatment, see Caputo,Radical Hermeneutics.
”The Universality of the Hermeneutical Problem” and ”On the Scope and
Function of Hermeneutical Reflection.” The latter is an explicit response to
Habermas‘s attempt to delimit hermeneutics.
47 Of Grarnrnntolugy, trans.GayatriChakravortySpivak
(Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 19761, p. 158.
-I4 “Edmond Jab& and the Question of the Book,” in W r i t i q and Difference,
trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 19781, p. 74. See ”DifMrance,” for the spatial and temporal meaning of this key term, in Margins of
41
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presence (and the metaphysicsof presence) is not a denial of the
claim that there is a computer in front of me as I write. It is a
denial of all philosophies according to which either meanings
or facts can be merely and directly present to me, unmediated
essentia1Iy (and not just causally) by that which is absent. There
are noatomic facts, no instantaneous nows.
Of course, there are intuitions and thereis acquaintance. But
such cognitions lose their epistemic privilege when we pay attention to the mediations that make them possible and render
their highly valued immediacy iIlusory. It goes without saying
that Derrida’s is a post-Kantian Kantianism in which thosemediations are themselves diverse and contingent, like Rorty’s optional vocabularies, not universal and necessary.
But when introducing his ”nothing outside the text” thesis,
Derrida focuses on the Hegelian meaning of his claim. The point
is not primarily that
we have access to, in this case, persons
”only in the text,” that is, in some particular interpretation of
them, ”and we have neither any means of altering this, nor any
right to neglect this limitation. All reasons of this type would
already be sufficient, to be sure, but there are more radical reasons.” The moreradical reasons concern the nature of the things
themselves, not our access to them.“What we have tried to show
. . . is that in what one calls the real life of these existences ‘of
flesh and bone,’ beyond and behind what one believes can be
circumscribed as Rousseau’s text, there has never been anything
but writing.”45
What does it mean to say that ”beyond and behind” the text
of Rousseau’s Cofzfessiorls, throughwhich we have access to
Rousseau, Mamma, and Thkrese, they themselves, and whatever
else gets written about or interpreted, are texts? Most simply
put, ”The thirrg itself is a sig~t.” Like signs, things essentially point
beyond themselves. We must abandon the search for the transcendental signified and, what is the same, the distinction between sign and signified. For there is no signified that ”would
Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982). The
temporal sense of the term derives from the deconstructive reading of Husserl
on internal time consciousness that Derrida gives in Speech a d Pllenameun,
trans. David B. Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973).
‘’Of G I X ~ ~ Z W Epp.
I ~ 158-59.
O~O~~,
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the cards €or us; it is an abandonment of the quest for certainty
and of the Cartesian (foundationalist) and Hegelian (totalizing)
strategies for achieving it. But this is just as true of Heidegger
and Gadamer. Even if some hermeneutical turns are sharper,
and thus more radical, than others, we should not lose sight of
the common ground that unites thehermeneutical traditions as
an alternative to those epistemologies that seek to locate know1edge in some Alpha or Omega point beyond interpretation.

Appropriating Postmodernisml
ONCEUPON A TIME, not yesterday, but not so very long ago,
I’m told, there was a minister in the Reformed tradition whose
sermons all had three points.In itself that is not unusual, butin
this case they were the same three points, regardlessof the text.
Each text was expounded in terms
of (1)what it said against the
Arminians, (2) what it said against the papists, and (3) what it
said against the modernists.
It would nodoubt be going too far tocall this zealous preacher
a postmodernist. But he certainly was persistent in expressing
his suspicions of modernity. Moreover, he suggests that one
might have theological reasons for such suspicions and that a
Christian thinker might be sympathetic with postmodernism,
which shares those suspicions.
But, the objection immediately arises, postmodernism is a radically secular movement. If by postmodernism you mean (as in
fact I do) such philosophers as Derrida, Foucault, and Rorty,
along with those aspectsof Nietzsche and Heidegger they have
appropriated, it is clear that the ’and’ in ’Christianity and postmodern philosophy’ can signify only an either/or without compromise. What has Athens to do with Jerusalem, or, to be a bit
more current, what has Paris to do with Grand Rapids (aka the
New Jerusalem)? Is not the task of the Christian thinker in the
face of such godless projects of thought to inoculate the faithful
against these diseases, first by warning them of the dangers
posed by Nietzsche and his minions, and then by refuting their
philosophies, wholesaleif possible, but retail if necessary’?
Before suggesting a different response, I note in passing the
I The following is a lecture presented on June 26, 1996, at Calvin College,
Grand Rapids, Michigan, in connection with a Calvin College Faculty Summer
Seminar in Christian Scholarship, a program funded by the Pew Charitable
Trusts. The theme of the six-week Seminar was Postmodern Philosophy and
Christian Thought.

all too real possibility that such refutations will consist of arguments designed to persuade those within the
circle of faith and
will often come down to little more than ”They are different
from us.” When apologetics lets this happen,it does not constitute a serious engagement with one’s opponents and can even
be construed, not without reason, as a refusal even to talk with
them.
”Appropriating postmodernism” is the name I give to the alternative strategy I wish to propose, one that seeks a middle
way between the total rejection of the refusenik and the equally
uncritical jumping on the bandwagon
of this month’s politically
correct fad.
One can thinkof appropriation asa doubly violentact. When,
for example, Derrida appropriates Heidegger, he first distinguishes the wheat from the chaff and discards Heidegger’s romantic/mysticaltendencies as relics of themetaphysics of
presence that both seek to overcome. Then he recontextualizes
the features of Heidegger’s attempt at the overcoming of rnetaphysics to which he is sympathetic, relocating them in his conceptualframeworkratherthan
in Heidegger’s. In their new
home they are recognizable, but not always immediately or easily, for their meaningis no longer quitethe same, and thevocabulary in which they are expressed is often quite different.
Without forgetting thedual negativity of rejection and recontextualization, it is possible to think of such an appropriation as
an invitation to conversation. The appropriator, after listening
carefully to the appropriatee, responds by saying, ”I find these
aspects of your presentation quite compellingand illuminating.
But for me they work better when recontextualized as follows.
Of course, that changes the project somewhat and involves the
abandonment of this or that aspect of your original proposal.
But don’t you agree that those ideasof yours I find compelling
work better in the context I propose, or at least, since they can
be fruitfully put to workthere, that theyare notinherently wedded to the larger goalsof your project?”
Whether one thinks of appropriation as violence or invitation
to conversation, 1 suggest that although it does not involve discovering anycounterexamples, it is a form of philosophical
I
counterargument. In another context, thiswasthestrategy
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adopted in response to thereligion critiques of Marx, Nietzsche,
and Freud. In a book called Stlspiciorz nrtd FnifJz, I argued that
their accounts of the ways in which irreligious interests shape
religious ideas and especially the uses to which theyare put by
the believing individual and community are genuine insights
and that the task of the Christian thinker is not to refute them
but to acknowledge their force. But I also argued that Marx,
Nietzsche, and Freud are plagiarists, that this kind of critique
has its origin inbiblical religion itself, that its proper motivation
is a religious fear of idolatry, and that its proper home is the
communities of biblical faith. Although I did not try to refute
the atheism of Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud directly, I did note
that my recontextualization involved the abandonment of that
aspect of their project, and I claimed to have shown that thereis
nothing inherently atheistic about their critique. That religious
people are often, even always, idolatrous, worshipping a god
created in their own image and in conformity with their own
interests, does not mean that thereis no God.
Since Marx and Freud are quintessentially modern thinkers,
while Nietzsche is a posthumous postmodernist, it will obviously notdo to identify postmodernism with their hermeneutics
of suspicion. So how shall we identify what might be appropriated in the present context? Postmodernism is as difficult to
define as, say, romanticism. Or more so. Just as romanticism is
defined with reference to classicism, so postmodernism is defined with reference to modernity. But there are so many modernisms. We speak of modernism in music, literature, painting,
and architecture. I shall not be concerned with these aesthetic
modernisms nor with the various postmodernisms that stand
over against them. We have already been remindedof theological modernism. That, too, is not my point of reference. But it
brings us closer to what we want, for “modernism” was the
early-twentieth-century American name for the liberal Protestant theology that developed during the nineteenth century in
Germany, and that theology was an attempt to accommodate
the message of Christianity to ”the modern mind,” to “modern
man come of age.”
It is this latter modernity (which was not particularly gender
conscious) to which the philosophical postmodernism that con-
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cerns me is the aftermath. It is a philosophicalattitude, expressed in a wide variety of philosophical theories, that mightbe
described as a certain faith in reason, a reason thattook scientific
objectivity and method as its touchstones. The philosophers I
have named, along with quite a few others, are united by a loss
of that faithin that reason.It should be obvious, but needs
to be
noted, that their loss of faith represents a threat to moral and
religious values just and only to the degree that those values
have been wedded to modern or Enlightenment conceptionsof
reason.
Let me illustrate what I mean by this latter point with reference to three theologians I encountered a few weeks ago during
my undergraduate studies. All wanted to base their theology
on the authority of biblical revelation, and all thought the right
account of that authoritywas the theory of biblical inerrancy. So
it is clear that all were fartoo conservative to have any sympathy
for theological liberalism. Yet two of them, ironically, had wedded their conservative theologies to precisely that modernity
with which that liberalism had sought accommodation.In terms
of theological content no onewould have called their theologies
modernistic. But the metaclaims they made about their theologies, to which, it should be noted, they gave theological status,
were born of the Enlightenment, children of Athens rather than
Jerusalem.
One of them said, ”With the helpof biblical revelation we can
achieve a knowledge of God wholly on a par with God’s own
self-knowledge. Our knowledge does not extendas far as God’s,
of course, but what we know is not in any way inferior to God’s
knowledge of the same truths.” This meansthat theological
knowledge, with thehelp of revelation, achieves the ideal of objectivity and perfect correspondence that science was thought to
achieve in relation to nature. This knowledge is entirely free
from prejudice or perspective, is wholly unconditioned by interests and desires, and is relative to no human culture.
N.B. Our theologian is not saying this about the Bible, but
about his own theology, at least in principle, at least when he
gets it right.
As a hint toward the possibility of a theologically motivated
I remind you
postmodern protest against this metatheology,
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that it is not just Nietzsche but alsoKierkegaard’s Climacus who
wages a sustained polemic against claims that human knowledge can operate sub specie aeterni, can peek over God’s shoulder
and see thingsfrom the divineperspective.
Our second theologian lectured on the perspicuity of scripture. He said, ”It is not necessary for us to interpret the Bible.
The Bible interprets itself. When we use the proper grammaticohistorical method, the meanings that resultare, if not untouched
by human hands, at
least uncontaminated by human culturesin
their finitude and fallenness.” Truth in advertising might have
required that the lecturebe titled “Cartesian hermeneutics.”
N.B. Once again, by a curious osmosis, the absoluteness first
claimed for biblical revelation has been claimed for a particular
theology, at least insofar as it has been methodologically rigorous.
In its generalform, this non sequituris anything but rare. One
does not even have to listen very closely to those who present
themselves as defenders of Absolute Truth or Absolute Values
to hear the all too frequent follow-up: ”And since We are the
defenders of Absolutes, it should come as no surprise that we
are the ones in possession of them. Our theories are the Truth
and our practices are the Good.’’ One of the tasks of a theologically motivated appropriationof postmodernism is to challenge
this move in a11 its forms, blatant and subtle. For just as I do not
become purple by speaking about violets, so I do not become
absolute by speaking about God. The divine character
of revelation does not cancel out the human character of my attempt to
say what it means.
If our first two theologians would be surprised to
discover
how thoroughly Cartesian they are, our third would be surprised to find himself linked to postmodernism. But he used to
say, “The Bible is the divinely revealed misinformation about
God.” This means that his theology, based on biblical revelation,
will never get it right, no matter how methodologically rigorous.
His beliefs will never simply correspond to the object they intend; they will never be theo d e p a t i o of his intellect to the divine
reality. He is a theologically motivated anti-realist, and just to
that degreewe can say, a bit anachronistically, that he has appropriated postmodernism.
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modernists can debate what theories we should adopt, while
denying that anyof them simply andfinally gets it right.
If the self-reference objection had the force its proponents
wish for, there would be nothing left of postmodernism to appropriate, at least not as a theory of Truth. But it doesn‘t have
that force, and in thatrespect the path to appropriation remains
open. I remain interested in appropriation because I find much
in the postmodern hermeneuticsof finitude andof suspicion to
be compelling philosophically.Moreover, as a Christian thinker
I find postmodernism’shermeneutics of finitudehelpfulin
thinking about human createdness and its hermeneutics of suspicion helpful in thinking about human fallenness.
As promised, my appropriation will involve a double negation, a rejection and a recontextualizing. Both of these stem from
the way the postmodern insights get expressed. It seems to me
that the postmodern arguments are about the limits of human
understanding and that they support the claim that we do not
have access to Truth. But that is different from the claim that
there is no Truth, which would be true only if there were no
other subject or subjects capable of Truth. But one looks in vain
for an argument, even a bad argument, for the claim that the
conditions for human understanding are the conditionsfor any
understanding whatever.
Secular postmodernism is guilty, I believe, of a non sequitur
that is equal but opposite to the one noticed
we
earlier. That one
slid from ”There is something Absolute” to “Our speech about
the Absolute must be absolute.” Postmodernism tends to slide
”We have no absoluteinsight’’ to
in the opposite direction, from
“There is no absolute insight.” Hence the formulation, “The
truth is that there is zzo Trtrth.” But this is equivalent to the claim
that since our understanding is not divine there is no divine
understanding, a view that might be taken to exaggerate our
importance in the overall scheme of things.
Kant, in the First Critique, is as stubborn as any postmodernist
in denying our access to Truth.But he thinks it would be simple
dogmatism to deny the reality of God and thatonly God’s
knowledge,unlike human knowledge, deserves tobe called
Truth. Similarly, in a context where Truth and System have been
tightly linked by Hegelian theory, Kierkegaard’s Climacus says
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that reality is a system for God, but not for us as existing creatures. These two thinkers provide
the theistic context into which
I would like to appropriate postmodernism’s claim. In this case,
notsurprisingly,recontextualizingmeansreformulating.The
version I want to propose is this:
The truth is that there is Truth, but in our finitudeand fallenness
we do not have access to it, We’ll have to make do with the truths
available to us; but that does not mean either that we should deny
the reality of Truth or that we should abandon the distinction between truth and falsity. Moreover, the most we should claim for
this claim itself is that it is true, that it is the best way for us humans to think about the matter.

,

The rejection that accompanies this recontextualizingis fairly
obvious. It is the secular, atheistic project of some postmodernists that falls by the wayside. My claim is that the arguments I
am interested in appropriating neither presuppose nor entail a
godless world and that the links between those arguments and
the secular project with which they are usually associated by
friend and foe alike are merely biographical and not conceptual.
To repeat, this is because those arguments show, not that there
is no God, but simply thatwe are not God.Moreover, they do so
in ways that make it more difficult to agree thatwe are not God
and then go about our business, theoretical and practical, as if
we were.
In saying that wedo not have access to the Truth,I am claiming thatwe do not possess it, that we do not preside over it, that
our knowledge fails to embody the ideals of adequation and
correspondence in terms of which Truth has traditionally been
defined. But this does not entail that the Truth has no access to
us, or that we should abandon the attempt to determine how
best to think about what thereis. The boy who doesnot suckon
coins because his parents have told him about thebugs that will
make him sick does not have the Truth about the matter (defined, in the analogy, by superior parental knowledge). But he
does think aboutthe matteras a boy with his intellectual limitations ought to think about it. Moreover, it is important to recognize from a theological point of view that his knowledge of the
is suffitruth of the matter, while neither Knowledge nor Truth,
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cient to keep him healthy(so far as coins are concerned) and to
bring him into a grateful and obedient relation
to his parents. It
is not clear that we should ask our knowledge
of God to do more
than this.
I want to conclude with a remembrance of another pastor,this
one my own, years ago. His preaching did not shy away in the
least from kerygmatic boldness; and he never suggested that we
replace the Ten Commandments with the Ten Suggestions. He
wrestled hard with the biblical text in order that his sermons
might be as faithful toit as possible. But with great regularity he
ended his sermons with these words: I think it must be something like that, I like to think of him, anachronistically to be sure,
as having appropriated postmodernism.

5

Christian Philosophers and the
Copernican Revolution
SHOULD
CHRISTIAN
PHILOSOPHERS be favorably or unfavorably
disposed toward Kantian idealism? I want to suggest that they
should be favorably disposed, that there are important affinities
between Kantian idealism and Christian theism-important resources in the former for expressing themes essential to the
latter.
This is not a majority report. Christian philosophers, both
Catholic and Protestant, have often felt a strong need to be
realists and have exhibited a correspondingly strong allergic reaction to Kantian idealism in all its forms. No student of Art
Holmes is likely to say that there is only oneway to be a Christian philosopher; and so I do not wish to deny that realism has
resources that can be put to good use by Christian thinkers. I
wish only to suggest that theinstinctive distrust of Kantian idealism is unfortunate and inneed of being overcome.
A recent renunciation of Kant and all his works can be found
in Alvin Plantinga’s 1989-90 Stob Lectures, “The Twin Pillars of
Christian Scholarship.”’ In disputing that repudiation of Kant,
my quarrel is not with Plantinga in particular but with a widespread tendency among Christian philosophers to which he has
given a powerful, simple, and typically witty expression.
Rejecting the view that human reason is worldview neutral,
he claims that philosophical conflict is one form in which the
battle between the Civitas Dei and the Civitas Mundi takes place.
In the western intellectual world at presenthe sees two primary
opponents to Christian theism: Perennial Naturalism, with its
ancient roots in Epicurus, Democritus, and Lucretius, and CrePublished as a pamphlet by Calvin College and Seminary, Grand Rapids,
Mich., 1990. Cited in the text as TI?
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ative Anti-realism, with its ancient roots in Protagoras and his
claim that man (sic) is the measure of all things. But he makes it
clear that the real locus classicus for this second major modern
threat to Christian theism is Kant’s Critique of Pure Rensolz (TP
pp. 10,14-15).
At issue is the epistemological core of the First Critique, to
which he gave memorable expression in the preface to the second edition by calling it a second Copernican Revolution. Realism hasassumedthat
”all ourknowledgemustconformto
objects.” His idealism will explore the alternative, ”that objects
must conform to our knowledge” (B p. xvi). Plantinga identifies
precisely this move as theessence of Creative Anti-realism: “But
the fundamental thrust of Kant’s self-styled Copernican Revolution is that the thingsin the world owe their basic structure and
perhaps their very existence to the noetic activity of our minds”
(TI‘ p. 15). I want to suggest that there are four fundamentally
different kinds of Kantianism, and that only one of these merits
the negative response Plantinga gives to Creative Anti-realism
in general.
The epistemological claim of realists is that ”knowledge must
conform to objects” because such conformity (however difficult
it may be to state whereinit consists) is both possible in principle
and just what it takes to make our judgments or beliefs into
knowledge. It is this claim that Kant seeks to qualify substantially. Much of what he counts as human knowledge is not our
conforming to the way things are but their conforming to the
way we apprehend them.
My experience in trying to teach Kant is that students are so
deeply wedded to some sort of commonsense realism that they
have a difficuIt time, not so much in accepting Kant’s claim, as
in first understanding what he is saying. So when I teach the
First Critique I resort to homely examples.I ask how it is possible for me to know a priori, that is, before turning on the TV to
watch the Evening News, that Dan Rather’s tie will be various
shades of gray. A typical answer will have an inductive character
quite contrary to Kant’s meaning. Dan Rather has been wearing
gray ties all week, so I infer that he will do so again tonight.
I insist that I have not been watching the news latelyand have
no observational basis for such an inference, but nevertheless
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know for sure that the tie will be gray tonight. Silence. Then,
suddenly, a light goes on, and some student solves the puzzle.
”You’re watching on a black and white TV set.” From there it is
fairly easy to show that Kant thinks of the human mind as a
kind of receiving apparatuswhose
”spontaneity”permits
things, regardless of what they are actually Iike, to appear only
in certain ways.
Crude as this model is, it illustrates several key elements in
Kant’s account. First, it attributes some but not
all of the features
I perceive the object to have to my receiving apparatus. I can
know the tie’s color a priori, for example, but not whether it
will be polka dot or striped. For Kant the features due to the
“spontaneity” of the human mind areformal, the formsof intuition and the categories of understanding: hence the appropriateness of describing the Copernican Revolution as attributing
the ”basic structure’’ of things in the world to ”thenoetic activity of our minds.”
Second, this model helpsus resolve the question whetherthey
owe ”their very existence” to that same activity. Plantinga’s answer to the question of whether Kant makes such a claims is
“perhaps.”2 It might be better to say, It depends. One way of
talking about Dan Rather’s tie is to say that there are two of
them, the red and blue one I would see if I were in the studio
and could see it without dependence on my black and white
receiving apparatus, andthe gray one I see while watchingTV
On the other hand, since I more naturally say I am watching
Dan Rather than that I am watching his image on the screen
(unless I am comparing two sets with higher andlower resolution), it might be better to speak of only one tie and of two ways
of seeing it. In both cases I look at his redand blue tie, but in the
studio I see it as it truly is, while at homewatching TV I see it as
it has been systematically distorted by areceiving apparatus that
simulfmeously makes it possible for me to see the tie at d l ( s i m c I‘m
~zotill the stzrdio) and makes i f impossible for me to see it as it t r d y is,
Now, Kant often talks the first way, as if there were two
In his discussion of Creative Anti-realism in his 1982 Presidential Address
to the Central Divislon of the APA, Plantinga exhibits the same uncertainty.
See “How to Be an Anti-realist,” in Pvoceedillgs m d Addresses of t h Amricarz
~

Philosoyhicd Assacit7fiotl, 1983, pp. 48 and 50.
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worlds, a noumenal world of things in themselves and a phenomenal world of appearances. But a careful reading makes it
clear that thisis just a faqorr de parler, a convenient, all but inevitable way of speaking about two ways of apprehending one setof
objects.
Both ways of speaking have their point, but as with the distinction between use and mention or between the material and
formal mode, it is important to be clear which one is operative
in any given context. It we are speaking the language of two
worlds, then it makes sense to say that ”the things in the [phenomenal] world owe their . . . existence to the noetic activity of
our minds.” For without that activity there would be no such
world and no such things.
If, on the other hand, we are speaking of one object and two
modes of apprehension, it would be misleading to attribute the
existence of things to ournoetic activity for just the same reason
that it would be silly to attribute the existence of Dan Rather’s
red and blue tie to the ”spontaneity” of my black and whiteTV
set. Without leaving this mode of thought, however, we could
say that the thing (the onlytie there is, the red and blue one) as
k m z m by us (and thus seemingto be gray) owes itsexistence to
the receiving apparatus, though the thing as it is in itself does
not. This way of speaking brings us so close to the language of
two objects and two worlds that the virtual inevitability of this
mode of speaking becomes clear.
A third advantage of our crude model is that it illuminates
Kant’s theory of the thing in itself, and, in so doing, reveals the
realism at the base of his idealism. Two important points about
Kant’s theory of the thing in itself are suggested by our model.
In the first place, by refusing to jettison the thing in
itself as
later idealists from Fichte and Hegel to Husserl and Rorty have
wanted to do, he makes it clear that the world whose existence
is dependent on our apprehension is not the world. It is only our
world, the worldof appearances, the world as known
by us; and
the dependence of that world on our apprehension is tautological.
In the secondplace, our model illustrates thefact that for Kant
the thingin itself, which is what is
it independently of our noetic
acts, is not best identifiedmerely by that independence.It is true
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that the realtie, the red and blue one, is what it is without reference to the black and white TV sets through which it may appear. If all those sets were destroyed, it wouldstill be there. But
it is not necessary to identify the tie without any reference to its
being observed. On the contrary, it is most easily identified as
the tie as seenby those in the studio2
For Kant, to be in thestudio means, quite simply, to be God.
Thus, for Kant, the thing in itself is the thing as apprehended by
God.4In the aftermath of Kant there has often been debateover
whether it makes any sense to speakof a world, of objects and
properties, of facts and truths, independent
of any andall apprehension of them. It is an interesting debate; but in view of the
tight link Kant makes between the thing
in itself and God’s
knowledge, it is a debate rendered not in the least
necessary by
the First Critique.
In that context, of course, Kant cannot simply helphimself to
God’s existence, so the point musthave a hypothetical character.
The thing in itself is the thing as apprehended by the God of
classical theism if there is such a God. But even in this hypothetical mode, Kant does not knowhow to identifythe world, except
by reference to God’s knowledge. Kant is, we might say, a perspectivist, and unless God (or someviable surrogate) represents
the perspective on the world, it is not clear that thereis anything
that deserves to be called the world.
Now it becomes clear how the Kantian version of Creative
Anti-realism, so far from beingone of the major modern threats
to Christian theism, is itself an essentially theistic the01-y.~The
If there are color-blind people in the studio, we need only apply our analysis of the TV set as a distorting apparatus to their biological sensing equipment. The tie in itself is the tie as apprehended by viewers whose cognitive
equipment is properly functioning.But if I am watching a black and white TV
instead of being present in the studio, the proper functioningof my cognitive
equipment will avail nothing so far as seeing the thing asit is in itself.
For a more detailed, textual presentation of this thesis and its implications,
see my essay ”In Defense of the Thing in Itself,” Kanf-Stldien 59, no. 1 (19681,
pp. 118-41.
Thomas Aquinas writes, “Even if there were no human intellects, there
could be truths becauseof their relation to the divineintellect. But if, per imyossible, there were no intellects at all, but things continued to exist, then there
from De
would be no such reality as truth.” Plantinga quotes this passage
Veritate Q. 1, A. 6 in ”How to Be an Anti-realist” (p. 68) as partof his argument
J
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The result is that the theistic character of Kantian idealism is
often overlooked entirely and almost never emphasized. Humanists often treat Kant as if he were a humanist. While this
helps to explain the negative reaction Christian philosophers
often have toward Kant, it does not justify it. For the humanist
reading of Kant does great violence to the text, while a textually
responsible reading develops an important theistic theme.
It is the general structure of the Copernican Revolution that I
wish to commend to Christian philosophers, not necessarily its
details. But I do want to look at a coupleof “details” that play a
significant role in Plantinga’s critique, to try to clear awaywhat I
see to be misunderstanding. Still speaking aboutKant, he writes,
Such fundamental structures of the world as those of space and
time, object and property, number, truth andfalsehood, possibility and necessity-these are not to be found in theworld as such,
but are somehow constituted by our own mental or conceptual
activity . . . they are not to be found in the things themselves. . , .
Were there no persons like ourselves engaging in noetic activities,
time, nothing displaying obthere would be nothing in space and
ject-property structure, nothing that is true or false, possible or
impossible, no kind of things coming in a certain numbernothing like this at aII.” (TI? pp. 14-15).R

The reference to truth and
falsity makes it look as if Kant identifies truth with human truth
after all, qualifying for the humanist designation and the oppositionof theists. But what doesKant
mean by saying that these characteristics are not to be found ”in
the world as such,” that is, in the world as it really is? Nothing
”world as such,” which is to say, the world as
more than that the
God sees it, does not have the temporal characteristics of human
experience. For all of the a priori features that define the phenomenal world and wouId be lacking in the absence of human
knowers are essentially tied to the humanexperience of time: (1)
Time, for Kant, is the sequential flow of inner and outer sense,
without which there is no human experience at all. (2) Space is
x Although such terms
as truth and falsity, object and property do not appear
in Kant‘s table of categories, it is not difficult to identify the categories Plantinga expresses with these terms, reality and negation, inherence and subsistence respectively. (A 80 = B 106).
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essentially temporal for Kant as well, since, to put it crudely, it
takes timefor perception to move from here to there. (3) Finally,
all twelve categories,insofar as theyconstitutetheworld
of
human experience and are not merely formal features of judgment, are schematized withan essential reference to time. Thus
the object and property that would disappearfrom the world in
the absence of human knowers are not object and property per
se, but substance and accident IZS defirjed by humall felnpordity.
Similarly, the truth and falsity that would disappear derive
from
the categories of reality and negation as esserlfidly linked fo o w
experience uf time. Thus we are back to the tautology that in the
absence of human cognition, the worldas ayyrehemkd by hz~mmz
minds would disappear.
All this leaves God free to apprehendobjects and their properties and to distinguish truth from falsity in the manner proper
to divine knowledge. On Kant’s view (and Plantinga’s, according to a recent essay), whatwe know about the natureof divine
knowledge is somewhat overwhelmingly exceeded by whatwe
don’t know. But surely on the basis of what Kant has said we
are not entitled to say with regard to such features of our world
as object and property or truth and falsity that withoutus there
would be ”nothing like this at
all.”
My teacher, Wilfrid Sellars, used to talk about the thing in
and wishing to
itself as in sprace andtrirne. Though no theist he,
put Kant to essentially humanist uses, he recognized that Kant
assumes some kindof correlation between the phenomenal and
noumenal worlds.Of course, he is not in a position to prove this
or to specify the nature of what we might call the analogy between the two by translating the metaphors of sprace and trime
(Sellars’s metaphors, not Kant’s) into the proseof the phenomenal world. The point is simply that nothing Kant says prohibits
the assumptionof such an analogy. Kant’s doctrine only prohibits the claim that our knowledge and God’s are univocal.
Objection-Kant’s theism makes too sharp a distinction, more
Platonic than biblical, between time and eternity. Today some
theists want to move away from the fut1u.usirnu2 tradition and to
say that God is in some sense intime. That would seem tomake
Kant’s move unnecessary.
Xeyly-(l) Even if God is in some sense in time, there might
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we11 be such a significant difference between divine and human
temporality that the distinction between the worldfor God and
the world for us remains necessary for the theist. (2) To say, on
the other hand, that God‘s temporality is so nearly univocal to
ours that the distinctionis otiose is to stretchtheism to its limits,
or beyond; but in any case, the Kantian attempt to preserve the
distinction would bean intra-theistic debate rather than the onslaught of the Ciuifns Mrrndi on the Ciuitas Dei.
Objecfiolz-But Kant’s theory is not just about our knowledge
of the world. It is also about our knowledge of God, and it entails that we cannot prove the existence of God, thereby depriving faith of its rational foundation.
Reply-(1) Kant‘s rejection of the ontological argument does
not derive from the Copernican Revolution but from the quite
different doctrine that existence is not a predicate. If he is mistaken about that,the ontological argument mightwork. (2)
Kant’s theory does nothing to preclude the moral argument for
the existence of God and might be seen as paving the way for it.
(3) Theistic proofs are not in any case an integral part of theism,
only of certain theistic systems. Many theists reject some or all
of the traditionalproofs, and some go so far as to argue that the
very project of trying to provethe existence of God is dangerous,
if not to theism, then to the faith theism means to express. In
short, the debateover theistic proofs is not the confrontationbetween the Civitas Mzlrzdi and the Civitas Dei either.
Objection-The previous objection raised the right issuebut in
the wrong way. It is our knowledge of God that is primarily at
issue; but the issue concerns revealed rather than natural theology. Scriptural revelation, received in faith, gives us a knowledge of God fully on a par with God’s own self-knowledge. But
Kant’s distinction betweenhuman and divine knowledge denies
this possibility.
Rephy-There is a considerable difference between the claim
that biblical revelation teaches us things we need to know and,
given our finitude and sinfulness, cannot discover on our own
and the claim made for revelation by the objector, whose theism
might well be described as hubristic theism. My teacher, Kenneth Kantzer (well known, like the objector, for his “high” view
of Scripture), used to say that the Bible gives us the divinely
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revealed misinformation about God. Thatwas his way of saying
that revelation is incarnational, that it comes to us as we are
rather than lifting us quite completely out of the human condition. Kant is no threat to this kind of theism; and if he is a threat
to the hubristic theism of the objector, he is in good company.
Was it not St. Paul who said that “we know only in part’’ and
see even that part “in a mirror dimly” (I Cor. 13:9, 12)? Once
again the CopernicanRevolution is not the Trojan horse that the
Civifas Mzsndi is trying to sneak into the Civitas Dei. It rather
serves as a reminder to the citizens of the latter that the city of
their love was not named after them.
Having promised to discuss four kindsof ”Kantian” idealism,
I turn briefly to three versions that differ in importantways from
Kant’s own. A11 of them reflect the fact that the history of the
Copernican Revolution, in spite of the universalist character
Kant gave to it, has been, from at least the time of Hegel on,
particularist and pluralist. For Kant, the forms and categories
that constitute the phenomenal world are atwork in all. human
cognition, at all times and in all places. But almost immediately
people began to notice the operation of historically specific a
priories constitutinga variety of human worlds.
I like to illustrate this variation on the Kantian theme with
another homely illustration. Suppose I am a racist and I meet a
member of a racial group I despise. I “know” a priori that this
person will have a number of undesirable characteristics and
will be inferior to me intellectually and morally. For my racism
has turned my mind into a receiving apparatus that will only
allow people of that race to appear in thatway, just as the black
and white TV allows red and blue ties to appear only as gray.
This racism is no doubt shared byothers, with whom I live together in a world constituted by our shared racist a priori. In
that world personsof the race(s) in question appearof necessity
to be quite different from what they are in themselves, that is,
different from theway God, and,for that matter,humans whose
cognitive apparatus is functioning properly, see them.It is quite
easy to apply a Kantian analysis to the many different worlds
(good, bad, and indifferent) that make up human history. We
usually call them cultures (or subcultures).
It is at this point that Hl{vlzllrlist-nelativist Creafizw Anti-realism
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enters thescene. Lacking any possible reference to God's perspective as the criterion of the world, and faced with the overwhelming variety of human worlds (even in the natural sciences, in the
aftermath of Kuhn et al.), it is easy for the humanist to conclude
"that there simply isn't any such thingas objective truth. . . . The
whole idea of an objective truth, the same for all of us, on this
view, is an illusion, or a bourgeois plot, or a silly mistake. Thus
does anti-realism breed relativism and nihilism'' (TP p. 18).
In his Stob Lectures Plantinga calls this view "deeply antagonistic to a Christian way of looking at the world' (TI' p. 19; cf. p.
20). In his 1982 Presidential Address to the Central Division of
the APA, he attributes this view to Richard Rorty and suggests
that it represents an illegitimate inference from the true premise
that there is "no methodical way to settle all important disagreements."' It is, we might say, like concluding from thefact that the
jury is hung thatthe defendant wasneither guilty nor innocent.
I agree with bothof these assessments of this particularist Protagoreanism. I also find it both logically and theologically problematic. But I demur to the tag line, "Thus does anti-realism
breed relativism and nihilism.'' For what drives this relativism is
its humanism, notits anti-realism. The two together can give rise
to views like Rorty's. But theism, combined with a bizarre reading
of Genesis 11, has generated a theological rationale for apartheid
in South Africa. Yet it would be strange to say, "Thus does theism
give rise to racism." Plantinga's dire warnings should have been
directed at thisspecies of Creative Anti-realism, not at the entire
genus. Only some mushrooms are poisonous.
There is another humanist variation on the
Kantian theme. Let
us call it ~~~l.Prarrist-Objecfivist
Creative Anti-vealist~z.It recognizes
the plurality of human worlds (cultures, paradigms, language
resolvgames) and even the absence of any neutral algorithm for
ing our deepest disputes about how the world
is or ought tobe.
But
At the descriptive level it is as pluralist as the previous view.
it does not abandon the notion of objective truth.
Lacking God, it needs what was previously referred to as a
viable surrogate for the divineperspective that would signifythe
world. It designates the consensus of the ideal (counterfactual)
"

"How to Be an Anti-realist," pp. 62-64.
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human community of investigators as the criterion of Truth. A
classic expression of this view is Peirce's definition of truth:
"The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all
who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object
real."l0
represented in this opinion is the
According to this view the distinction between appearances
and the thing initself returns. The thing initself is the object of
that ultimate consensus. Anything elseis appearance. Thus we
may (think we>have good reason to think that Newtonian physics is closer to the truth than Aristotelian, and relativity and
quantum physics closer than Newtonian. But none of these can
claim to be more thanour best approximation to the Truth, our
current truth. Since the idea of Truth functions as a regulative
ideal, any currenttruth is phenomenal and not noumenal truth.
Habermas's notion of a consensus reachedby an ideal speech
community or in accordance with the counterfactual norms
imis an extension of this ideato normaplicit in ordinary discourse
tive as well as factual truth. Its explicit purpose is to retain, in
the face of various forms of ethical relativism,an objective truth
for ethics analogous to whatis available for science." Here, too,
the clear implication is that whileall our judgments, whether of
fact or of right, are open to challenge and revision, these truths
are answerable to the Truth.'z
Since this is a humanist view, the theist will find it inadequate.
But once again it is important to locate the disagreement correctly. The proper theistic complaint against this view is that it
1 0 Collected Payers of Chnrles Sanders Peirce, ed. Charles Hartshorne and Paul
Welss (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard UniversityPress, 1931-351, vol. 5, p. 407.
1 1 Habermas does not treat
all value judgments as objective. Some remain
line
matters of taste, so he distinguishes the right from the good. Drawing the
is a difficult and hotly disputed task. But the point is that Habermas is an
ethical as well as a factual objectivist. In the midst of de facto moral pluralism,
he holds that our judgments about what
is right are responsible to a norm
independent of what we or anyone else at any given moment may happen to
think. See especially "Discourse Ethics: Notes on a Program of Philosophical
Justification," in Mural Comciousness and Cornrnunicnfive Action, trans. Christian
Lenhardt and Shierry Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge, Mass.:MIT Press, 1990).
I 2 Habermas is more explicit than P e k e about the humanistcharacter of his
view. This comes most fully to expression in his theory of the linguistification
of the sacred, the substitutionof human language for God. See Theory of Communicative Action, trans. Thomas McCarthy,2 vols. (Boston: Beacon Press, 1984,
19871, vol. 11, pp. 77 ff.
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is humanist, not thatit is an anti-realist. For it is the former and
not the latter that links this theory
to the Cizlifcls M z i d i .
At the same time, the theist has reason to appreciate several
features of this view in spite of its humanism. First, the PH (for
Peirce-Habermas) version of Creative Anti-realism can recognize
at the descriptive level the unsurpassabIepluraIity of human perspectives without abandoning the notion of objective truth. Unlike relativistic anti-realism, it doesn’t conclude from a hung jury
that the defendant neither did nor did not commit the crime.
Thus it can avoid the temptation, to which the Enlightenment
succumbed, of having to make excessive claims for human reason’s actual ability in order to preserve the notion of objectivity.
Second, it can nevertheless reflect critically about the criteria
and the methodologiesby which our efforts to know thereal are
shaped. The goal, ideal hzrrnnn consensus (which the humanist
will call Truth, the theist truth), may well enable us to specify
norms with whose helpour progress is more likely to be in the
right direction than without them.
For the humanist this will
primarily concern science (the realm of objective fact) and ethics/politics (the realm of objective value). For the theist it will
also include theology, and the theologian (whose proper goalis
also an ideal h r n m z consensus) might well learn from thephilosophy of science and from critical social theory lessons that will
help to develop a sounder hermeneutics
for interpreting the data
of experience and biblical revelation. The task of finding a middle groundbetween arrogantobjectivism and cynical relativism
is just as difficult for theology as for science and ethics.
PH
Finally, the theist can appreciate and appropriate from the
version of Kantianism its strong sense of the penultimate (at
of the de facto pluralbest) characterof our current theories and
ism of perspectives from which we find ourselves unable to extricate ourselves other than by fiat. The reminder that our best
theories to date, includingour theologies, are in their very structure and not just in their details fallible, open to critique, and
revisable can be welcomed by the theist, who is committed to
taking both human finitude and human sinfulness seriously.
This reference to sinfulness brings us to our fourth and final
version of Kantianism. It is a theistic view that equates the thing
in itself with the thing as known by God. Thus it holds to an
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objectivist notion of truth. Its idealistic interpretation of human
understanding differs from Kant’s and agrees with the two humanist variations we have examined by giving a pluralist account of thephenomenalworld.The
a prioriesthatdefine
human cultures, paradigms, language games, and so forth are
legion. We can call this view Theist-Pltrralist Crentizw Anti-realism
to distinguish it from Kant’s own Theist-UnivcvsnTisf version. It
also differs fromKant’s view by making sin rather than finitude
the primary barrier between human and divine knowledge. For
my money Kierkegaard is the best proponentof this view.
Our racism example is helpful here. In it we encounter a
human world that has two important characteristics. First, it is
one of many different worlds constitutedby human patterns of
apprehension. Thus the worlds of white racism, black racism,
anti-Semitism, nationalism, sexism, and so forth represent distinctively different ways in which the human receiving apparatus requires others to appear. Second, it is a result of human
sinfulness. If for Kant the primary barrier between God’s view
of the worldand oursis our finitude, more particularly,
our ternporality, for Kierkegaard it is our sinfulness. While Kant points
to differences that obtain whenour cognitive equipment is properly functioning, Kierkegaard, in the tradition of Paul, Augustine, Luther, and Calvin, points to the fact that it never is, that
with respect to at least some kinds of truth, including above all
else the truth about God, we are disposed to “suppress the
truth” and thereby to become those whose “senseless minds
[are] darkened” (Rom. I :18, 21). Paul, whose words these are,
immediately connects them to idolatry (v. 23), to the gods who
are created in the human image, that is, constituted by the
human modeof apprehending them.
Plantinga notices that Creative Anti-realism can talk this way
about the divine.
In contrast to simple atheism
it takes the essentially Feuerbachian view ”that thereis such a person as God,all
right, but he owes his existence to our noetic activity-[a view
that] seems at best a bit strained” or ”seems at best a piece of
laughable bravado.”’? Would that it were only laughable bravado thatwe have to do with here,and not the inveterate human
tendency toward idolatry!
I

“How to Be an Anti-realist,” pp. 49 and 54.
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In spite of his professed Calvinism, Plantinga fails to recognize in what he calls, aptly, creative theological anti-realism a
cogent and powerful account of the noetic effects of sin. We
might say that he is so devoted to giving an account of human
knowledge in terms of the proper functioning of our cognitive
equipmentthathetendstoignoreitspersistentpropensity
toward malfunctioning.
Or we might say that he hasfailed to make the kind of distinctions between various forms of anti-realism to which this essay
is devoted. In a humanist context, the view that we create God
in our own image is the whole story about God and is but a
sophisticated version of atheism. But in a theist context, it is the
recognition that in spite of what God truly is, our sinfully corrupted receiving apparatuses generate gods conveniently suited
to our demands.
We may be looking at the red andblue God present in nature
or in scripture, but we seeone of the manygray gods that make
up the story of human religion. This is not to say that we create
these gods out of whoIe cloth. Kantianism never confuses the
phenomenal world with fiction. Thus idolatry is perhaps better
thought of in terms of edited gods than of fabricated gods, just
as propaganda is most effective when liberally laced with truth.
This means that the
God we actually worship, the phenomenal
God constituted by the sinful"spontaneity" of our receiving apparatus, may be (1) all comfort and no demand (Freud), (2)the
justifier of our position of social privilege and power (Marx), or
( 3 ) the justifier of our resentment and revenge against our enemies (Nietzsche)?
In short, where the humanist finds a sophisticatedversion of
atheism, the theist cmt mzd should find a powerful expression of
prophetic monotheism and its protest against the human tendency, even among God's covenant people, to idolatry. Such a
warning, it seems to me, should be an essential part of every
epistemology that purports to be guided by Christian theism,
For a detailed study of these three masters of the hermeneutics of suspicion as presenting an essentially prophetic critique of religion from a secular
perspective, see my S~lsyicionand Fuiflr: The Religious Usrs of Modenz Atheism
(New York: Fordham University Press, 1998).
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and this is the most important reason why Christian philosophers should take the Copernican
Revolution seriously.
In other words, Kierkegaardian Kantianism
is more important
than Kantian Kantianism. Why? Kant’s version helps the theist
to express the limitationsof human knowledge due to finitude,
whereas Kierkegaard’s helps to express those due to sin. Both
are important, but epistemicfinitudeseemstoget
itself expressed more easily without help from the CopernicanRevolution than does epistemic fallenness.
Take the cases of Aquinas and Plantinga (who may be more a
ThomistthanaCalvinist).
Both give anti-realist accounts of
Truth, making Truthand God’s knowledge necessarily coextensive.15But when it comes to human knowledge, the matter is
different. Aquinas gives a classically realist account, and Plantinga treats all forms of Creative Anti-realism as assaults on the
Kingdom of God. Neither has trouble expressing the finitudeof
human knowledge vis-a-vis the divine; though neither of them
notices the ”Kantian” implicationsof the distinctions they draw,
Finally, neither of them is very sensitive to the noetic effects of
sin. Compared to Augustine, Luther, and Calvin, for example,
Aquinas does epistemology as if in the Garden of Eden. And
Plantinga, as alreadynoted, has anepistemology all but entirely
oriented toward the proper functioningof the human mind.He
is unable to see in ”creative theological anti-realism” anything
more than what itis in the handsof humanists.
Could it be that realisrn/hostility toward anti-realism in our
account of human knowledge tends to blind us to the noetic
effects ofsin, and encourages us to treat as episodic (empirical)
error what needs to seen as systematic (a priori) suppression of
the truth? If so, then Christian philosophers would do we11 to
start out by making friends with the Copernican
Revolution.

li See the passage from Aquinas, quoted by Plantinga in n. 5. His own view
comes down to the claim that “the fundamental anti-realist intuition-that
truth is not independent of mind-is correct. This intuition is best accommodated by the theistic claim that necessarily, propositions have two properties
essentially: being conceived by God and being truth if and only if believed by God.
So how can we sensibly be anti-realists? Easily enough: by being theists.” See
”How to Be an Anti-realist,” p. 70.
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Totality and Finitude in
Schleierrnacher's Hermeneutics
Flower in the crannied wall,
I pluck you out of the crannies,
I hold you here, root and all, in my hand,
Little flower-but if I could understand
What you are, root and all, and aII in all,
I should know whatGod and man is.
Alfred, Lord Tennyson

WE CAN TAKE "root and all, and all in all" to be poetic longhand
for 'completely' and "God and man" to be a synecdoche for 'all
there is, the totality of being'. The poet says, in effect, "If I could
understand the tiniest part comylefely, I would understand the
whole show." On the other sideof this coin we find the holist,
telling the poet, "Yes, and unless you know the totality of being
and know it completely, you cannot understand anyof its parts
aright."
Like Spinoza and Hegel, Schleiermacher is a holist par excellence, especially by virtue of his hermeneutical circles. The relation of mutual determination between whole and
part is utterly
fundamental to his theory of interpretation. But I say circles, plural, because (with apologies toHoward Cosell) one finds a veritable plethoraof circles in his writingson hermeneutics, notjust
that of whole and part. If we imagined them as a kind of entourage, he wouldrival that Gilbert and Sullivan character who was
accompanied by "his sisters and his cousins, which he reckons
by thedozens, and his aunts."
There is, for example, the way in which both grammatical and
technical or psychological interpretation depend uponthe other
member of this pair for their own completion. Thus, " U d e r -
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stonding is ody a bei~lg-i12-orle-nrlofherof these two molnents" (p.
$I).' In abbreviated form, "Grammatical. Not possible without
technical. Technical. Not possible withoutgrammatical." TOseparate the two is to engage in "complete abstraction" (p. 94). Or
again, "Just as both methods are necessary to obtain complete
understanding, so every combination of the two must proceed
in such a way that the initial result of the one method will be
supplemented by further applications of the other" (HHM p.
191).2 N.B. While Schleiermacher is talking about what is necessary for complete understanding, he does
not posit that completion butrather
talks of an "initial result" that is to be
"supplemented," not completed, by applications of the other
method. We will return to this issue.
Schleiermacher describes this reciprocal dependence in terms
that evoke the structuralist distinction betweenlmzglre and pmole.
Thus, "every utterance has CI dtrnl relationship, to the totality of I m grlage wrrd to the zullole thought of its origilzntor. . . . The individual
is determined in his thoughtby the (common) languageand can
think only the thoughts which already have their designation
in his language. . . . [Llanguage determines the progress of the
individual in thought.For language is not just a complex of single representations, but also a system of the relatedness of representations . . . and every individual is only a location in which
the language appears" (pp. 8-9).
On the other hand, "every utterance is to be understood only
via the whole Iife to which it belongs" (p. 9). The author "collaborates in the language: for in part he produces something new
in it . . . in part he preserves what he repeats and reproduces"
(p. 91). The relation of the utterer to the languageis this: "he is
its organ and itis his. . . . The grammatical side puts the utterer
in the background and regards himas just an organ of the IanI Page numbers not otherwise identified in the text are from Friedrich Sch~
mill Ofher Writings, ed. Andrew Bowie
leiermacher, HemrenPufics O J Criticistn
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998). When citations are from Schleiermacher's Hmneneufrcs: The Handwritfen Mn)r~rscriyts,trans. James Duke
and Jack Forstman (Missoula, Mont.: Scholars Press, 1977), the page numbers
will be preceded by HHM.
These last two quotationsare, respectively, from the notesof 1805 and from
the first Academy Address of 1829. See also pp. 5,24,60,88-89,229,254,257,
and 267.
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guage. . . . The technical side, on the other hand, regards the
utterer as the real-ground of the utterance and the language
merely as the negative limiting principle” (pp. 229-30). It is in
making the latter point that
Schleiermacher identifies the hermefirst just as well
neutical task as “to understand the utterance at
and then better than itsauthor” (p.23; cf. pp. 33,228,266).
Within grammatica1 interpretation thereis at least one further
circular relationship. Within a single sentence
or proposition
there are the subject and the predicate, ”which mutually determine each other’’ (p. 61). ”The subject must receive its final determinacy via the predicate and the predicate via the subject”
(p. 239)?
Then, on the side of technical/psychological interpretation
there are a coupleof circular relations that do not appear to be
variations on the whole/part scheme. One is the relation between the objective and subjective in a given utterance: ”There
is nothing purelyobjective in discourse; there is always the view
of the utterer, thus something subjective, in it. There is nothing
purely subjective, for it must after all be the influence of the
object which highlights precisely this aspect.” Since the utterer
is at once ”in the power of the object” and “outside this power,
inhibiting, interruptingit,” the reconstructive task of interpretation ”rests primarily on understanding therelationship of both
functions and the way they interlock” (pp. 257-58; cf. pp. 26061). Thus, for example, we interpret love in the lightof what the
poet says about it, but we interpret that subjective presentation
in the light of what we already (somehow) know about
love.
A second circle (no doubt in hermeneutical hell for those who
lust greedily for the pleasures of unilateral determination and
are angry when their sloth is disturbed by the strenuous tasks
imposed by circularity) is found between divinatory and comparative methods, which“because they refer back to eclch other, also
may not be separated from each other. . . . Both refer back to each
other. . . . Both may not be separated from each other,” because
divination gets its confirmation from comparison, and compariAlthough subject and predicate “mutually condition” each other, they do
so ”not completely” because each is also determined by the adjectives, adverbs, prepositions, and so forth (p. 50).
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son gets itsunity from divination(pp. 92-93]? And just to keep
things interesting, Schleiermacher tells us that both operations
in their mutual dependence are“necessary for each side, for the
grammatical as well as for the psychological” (HHM p. 205),
which, as we have already seen, form circle
a
of their own.
We might see these relationshipsas a form of contextualism.s
Seminarians, while being trained topreach, are often told that a
text without a context is a pretext, as in thejuxtaposition of the
gospel texts that read: ”andJudas went out and hangedhimself
. . , go and do thoulikewise” (Matt. 27:5, Luke 10:37).In the pairs
we have just looked at, Schleiermacher presents each partner as
the context for the other. But the most basic form of text-context
relation in his hermeneutics is that of part to whole. This is the
paradigmatic hermeneutical circle. Thus interpretation isa twofold task, ”namely to understand the unityof the whole via the
individual parts and the value of the individual parts via the
unity of the whole’’ (p. 109). For, to repeat, as Schleiermacher is
not bashful about doing, “on the one hand the whole can only
be understood via the particulars, and on theother hand . . . the
particulars can only beunderstood via thewhole” (p. 148).
When he repeats this idea once again in his second Academy
Address, he adds, ”This principle is of such consequence for
hermeneutics and so incontestable thatone cannoteven begin to
interpret without usingit” (HHM p, 196).
It should corne as no surprise that the whole/part
circle is not
one but rather many circles, as we shall see shortly. But before
looking at their concentric/eccentric structure, we shouldelimi(a task
nate, if possible, an importantmisunderstanding
Schleiermacher can hardly object to). It is while speaking of the
whoIe/part relation
that
Schleiermacher says, “Complete
knowledge is always in this rzpparejzt circle” and ”This seems to
be a circle” (pp. 24, 27, emphasis added).
We need to read this passage in connection with another: ”If
we are to understand the whole
via the particularand theparticular via the whole we find ourselves in the situation of 7nutunl
determimtiorz” (p. 149, emphasis added). It is mutual determina.1

Cf. pp. 100,262, and HHM pp. 189-92.
Schleierrnacher speaks the language of context at pp. 54 and 231-36.
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tion that makes the relations we have looked at so far circular
rather than unidirectional or unilateral. Not only is there nothing nppnrelzt or seeming about this, butSchleiermacher never suggests that there is. So why does he suddenly speak that
way
about his most fundamental
circle, that of part and whole?
Tt might be that he envies the
confidence with which theclasof departure,
sical foundationalistssetsailfromtheirpoint
something that is either self-evident, or evidentto the senses, or
incorrigible,6 but in any case not something provisional that
awaits correction and revision in the light of that to which it
leads. In the presence of any thought that is relative to its presuppositions, he may share the vertigo that leads to foundationor, to
alism as the attempt to render thought presuppositionless,
say essentially the same thing,to make sure that its presuppositions are premises that themselves are absolute and not relative.
In the context of Hcideggerian pre-understandings and Gadamerian pre-judgments (prejudices), it is common to speak of
presuppositions and their provisional character.Schleiermacher
does not often speakof presuppositions, but in the passagejust
cited about "mutual determination," he does. He continues:
If we now posit the same hermeneutic principlesfor the achievement of this task as well, but posit a difference of the underlying
presuppositions, then different results
will emerge. [Enter the
vertigo of relativity.] The sameness of the results points back to the
sameness of presuppositions. Admittedly, if we can now say that
the rightness of the results depends purely on the application of
the right hermeneutic principles, then on the other hand the right
results must often first decide which presupposition is the right
one, for the result has been arrived at via this presupposition.

After noting that the interpreter uses presuppositions
as foundations "one after the other" and needs to be careful in so doing,
Schleiermacher continues, "The result which,if one begins with
the various presuppositions, most corresponds with the immediate context of a text will be the correct one. But without trying
('1 take this account of classical foundationalism from Alvin Plantinga. See
Faith nnd Rntionnlify: Reason n17d Belief 111 God, ed. Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas
Wolterstorff (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983), pp.
58-59.
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this out one cannotsay that one hasa safe foundation" (pp. 149-

50).
Just how safe a foundation Schleiermacher hopes to end up
with remains to be seen, but we mustnotice first of all that it is
something he ends up with, not something he starts out with.
Still, if his procedure is one that starts out with provisional presuppositions thatlose this characterat the end,leaving one with
a safe foundation, one might be tempted to say that interpretation is only apparently or seemingly circular. But that is not
what happens inthis text. In the first place, it begins by affirming "mutual determination," the essence of circularity. Then, so
far from seeking to eliminate this feature,
Schleiermacher reiterates it, insisting that the result depends on the presupposition
but also that "the right results must often first decide which
presupposition is the right one."
Whatever the "safe foundation" may be, for which Schleiermacher hopes, there is no attempt to render circularity itself
merely provisional. So why doeshe speak of an apparent,seeming circle? I think it must be admitted that even if this diction
does not representa failure of nerve on his part, it is misleading
and likely to arouse false hopes in the faint of heart.
But a charitable reading of the passages in question is possible, as follows~There is no escaping the hermeneutical circle of
whole and part (or any of the other hermeneutical circles). No
matter how stable anygiven state of reflective equilibrium may
appear (and here the language
of seeming is not misleading), it
retains its circular character. We are puzzled, as when we think
of the two famous ladies
who madetheir living by takingin each
other's wash; and we are anxious lest we get the hermeneutical
equivalent of feedback screech, as when the output of an amplifying system becomes its input, But this puzzlement and this
anxiety need not be paralysis. Even if we can never get out of
the circle, we can get in. As Heidegger puts it, "What is decisive
is not to get out of the circle but to come into it in the right
way."7
So perhaps Schleiermacher is just calling our attention to his
Martin Heidegger, Betng and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward
Robinson (New York:Harper & Row, 1962), p. 195 (732).
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account of how to get in in the right way. We want to interpret
a text. But in order rightly to read any part we must know the
whole, but how can we know the whole, since we have not yet
interpreted the parts from which alone such knowledge can
arise? The answer,of course, is simple, straight outof Mortimer
Adler’s How to Read a Book. On the basis of a ”cursory reading”
(62) we formulate a
(p. 27) ora”provisionalread-through”
“provisional overview’’ (p. 257; cf. p. 92). In this ”general overview” (pp. 31,90,152,258-59) of the whole (pp. 61-62) we have
the whole ”provisionally understood as a sketch” (p. 232; cf. p.
238). On the basis of this anticipation of the whole, provisional
and sketchy as it may be, it is possible to begin interpreting the
parts, anticipating that the results
will correct and concretize our
vision of the whole, which in turn will provide new guidance
for interpreting the parts.We’re in! We’re off and running!
But it’s not that simple. On the linguistic side, the text is but
one of many wholes that are presupposed by the interpretation
of their respective parts. The smallest unit of understanding is
be underthe sentence or proposition.
But it is a whole that must
stood in terms of its parts, and vice versa (pp. 28, 30, 35, 44, 56,
61; HHM pp. 197,202).
But sentences, too, must be understood, not just in terms of
their parts but as themselves parts of a larger whole, namely, a
text (pp. 27,35,44; HHM pp. 197,202). Of course, a text may be
made up of texts: ”Be careful to distinguish the limits of the
whole. Truly mad ideas have come via this into poetics: that the
Iliad was regarded as being originally a whole, the Pentateuch,
Joshua as well.In the sameway a book can, although it is otherwise a unity, consist of many wholes, which one must separate
from each other” (p. 99).
The next largest whole, of which the text is a part, is a genre,
and Schleiermacher continually reminds us to pay attention to
these contextsand the presuppositions they embody(pp. 25/92,
240,246,254,262-64). I find this a particularly
good site at which
to illustrate the logic of whole and part. Suppose I pick up Gzdliver’s Travels and from the title anticipate that the whole is an
ordinary travelogue. My attempt to make sense of the parts on
this presupposition will rather rapidly encounter difficulties.
On
the basis of my encounter with the parts,I will revise my provi-
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sional overview. Now I take the book to be a novel, or, more
particularly, children’s fiction, and interpretation will go more
smoothly. But for a reader with some knowledge of Swift and
English history, technical interpretation will intersectwith
grammatical, and a furtherrevision of my genre presupposition
will be necessary. I will discover that I can make fullest sense
out of the text only if I take it to be political satire in the guiseof
children’s fiction. Thus thewhole is continuously revised in
terms of parts.
But a literary genre is but a partof a language; so if we would
understand a genre, and texts that are its parts, and the sentences that are the text’s parts, we must know the language as a
whole, in particular, “the languagearea which is common to the
author and his original audience’’ (p. 30). But this can be a very
complex whole. For example, the New Testament is written in
Greek; so its interpreter must know the Greek common to its
authors and their first readers. But to know this one mustknow
the Aramaic in which many of the recorded events first took
place, and that was the mother tongue of some of the authors
and readers. In addition, one needs to know the Greek of the
Septuagint into which the Old Testament background of both
the events and the writings themselves had been translated. In
both of these ways, one must pay special attention to the presence of Hebrew patternsof thought that are present in the
Greek
language of the writers and their audience (pp. 39-43, 47, 50,
85).
By now we should expect to be reminded that the complex
whole thatis KoineGreek is itself but a part of the wholehistory
of the Greek language. Nor does Schleiermacher disappoint us.
For its completion, grammatical interpretation must place sentences, texts, genres, and even that ”certain period of a language” that the author shares with the original readers (p.236)
within the whole history of the language. And so, for example,
the New Testament language ”must be subsumed under the totality of the Greek language” (pp. 37-39,247).
The wholes we must encompassto make sense outof the parts
become parts of larger wholes with such blinding speed that
we
become dizzy. And we’ve just been looking at the grammatical
side of the task. Thetechnical or psychological side still lies be-
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fore us. To repeat, “every zdternlzce has CI dzral relatiomhip, to the
totality of Imgzrnge crrzd to the whole thought of its origimtor” (p. 8).
The second part of this dual task means that ”every utterance is
to be understood only via the whole life to which it belongs,’’
not just the language but the language users ”in the determinedness of all the momentsof their life, and this only from the
totality of their environments . . . via their nationality and their era”
(p. 9; cf. p. 24).
Again we move in ever widening circles. We cannot restrict
ourselves to that portion of the author’s life from which most
immediately the text arises but must ask, ”what relationship
does it have to his whole life and how does themoment of emergence relate to all other life-moments of the author?” (p. 107).
Of special interest, of course, will be the whole of the author’s
life as author. We must grasp ”the literary totalityof a person”
(p. 94).
I shall never forget the awe and wonder with which I once
heard a distinguished literary critic announce the death of the
New Criticism. As part of a series of lectures to incoming freshmen on exciting new developments in various disciplines, he
was describing the cutting edge of literary theory (a special hermeneutics, I suppose). With the solemnity only possible in an
academic context, he announced to the bright and eager new
collegians, ”We have discovered that if we are trying to understand a poem, and if the author of that poem has written other
poems, it helps in understanding that first poem to read the
other poems.” What a breakthrough! Would Schleiermacher be
pleased to see his wheel reinvented, or dismayed that it could
be presented as avant-garde thinking?
I don’t know. But in either case, he would nothave been satisfied to stop with this textual totality. He is concerned about the
”whole sphere of life” (p. 27) to which a text belongs, and this
means, in the first place, that we must know the writer ”in the
totality of his life as a historical person’’ (p. 142) and not just as
a writer.
But we do not have to wait for Schleiermacher to tell us that
this richer, more concrete totality is but a part that needs to be
understood in thecontext of the wholeto which it belongs: ”The
writer is therefore only to be understood via his age’’ (p. 100).
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The “history of the era of an author” is the whole in terms of
which theauthor mustbe understood (p. 24). This can beunderstood in the first instance as ”the literary life of the people and
of the age” (p. 144), but once again we cannot stop there; we
must go on to a more encompassing horizon. Thus, with reference to classical philology, Schleiermacher tells us that the interpreter needs to grasp ”the spirit of classical antiquity’’ (HHM
p. 211); and the New Testament exegete must contextualize the
biblical text in “the total state of Christianity in the ApostoIic
era” (p. 152), and in an even larger whole, ”the world from
which the N[ew] T[estament] immediatelyarose” (p. 231).
The import of this prodigious holism, it seems to me, is independent of what onethinks about the degree to which the interpretation of Schleiermacher’s interpretation of interpretation by
Dilthey and Gadamer needs to be corrected along lines suggested by Frank and Bowie.8
My own view, for what it is worth, is that there is more than
a little psychologism or ”Romanticism” in Schleiermacher’s
texts, but that hisconcern to reconstruct the innerlife experience
of the author is only of penultimate significance for his hermeneutics, which has as its ultimate goal what Gadamer would
call the Sache, the ”object” or subject matter of which the writer
speaks. In the attempt to escape the narrow isolation of one’s
own first-hand experience of love or God or whatever,
one seeks
to encounter the Sache, m f CIS die Sache selbst buf as re-presmted by
mother ilz IZ text. It is to understand this content that one seeks to
understand the text, and to understand thetext one must have a
vast array of both linguistic and historico-psychological knowledge andskills. Reconstruction of the life experience from which
For this ”debate” see Wilhelm Dilthey, “The Rise of Hermeneutics” and
other essays on Schleiermacher in Herrnerreutics nnd the Sfrdy of History (vol. IV
of Selected Works), ed. Rudolf A. Makkreel and Frithjof Rodi (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1996); Hans-Georg Gadamer, Trrrth mzd Method,
trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, 2nd rev. ed. (New York:
Crossroad, 1991); Manfred Frank, Dns rnniz~idalelle-AIlSenleine:Textstwktlrrieru q trtzd -interpretofion nadr Scldeierlnacller (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1977); MLWfred Frank, The Subject nnd t h Text:
~ Essnys in Literary Theory mzd Philosophy, ed.
Andrew Bowie (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Andrew
Bowie, Aesthetics atld Subjectivit?y:From Knnt to Nietzsclze (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993);and Bowie, From Romarlficism to Critical Tlrcory: The
Pfrilosoyhy of Gertnau Liternry Theory (London: Routledge, 1997).
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a text arises is but a means to encountering the presenceof the
Sache in the text.
Although Schleiermacher does not quite use this Gadamerian
language of the presence of the Sache in the text’s re-presentation: he often makes it clear that the telos of interpretation is
“the object, that by which the author is moved to the utterance”
(p. 90). It is the idea of the author that ”vouches for his significance, not his individuality, but the way in which he presents the
iden does vouch for his individuality” (p. 98, emphasis added).’[)
Thus, in theological interpretation the goal is ”supersensuous
things via the understanding of human discourse” (p. 228) or,
more specifically, ”the being and the spiritof Christ” (p. 157).
But we can leave aside for now the otherwise important debate about how best to construe Schleiermacher’s concern with
reconstructing the Iife experience of the author. For on any account our author will remind us of the prophet whosaw wheels
within wheels.” Ours sees circles within circles within circles.
And he is a prophet of gloom and doom in two important respects, In the first place, his hermeneutics spells the end for
foundationalist strategies in any domain in which knowledge
has the form of interpretation.
In my experience, the term’foundationalism’ is often misleadingly used to signify either of two metaphysical views rather
than the epistemological thesis that I take to be its proper signification. I understand metaphysical realism to be the view that
the real is and is what it is independent of our cognitions and
construals (except, of course, for our cognitions and construals,
which are also real)P And I understand theism to be (in part)
the view that thereis a personal creator who standsin an asymmetrical dependence relation to the world: the world depends
for its actuality (bothessence and existence) on God, but God is
See Trlrflz and Mefhod, pp. 113, 127, 143, 149, 153.
For other relevant passages,see pp. 103,137,139,230, and 257-58.
I 1 Ezekiel 1:15-21 and 10:9-14.
l 2 Kant holds this view. That is what the thing in
itself is all about. Any
realism that wants to distinguish itself from the anti-realism of Kant and the
host of subsequent variations on his transcendental idealism must add the
eplstemic claim thatw e can know the independentlyreal as it is in its independence, that our knowledge exactly corresponds to or mirrors what is ”out
there” without in any way altering or distorting it.
‘I
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not so dependent on the world. Since creation is a free choice,
is an actual world. When
God is actual whether or not there
these are called foundationalist views, it is presumably because
for metaphysical realism the world is an independent foundation for our knowledge, and for theism God is an independent
foundation for the world. In both cases foundation has acausal
sense.
But the point of calling these views foundationalistis usually
to suggest that theyhave been discredited by the broad, contemporaryconsensusagainstfoundationalism,itswidelyanfor that
nounced collapse. This is frightfullymisleading,
consensus is not directed against either metaphysical realism or
theism but rather against an epistemological thesis that is neutral with respect to both.It is a claim about the structure of our
knowledge, whatever its content.
In its softform it is merely the claim that while some partsof
our knowledgedependepistemically
upon others,thereare
parts that do not, that stand on their own.This view, while vigorously challenged by some, is just as vigorously defended by
others. Announcements of the collapse of foundationalism conof our knowledge
cern a strongerclaim, namely, that those parts
that do not depend on other partsbut stand ontheir own can be
a fundarnenturn ~ I Z C O ~ C E I S Sfor
Z ~ Ithe whole edifice of knowledge
by virtueof their certaintyand finality.13We can begin with parts
that can be known prior to our grasp of the whole and that will
not require revision as we build the whole on them as foundation. Epistemically these parts are atomic in nature rather than
holistic. Neither do they presuppose the whole to which they
eventually belong, nor are they liableto correction as that whole
emerges into view.
It is clear thattherelation
of mutualdeterminationthat
Schleiermacher finds between whole and part is incompatible
with both of these claims. Schleiermacher belongs, if we may
speak a bit anachronistically, to the contemporary consensus
against (strong) foundationalist strategies in epistemology, at
least, to repeat the qualifier,in any domain in which knowledge
has the formof interpretation.
See n. 6 above.
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But how much of a qualifier is that? Dilthey, supported by
Weber, Ricoeur, and others, has extended hermeneutics beyond
the world of texts to the world as text, at least the human world
as studied by the Geisteswisse7zschce~z.l 4 More dramatically, no
doubt, Kuhnian philosophyof science gives a hermeneutical cast
to the natural sciences. What else is a scientific revolution but a
revision of our picture of the whole of (some domainof) nature
in the light of our study of its parts?I5Both Heidegger and Wittgenstein, each in his own way, teach us how to see all seeing as
seeing-as, all cognition as construal.So perhaps the qualifier is
left with no real work to do.
There is a second sense in whichSchleiermacher, with his circles in circles in circles, is a prophet of epistemic gloom and
doom. For if knowledge as interpretationhas no fixed and stable
Alpha, it is equally devoid of a final and all-inclusive Omega.
Right at the start, Schleiermacher tell. us that "criticism should
not" (p. 4). The totality
come to an end, but hermeneutics should
required for a final interpretation "is never completed; the task
is therefore strictly infinite and can only be accomplished by
approximation" (p. 235).
There are three components to thislast claim. First, the task is
never completed because neither of its mutuallydependent
tasks, the grammatical and the technical/psychological, can be
completed: "No language is completely present to us, not even
our own mother tongue" (pp. 14-15; cf. p. 55). But this is only
half the story. The hermeneuticalOmega Point would require "a
complete knowledge of the language, in the other case a complete knowledge of the person. As there can never be either of
'.'See Dilthey, Hcrmewttics nrrd the Study of History; the discussion by and
about Weber (and others)in Urderstanding n r d Social Irlquiry, ed. Fred. R. Dallmayr and Thomas A. McCarthy (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1977); and Paul Ricoeur, Hemreneutics u r d the Hutnarl Sciences, ed. and
trans. John B. Thompson (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).
l 5 See Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Sczcntific Rezdz/tio,ns, 2nd enlarged
ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970);Robert I? Crease, "The Hard
Case: Science and Hermeneutics," in The V r y Idea of Radical Hrrmerwtrtics, ed.
Roy Martinez (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities, 1997); and the debatebetween Gyorgy Markus, "Why Is There No Hermeneutics of Natural Sciences?
Some Preliminary Theses," and Patrick Heelan, "Yes! There Is a Hermeneutics
of Natural Science: A Rejoinder to Markus," in Sclence in Confexf 1, no. 1 (1987)
and 3, no. 2 (1989),respectively.
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these, one mustmove from one to the other, and norules can be
given €or how this is to be done" (p. 11).
With reference to these two gargantuan circles, Schleiermacher asks, "But who could dare completely to accomplish this
task!" Then he immediately continues, "In the meantime [while
awaiting the consummation never to be expected, however devoutly wished] one does not ever have to want to completely
accomplish this task, but in most cases only to accomplish it to
a certain extent" (p. 38).16This is the second point. Because the
to-ing and fro-ing between whole and partsboth within and between the two most basic circles is always ongoing, final interpretation is but a regulativeidea.Thegoal
is "cornylefe
understarrtiing of style," but this objective "is only fo be achieved by
approximation" (p. 91; cf. pp. 235, 240, 247; HHM p. 201). It is
always provisional(p. 257; HHM pp. 200,203), ever open tocorrection (pp. 25,92,98,259).
In the third place, there is another way of seeing hermeneutics as an infinite task, complementary to theimage of the hermeneutical circle as the horizon that
ever recedes from our
advance and leading to the same
conclusion about approximation, provisionality, and correctability.Thethree
key terms
are individuality, intuition, and indeterminateness.
Schleiermacher emphasizes that the
goal of hermeneutics is an individual, and this, we might note, will betrue whetherwe think of a
text as an event in the history of a language, or of a text as an
event in the experienceof its author, or
of a text as a representation of its "object." But, as Kant reminds us, concepts give us
universality; only intuitions give us the individual.The infinite
task of interpretation is to achieve the intuition in which individuality is grasped as such (pp.96-98).
This is the context, I believe, to understanding what Schleiermacher says about determinacy and indeterminacy. He writes
that "in every case there is construction of something finitely
determinate from the infinite indeterminate. Language is infinite
because each element is determinable ina particular manner via
.

.

""

Schleierrnacher adds a warning against sloth: "But precisely where we do
not strive for complete thoroughness we often overlook what we should not
overlook."
lo
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and Schleiermacher’s account of howthingssuddenlymake
new sensecan be confirmed from such hermeneutical moments.
We simply need to be reminded, as Schleierrnacher himself recognizes, that his ”at the end” also signifies a new beginning, a
new phase of a task that remains infinite.
With this accountof interpretation, Schleiermacher parts
cornpany decisively with his majorBerlin contemporary and, as
some would have it, rival-Hegel. Hegel, too, is a holist; as such
he consistently repudiates atomistic, foundationalist strategies
in knowledge. But he would rather label regulative ideas and
infinite tasks the Bad Infinite of Unhappy Consciousness than
abandon the claim to Absolute Knowledge that belongs toPlatonism (as distinct from Socratism) and the history of the footnotes thereto. So, with equal consistency, he affirms in various
ways (phenomenological, logical, and ultimately historical) our
ability to grasp the whole, not
just in presentiment and anticipation, but ina definitive and final way. Those who seek to weaken
his claims in this respect by noting, for example, that he was
willing to revise his Logic failto recognize thatjust to the degree
that he acknowledges,in anticipation of the wicked question of
Johannes C l i ~ n a c u s that
, ~ ~ the System is not complete, he falls
back into the Bad Infinite of Unhappy Consciousness he has so
disdainfuljy purported to surpass. If his grasp of the whole is
provisional and penultimate,thiscontaminatesthewhole
of
speculative science and undermines theclaim to reach ”the goal
where it can lay aside the title ’love of knowing’ and be actual
kmwilrg,” where ”Spirit has made itsexistence identical with its
essence . . . and the separation of knowing and truth is overcome,” where ”knowledge no longer needs to go beyond itself”
because we have reached ”the cornpletim of the series, where
’appearance becomes identical with essence, so that its exposition will coincide at just this point with the authenticScience of
Spirit,” which will ”signify the nature of absolute knowledge
itself.”2o
I ” Climacus has satirical fun at Hegel’s expense with his readiness to bow
down and worship the System if only he can be assured that it is complete.
i~g
Posfscnyt, trans. Howard V. Hong
See Kierkegaard‘s C o ~ l c l ~ d Uuscientific
and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992).
N Hegel’s Phetronrenolugp of Spirit, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 19771, pp. 3, 21, 51, 50,57.
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Schleiermacher sides withKant, rejecting the purportedHegeThis
lian Az4jhebu~gof critical idealism into speculative idealism.
means that he relegates human understanding to the realm of
appearancesratherthanthingsin
themselves, phenomena
rather than noumena. He
is what today would becalled an antirealist. Of course, he does not use this Kantian or contemporary
language. But over against Hegel he affirms an unsurpassable
finitude of human knowledge4 amassuming here that we extend his hermeneutics beyond the realm of the textual, as suggested above-and over against Descartes, for example, he gives
a qualitative rather than quantitative analysis of that finitude.
This makes him a kissing cousin to Kant.
Consider Descartes’s analysis of human cognitive finitude. It
is twofold. On the one handis the fact of error. By contrast with
a divine, perfect knowledge that never errs, we sometimes getit
wrong. On the other hand, thereis incompleteness. Thereare, to
speak the language of propositions, true propositions whose
truth we do not know and of which, in some cases, we have
never even imagined. But when we get it right, when we know
the truth of a true proposition, there is no incompleteness about
that knowledge. We know that fact as well as it can be known,
as well as any divine or infinite knower knows it. Neither the
meaning nor the truth of that proposition is dependent upon a
context not yet articulated. In this propositional atomism, the
growth of knowledge will add new pieces to these pieces of
knowledge, but the original pieces (since by hypothesis we got
them right)will not be revised or corrected in the process.
As holists, both Schleiermacher and Hegel reject this picture.
For them T. S. Eliot’s ”In my end is my beginning”” comes to
mean that I truly know my epistemic point of departure only at
the journey’s conclusion when the to-ing and fro-ing between
part and whole has ceased, not temporarily because I am tired
or because 1 have no practical need to pursue it further, but permanently because we have achieved the final paradigm andunderstood the parts(at least in principle)” in the light
of this final
whole.
T. S. Eliot, “East Coker” in Furrr Qmrtefs.
Hegel has no difficulty acknowledging the empirical finitude of human
knowledge, and he rightly refuses the demand of Herr Krug to deduce his
22
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The ideaof this completionis thetouchstone of Schleiermacher's hermeneutics. He differs fromHegel only in onelittle detail:
he insists that we can never occupy this Beulah Land of the
Spirit, having crossed the Jordan that separates finitude from
infinity, human from divine, the church militant from
the church
triumphant. In the Hegelian church, realized eschatology is orthodoxy, and it is because he is a heretic on just this point that
Schleierrnacher is a KantianZ3
For Kant, the distinction between appearances and things in
themselves is the difference between theway the world (the only
world there is) is apprehended by finite human minds and an
infinite, divine, creative intellect.24While Schleiermacher doesn't
employ theKantian vocabulary, his hermeneutics articulatesessentially thesame distinction, namely, between finite minds that
can never encompass the totality except provisionally and an
infinite knowing, unavailable to us, that could bring theprocess
to completion. On Kant's view, our attempt to grasp the
Unconditioned by grasping the totality of the conditions results in
dialectical illusion. Schleiermacher's view, at least in his hermeneutics, is milder. Our failure to grasp the whole adequately
results in penultimacyrather
than paralogism,anticipation
rather than antinomy. But in either case, the inadequacy means
that our knowing never achieves truth in its classical sense as
ndaequatio rei et irztellectus.
Kant sees humanknowing inratherstatic
terms, while
Schleiermacher's view lends itself to a morehistorical (Hegelian,
Kuhnian) understanding of understanding. But for both of
them, what counts as truth among
us at anygiven time can only
be truth witha smallt, in Kantian language phenomenal knowlpen within the System. See Hegel's 1802 essay "How the Ordinary Human
Understanding Takes Philosophy (as Displayed in the Works of Mr. Krug)," In
Befuwen K a ~ at d Hegel: Texts in the Deuelopment of Post-Kantinn Idealism, trans.
George di Giovannl and H. S, Harris (Albany: SUNY Press, 1985). See also
Hegel's Philosophy of Nature, trans. A. V. Miller (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970),
p. 23n. (Note theRemark to 1250 of the Enc!yclopedia.)
2i It is not too difficult to argue thatSchleiermacher is a Kantian both in his
Redell and in his Glaubenslehre. But a careful analysis will show, I believe, that
he works out his finitist epistemology quite differently in those texts both visa-VIS each other and vis-a-vis his hermeneutics.
24 See my essay "In Defense of the Thing in Itself," Knnt-Sfudien 59, no. 1
(1968), pp. 118-42.

TOTALlTY AND FINITUDE 1N SCHLEIERMACHER’S HERMENEUTICS

125

edge, knowledge of appearances rather than of things in themselves. Or, to put the point bluntly:
We never get it right. Lacking
that final, unrevisable vision of the whole,we never fully understand the flower in the crannied wall. And our failure is qualitative and not quantitative. It is not that we know a few things
adequately, while being ignorantof many other facts. We know
nothingadequately,everything(atbest)
only approximately.
Our very highest cognitive achievements, Newtonian science in
Kant’s case, fail to mirror nature (or supernature).
I once argued to the MaritainSociety that Aquinas was a Kantian. Since I lived to tell about it, I have become bolder. So I shall
conclude with the suggestion that Schleiermacher is not only a
Kantian but also a Derridean. Derrida,of course, is a holist. In an
early, now classic, exposition of deconstruction, he writes, “Yet
all that Hegel thought withinhis horizon, all, that is, except eschatology, may be reread as a meditation on writing.”25Derxida is
telling us that he, like so many others, is a Hegelian without the
Absolute, without totality, without eschatological closure.
Nothing links Derrida to Hegel more closely than his holism.
The point about privileging writingis simply that, accordingto
a classical theory, writtensignspointbeyond
themselves to
other signs that, by virtue of being themselves signs, point beyond themselves. To say “There is nothing outside of tke text”26 is
to say that everything points beyond itself to its other, without
which it cannot be understood. In semantics this
is a holist theory of meaning, analogous to the structuralist notion that one
to really undermust know the entire unabridged dictionary
stand any of the words in it. But it is an ontological as well as a
semantic thesis. Derrida writes,“The thing itself is a sign,”17 and
whether we want to speak of things, or facts, or events, he is
an Hegelian who tells us that all finite realities point essentially
beyond themselves-this is the so-called doctrine of internal relations-to other finite things and ultimately to the totality of
their complex interrelation.
But, of course, Derrida is an Hegelian without the eschatology,
?i Jacques Derrida, Of Gra~nrnntology,
trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976), p. 26.
2(, Ibid., p. 158.
27 Ibid., p. 49.
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which means that thetotality (semantic or ontological), while always presupposed and always required, is never actually present.
This is the heartof deconstruction as thecritique of the metaphysics of presence. Nothing is ever simply and fully present because
essential to its meaning and to its
the totality of the others that are
being is never present except as presentiment. Thus, for example,
Derrida rejects what he calls the "transcendental signified," by
which he means "a concept signified in and of itself, a concept
simply present for thought, independent of a relationship to language, that is, of a relationship to a system of signifiers." Such a
meaning "would exceed the chain of signs, and would no longer
itself function as a signifier. On the contrary . . . every signified is
also in the position of a signifier," that is, every meaning essentially points beyond itself to other meanings?
When Schleiermacher tells us, in the context of his own holism,
"No language is completely present to us, not even our own
mother tongue" (pp. 14-15), we hear the affinity with Derrida
and draw the conclusion that no word, nosentence, no text, etc.,
is ever completely present to us for just this reason. By the same
token, as we havealready seen, we would haveto have a universal
history, escl~atologicallyfulfilled, to be able to have fully present
to us any author in the context of his or her historical era.
Among the other Derridean themes appresented with this
critique of simple or pure presence we can mention two: deferral
and undecidability. The (in)famous
neologism difkrmzce was created to signify not only the importance of difference, as in the
need to attend to meanings and things different from the ones
we would understand if we should understand them, but also
deferral, the fact that the definitive articulation of any meaning,
thing, fact, or event is perennially postponed untileschatalogical
I* Jacques Derrida, Pusitious, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981),pp. 19-20, emphasis altered. If one traces the terms 'simply'
and 'pure' throughout Positions, one will discover an essential nuance that is
often overlooked in reading Derrida. He writes, "I have never ceased calling
into question the motif of 'purity' in all its forms (the first impulse of what is
called 'deconstruction' carries it toward this 'critique' of the phantasm or the
axiom of purity, or toward the analytical decomposition of a purification that
would lead back to the indecomposable simplicity of the origin)"; Manolirzgnalism ( ~ the
f Other or The Prosflzesis of Origir?, trans. Patrick Mensah (Stanford:
Stanford University Press, 19981, p. 46.
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closure is achieved and the part is fullypresent because its
whole (whichis no longer itself but a part) is fully present.'"
Closely linked to this notionof deferral is that of undecidability.'" Because "a context is never absolutely determinable,"31semantic or ontological entities, which are essentially contextual,
are never absolutely determinable either.Abstracted from their
context, as theynecessarily are, both for atomists
who take them
to be externally related to their othersand for holists who recognize their internal relatedness but cannot absolutely determine
their context, they have about them a certain indeterminacy or
undecidability. Things might go this way or that; it is too early
still be too early tomorrow).
Of course,
to tell for sure (and it will
undecidability doesn't mean that we cannot and do not make
decisions, provisional and risky as they may be, or that we are
free to construe things however we please, without any constraints. But it does mean that our current truths (lowercase t)
are decision relative in a way both Descartes and Hegel are desperate to deny.
It is not toodifficult to seeSchleiermacher's affinity with these
motifs. As the hermeneutical circle ripples ever wider, it becomes increasingly clear that it will be tomorrow, and tomorrow, and tomorrow before we reach fully determinate meaning.
When he tells us that "in every case there is cortstructiorz of somefhirrgfinitcly detcrurrirzafefrom the irrfinite irzdeterminate. . . . For ezt-ry
infuitiorz of m z individtml is irzfinite" (p. 11, emphasis added),32 we
suspect that he has been reading Derrida on thesly.
Hegel would not be pleased. Where are the thought police
when you need them?
?"See "Diff&ance," in Mlzrgins of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).
Derrida alludes to Godel's theory as a model of the kind of undecidability
he has in mind. See Dissnnirmfim, trans, Barbara Johnson (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 19Sl), p. 219, and Writing n r d Diffuwm7, trans. Alan Bass
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), p. 162. Cf. Positiorrs, p. 43, and
John D. Caputo, Decomtructmn in II Nzrfshrll: A Conzwsntion with Incqws Derridu
(New York: Fordham University Press, 1947), pp. 37-38.
Jacques Derrida, "Signature Event Context," in Margrns, p. 310.
v Derrlda's strong misreading of Fmr' u r d Trr~nblir~g
in The Gift of Death, trans.
David Wills (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 19951, with its slogan torlf
mrtrr est follt n u t r e (every other is wholly other), canbe read as a meditation on
the infinity of the individual as such.
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Positive Postmodernism As
Radical Hermeneutics
HERMENEUTICS
is the form in which epistemology lives on. In
onesenseepistemologyis
dead. As theattempt to provide
human knowledge with solid foundations, to prove that it can
transcend the limitations of its perspectives and be adequate to
the reality it intends, it is widely perceived to have failed. As
the extravagant claims for clarity, certainty, and completeness
necessary €or Episteme or Wisserzschcljt have proved chimerical
even for the paradigmsof mathematics and mathematical physics, the notion that epistemology is a bad habit that needs
to be
broken has increasingly carried the day. But as an investigation
into the nature and limits of human knowledge (with special
emphasis on its limits), epistemology
lives on, frequently under
thename of hermeneutics,signifyingboththeinterpretative
character of pre-philosophical human understanding and, correof a certain mode
spondingly, interpretationas the central theme
of epistemological reflection.
THEINESCAPABILITY

OF HERMENEUTICS

Hermeneuticsisinescapable.Human
life is cultural and not
merely natural. We remain unable to spell out this distinction
as
clearly as we would like, but it remains undeniabIy thecase that
even the most mindless couch potato does not live by instinct
alone. Our lives are embedded in ideas (and thus texts) and
practices (and thus institutions) that
are handed downto us and
that we make our own, thus giving form and content to our
existence, by (re)interpreting them.
Corresponding to the categoricalnecessity of hermeneutics at
this level is a certain hypothetical necessity. It is not necessary

I’OSlTlVE POSTMODERNISM AS RADICAL HERMENEUTICS

129

that there should beGeisteswissenschaften. They are culturalartifacts, and much of human history has preceded their invention.
But if there are to be sciences of human life itself as cultural
artifact, theywill necessarily be hermeneutical sciences, exhibiting thesame hermeneutical circle as the ideasand practices that
are their subject. They will be interpretations that presuppose
interpretations, (re)interpretationsof (re)interpretations.
From Aristotle through Ayer, empiricists have sought to make
perception a matter of nature untainted by nurture, freeing
knowledge from history while keeping it tied to the earth. But
without success. As it has become increasingly clear that all
seeing is ”seeing as,” it has become increasingly unclear how
to deny, convincingly, the cultural, hermeneutical character of
perception. The Hegelian claim that consciousness is less basic
than spiritmeans that I perceive even physical nature as We have
learned to perceive it. (Even the ability to perceive the world as
physical nature is learned, and the concept of physical nature is
a cultural artifact.)
Corresponding to thecategorical necessity of hermeneutics at
this level is another hypothetical necessity. It is not necessary
They are cultural artithat there should be ~~turzuissenschaffelz.
facts, and much of human history has preceded their invention.
But if there are to be
sciences of physical nature, theywill necessarily be hermeneuticalsciences, exhibiting thesame hermeneutical circle as theperceptions to which they make their ultimate
appeal; in the absenceof theory-free data, they will be interpretations that presuppose interpretations,and their objects will be
(theoretical) (rehnterpretations of the (perceptual) (re)interpretations that constitute their evidence,Since the work of Thomas
Kuhn and others, the hermeneutical characterof the natural sciences has beenincreasingly acknowledged.
Correspondingtothisfourfold
necessity of hermeneutics,
doubly categorical and doublyhypothetical, is a third hypothetical necessity. It is not necessary that there should be philosophy
as epistemological reflection. It is a cultural artifact, and much
of human history has preceded its invention,But if thereis to be
second-order reflection on human life both in its prereflective
(but interpretive) everydayness and in its first-order (interpretive) reflection in the sciences, it will necessarily be hermeneuti-
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cal, exhibiting the same hermeneutical circle as all four regions
of its subject matter (a classification that is itself an interpretation). It will be a (re)interpretationof (re)interpretations that presupposes prior interpretations. If it is not naive, it will know
itself to be such.Very likely it will call itself philosophical hermeneutics.
In these senses hermeneutics is inescapable. When philosophers like Habermas and the late
Heidegger-and, following the
latter, Foucault and Derrida-speak of being beyond hermeneuI have just
tics, they do not deny theinescapabilitythesis
sketched. They rather mean that their philosophical hermeneutics differs in some importantrespect from someone else’s, usually the early Heidegger’s or Gadamer’s or Ricoeur’s, which they
perceive as remaining too Cartesian or too Hegelian. But they do
not deny thatall seeing is ”seeing as,” that philosophical reflection and its subject matter is hermeneutical ”all the way down.’’
Thus it is appropriate thatJohn Caputo shouldgive the title Radical Hernzelmftics to his challenging, largely Derridean answer to
the question ”What is philosophy?

THECONCEPT
OF RADICALITY

AS A

MIXEDMETAPHOR

But what does it meanfor hermeneutics as a mode of philosophical reflection to be radical? If, as we are often told today, concepts are a certain kind of metaphor, the concept of radicality
can be described as a mixed metaphor. It combines two quite
distinct meanings.Etymologically it means gettingto the root of
things, or, to use a virtually synonymous metaphor, getting to
the heart of the matter. To be radical is the opposite of being
superficial; it is to break through the surface appearances to the
reality they hide or disguise. Even the Nietzschean claim that
appearances are all there is is radical in this sense, for to reach
this “truth” it is necessary to break through the ”superficial”
view that the distinction between appearance
and reality makes
sense.
It may seem strange that one moment it is superficial to be
satisfied with surface appearancesand radical to seek the reality
they hide or disguise, while the next moment it is superficial to
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seek such a realityand radical to recognize that deep down
there
is nothing butsurface. Who is radical, Plato or Nietzsche?
loses the appearanceof paradox when
This puzzling situation
we remember that the concept
of radicality is a mixed metaphor
and turn our attention
from its spatialto its temporal dimension.
Temporally speaking, to be radical is to make a decisive break
with the status quo. It is to go beyond the critique of the status
quo that is itself part of the status quo. The loyal opposition is
also critical of the status quo, but the radical is critical of the
status quo constituted by the currently dominant forces and
their one or more loyal oppositions.
From a radical perspective,
the loyal opposition is too loyal. It is reformist rather than revolutionary because it shares important common ground with the
dominant forces of any given historical present. To be radical is
to be revolutionary in the sense of rejecting the framework in
which the current debate and struggle
for power take place.
Thus, Marxism is radical in relation to the conservatisms and
liberalisms that have defined Anglo-American politics, MerleauPonty wasseekinga radical politics in H z m m i s m and Terror
when he rejected both Communism and anti-Communism, and
Thomas Kuhn is radical vis-A-vis the debate between "creation
science" and traditional Darwinism.
It is clear that in this sense the concept of radicality is situation
relative. The concept of human rights that was radical in the
by the French and American Reveighteenth century (as defined
olutions), and in many contemporary contexts still is (as defined
by the United Nationsand Amnesty International), is viewed in
other contexts, for example, by feminists, who not surprisingly
call themselves radical, as part of the status quo thatneeds to be
questioned. They see the totalitarian-authoritariansocieties that
violate human rights and the liberal democracies that (by cornparison, at least) honor human rights as sharing patriarchal assumptions thateitherrepresentthe
neglect and violation of
important human rights or render the very concept of human
rights hopelessly ideological. (Does the spatial metaphorof penetrating to the heart of the matter have androcentric, agonistic
assumptions that render the very concept of radicality hopelessly ideological? Is there a receptive radicality?)
It is not difficult to see how the mixed metaphor we know as
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the concept of radicality came to be. Those who stand outside
the two or more sides of the debate that defines a particular
status quowill easily find all parties, including the loyal opposition, to share a common superficiality. The entire debate, and
must be rejected; for the
not just this sideof the question or that,
question itself fails to get to the root
of things, to theheart of the
matter. The spatial metaphorof penetration is takenu p into the
service of the temporal metaphorof revolution.
Thus, to use one moreexample, morality is always radical in
relation to technology and the assumptions of its instrumental
reason that (I) means are justified by their effective production
of (2) ends (such as economic growth) that are themselves selfevident and notsubject to moral evaluation.Conversely, instrumental reasonis always radical in relationto morality because it
rejects a11 debates about what ends we should seek and about
what means are legitimate, as distinct from efficient, in achieving them.
If military-industrialinstrumentalism is themost concrete
known as modernity, to beradproduct of the radical revolution
ical as thetwentieth century comes to a close would be to adopt
a moral posture thatchallenges, not just this strategy or that for
achieving economic growth or national security, but the very
framework that defines the fundamental human task as finding
the most effective strategies for achieving greater wealth and
power for one’s own nation state.

RADICAL
THEHERMENEUTICAL TURNAS ALREADY

We can now see that what it would mean to develop a radical
hermeneutics will depend on how we interpret (since hermeneutics is inescapable) the status quo, our here and now. I shall
adopt the fairly widespread practice of naming our here and
now ’modernity’ and accept the implication that (for us) to be
radical. means to be postmodern; and
I shall interpret the dividing line between modernityand its sequelso as to make it clear
that postmodern radicality is far from being the monopoly of
French poststructuralism. It wiIl turn out that Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics and Derrida’s deconstruction are both
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postmodern, but also that
each represents only a minimally radical hermeneutics.
We might beginOUT interpretation withthe military-industrial
instrumentalism already suggestedas the most concrete expression of modernity. This would put the question of ethics front
and center. But we might do better, in Hegelian fashion, to make
concreteness our terminus ad quem rather than our terminus a
quo. I find those interpretations of modernity most convincing
and illuminating that begin more abstractly with whatis sometimes called the Enlightenment project. It can be identified in
terms of three ends and one means. The ends have been to replace mythas with logos, tradition with critique, and authority
with autonomy. The means has
been one variety or another of a
foundationalist epistemology in terms of which logos, critique,
and autonomy are defined. Thus, to
begin abstractly is to begin
with epistemology rather than with
ethics, but itis to realize that
postmodern challenges to modernity will eventually have to be
ethical if they are not to remain lost in abstraction.
Epistemologically speaking, the break with modernity begins
when we begin to see foundationalism as a particular culture’s
lnytkos about the logos, to see how deeply dependent on the authority of scholastic metaphysical traditions is Descartes’s attempt to free himself from all authority and tradition, to see how
quicklytheEnlightenment
projectitselfbecomes
atradition
whose authority is to be taken for granted, and to see the account of autonomy in termsof “the rights of man” and of /’man
come of age” asembodyinganolder,patriarchaltradition
whoseauthorityis
likewise not tobe questioned. All such
seeings are insights into theways modernity deconstructs itself
and gives rise to the postmodern.
But we mustn’t move too quickly to the postmodern. For modernity, like virtually every other status quo,is a complex reality
with its loyal opposition and corresponding debates. Two such
debates, internal to modernity, require special attention.
For the
postmodern is not only the rejection of the Enlightenment projof theentireframework
in
ect anditsfoundationalism,but
which it debates and, for the most part, defeats, itsloyal opposition.
The first of these debates is between Enlightenment and Ro-
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manticism. While the former seeks to escape the tutelage of historical existence throughtheforward-looking
movement to
majority and the autonomy of adulthood, the latter, finding
childhood and adolescence equally intolerable, longs for a return to the womb of some past Eden. (How’s that for a mixed
metaphor?) Freud’s contempt for Romain Rolland’soceanic feelings, at the outset of Civilization mrd Ifs Discontmts, gives us this
debate ina nutshell. Emergence vs. immersion, progressvs. nostalgia, discursive reasonvs. intuitive faith.
And yet Romanticism is distinctively modern, the loyal opposition rather thana radical alternativeto the Enlightenmentproject. For it shareswithitsopponent
(1) a keen sense of the
historicality of its existence, (2) an unwillingness to tolerate the
essentially incomplete character of a life so richly mediated, and
(3) the desire to transcend the mediations that constitute its minority, its always-on-the-way-but-never-there character, through
the attainment of some kind of immediacy. The debate is over
the nature of this immediacy, whether it is to be found in the
protocol sentences of some rationalist or empiricist foundationalism or in an affective realm whose expression can only be
through the metaphors and images
of art. To the participants the
debate is a ferocious fight, but it presupposes a huge agreement
that is all but definitive of modernity.
The second debateis between Enlightenment foundationalism
and Hegelian holism. The latter repudiates immediacyin all its
forms, thereby setting itself over against both Enlightenment
and Romanticism. It is tempting to call it the first form of postmodernism.
Yet Hegel remains distinctively modern. For in spite of repudiating the immediacy that unites the other parties in the parliament of modernity, he retains with the Enlightenment the ideal
of absolute knowledge. But in his case one is to get beyond the
mediatedincompleteness of historical minoritynot by withdrawal to immediacy but by advance to complete mediation.
This totalizing strategy, worked out conceptualIy in the Logic
and historically in the Philosophyof Spirit, is at once an alternative to foundationalism and the transformation of the ideal of
progress into a realized eschatology, fleeing the incompleteness
of historical existence even faster than the incrementalismof the

I’OSITIVE POSTMODEKNISM AS RADICAL HERMENEUTICS

135

Enlightenment, which is willing to contentitself with piecemeal
eschatology.
If we ask what unites Enlightenment and Romanticism on the
question of immediacy in spiteof their disagreementover absolute knowledge, we find it to be the same thing that unites Enlightenment and Hegel on absolute knowledge in spite of their
disagreement over immediacy. It is an allergic reaction to the
intertwined Unferweglichkeifand Ujzheilnlidzkeif of historical existence and the corresponding desire at
every moment to have
already arrived, toexperience no gap between essence and existence. Modernity is Platonism run amuck. It seeks to suppress
the fears of childhood and theanxieties of adolescence by being
always at home. In the language of Hegel’sLogic, the three
levels of categoreal
modes of modernity operate at different
complexity: Romanticism at the level of Being, Enlightenment at
the level of Essence, and Hegel himself at the level of the Concept. Thus it is easy to overlook their essential kinship.
In relation to modernity so conceived, the hermeneutical turn
is already radical, and the term ’radical hermeneutics’ is a pleonasm. For hermeneutics is the claim that all forms of modernity
are superficial, and that if one digs deeply enoughto get to the
heart of the matter, one discovers that immediacy and totality
are equally chimerical. We are never at home, or, to be more
precise, we are always at home(never without Gadamerianprejudices, a world or life world of established meanings and facts),
but every home is provisional and penultimate (never beyond
Derridean difference).Our existence is necessarily nomadic. The
Uuteuweglichkeit and Uszheilnlichkeit of our historical odyssey are
unsurpassable. They demarcate our existence because they belong to the essence of our being in the world. To flee them is to
undertake a self-defeating project, and this is fortunate, since
to succeed, per impossible, would be to take leave of ourselves.
Unfortunately, we take leave of ourselves simply by engagingin
such flight, no matterhow futile it always turns out to be.

GADAMER
AND DERRIDA
AS EQUALLY
RADICAL
The argument of the preceding section implies that the hermeneutics Gadamer develops out of the early Heidegger is just as
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radically postmodern as the deconstruction Derrida develops
out of the late Heidegger. There are important and interesting
differences between them, but in relation to modernity the important thingis their mutual denial of both immediacyand totality, their mutual. affirmation that we never stand at either the
Alpha or theOmega point of our experience. Whetherwe speak
of language or the world, it has always begun when we arrive
on the scene, and neither has completed its historical journey
when itcomes our time to speak.We are always in medias res.
Gadamer’s strategy is to reprise Hegel’s arguments against
immediacy in terms of linguistic and historical mediation and
then to allow these elements of Hegel’s thought to deconstruct
of either loghis claims to
achieve absolute knowledge by means
ical or world historical totality (closure). Because there is so
much of Hegel in Gadamer’s refutation of Hegel’s essential link
to modernity, he is o€ten accused of having made only a halfhearted break with Hegelian modernity. But if immediacy and
totality are impossible, they are impossible, and nothingDerrida
can say will make them,to speak ungrammatically, moreirnpossible.
Derrida’s strategy is to develop an argumentagainst immediacy (presence) more deeply indebted to structuralism than to
Hegel, and then to allow this critique to undermine any subsequent claims tototality. One learns things from Derrida that one
does not learn from Gadamer, but the opposite is equally true,
and, to repeat, Derrida does not render immediacy and totality
more impossible than Gadamer does; he just renders them impossible.
Of course, Gadamer is dependent on Hegel in the process of
deconstructing him, but Derridais no less dependent on structuralism in deconstructingit, and structuralismbelongs as much
to modernity as does Hegelianism. It is a species of the Enlightenment project. In keeping with Descartes’s practice and in opposition to his profession and promise, Gadarner and Derrida
trajointly acknowledge the dependenceof their thought on the
ditions they seek to
criticize. For both of them criticism is necessarilyinternal criticism. It always has something of anad
hominem character.
Like Derrida, Gadamer sides with Nietzsche against Hegel.
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Unlike the Enlightenment, which often sought unity by an unhistorical denial of plurality, Hegel acknowledges the plurality
of perspectives generated by the historical process but seeks
unity nevertheless by integrating all of them into an organictotality. His formula, taken from the Kantian
table of categories, is
simple: Plurality + Unity = Totality. But if asked to solve the
following formula for x , Plurality = Totality = x, the answer
can only be Nietzsche. His perspectivism is the result of acknowledging historical plurality with Hegel while denying his
claim to surpass it by means of a totalizing unity.In these terms
Gadamer is as much a Nietzschean as Derrida is. For both of
them affirm a plurality of perspectives that is beyond our power
to totalize and thus unify in any final view from nowhere. For
both of them the truthis that we have no Truth. They represent
of perspectival finitism.
two variations on the theme
It is widely thought that Derrida
is a more radical thinker than
Gadamer. Against this received wisdom 1 have suggested that
vis-a-vis modernity, at least, they are more or less equally radical. Why has it seemed otherwise to so many? No doubt it is
largely a matter of rhetoric, style, and emphasis, which may in
turn be due to national character. French intellectuals seem to
feel a deep need to shockand scandalize. Derrida’s rhetoric and
his styles are shaped by this tradition and addressed to readers
whose expectationshave been shaped by it as
well. Correspondingly, he emphasizesall but exclusively what we cannot do and
cannot have, given the collapse of the Enlightenmentproject and
its loyal oppositions.
By contrast, Gadamer is willing to talk about what we can do
and have even if immediacy and totality are not among them.
While Derrida hammersaway on undecidability,&darner notes
that while no fusion of horizons (perspectives) canbe complete
or permanent, there can be a mutuality of understanding and
agreement (Verstiilzdigung) sufficient for cooperative life together.
Gadamer does not deny that ultimately and theoretically UIIdecidability reigns, since there can be neither immediacy nor
totality; and Derrida does notdeny that penultimately and practically we can find ways to live together. For one the glassis half
full; for the other, half empty. It is this difference of emphasis
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that gives the appearance of greater radicality on the partof Derrida (especially to English-speaking readers caught up in the
French tradition of shock and scandal). But those emphases lie
on the surface, and that view is superficial. At the heart of the
matter, Gadamer and Derrida are equally postmodern.

THE INCOMPLETENESSOF THE HERMENEUTICS

OF

FINITUDE

William James is said to have complained that for his colleague
Josiah Royce, the world is real but not so very damn real. In that
spirit we can say that the hermeneutical turn is radical but not
so very damn radical. If we wish to make it more radical, to
break more decisively with modernity, what is needed is not
more shock and scandal rhetoric, but a more penetrating analysis of the failure of the Enlightenment project and its Romantic
and Hegelian alternatives.
Modernity wanted to own the Truth and thereby
always to be
at Home. It wanted life to begin not with ”Once upon a time”
but with ”And they lived happily ever after.” As perspectival
pluralism, the hermeneutical turn recognizes modernity’s selfunderstanding as a wish-fulfilling fantasy, Descartes’s dream in
the Freudian sense. With Kant, but ultimately against Kant, it
makes finitudean epistemological category in a far moreradical
sense thandid classical empiricism. Being situated inour bodies,
in our language, and in our social history, we are caught between the Eden of originary presence and the Eschaton of organic totality.
But this finitude is not the only barrier to our possessing the
Truth and being always at Home. The hermeneutics of finitude
becomes more radical when it becomes the hermeneutics of suspicion by making sin, in addition to finitude, an
epistemoIogica1
category.
To make sin an epistemological category is to call attention
not merely to the influence of desire upon cognition but more
particularly to the influence of precisely those desires that we
cannot acknowledgebecause we have sufficient conscience to be
ashamed of them. This means that while the hermeneutics of
suspicion involves the unmasking of false consciousness and
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self-deception, not every such unmasking involves the hermeneutics of suspicion. For not every false consciousness is motivated, that is, not every distortion of self-consciousness is rooted
in desire; and not every self-deception, which is by definition
motivated, is motivated by desires of which the self involved is
morally ashamed.
We can find an example of the first case in Merleau-Ponty.
His critique of Descartes in the section of The Phertomeltology uf
Perceyfiott entitled ”The Cogito” includes an analysis of false
love. This is clearly a case of false consciousness, but he sharply
distinguishes it from deceitful love that must be understood in
terms of an inner conspiracy of the self against itself. As motivated false consciousness, deceitful love is the self-deception in
which I persuade myself of something I know to be false. By
contrast, false love is not so much motivated from within as
something thatovertakes me from without.I am seized by powerful affections. In my inexperience and not knowing any better,
I identify them withlove. I am mistaken, but my falseconsciousness, being unmotivated,is not a case of self-deception. I am not
mistaken in the service of some need not to recognize thetruth.
Although Merleau-Ponty’s politics regularlyemploys a fullfledged hermeneuticsof suspicion, his phenomenological ontology remains, here as elsewhere, within the hermeneuticsof finitude.
We can find an example of the second case in the account of
Dasein’s Being-toward-death with which Division I1of Heidegger’s Beilzg am! Time opens. There is no question but that the
”evasive concealment” and ”tranquilized everydayness” with
which I confront death as my ownmost possibility is motivated
from within and is a case of Self-deception in which I try to persuade myself of what 1 know isn’t so. Heidegger identifies the
motive as “cowardly fear,” and it is just this motive that distinguishes Heidegger‘s analysis from the hermeneutics of suspias guilty
cion, wherethe motive wouldbetterbedescribed
shame. Heidegger exposesa self-deception whose purposeis to
comfort, while the hermeneuticsof suspicion exposes thoseselfdeceptions whose purpose is to justify a plea of not guilty in
spite of the presence in me of desires, feelings, or actions I do
not and cannot morally condone. Cowardly fear may be a vice,
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but it is not that, on Heidegger’s example, that I am trying to
hide from myself. It is the certainty of my death, my finitude
and not my fault.
If we compare Heidegger’s analysis with Freud’s interpretation of his dreams of Irma’s injection and the uncle with the
yellow beard, this difference in motivation will emerge clearly.
Freud makes sin an epistemological category, whereas Heidegger’s analysis, even of self-deception, does not. In the former
case we lack the humilityto acknowledge our faults; in the latter
we deceive ourselves because we lack the courage to face our
fate.
Ricoeur, through his studiesof Freud and Marx, and Foucault,
through hisgenealogical strategy derived fromNietzsche, represent the best examplesof the hermeneutics of suspicion within
contemporary philosophicaldiscussions. By making sin anepistemological category, in fact if not in name, theyare moreradical
than Gadamer and Derrida.
Foucault’s analysis of the will to power, for example, does
not focus our attention on those would-be Lhmzelzscherz who
shamelessly seek to exploit and control others, but rather on
those who (1) achieve domination (2) without noticing that they
have done so because (3) their professed morality does not approve of domination.Hedirects
our attention to wolves in
sheep’s clothing, practicing masters with slave superegos. For
Nietzsche the paradigm of that kind of will to power is the
priest, and whatFoucault gives us is a seriesof variations on the
theme of priestly power, whether the priests be quite literally
clergy from the church,
or, as modernity’s secularism establishes
itseIf, doctors and therapists fromthe Ministry of Health, philosophers and social scientists fromthe Ministry of Truth, and correctional officers from theMinistry of Justice.
Far from being an alternative to the hermeneuticsof finitude,
such a hermeneutics of suspicion presupposes and sometimes
of situation episeven develops on its
own the standard analyses
temology. But it goes beyond those analyses to pinpoint problems even more threatening to modernity than finitude. For, in
its Enlightenment form, at least, modernity thought it could
handle finitude. We need only think of Descartes’s distinction
between finite and infinite substance or Kant’s distinction be-
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tween phenomena and noumena.
But all forms of modernity are
deeply committed to a Pelagian anthropology that is seriously
put into question by the Augustinian assumptions underlying
the hermeneutics of suspicion. (If Marx and Nietzsche, two of
its paradigmatic practitioners, have eschatological hopes for a
restoration of primal innocence, so does Augustine. Against
Kant, and with Augustine, they would agree that
human life this
side of apocalyptic change is not capable of regeneration without grace.)
OF THE HERMENEUTICS
OF SUSPICION
THE INCOMPLETENESS

The hermeneutics of suspicion is a powerful weapon against illusions, including the mystifications of modernity. But it is not
a very good resting place. In the first place, it easily becomes a
form a moral megalomania. Forif we practice it only against
“them,” whether ”they” are Cartesians, communists, or whatever, we becomethe ultimate Pharisees.
We become like the Sunday School teacher who concluded a lesson aboutthe selfrighteous Pharisee, whose prayerconsisted in thanking God that
he was not like other people, by saying, ”Now children, let us
fold our hands, close our eyes, bow our heads, and thank God
that we are not like that Pharisee.”
If, on the other hand,we make a pointof including ourselves
among the targets of suspicion, things are not necessarily any
better. For with sustained suspicion directed against ourselves
the thrill of discovery quickly dissolves into the agony of despair. Such a discipline may be good forour spiritualhealth, but
by itself it is like a diet of nothing but ex-lax. It helps to purge
us of putrid waste that has been deprivedof whatever nourishment it may once have had (since illusions are seldom wholly
without truth-they only render the truth they retain poisonous
to their believers). But it satisfies no spiritual hunger, and our
as
spiritual bulimia guarantees that we remain malnourished
well,
Of course, despair may be the ultimately philosophical passion, the affect that best fits the truth about our situation, It is
just such a belief, I suspect, that makesso much of modern and
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postmodern philosophy little more than thinly disguised Stoicism. But even if despair is a vice and not a virtue, it is not the
most dangerous consequence of sustained suspicion. It has an
essentially unstable chemistry, and it turns into cynicism much
more easily than into hope. As despair turnscynical, the bulimia
of the spirit turns into theanorexia of the spirit. Turning from a
feast and purgestrategy that leaves one as exhaustedas hungry,
the spirit is no longer willing torisk any nourishment at all. The
irony is that this cynicism is peculiarly modern, for the criterion
of its negationsis modernity’s concept of Truth. Insteadof offering a less arrogant and possibly more human concept of truth, it
is content to tell us what we can’t have, measured by modernity’s quite possibly neurotic needs for certainty and finality.
The point I am trying to make is simply this. Our analysis to
this point has identified radicality with negativity. It threatens
to leave us between the devil and the deep bluesea, between the
illusions of modernity and the cynicism of postmodernity. In
response to this threat, I want to suggest that postmodern epistemology as the hermeneutics of finitude combined with the hermeneutics of suspicion need not becynical, however tempting it
may be to accentuate thenegative in the quest for radicality. Of
course, radicality is by definition negative; but it is not by definition wholly negative. From the premise thatwe have no Truth
it is not necessary to conclude that everythingis false, and, thus,
that everythingis permitted.
If we do draw this inference, there is really no good reason
not to sell our souls to the military-industrial instrumentalism
that can reward us so handsomely, especially if we are white,
and male, and smart. We can define nihilism as, first, this cynical
inference from thefailure of modernity (everythingis false) and,
second, the cynical pact with the Devil that goes with it (everything is permitted). It is, to repeat, a possible path for those who
see modernityas malaise rather than asmankind’s (sic) majority.
And it is undeniably a radical response to modernity.
But if nihilism is both possible and radical, I want to suggest
that it is neither necessary nor so very damn radical. If we are
really serious about a radical hermeneutics, we must go beyond
the negations of both the hermeneutics of finitude and the hermeneutics of suspicion. I have in mind not the abandonmentof
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these negations througha desperate defenseof realism (usually
a defense of extravagant epistemological claims masquerading
as a metaphysical claim) but their A$kdmIzg, their teleological
a larger whole of which
suspension, their incorporation into
they are but parts, however crucial. It is clear that the whole in
question cannotbe composed byadding newnegations, on pain
of merely intensifying the cynicism we seek to avoid. A truly
radical hermeneutics must reply to the positivity of modernity
with an alternative positivity that is distinctively postmodern
by virtue of presupposing the negationsinvolved in seeing our
thinking as both situated andsinful.
POSITIVE
POSTMODERNISM

I find in Kierkegaard and Nietzsche the best examples of such a
radical hermeneutics. So I want to claim that in relation to modernity Gadamer and Derridaoffer a measure of hermeneutical
radicality, that Ricoeur and Foucault offer a more radical hermeneutics, and that Kierkegaard and Nietzsche offer a still more
radical hermeneutics. Without claiming that theirs is a hermeneutics than which a moreradical hermeneutics cannot be conceived, I do not find myself in a hurry to go beyond them. The
challenge they present to us is so deep and so comprehensive
that we could do worse than work onit and let it work on us for
a while. The kind of hermeneutics they offer to us is anything
but a mastered moment.
Both thinkers are decisively postmodern. Both have taken the
hermeneutical turn, and each has developed his own sophisticated hermeneutics of finitude, supplemented by a devastating
hermeneutics of suspicion. What makes themdistinctively postmodern, however, is their positivity. Without retracting the relentless negativity of their thinking, both are willing to affirm
an ontology, a metaphysics, a Welfalzschazlulzg-call it what you
will-in terms of which human life can be meaningful by virtue
of goals worth sacrificing for. Each is the self-appointed prophet
of a god he finds worthyof worship in the formsof celebration,
surrender, and imitation.
Their gods, of course, are as different ascan be. Kierkegaard’s
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is the God of the Bible: of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob; of Peter,
James, and John-the God who became human inJesus of Nazareth. Nietzsche’s deity is Dionysus, the God of madness, the
God human
myrtle, and, above all, the maenads-another
enough to die, and divine enough torise again. But the modes
of this death andresurrection are asdifferent from thoseof Jesus
as the moralitiestaught to the followers of these faiths are different. Kierkegaard would have no quarrel with the slogan Nietzsche uses to concludeEcce Homo, ”Dionysus versus the Cnrcified.”
It may seem alltoo inevitable thatthe positivity of these postmodernists should take the formof religious faith. After all, an
important part of the modernist project was to bring religion
within the limitsof reason alone (thinkof Kant, Schleiermacher,
and Hegel for the three modes of modernity discussed above).
If, during the heyday of modernity, many of its own devotees
(please note the irony) concluded that sucha task was impossible and that religion must be rejected as irrational, is it not even
more obvious in the collapse of the entire modernistproject that
reason cannot ground anypositivity, sacred or secular, and that
faith as arbitrary choice is the only alternative to the nihilismof
cynical negativity?
Interestingly, neither Kierkegaard nor Nietzsche sees it that
way. In spite of the former’s talk about the leap and about the
subjectivity of truth, and in spite of the latter’s talk about truth
as useful lies and aboutthe irreducible pluralityof perspectives,
both are eager togive reasons for their faith. Both are clear that
giving reasons cannothave the meaning modernity would have
wished, a pure gaze at naked truth by means of a recollective
But both, unlike mowithdrawal from earthbound situatedness.
dernity and its cynical critics, reject the either/or of absolute
reasons or no reasons at all. Each spends a great deal of time
and effort spelling out an interpretation of human existence in
terms of which his faith makes sense. They know full well, and
never let us forget, that those interpretations arejust that, interpretations, and that they necessarily lack both the immediacy
and the totality that might satisfy modernity’s question for certainty (epistemologically speaking) and security (existentially
speaking). Because theseinterpretationsarethoroughlyphenomenological, in the descriptive sense, each is able to invite us
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to try his on and see whetherit does not fit our own experience
better than the alternatives.
I want to draw these reflections to a close (temporarily, that is,
without closure) by givingmy own reasons, whichdo not claim
to be absolute, for preferring Kierkegaard's faith to Nietzsche's
and for concluding that radical hermeneutics
is best exemplified
in the complex authorship of the melancholy Dane. Since this
entire essay is but the sketchof an argument,each part of which
needs and could easily be given detailed development, I make
no apology for giving little more here than theses thatI believe
are capable of detailed defense.
In the midst of his most sustained witness to his Dionysian
faith, at the very beginning of Thus Spoke Znrathusfm, Part III
("The Wanderer"), Nietzsche writes, "in the end, one experiences only oneself.'' No text in his entire corpus gives greater
support to the Heideggerian thesis that Nietzsche is the Vullelzdung of metaphysics, and thusof modernity, rather than its
oberwindung. It is Nietzsche's loneliness rather than his madness that
is the existential correlate to this thought. The triumph of Platonic intuition over Socratic conversation has given a monological cast to the metaphysical traditionof the west that modernity
did not (even try to)overcome, even in Hegel, whose dialecticis
eventually not dialogical. In its allergic reactionUlzterweglichto
keit and Unheirnlichkeit, inheritedfromPlato(hence
all those
footnotes), modernity turns out to be allergic to alterity as well.
On this crucial point, Nietzsche remains, mnlgre' h i , more the
child than the enemy of modernity, not just in the passagecited,
but throughout his writings. For they are the quest for a form
of autonomy far more extensive than anything modernity ever
dreamed of.
By contrast, Kierkegaard's authorshipis the sustained attempt
to spell out the conditionsof the possibility of encountering the
genuinely other. The individualism for which he is famous is
onlypenultimate. It seeks to expose thecrowd(Nietzsche's
herd) as a strategy for collectively warding off anything truly
other, in order to open the essentially relational self, who
is neither a Spinozistic substance norLeibnizian
a
monad, to the thoroughgoingotherness
of God and neighbor. If he focuses
especially on the God relationship, it is because God is better
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able thanmy neighbor toresist the variety of strategies by which
I or We might try to reduce the other
to the same, thereby retaining my Cartesian or our Hegelian self-sufficiency.
It is this will first to permit and eventually to welcome the
other into one’s life that makes Kierkegaard seem to me more
radically postmodern than Nietzsche. In relation to two themes
left dangling earlier in this essay, this reading of their relationship has two important corollaries. Although I have pointed to
military-industrial instrumentalismas themost concrete expression of modernity, implying that a truly radical postmodernity
would have a morality capable of challenging the will to power
of the nation state, I have kept the discussion focused on more
abstract, epistemological issues.
I think it can be shown that Nietzsche does not have the resources for developing such a moral critique of modernity, not
because of his epistemological negations but because of his allergy to alterity. It may well be that the Nazis’ use of his statements on war andcruelty rest on unsophisticated readings that
overlook his interestinspiritualizingorsublimating
our instincts of hatred. But no one has ever found in him a critique of
the honestly hostileheart, or accused himof being a philosopher
of peace rather than, like Heraclitus before him and Heidegger
after him, of polelnos.
By contrast, Kierkegaard, who knows as well as Nietzsche
how easily professed virtues are really splendid vices, does not
give up on compassion and neighbor love but seeks to show
how their true form is essential to human flourishing. By virtue
of his fundamental willingness tofind that decentered selfhood
that can experience the otheras truly other, Kierkegaard has the
basic moral resources neededfor a critiqueof modernity’s moral
Cartesianism, the placing of the self, individual and collective,
at the center, thereby making wealth and power, personal and
national, the overriding goals of life. Like the Hebrew prophets
before himand Levinas after him, Kierkegaard is a philosopher
of slznlorn rather thanof polemos.
The other corollary concerns the question whether there can
be a receptive radicality or whether the image of penetrating
to theinner core of being is hopelessly
beneaththesurface
andro-phallo-centric. I would not be so foolish as to call Kierke-
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gaard a feminist. But I believe his openness to otherness, expressed in the priority he
gives, in contrast toNietzsche, to agape
over ngon, lays the groundwork for a receptive radicality that can
include the feminist critique of modernity. And no critique of
modernity that incorporates a thoughtful feminist component
will ever be able to say, ”In the end, one experiences onIy oneself.”
Modernity is an escapist refusal of the ontological relativity
defined by U~tenrwglichkeifand Urgheimlichkeif and the moral relativity defined by the unconditional claims of both the divine
and human other upon me as an individual and upon
us as
a people. Much of secular postmodernism, inspired by Greek
sources, sees this multiple decenteringof the self as a fate nobly
to be borne.By contrast, Kierkegaard sees it as a task humbly to
be accepted, the task that makes life at once human and worth
living. In doing so he points the way to a postmodernism of
shalom, one that undermines the foundations
of war between nations, classes, races, and genders. Those of us who are
interested
in radical hermeneutics could do worse than to linger thoughtfuIIy with himawhile.

8

Father Adam and His Feuding
Sons: An Interpretation of the
Hermeneutical Turn in
Continental Philosophy
THE STORY of the hermeneutical turn in continental philosophy
can betold in almost biblical terms. In theplace of Father Adam
(or Father Isaac) we have Father Heidegger, and in the place of
the feudingsons, Cain and Abel (or Jacob and Esau), we have, at
least according to one telling/ the reactionary son, Gadamer, and
the radical son, Derrida.'
I find this reactionary/radical dichotomy at least as misleading as it is illuminating.' It is perhaps one of those hierarchical
dyads that needs to be deconstructed. But, following the old
preacher's adage, "a text without a context is a pretext," which
isn't the worst hermeneutical theoryI've ever run across, I'd like
to take a running start at thetroika whose hermeneutical reflections dominate so much of contemporary discussion, for their
prehistory is an essential part of their story.
Actually, it seems to me that there are two prehistories. The
standard story sees the emergence of philosophical hermeneutics in Heidegger and Gadamer as thecritical heirs of Schleier~
critical side involves a double
macher and D i l t h e ~ .The
See John D. Caputo, Radicd Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconsfruction, nrzd fhe
Herrnenerrfic Projecf (Bloomington: Indiana UniversityPress, 1987), pp. 5-6,8182, 96, 108-119. Cf. Caputo's "Gadamer's Closet Essentialism:
A Derrldean
~~Y,
Critique," in Dialogue and Deconsfmcfiorr: The Gadamer-Derrida E I I C O I I ~ Zed.
Diane I? Michelfelder and Richard E. Palmer (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989).
2 For one account of why, see "Positive Postmodernism as Radical Hermeneutics" (chapter 7 above),
See, for example,RichardPalmer,
Hermeneutics: Inferpretafion Theory r n
Schleiernracher, Diltkey, Heidegger, nnd Grzdarner (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969);Paul Ricoeur, "The Task of Hermeneutics," in Paul Ricoetrr:
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rejection. First there is a move away from the psychologistic
tendencies o€ nineteenth-centuryhermeneutics,according
to
which the task of understanding is to reconstruct and reexperience precisely the authorial experience that gave rise to the text.
of inward experience; reading
Writing is the outward expression
is the reverse movement that uses the expression as a means
to relive the experience. Thus, for Schleiermacher, ”every act of
understanding is the reverse side of an act of speaking, and one
must grasp the thinking that underlies
a given statement.”4 One
“must be able to step out of one’s own frame of mind into that
of the
Comparative
grammatical
study is essential
to
this task, but ultimately it depends on divination: ”By leading
the interpreter to transfer himself, so to speak, into the author,
the divinatory method seeks to gain an immediate comprehension of the author as an individual.”6
Dilthey, we are told, does not ground Versfehelz ”in empathy
andintuition,” but instead of speaking of Eilzjiih1el.r speaks
rather of NacherZeben and Nachjuhlelz, ”neither of which refers to
a unifying projection of the self into the ~ t h e r . ”But
~ this is only
to reformulate the psychologism of romantic hermeneutics, not
to abandon it.
The idea that the ultimate goal of interpretation is to reconHermeneutics afzd the Humall Sciences, ed. and trans. John B. Thompson (New
York: Cambridge University Press, 1981); and Joseph Bleicher, Cot1tey.mr-q
Heanerleutics:
Herrneneufics
RS Method, Philosophy, ntrd Critique (London:
Routledge, 1980).
E D. E. Schleiermacher, Hermeneutics: The Hclndzurittetl Manuscripts, ed.
Heinz Kimmerle and trans. James Duke and Jack Forstman (Missoula, Mont.:
Scholars Press, 1977)) p. 97. Henceforth H H M . Implicit in passages of this kind
is the assumption that thought
is prior to and independent oflanguage, which
is related to it only accidentally and externally. In his introduction kmmerle
argues that Schleiermacher moves toward such a view from an earlier view
where thought and language areinseparable.
-‘Ibid., p. 42.
Ibid., p.150. Cf. p. 113: ”Before the art of hermeneutics can be practiced, the
interpreter must puthimself both objectively and subjectively in the positionof
the author.”
Rudolf A. Makkreel, Dilthey: Philasoyher of the H~rmnnStudies (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 19751, pp. 5-7, including nn. 3-5. Cf. pp. 252-53,
n. 5. Makkreel argues that Dilthey’s movement is away from psychologism
toward a hermeneutic focused more on the expressions of Geist than on the
underlying experiences. In other words, he moves in the opposite direction
from Schleiermacher as Interpreted by Kirnmerle. See n. 4 above.
J
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struct and reexperience the intention of the author is the link
between the psychologism of Schleiermacher and Dilthey and a
second feature of their hermeneutics rejected by Heidegger and
his sons, namely, its objectivism. Objectivism in this context is
the claim that interpretation can mimic the natural sciences by
producing judgments of universal validity, namely, judgments
not relative to some particular standpoint and valid only within
it. Schleiermacher knew that interpretation is an art (Kunsf),but
he wanted hermeneutics to be a science (Ktuzsflehre). The basic
ingredients of the objectivism he shares withDilthey are two:
1. Hermeneutics can be a science only if it has a determinate
and unchanging object (for which role the author’s intention is
a splendid candidate).Two major twentieth-century heirsof this
objectivism are E. D. Hirsch, Jr., and Emilio Betti. Seeing that
objectively valid interpretation requires a certain kind of object,
Hirsch writes,
When, therefore, I say that a verbal meaning is determinate I
mean that it is an entity which is self-identical. Furthermore, I also
mean that it is an entity which always remains the samefrom one
moment to the next-that it is changeless. Indeed, these criteria
were already implied in the requirement that verbal meaning be
reproducible. . . . Verbal meaning, then, is what it is and not something else, and it is always the same. That is what I mean by determinacy.x

Betti makes much the same point when he makes ”the autonomy of the object” the first canon of his hermeneutic.Y
2. Hermeneutics can be a science only if it spells out a normative methodology, a strategy for gaining objectively validated
knowledge of its determinate and unchanging
object in terms of
rules or canons. From Descartes down to the more experimental
methodologies of the natural sciences, the goal of method has
Vnlidity 111 Interpretation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 19671, p. 46.
‘’ Herme~-reuticsLJS the

Gewrnl Methodology of the Gezsfes7oissr~zsch~~~en,
ed. and
trans. Josef Blelcher, in Corlhmyarnry Neuvwnerrtics, p. 58. Like Hirsch, Betti
Wolf, in
links this autonomy tightly to the author’s intention. Friedrich August
dialogue with whom Schleiermacher developed his hermeneutic, had already
written that the aim of hermeneutics 1s ”to grasp the written or even spoken
thoughts of an author as he would have them to be grasped.” Quoted in
Palmer, Herwwneutics, p. 81.
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been to free knowledge from tradition, bias, or any other kind
of particular perspective and render itsvalidity universal.
If the hermeneutical turn we seek to understand is a turning
away from psychologistic tendencies and methodological aspirations, both in the service of objectivism, it is also the appropriation of two important themes fromSchleiermacher and Dilthey.
The first of these is a generalized hermeneutics. Schleiermacher
bemoaned the fact that there was no general theoryof interpretation but only the
specialized hermeneutics associated with
three groups of normative texts: biblical hermeneutics, legal hermeneutics, and the hermeneutics of classical philology. He insisted on seeing theseas special cases of a more general account
that would apply to any text whatever (spoken or written). In
seeking to make hermeneutics the methodology of the Geisfeswisselaschnftelz, Dilthey enlarges the range of interpretation and
understanding to incIude all expressions or objectifications of
the human spirit, including nonverbal works of art, historical
events, social practices and institutions, and so forth. It is now
textual interpretation as such, and not, for example, biblical interpretation, that is seen as a special case.
This double generalization, or "deregiolzalizaf i d ' of hermeneutics, as Ricoeur calls it,](' is assumed by the hermeneutical
turn we are exploring. Heidegger and Gadamer will seek to express it by saying theyare doing ontology rather than methodology. We have already seenbriefly what this "rather than" means
negatively. What "ontology" signifies positively is that interpretation belongs as a fundamental feature to the being-in-theworld of the being that each of us is. The understanding that
arises from interpretation is who we are. Ricoeur calls this the
"radicnlisnfiorz" of hermeneutics. But the turn toontology is not,
as Ricoeur suggests, a turn away from epistemology. For, first,
deregionalized hermeneutics remains areflection on the nature
and limits of human knowledge, and, second, what makes Heidegger and Gadamer radical
relative to Schleiermacher and Dilof the hermeneutical
they is theirepistemologicalreading
circle. I

"' "The Task of Hermeneutics," p. 4 4 .
I ' [bid., p. 44.Cf. "Hermeneutics as Epistemology" (chapter 3 above). Rorty's
slogan of the end of epistemology ~n Philosophy mzd the Mirror of Nature
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The hermeneutical circle is the other theme that carries over
into the hermeneutical turn of the twentieth century. Already
propounded by Schleiermacher’s immediate predecessor, Friedrich Ast, it is a circle of part and whole. But already in Schleiermacher it means more than that the meaning of the whole of a
text must be constructed from meanings of the parts alzd vice
versa. For the whole in terms of which any given passage must
just the whole of the text in which it appears
be interpreted is not
but the whole of the language in which it is written and the
it.12
whole of the life of the author who wrote
This means that the task of interpretation is infinite, for the
two wholes that are the context of any text are themselves both
infinite. We can have a ”presentiment” of the whole, but every
interpretation will be “imperfect,” ”only an approximation,” in
short “provisional . . . until suddenly at the end every part is
clear and the whole work is visible in sharp and definite contours.’’13By itself this passage suggests that hermeneutical
totality can be achieved; but elsewhere when stressing the infinity
of the interpretative task, Schleiermacher makes this “end” of
interpretation sound more like a regulative ideal. To complete
the task “it would be necessary to have a complete knowledge
of the language . . . [and] to have a complete knowledge of the
person,” which in both cases is “imp~ssible.”~~
Because of the
infinity of the task, ”inspiration” is needed?But from this inspiration we should not expect necessary insight of the sort that
we are back to a presenresults fromproofs.16It would seem that
timent of the whole thatwill remain provisional.
It is a shorter step fromSchleiermacher’s infinite to Derrida’s
undecidability than might be immediately evident to those who
share the Sehlzsucht nach der Wisselzschaft that links romantic hermeneutics to its reiteration
in Dilthey, Betti, and Hirsch. But Heidegger and Gadamer, and not only Derrida, will find in this
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979) is misleading. The hermeneutical
turn is in the endonly one particular way of reflecting on the nature and limits
of human knowledge.
H H M , pp. 98-99,202.
bid., pp. 198-203.
1 ’ Ibid., p. 100.
I s Ibid., p. 112.
l h Ibid., pp. 183-86.
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notion that the hermeneutical circle poses an infinite task for
interpretation thebasis for deconstructing that yearning (which
is not the same as abolishing or abandoning it). In orderto appreciate more fully the radical implicationsof the hermeneutical
circle for our troika and those who have taken the hermeneutical
turn with them,it will be helpful to trace the other prehistoryof
that turn.
This second story moves from Kant through Hegel and
Kierkegaard to Nietzsche. Within the hermeneutical circle the
presentiment of the whole functions
as an a priori, as a condition
for the possibility of interpreting any part.The Copernican revolution of the First Critique is the discovery that interpretations
dependent on a priori guidelines are relative to the standpoint
constituted by those guidelines and that, unless it can be legitimately claimed thatsuch a standpoint is the absolute standpoint
(today, followingThomas Nagel, we might call it the view from
nowhere), the resultant knowledgewill not beAbsolute Knowledge. Since the forms and categories that make possible human
experience constitute the human standpoint, not the divine, the
former can give onlyphenomenalknowledge(appearance),
while only the latter
can give noumenal knowledge (the thing in
itself). Even within the limitations of the phenomenal, our inability to specify the totality of the conditions of any phenomenon make the ideal of knowledge a regulative ideal.17
One might reply that there is no hermeneutical circle in Kant
of expesince we do not revise our a priori principles in the light
rience. True enough, and while he insists that (noumenal) Truth
and Knowledge are not available to us, the (phenomenal) truth
and knowledge he thinkswe can have depend for their objectivity onour having universally valid and unrevisable anticipations
of experience. But what if human knowledge is historical and its
presentiments labile as Schleiermacher and Dilthey presume (at
least for the Geis teswissenschnften)?
"My reading of Kant's Copernican Revolution as essentially theistic has
been developed in more detail in "In Defense of the Thing in Itself," KnntStrrdien 59, no. 1 (1968)' and "Christian Philosophers and the Copernican Revolution" (ch. 5 above). Its relevance to hermeneutics is discussed in my "PostKantian Reflections on the Importance of Hermeneutics," in Disciplining HerInenelrtics: Inferpretution i n Christian Perspective, ed. Roger Lundin (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1997).

Hegel to the rescue. First, he recognizes both phenomenologically and logically that there is a plurality of human interpretative standpoints,defined
by different a priori, categoreal
structures.Thenhe recognizes thatthissynchronicplurality
shows itself historically in a diachronic plurality. Next he notes
that the relativity inherent
in this plurality can be Overcome only
if the totality of perspectives can be integrated into an organic
whole, which would thendefine a perspective no longer relative
to any alternative. Finally, he makes the audaciousclaim to have
achieved that integral totality by which Absolute Knowledgeis
constituted. His Logos is God before the creation of the world,
to which all finite things are relative but that itself is relative to
nothing other than its own internal moments. Better than the
merely human objectivity that Kant thought was possible
through the ahistorical (noncircular) characterof human understanding, Hegel offers a Divine Objectivity in two easy steps:
first, acknowledge the historical diversity and revisability of interpretative standpoints that make the
hermeneutical circle a reality; then escape the circle by completing the infinite task it
poses, by achieving totality.
The aftermath toHegel is largely the story of Hegelians withof a sense of
out the Absolute, philosophers with too much
human historicality to take seriously any strategy but Hegel’s,
but with too muchof a sense of human finitude and diversity to
take that strategy itself seriously. History without totality renders null and void not only the Divine Objectivity offered by
Hegel but even the humanobjectivity offered by Kant.
This is already the case for Kierkegaard. He and his pseudonyms often argue like this:
It is often said that Christianity is unreasonable. Some, like Lessing, conclude that it must be rejected on these grounds. Others,
like Hegel, conclude that it must be reinterpreted beyond
recognition in order to become reasonable. Christian apologists respond
by trying to show that their faith is reasonable after all. My “defense” of Christianity is quite different. I admit, nay insist, that it
is unreasonable. But I reserve the right to inquire just who ”Reason” might be and who appointed it to be the ultimate arbiter of
the Trueand the Real.
Upon examination ”Reason” turns out tobe doubly defective.
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On the one hand, it is radically finite. It is always human understanding that takes to itself this honorific title. But for Christianity, human understanding is not Divine Understanding and can
never be the ultimate touchstone of Truth. Kant was right about
that.
But Hegel helps us to see that it is worse than that. Human
understanding is not timeless, unchanging, and universal. It is
always some contingent, particular point of view, shared by a certain group of people at a certain time. But especiaIIy when ”Reason” claims to be the integrated totality of all such perspectives
and insists on the uppercaseR in its name, impatiently dismissing
as unenlightened (Lessing) or immature (Hegel) anythingthat
dares to differ from it, it becomes clear that ”Reason” is not just
the shared assumptions of some human group but the self-congratulatory self-legitimation of some Established Order. Kant was
right in denying the power of totality to human understanding;
but that means that what Hegel shows us (against his intentions)
is what Marx would say clearly: ”Reason” is ideology.
But why should Christianityhave to prove its respectability by
showing that it conforms to the Idols of the Tribe? When it is
objected that Christianity is unreasonable, people of faith should
reply, ”It is just as you say, and the amazing thing is that you
think that it is an objection.”tfi”Reason” is a Wizard of Oz who
has cowed people far too long. It’s long since time to go behind
the screen and see the discrepancy between the image and the
reality.

So far as I can see, there is only one difference between Kierkegaard’s demythologizing of ”Reason” and Nietzsche’s perspectivism. Kierkegaard thinks that there is an Absolute Perspective
(at once the view from everywhere and fromnowhere), available
to God but not to us. Nietzsche thinks there is no such thing. But
they are in profound agreement about the nature and limits of
human understanding:
Its yreslrypositio~saIways constitute a finite and contingent persyectizv.
This yevspcctive is always one of many, conflicting puitzts of
view.l 9
Phi2osuyhical Fungrrrenfsll~~~rzllnes
Clinzacus, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna
H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 7985), p. 52.
I ” The visual perceptionof a physical oblect is perspectival. But it is not radi-
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The resultant relativity of truth claims to the point of view or
paradigm which is the a priori conditionof their plausibility and
verifiability cannot be overcome by Hegel's totalizing strategy
but signifies the nature and limits of human understanding.
The present age, whether it thinks of itself as Modernity, flying
the flag of Reason, or Christendom baskingin its demonstrated
reasonableness, is the self-deceived, self-deifyingdenial of
these (to it) humiliating reminders thatisitneither God nor the
Kingdom of God.

This story, or somethingvery much like it, is the other prehistory of the hermeneutical turn, thecontext in which the hermeneutical circle was taken over by Heidegger and his sons and
ilzfeuyreted against Schleierrnacher and Dilthey. It is not that Dilthey did not know the story. He writes,
The finitude of every historical phenomenon, . . . the relativity of
every kind of human apprehension of the totality of things is the
last word of the historical Weltanschauung. . . . And over against
this both the demand of thought and the striving of philosophy
for universal knowledge assert themselves. The historical Weltansclzauung liberates the human spirit from the last chains that natural science and philosophy have not yet broken. But where are the
menns to overcome the arzavcl~yufoyirziom wlzich then threatem to befall
US?20

But Dilthey's objectivist response to this questionshows that he
is still enthralled by "the striving of philosophy for universal
knowkdge" and only partly unchained from natural science.
His critique of historical reason is free from the assumption that
Geist must become the object of knowledge in just the sameway
as Nutw, but not from the assumption thatit must have a separate but equalobjectivity so as to satisfy "the striving of philosophy for universal knowledge."?'
cally perspectival because the view from here and the view from there complementratherthancontradicteach
other.The
mutualincompatibility
of
perspectives is crucialto the radical perspectivism of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. This is obvious enough when Christianity is seen as incompatible with
"Reason" or Dionysian Overman, but it is often left implicit in more general
discussions, leaving careless readers
to see perspectivism as trivial.
Quoted in Makkreel, Dilthey, p. 3, emphasis added.
2 1 Bleicher describes Dilthey's "scientistic territory" in this way: "Empiricistically he focuses on something 'given,' the ultimate unit of experience which
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It is the abandonment of this assumption in understanding
the significance of the hermeneutical circle that constitutes the
hermeneutical turn and its radicality in twentieth-centurycontinental philosophy.22Heidegger's interpretation of the circle in
terms of pre-understanding in Being and Time and Gadamer's
construal in termsof prejudice in Truth and Method have broken
decisively with "the striving of philosophy for universal knowledge." We aretooembeddedinourhistorical
locality, our
language, our culture, our practices, and, of course, the interpretations these makepossible for philosophy's strivingto be anything butfutile, its dream anything but a pipe dream.
What thenabout Dilthey's question, "But wherearethe
means to overcome the anarchy of opinions which then threatens to befall us?"It is Gadamer more than Heidegger who
addresses this issue, and
his answer is quite direct: not methodological objectivity but open and honest dialogue.=
It is possible,
he believes, to come to an understanding with those who start
with different prejudices from
our own. Therecan be a fusionof
horizons. Of course, theseunderstandings andthese fusions are
never total nor permanent, but they are not nothing either.
see his
It is this aspect of Gadamer's work that leads many to
as a conservative or even reactionary hermeneutic, especially in
comparison with Derrida. This seems to me mistaken.24In the
first place, the claims Gadamer will make about the limited and
fragile possibility of mutual understanding making it (sometimes) possible for us to live together without violence are not
in the sphere of hermeneutics is the 'lived experience'. Equally, 're1iving"a
concept Dilthey never seemed able to free himself from-functions
as the
equivalent to observation: 'both fulfill on the empirical level the critenon
for a
copy theoryof truth; they guarantee, it seems, the reproduction of something
immediate withinan isolated consciousness that isfree of any subjective elements"'; Contemporary Hermeneutics, pp. 23-24. The final quotation is from
Jiirgen Habermas,Protestbavegung und Hochschulreform (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp,
19691, p. 226.
z2 For very similar developments within the AngleAmerican "analytic" traditions, see Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, and Nancey Murphy,
Anglo-American Postmodernity (Boulder: Westview Press,1997).
23 Habermas enters the scene with a theory of the for
rules
such a dialogue.
But these are more nearly moral norms than the rules that constitute a methodology. For Gadamer and for Habermas the task of coming
to an understanding
is more basicallya moral than a theoretical task.
24 See n. 2 above.
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claims Derrida finds it necessary to contest.In the second place,
like Heidegger before him and Derrida after him, Gadamer has
seentheradicalimplications
of Schleiermacher’s recognition
that the infinite whole(s) in terms of which the parts must be
interpreted setfor interpretation an infinite task thatit can never
complete. All construals will be provisional-but not in the way
in which our vision of a physical object is provisional, since
there is an infinite number of perspectives from which we might
view it, and wewill always have occupied onlya finite subset of
these. Like Heidegger before him and Derrida after him, Gadamer understandsDilthey, when he says that “the relativityof
every kind of human apprehensionof the totality of things is the
last word of the historical Weltuilschlllfzi~lg,”to signify not just
that our presentiments of the totality are just that, anticipations
of experience we have not yet had; their relativity also signifies
that they are embedded inand constituted by conflicting a prioris, pre-understandings, prejudices, whichcannotsimplybe
added together togive us an increasingly determinate and stable
common object.
The differences have to be negotiated; that is the infinite task
of understanding. Every understanding, the oneI start with and
the one you and 1 reach through a dialogical fusion of horizons,
is open to deconstruction and furtherdialogue,opento
the
claim, not just that it has left something out, but thatit has construed things wrongly and needs to be revised, not just supplemented (or perhaps that supplementation is always Az~fiebu~rg,
the recontextualization that changeseven what itretains).”
In other words,before Gadamer becomes the evangelist of the
gospel of HorizonfverschmeZzI~Izg,he is, like Heidegger before him
and Derrida after him, a prophet of epistemological gloom and
doom. And he is hopelessly protestant.He has given u p all hope
of a universal Mother Church, whetherin the temples of Reason
or the basilicas of Christendom. In a world of dangerous difference, the most he can hope for is a bit of ecumenism, a modus
vivendi based on dialogue rather than violence and manipula15 See Jacques Derrida, “From Restricted to General Economy: A Hegelianism without Reserve,” In Writing and Differewe, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978).
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tion. But the presence of this hope doesn’t cancel out his radical
resistance to the sirens of science who seduced Schleiermacher
and Dilthey. Nor does itmake him a reactionary any more than
Paul is a Pelagian because after preaching sinhe preaches salvation. Just as Pauline soteriology presupposesand doesnot erase
his hamartiology, so Gadamer’s politics of dialoguepresupposes and does not erasehis radical reading of the hermeneutical circle. Neither of texts nor of the world are methodologically
validated objective interpretations available to
We have always already presupposed what has not (yet) been methodologically validated and what is at odds with the presuppositions
that lead others to make conflicting construals. In short, the hermeneutical turn is inherently radical. It says a decisive No to
“the striving of philosophy for universal knowledge.”

It is not necessary to huff and puff arguments to show thatDerrida’s reading of the hermeneutical circle is radical. Perhaps he
has been reading Schleiermacher in addition to Saussure when
he tells us that ”the book is never finite.’’27But without denying
the infinite task of hermeneutics, itis possible to understand that
infinity in two quite different ways: ”The original opening of
interpretation essentially signifies that there will always be rabbis and poets. And two interpretations of interpretation” (p. 67).
The comparison of the rabbi and the poet is an importantchapter in the hermeneutical turn we are exploring and therefore
By speaking simply of the world and not the human world, this formulaand the Nrztion assumes that the distinction between the Gcistcsn~isser~scllnfferl
tzlv7llissenschaftrll cannot be sustained and that the natural sciences are also
caught up in a hermeneutical circle. Since Thomas Kuhn’s The Strrrcture of ScientiJic Revolutions, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970), this
latter claim has had to be taken seriously. For a sense of the discusslon, see
Mary Hesse, Rezdutiolts ~ 1 7 dRc~cnnstvr~tior~s
in the Philosophy of Scierlce (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1980), and Robert I? Crease, ”The Hard Case: Science
ed. Roy Martinez
and Hermeneutics,” in The V e q Iden of Rrzdicd Hevnz~v~e~rtics,
(Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1997). In 714 of Beyond Gaud nmf
E v i l , Nietzsche had already written, “It is perhaps just dawning on five or six
minds that physics, too, is only an interpretation and exegesis of the world (to
suit us, if I may say so!) and rrot a world-t.xplanation.”
z “Edmond ]ab& and the Question of the Book,” in Wrififlgn~zdDiffcwnce,
p. 75. Subsequent references to thls essay will be given parenthetically in the
text.
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worthy of our exploration. For like Jabes, the author of the text
on which he comments in this essay, “adding pitiful graffiti” (p.
74) as he putsit, Derrida sees the Jew and the poet as ”at once
so united and disunited’’ (p. 67)?
They are united bya similarityso deep that theJew is at once
a metonym andexemplar of the poet. For both thescene of writing is exile. They ”are not bornhere but elsewhere. They wander,
, . . sons of the Land to come” (p.
separated from their true birth
66). But just because theyshare ”thevery form of exiled speech”
they also share “thenecessity of exegesis, the interpretive imperative,” or, to put it a bit differently, ”In the beginningis hermeneutics” (p. 67).
The nature of this shared exile and its link to the infinite task
of interpretation is not immediately clear. It becomes clearer
when Derrida supplements one Old Testament metaphor with
another andidentifies the scene of writing, east of Eden but west
of the New Jerusalem, as the desert, describing it this
way:
God no longer speaks to us; he has interrupted himself: we must
take words upon ourselves. We . . . must entrust ourselves tp
traces, must becomemen of vision because we have ceased hearing the voice from within the immediate proximity
of the garden.
. . . Writing is displaced on the broken line between and
lost promised speech. The differeme between speech and writing is sin, the
anger of God emerging from itself, lost immediacy, work outside
the garden. (p, 68)

Derrida, of course, does not think there is a deep difference
between speech and writing. But a philosophic tradition going
back at least to Plat0 and Aristotle does, and he employs the
distinction (as here) in the process of deconstructing it. Thus,
when he says that all language is writing, he is not denying
the
obvious fact that we sometimes speak and sometimes write; he
is saying that speech also has the derivative character attributed
by the traditional theory (sometimes called logocentrism) only
to writing.
2R The essay takes the form of quotations from Jabes’s Le Livrr des quesfions
and commentary thereon, which takes the form bothof explication and of extrapolation, leaving it unclear where Jab& leaves off and Derrida begins. To
this observation Derrida might wellreply, ”Bingo! Is it not always so?”

What, then, is the ”immediacy” or “immediate proximity”
whose possession constitutes the gardenand whose loss constitutes exile into the desert that is, for rabbi and poet alike, the
necessity of interpretation? It is, of course, the presence presupposed by the western tradition insofar as that tradition is the
metaphysics of presence. This presence is of two sorts: the sheer
presence of the mind to meanings is what makes it possible for
(spoken) words to be the bearers of clear and distinct ideas,
while the sheer presence of the mind to objects or facts is what
makes it possible for the mind to be the mirror of the world.
Where meanings have such clarity and truths such certainty,interpretation is not necessary.
On the logocentric version of the metaphysics of presence,
speech is the immediate outward expression of an inner intuition in which the mind
is directly and fully present to its meanings, and, when notin error, just as directly and fully present to
the objects or facts referred to in terms of those meanings. Both
meaning and reference are without ambiguity or indeterminacy.
it be meaning or
The object of the mind’s intentionality, whether
fact, concept or thing, is a transcendental signified, in which the
mind comes to rest. (Hence the language of intuition.) It is a
signified that is not also a signifier, pointing beyond itself to
other signs in terms of which it must be interpreted. It is not
necessary to go beyond the given.’”
There is another way to see how interpretation is not necessary on this model. Spoken words are the postal system that
enables, by means of divination or deciphering, the reconstruction or reexperiencing in another mind of the intuitions (sheer
presences to meaning or fact) of the first mind. If the original
intuition renders interpretation unnecessary in the inner speech
that is thought, the repetition of intuition makes interpretation
unnecessary in the context of communication. The idea seemsto
be this: If the postal system malfunctions and there is misunderstanding, it can be easily remedied because, first, in the typical,
face-to-face situation the hearer can ask, Do you mean this? and
~Derrida’sfullest account of logocentrism in terms of the transcendental
signified 1s found in Of Grarnnmtalagy, trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976).Also see n.32 below

the speaker can reply, No, I mean that;” and, second, given the
postal system model, there is nothing inherently calling for construal, but only for repetition.
For logocentrism, spoken signs signify or point to meanings
(essences) and facts or objects (existences) but not to othersigns.
Written signs, by contrast, being derivative fromspeech, signify
or point to other signs, possibly other written signs (intertextuality) but ultimately to spoken signs.Thus, they never signify a
transcendental signified in which the mindcan come to rest, but
always other signs, which point beyond themselves. But suppose, as Derrida does, that all signs did this; suppose all language is “writing” in this sense. Then all language calls for
interpretation,because all signspointbeyond
themselves to
other signs in terms of which they are to be interpreted? To live
away from the “intimacy of the garden . , . between lost and
promised speech’’ (p. 68) is to experience absence where logocentrism promises presence, to live in the desert where writing
is possible and interpretation necessary.
Where the immediatepresence of speech, as traditionally construed, hasbeen replaced by writing and the absence
it involves,
”Encounter is separation” (p. 74). In other words, presence is
(also) absence (cf. Heidegger: unconcealing is also concealing). It
should not be necessary to say, but it probably is, that Derrida’s
emphatic denial of presence is not the denial thatI am now (as I
write) present to my computer but absent to the Taj MahaP2
w It is pointless to object that some speech situations (radio broadcasts, press
conferences, or lectures without opportunity for questions) a r t not face to face
in the specified sense, while some forms of writing (students passing notes
in class) are. Derrlda has far deeper reasons for challenglng the traditional
distinction, which restsin any case on their typical forms in which the speaker
is present to the hearer and the writer absent to the reader.
;I This way of putting it suggests a link between Derrida and classical American anti-intuitionist theories of interpretation as found In Royce, Whitehead,
and Peirce. For an attempt to distance Pence from Derrida, see Umberto Eco,
“Unlimited Semeiosis and Drift: Pragmaticism vs. ’Pragmaticism’,” in Perrce
m d Corltwryormy T h r g h f ,ed. Kenneth Laine Ketner (New York: Fordham University Press, 1995).
\ ? I was about to qualify this sentence by the insertion of the phrase ”in the
commonsense meaning of the terms [presence and absence],’’ but part of what
Derrida wants to reslst is the way in which the theoretical interpretation he
opposes has insinuated itself Into common sense so that we come to philosophy with a bias In favor of the ”myth of the given.” He writes, ”Now, ‘every-
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What he disputes is the philosophical theory that this kind of
presence or introspective presence to my
own meanings is ever
sheer presence, presencenotessentiallyaccompanied
by absence.33 That iswhy he speaksso frequently of traces, which are
precisely presences that essentially point beyondthemselves to
what is not present.
Derrida preaches a brief, two-point sermon on the text "Encounter is separation." First, this statement "contradicts 'logic,'
breaks the unityof Being . . .by welcoming the other and difference into the sourceof meaning" (p. 74).The point is as simple
as its implications are disturbing. If signs and things always
point beyond themselves to other signs and things that point
beyond themselves, etc., then the task of determining meaning
or fact is an infinite task that could only be stopped arbitrarily
or by means of Hegelian totality. To call this "welcoming the
other and difference into the sourceof meaning" is to note that
the meanings from which any meaning differs are an essential
part of its own meaning and that the others from which any
object is distinguished are essential parts
of its being.%
The second point comes in the form of an objection and a
reply. Objection: "But . . . Being must always already be conceptualized in order to say these things . . . and especially in order
to say that encounter is separation.'' Reply: "Certainly, but 'must
daylanguage' 1s notinnocentorneutral.Itisthelanguage
of Western
metaphysics, and it carries with it not only a considerable number
of presuppositions of alltypes,butpresuppositionsinseparablefrommetaphysics,
which although little attended to are knotted Into a system";
Posittons, trans.
Alan Bass (Chicago: Uruversityof Chicago Press, 19811, p. 19. Wilfrid Sellars's
attack on the "myth of the given" in Emptrtclsm and the Philosophy of Mind
(Cambndge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1997) belongs to the story of
"analytic" postmodernism. See n. 22 above.
33 According to Derrida, by maintaining "an essential and juridical distinction" between signifier and signified, Saussure, with the tradition to whlch he
belongs, "leaves open the possibilityof thinking a concept signified in and
of
itself, a concept simply present for thought, independent of a relation to language, that isof a relationship to a system
of signifiers. . . . He accedes to the
classical exigencyof what I have proposed to call a 'transcendental signified,'
which in andof itself, in its essence, would refer to no signifier, would exceed
the chainof signs, and should no longer itself function as a signifier";
Positions,
pp. 19-20, emphasis changed.
For the classical statementof t h point in the languageof difference, see
Demda's essay "Diffhrance,'' in Murgzns of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press, 1982).
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always already’ precisely signifies the original exile from the
kingdom of Being, signifies exile as the conceptualization of
Being, and signifies that Being never is, never shows itself, is
never present, is never I Z O W ,outside difference” (p. 74). Careless
and hostile readings will omit the last two words of this claim
and attribute sheer nonsense to Derrida.But the claim that everything includes difference, that every itself includes an other,
that every presence includes an absence, and that every now includes a then is not nonsense; it is rather a strong doctrine of
internal relations.3.5
The ’must always already’ reminds
us again of the hermeneutical circle. Theconstrual of any phenomenon as something
(along with the assertion that it is something) contains an implicit reference (presentiment, pre-understanding, presupposition, prejudice, paradigm) to the totality of the differences and
alterities that Derrida has welcomed into the originof meaning.
Because this totality is never present, never now, we never understand anything as itself, as it is in itself. For it is itself, not in
splendid isolation from everything else but only in its essential
relatedness to everythingelse. The poet thinksif he really understood the flower in the crannied wall he would understand everything else (or at least ”what God and man is”)? Derrida
reverses this; unless we understand everything else, we do not
understand the flower. It has not yet showed itself.
Not even, or perhaps, especially not God. Ever mindful of the
theological ramifications of these issues, Derrida adds,
“Whether he is Being or the master of beings, God himself is,
and appears as what he is, within difference, that is to say, as
difference and within dissimulation” (p. 74). In Thomistic language, our knowledgeof God in this lifetime, whether by reason
beatific vision. In
or by revelation, is not to be confused with the
Pauline language, we do not now see God face to face.
If the rabbi and the poet carry on the task of interpretation in
x
i This very strong doctrine of internal relations, but without closure or totality, is what enables Derrida to write, “Yet all that Hegel has thought within
this horizon, all, that is, except eschatology, may be reread as a meditation on
writing. Hegel is also the thinker of irreducible difference”; Of GrarnnmfoIogy,
p. 26. In Derrida’s deconstruction, Hegel is hoisted with his own petard.
Alfred, Lord Tennyson, “Flower in the Crannied Wall.”
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the aridexile of this perennial penultimacy, they nevertheless
do
so differently. The rabbibelongs to "the Jewishcommunity
which lives under heteronomy and to which the poet does not
truly belong." The symbol of this heteronomy is a "sacred text
surrounded by commwtaries" (p. 67).37N.B. What defines rabbinic
heteronomy is not the denial
of exile; for the rabbi, like the poet,
has made the hermeneutical turn.
It is rather the claim that what
we interpret in the desert is a sacred text, a repository of divine
truth that may exceed our grasp (or what's a heaven for), but
that is real nevertheless,nay, more real than any interpretation.
The rabbi gives a Kierkegaardian interpretation to human finitude.
The poet, by contrast, is a Nietzschean, for whom
God is dead:
Poetic autonomy, comparable to none other,presupposes broken
Tables. . . . Between the fragments of the broken Tables the poem
grows and the right to speech takes root. Once more begins the
adventure of the text as weed, as outlaw far from'the frrfl7crl~ndof
the Jews,' which is a 'sacred text surrounded by comrnerztaries.' . . .
The difference between the horizon of the original text and exegetic writing makes the difference between the rabbi
and the poet
irreducible. (p. 6 7 P

For the poet's task is to produce an original
text, not a commentary, and the presuppositionof this is the story of Exodus 32, in
which the tables of stone on which God wrote the covenant are
smashed to smithereens. The rabbi, but not the poet, readsExodus 34, in which the broken tables
are replaced by new ones.
For
the poet,"God separated himself from himself, in orderto let us
speak, in order to astonish and to interrogate us. He did so not
by speaking but by keeping still, by letting silence interrupt his
voice and his signs, by letting the Tables be broken'' (p. 67).
This is why it is possible to describe Jabks's book as "the POetic revolution of our century, the extraordinary reflection of
man finally attempting today-and always in vain-to retake
possession of his language (as if this were meaningful) by any
means, though all routes, and to reclaim responsibility for it
against a Father of Logos" (p. 73).
v

This phrase is italicized because Derrida takes it directly from Jabes.
On these italics, see previous note.
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This wouldbe good, orthodox Nietzscheanismexcept for that
nagging little phrase "and always in vain." Is the earlier acknowledgment that "there will always be rabbis and poets" (p67) something other than the regretof the inteliectual elite that,
like the poor, the hermeneutical
hoi polloi (along with their
scriptures and their
classics) will always be with us? Is the poetic
interpretation of interpretation ultimately futile?
With these questions in mind, we turn to Derrida's comments
on the book in the closing pages of his essay. Faith in the book,
he warns us, is not tobe simply identified with faithin the Bible.
The rabbi, with his sncred text, now becomes a metonym for all
who believe "that Being is a Grammar; and that the world is
in all its parts a cryptogram to be constituted through poetic
inscription or deciphering; that the book is original, that everything bclolzgs to the book before being and in order to come into
the world . . . and that always the impassible shore of the book
is first" (pp. 76-77).
To believe in the book is to believe both that intelligibility and
truth precede empirical existence and human language and
that
to understand the latteris to decipher it by seeing itas an external manifestationof and occasion for recognizing init that prior
ideality. Plato and Hegel should be sufficient to remind us that
this view of interpreting the (book of the) world is not tied to
belief in theBible; and Schleiermacher, along withDilthey, Betti,
and Hirsch, should suffice in the same way when it is a matter
of interpreting texts.
The crucial move here is the construal of interpretation as deciphering. SupposeI want to ask my wife a question without the
kids understandingit. I say, AI-shay e-way 0-gay oo-tay ac-may
onalds-day? If she understands me, she will decode my pig
Latin message to read, Shall we go to McDonalds? We started
with a fully determinate and unambiguous statement in my
mind; I gave it external expression in a linguistic form wholly
external to its prior meaning; and Mom understood me when
she deciphered it back into its original form, so that now the
meaning in her mind and the meaning in mine are identical.
This is precisely the interpretation of interpretation that is abandoned by all who take the hermeneutical turn with Heidegger,
Gadamer, and Derrida. Thus, for example, when Gadamer sug-
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gests that interpretationis translation, he emphasizes that translation is not this kind of deciphering: "Not occasionally but
always, the meaning of a text goes beyond its author. That is
why understandingis not merely reproductive butalways a productive activity as well. . . . It is enough to say that we understand in a diffcrtwfway, if we mders#nlrd nf ~111."~~'
In other words, rabbinic hermeneutics, practiced by people of
the book, whether that book be the Bible or not, knows itself to
live in an exile from the immediacyof sheer presencethat makes
interpretation necessary; but it construes interpretation as discovering a pre-empirical, prelinguistic intelligibility through deciphering the texts (including the world) in which it has been
encoded. With or without an appealto method, it interprets interpretation along thelines of Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Betti, and
Hirsch rather than radicalizing the hermeneutical
turn withHeidegger and his quarreling sons.
We are prepared for Derrida's question: "What if the Book
was only . . . an epoch of Being (an epoch coming to an end . . . )?
If the form of the book was no longer to be the model of meaning?" But perhaps we are not quite ready €or the dramatic turn
it takes: "If Being was radically outside thebook . . . If the Being
of the world, its presence and the meaning of its Being, revealed
itself onIy in illegibility, in a radical illegibility which would not
be the accomplice of a lost or sought after legibility, of a page
not yet cut from some divine encyclopedia?" (p. 77).
This illegibility is "radical" because it is "original" (p. 77). In
Heidegger's language the foundation(Grzmd) turns outto be the
abyss ( A b g r z d ) .In the languageof Kierkegaard's Climacus, the
risk of meaning always occurs at sea, with 70,000 fathoms of
brine separating the speaker from a terra firma that could be
reached only by drowning. But radical, original illegibility "is
not irrationality, is not despair provoking non-sense, is not everything within the domains of the incomprehensible and the
illogical that is anguishing. Such an interpretation . . . already
belongs to the book" (in accord with the notion that skeptics
are always disappointed Platonists) but "original illegibility is
Hans-Georg Cadarner, Truth nnd Method, 2nd ed., trans. Joel We~nsheimer
and Donald G. Marshall (New York: Crossroad, 1991), pp. 296-97.
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therefore the very possibility of the book and, within it, of the
ulterior and eventual opposition of ‘rationalism’ and ’irrationalism’ (p. 77).
This is not the time or place to go into Derrida’s theory of the
quasi transcendentals thatare atonce the condition
of possibility
and the condition of impossibility of that to which they give
rise? What is important for us about this little meditation on
the death of the Book, the passing of its epoch, is the strong
denial, in theform of rhetorical questions to be sure,of meaning
or intelligibility prior to and outside the world of the text and
the text of the world (the humanly interpreted world). It looks
like a homily on one of Derrida’s most famous texts, “There is
nothing outside of the text,1141especially when Derrida adds,
”Every exit from the book is made within the book’’ (p. 75).
But there is another side to this meditation
on the book. What:
about these exits from the book? No doubt they are the putative
excursions beyond language to prehguistic
a
intelligibility that
are thoughtto be possible by those who have not fully made the
hermeneutical turn. So we should forget about them. But no!
Derrida assumes that we can and must undertake such exits,
even if they are not possible, even if they can only be made
within the book. Can this be the meaningof the “and always in
vain” with which Derrida earlier qualified the poetic project of
autonomy,taking over responsibilityforlanguagefromthe
Father of Logos, the Author of the Book?
If there is nothing outside the text, and human writing, as
only writing thereis, the poet’s patricide
Derrida assumes, is the
would be unproblematic. But just after he speaks of exiting from
the book, Derrida writes, “If writing is not a tearing of the self
toward the other within a confession of infinite separation, if it
is a delectationof itself, the pleasure of writing for its own sake,
the satisfaction of the artist, then it destroys itself. . . . It is true
that to go toward the otheris also to negateoneself’’ (pp. 75-76).
”

Rodolphe Gasch6 introduced this term in The Tnin of the Mirror: Derrida ami
fhe Philosophy of Refi’ecfiolr (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986).
John D. Caputo uses it extensively in The Prayers and Tears of Jacqws Drrridn
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997).
Of Grulnmafology,p. 158. For a double reading of this claim as both Kantian
and Hegelian, see “Hermeneutics as Epistemology” (ch. 3 above).
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It may be, as Derrida writes elsewhere, that "the notion of an
Idea or 'interior design' [interior to the mind of some author or
Author] as simplyanterior to a work [text or world] which
would supposedly be the expression of it, is a prejudice." But
we must not forget thatif creative writing
is not the purely transparent expression of this form, it is nevertheless, simultaneously, revelation.
If creation were notreveIation,
what would happen to the finitude of the writer and to the solitude of his hand abandoned by God? Divine creativity, in this
case, would be reappropriated by a hypocritical humanism. If
writing is inaugzrvd it is not so because it creates, but becauseof a
certain absolute freedom of speech, because of the freedom to
bring forth the already-thereas a sign of the freedomto augur. A
freedom of response which acknowledgesas its only horizon the
world as history and the speech which can only say: Being has
always already begun.To create is to reveal.13

N.B, The poet's creative freedom is not freedom to create ex
nihilo. It is a "freedom of response" to Being that "has always
already begun." Whatever play means in Derrida, it does not
mean making it up as we go along and as we please. To write is
to engage the other, notjust other writers but something outside
the text: "Just as the end of writing passes beyond writing, its
origin is not yet in the book" (p. 76).
Before we get too excited, Derrida repeats his sober reminder,
"But-and this is the heart of the matter-everything that is exterior in relationto the book, everything that is negative as concerns the book, is produced u~ithilz the book. The exit from the
book, the other and the threshold, are all articulated withisz the
book . . . the book is not in the world, but the world is in the
book" (p. 76)?
The exit from thebook is impossible (as achievement) because
everything we say about what might be outside thebook, prior
to our language and its prejudices, is shaped by our language
and its prejudices. But the exit from the book is also necessary
(as attempt) because in our finitude we can never be the Father
"Force and Signification," in Writing a d Difference, pp. 11-12.
It would seem that Derrida means text as human writing rather than book
as pre-empirical, prelinguistic divine intelligibility.
42
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of Logos, the mind in which intelligibility precedes worldly or
textual existence. With common sense, we must assume that the
world is out there. But, having taken the hermeneutical turn, we
must acknowledge that we can never get out there for a naked
romp with Being in which, having shed the Iatest style (and all
others) of prejudices, we can coax Being to disrobe before our
voyeuristic gaze.
The hermeneutical turn is theCopernican
Revolutionupdated by a nineteenth-century appreciation of history and a
twentieth-century appreciation of language. In its original version, that revolution says, "Human reason has this peculiar fate
that in onespecies of its knowledge it is burdened by questions
which, as prescribed by the very nature of reason itself, it is not
able to ignore, but which, as transcending all its powers, it is
also not able to answer.''44In its Derridean version it is the similar reminder that we must seek to exceed the text, for that is the
meaning of our finitude, knowing all the while that such attempts are"always in vain" precisely because of our finitude.
This same paradoxical situation reappears when Derrida revisits the "two interpretations of interpretation," this time associated with Rousseau and Nietzsche, in an essay that has been
used to date the transition from structuralism to poststructuralism in Europe:l>"The one seeks to decipher,dreams of deciphering a truth or an origin which escapes play and the orderof the
sign, and which lives the necessity of interpretation as an exile.
The other, which is no longer turned toward the origin, a€firms
play and tries to pass beyond man and humanism, the name
of
man being the name of that being who . . . has dreamed of full
presence, the reassuring foundation, the origin and the end of
play. "lh

'-IOptnmg sentence, preface to the first edition, Critiqrw ( ~Pfw e Reasorl.
li "Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences," in
W r i t i q nrld Differerlce.Less sympathetic thanI to this development, Roger Lundin, who sees thls essay as the transition to poststructuralism, also says that it
"proved to be a deadly openmg salvo in the Continental invasion of American
universities"; The ClrIture of Irllerprefrrtmn (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans,
1993), p. 189. For our differing interpretations of "Structure, Sign, and Play,"
see Lundin's chapter 8 and my "Deconstruction and Christian Cultural Theory
(ch. 9 below).
"Structure, Sign, and Play," p. 292. In the Jab& essay, both the rabbi and
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It is easy to read this as a call to abandon one interpretation
of interpretation for the other. But the text won't allow this.
Derrida reminds us that these two hermeneutical postures "are
absolutely irreconcilable even if we Iive them simultaneously
and reconcile them in an obscure economy." But he does not
advise us to flee the tension of this irreconcilability. On the contrary, "For my part, although these two interpretations must
acknowledgeandaccentuatetheir
difference and define their
irreducibility, I do not beIieve that today thereis any question of

chuusi~g.'~~~
Derrida goes on to give his reasons, suggesting thatwe neither
can nor should try to choose between these "absolutely irreconcilable" alternatives. For him the hermeneutical turn is not from
the rabbi to the poet or from Rousseau to Nietzsche but from
such either/ors to the tensionof both/and. We might put it this
way. The real is too "weak" to determineor govern our construals of it. This leaves to human language an enormous freedom
that the poetcelebrates as autonomy. At the same time, we cannot but thinkof ourselves as seeking to articulate (reveal) a real
that is not a product of our construals, for we are finite and not
God. This is the heteronomy the rabbi experiences as responsibility.
I have tried to be prescriptive in thispaper while being descriptive; and I have tried to describe the hermeneutical turn that
separates Heidegger, Gadamer, and Derridafrom
Schleiermacher, Dilthey, Betti, and Hirsch with sufficient sympathy to
suggest that it is philosophically compelling. We should make
that turn, if we have not already done so, at least to the degree
of recognizing the double impossibility signified by Derrida's
suggestion thatwe are not tochoose between thetwo interpretations of interpretation. The rabbi reminds the poetin us that we
are not God. The world, including the world of the text, is not
simply a function of our interpretations; our task is to reveal
the poet seem to experience "the necessity of interpretation as exile." But just
to the degree that the rabbi construes hermeneutics not only in terms of sacred
texts and commentaries but also as deciphering, he thinks he can escape the
desert.
hid., p. 293.
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what is already there. At the same time, the poet reminds the
rabbi in us that neither by immediate intuitionnor by deciphering inference do we have access to structures of intelligibility
innocent of and uncontaminated by contingent and particular
systems of human meaning.
To make the hermeneutical turnin its most radical senseis to
be willing to construe human cognitive finitude as the inability
to be either simply the rabbi or simply the poet. Rather than
choosing between these alternatives, we choose to live the tension of their inseparability, allowingeach to be interrupted and
delimited by the other,
But can we, as Christians, make sucha choice? I don’t see why
not. I see nothing in the gospel of Jesus Christ that requires us
to be wed to the objectivism that is abandoned when we acknowledge that just because we are not the Creator, there is a
creative aspect to all our construals that resists our attempts to
reduce interpretation to decoding or deciphering. This means
that our knowledge is finite not just in a quantitative sense but
in a qualitative senseas well. There is much we do not know, to
be sure; but even what we do know is perennially penultimate
because of its relativity to perspectives that are themselves particular and penultimate. But for the Christian it is God who is
Absolute and Infinite, not we; nor does our knowledge lose its
relativity and its finitudeby being about God, any more thanwe
become purple by thinking about grapes. Just as
we are not
saved by good works morally speaking, we are not saved by
good works epistemically speaking, by attainingto a knowledge
of God and of God’s will that is adequate (in the philosophical
sense of the term adequatio intellectus et rei) to its intended object.4x It’sOK to see in a mirror dimly, or,if like me you prefer
the King James here,to see in a glass darkly. Just asGod’s ways
are not ours, so God’s thoughts are not ours. As theists, Kant
and Kierkegaard remind us of this biblical truth. Should we re480bviously Ideas that are not “adequate” in this technical philosophical
sense of the term can be adequateto any number of important tasks: pointing
us in the right direction, evoking worship, obedience, and service-in short,
bringing us into the kind of relation with God and the world that 1s appropriate to human creatures in thislife.
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sist being reminded once again by Heidegger, Gadamer, and
Derrida, just because they do not share ourfaith?
No doubt Derrida,with whom we have concluded, is the
hardest case. Should we notreject his system of thought because
of its atheism, because it entails claims we cannot accept: there
is no God, there is no Truth, there is no revelation, etc? In a
word, No, we should not.
To see why not, let's look at the matter of Truth. I think it fair
to say that Derrida's "system" of thought "entails" that Truth
and Knowledge as classically defined are illusory. But this conclusion follows from two distinct premises.Jy First, there is an
analysis of the embeddedness of humanunderstanding in
particular systems of meaning that undermine philosophical
aspirations to universality, objective certainty, correspondence, adeqrrafio, etc. Second, there is the atheistic premise to the effect
that there is no divine intellect in which is to be found (as Kant
and Kierkegaard supposed) the Truth and Knowledge that exceed human grasp. Theconclusion is that Truth and Knowledge
are not to be found anywhere.
Surely the atheistic premise is unacceptable to theists, along
with theconclusion about Truth and Knowledge
it helps to support. But to reject these is not to reject the first premise and its
analysis of human finitude as embedded relativity. That part of
the package is not conceptually tied to the atheistic part. The
Gospel is not threatened when we examine it on its own philosophical merits without theological prejudice, It presents itself
as an account of human finitude, a theme to which we also are
committed precisely by our belief in creation. It may well provide insights thatcan be appropriated for Christian thought,recontextualized by being separated from the atheistic premise
and joined to theistic and more specifically Christian themes.
But, it will be argued, Christians are committed to the claim
that God spoke to us by the prophets and a by
Son and thatGod
speaks to us today through the Bible, which is theWord of God,
and by the inner testimony of the Holy Spirit, which enables us
.

"

Although Derrida offers arguments, he does not employ the rhetoric of
premises, entailment, and so forth. But I think we can use that language for
purposes of analysis.
w
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to understand what God has said and is saying to us,?[)while
there is no room for this in Derrida’s scheme. If there is no God,
there is surely no revelation in salvation history, in Scripture, or
by means of the witness of the Holy Spirit. Fair enough. But does
it follow that Christians, who do not look to Derrida for these
themes in any case, might not appropriate his analysis of our
finitude into a context in which revelation motifs are pivotal?
I think we can formulate the issue quite sharply. If by revelation we understand an event by which we are caught up to the
third heaven (2 Cor. 12:2-7) and enabled to see God face to face
(Ex. 33:17-23, 1 Cor. 13:12) or, to put it in somewhat different
language, if revelation enables us to see the real, including God,
s z h syccie netcvlzifnfis, it will be difficult to incorporate a Derridean interpretationof interpretation into our Christian thought.
But what if revealed truth is a treasure we hold in clay jars (2
Cor. 4:7)? What if revelation occurs, not when we are Iifted out
of the cave, but precisely when God kenotically enters ourworld
and speaks to us under theconditions of our encavement? What
if that is what it means to see in a mirror dimly (I Cor. 13:12)?
That, I believe, is what Thomas Aquinas thought when he denied that we have quidditative knowledge of God, whether by
reason or revelation, but only analogical knowledge? That, I
believe, is what John Calvin thought
when he suggested that“as
nurses commonly do with infants, God is wont in a measure to
’lisp’ in speaking to us. Thus such forms of speaking do not
so much express clearly what God is like as accommodate the
knowledge of him to our slight capacity. To do this he must
descend far beneath his loftiness.””
There are substantial biblical and theological motivations for
Nick Wolterstorff is right, I believe, to protest against the reduction of divine discourse to revelation.See Divine Discourse: Philosophical Rcflrctiom on the
Clnirn Tlmt God Sptwks (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993, especially chs. 2-4. God speaks to us for many purposes, andself-revelation is not
always primary. I focus on revelation here because in this context it is revelatory speech acts that are especially important.
See John Wippel, ”QuidditativeKnowledge of God,” in Mc3hyhysical
Thclnes In Tllomns Aquinas (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America
Press, 1984).
11 Zmfitutes 1.13.1.Cf. Ford Lewis Battles, “God Was Accommodating Himself to Human Capacity,’’ in Reuadings in Calvin’s Theology, ed. Donald K.
McKim (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker Book House, 7984).
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thinking of revelation as divinekenosis rather than human apotheosis. The fully radical hermeneutical turn can be fruitfully
appropriated for Christian thinkingin such a frame of reference.
Finally, it will be argued in more general terms that it is always dangerous to go to the Philistines to sharpen one% tools (1
Sam. 13:19-21). After all, to mix biblical metaphors, the gold
taken when Israel spoiled the Egyptiansended u p in the golden
calf. No doubt some of it did. Appropriation is inherently dangerous. But some of that gold ended u p in thetabernacle as well,
and itis that possibility I hope to keep open.

9

Deconstruction and Christian
Cultural Theory: An Essay on
Appropriation
THEPROSPECTS do not seem bright for an appropriation of postmodern insights in the service of a Cluistian interpretation and
critique of contemporary culture. Philosophical postmodernism is
widely seen as being, at best, the moral equivalent of leprosy and,
at worst, the moral equivalentof AIDS. The need todemonize runs
deep. How elsedo we persuade ourselves, inspite of the evidence
to the contrary, that we are really good, the last, best hope of the
world? So it is that the temptation to lump postmodernism together with Hitler and Stalin is simply irresistible tosome.
For example, Michael Howard is enthusiastic about the “devastating attack on the forces of post-modernism in academic
studies, literary, philosophical and historical” that he finds in
1
2 Looking ilzfo the Abyss. She portrays
Gertrude Himmelfarb’s 0
postmodernists as the spiritual successors of John Stuart Mill’s
vision of a ”value-free society” and of the Bloornsbury group
that “poured mockery on the whole concept of moral commitment and regardedhistory, philosophy and literature as
vehicles
purely for private pleasure.” Sandwichinga reference to Jacques
Derrida,probablythe
most widelyinfluential of the French
poststructuralists on the North American scene, we find this
summary: “We know what happens when people actually put
these ’value-free’ principles intopractice; we saw it only a generation ago on a horrific scale in the Holocaust. . . . At best [these
people] are frivolous game-players who make a virtue of their
moral irresponsibility. At worst, they are set on destroying the
standards thatnot only maketheir own activity possible but also
enable society to survive at all.”’
I Michael Howard, “Facing the Monsters,” The New York Tilnes Book Revzew,
March 6,1994, pp. 11-12.
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Apparently in dealing with the bad guys one is permitted to
be scurrilous rather than scrupulous. Whenan Oxford historian
praises a CUNY colleague for deriving fascism from Mil's vision of a liberalsociety, it would seem that the academyis truly
in deep peril-to say nothing of the curious portrayalof Hitler's
gang as a"value-free" society. I had thought their problem was
in assuming that the quite particular valuesof which they took
themselves to be the embodiment were absolute values; and I
was reminded of Arthur Schlesinger's address in which he reminded us that the atrocitiesof modernity have been committed
by moral absolutists.
A certain Francis Duke from Los Angeles was thinking along
the same lines. His reply to the Howard review points out that
the Holocaust, like the Inquisitionand slavery, was perpetrated
to be
by those who took the values legitimating their power
quite absolute. Acknowledginghis own reservations about postmodernism, he adds, "But implicitly they are asking the right
question:How do we make sure another Holocaustdoesn't
occur while we are busy listening to Bach and Mozart and congratulating ourselveson our wonderful eternalvalues?"'
Literary theorist Roger Lundin is as eager as historians Howard and Himmelfarb to protect the world from the postmodern
menace. His defenses are activated by the suggestion that"postmodernism can be seen as an extended meditation on several
Pauline themes whose repudiation
all but defines modernity"as
the claim to absolute knowledge.Reference is to the notion that
we do not now see the eternal"face to face" but only "in a mirror, dimly" (1 Cor. 13:12) and that we hold the truth of the gospel "in clay jars" (2 Cor. 4:7), to say nothing of our tendency
as sinners to "suppress the truth" (Rom. 1:18),"Philosophically
speaking, the main motifs of modernism are the attemptto have
done, once and forall, with Paul and his gloomy followers, from
AugustinethroughLuther
and Calvin to Kierkegaard and
Barth."j
Lundin duly notes that the suggestion alleges an affinity between the hermeneuticsof finitude and the hermeneutics ofSUSLetter to The N m York Times Book Review, March 20, 1994, p. 31.
Quoted from Merold Westphal, "The Ostrich and the Boogeyman," Christlan Scholnr's Review 20, no. 2 (Dec. 1990), pp. 115-16.
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picion to
be
found
in
postmodernism
and
the
Pauline
understanding of the radical limitsof our cognitive equipment.
But ratherthanexplore
this curious convergence, he warns
against misreading poststructuralist intentions and counters:
To say that postmodernism is an extended meditation on Pauline
themes is like saying that because Joseph Stalin shared Winston
Churchill’s fear and loathing of the Nazis, the Russian dictator’s
speeches to rally his countrymen were extended reflections on political democracy andeconomic freedom. It is accurate to say that,
like Derrida, Augustine would assail the tenets of modernism, but
it is misleading to imply that since the two of them would spurn
Descartes, they would be eager to embrace each other.4

Presumably Lundin does not intend
for us to correlate Paul (and
Augustine)with Stalin, leaving Derrida to play the role of
Churchill.
In this Wonderland as in an earlier one, things get “curiouser
and curiouser.” First of all, nothing was said about the intentions of the poststructuralists, whose radical secularism is obvious enough, while on the other hand, ”Pauline”
their
dimension
is something neither their friends nor theirfoes are eager to notice. One might have hoped that ”can be seen as an extended
meditation’’ would not be immediately translated as ”is an extended meditation” in the sense that implies that is
this
the writers’ intention. What about thepossibility that what they helpus
to see exceeds their intentions?5That a hermeneutics of finitude
will illumine the epistemic meaningof creaturehood, and that a
hermeneutics of suspicion will illumine the epistemic significance of sin, even if developed by those who do not speak the
language of Creation and Fall? What happened to the notion
that all truth is God’s truth, even truth from the pens of atheists?
.t Roger Lundin, The Czllfzrre of Illtcryretatiolz (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 19931, pp. 205-7.
My strategy in dealing with philosophical postmodernism is the same as
my strategy for reading the hermeneutics of suspicion in Marx, Nietzsche, and
Freud. In Szlsyiciurr L V J ~ Fnith: The Xeligiozls Uses of Moderll Atheism (Grand RapIds, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1993),I argue that, contrary to their atheistic intentions,
their critiques of religion echo and illumine the biblical critiques of instrumental religion and make good Lenten reading for Christians willing to engage in
serious self-examination.
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Nor was there the slightest suggestion that Augustine
and
Derrida would be ”eager to embrace each other,” only that the
(not so obvious) similarity of substance between their critiques
of what Augustine calls philosophical “presumption” (Colzfessiorzs VII, 20) is worth noticing and exploring, and not just the
If there
(quite obvious)difference of motivation that underlies it.
really is a similarity of substance, then the simile of Stalin only
serves to obscure the possibility that those of us who trace our
lineage through Augustine might find insights worth appropriating from Derrida in the pursuitof our ownproject.
Lundin isa serious scholar, nota talk show host tryingto raise
ratings or a televangelist trying to raise money with rhetorical
reassurances that he will protect us from thebad guys. I assume
the same about Howard andHimrnelfarb. Why are they then so
quick to link Hitlerand Stalin with postmodernism?This assimilation of postmodernism to totalitarianism is especially ironic
since the former is a sustained critique of the violent, totalizing
discourses that absolutize theirown insights, thereby legitimizing theviolent, exclusionary practices congruent with those discourses.
Perhaps part of the reason is political: postmodern critique
does not find such discourses and practices only in such safe
places as communism andfascism. (The habit of labeling anyone
who dares to criticize the West as either communist or fascist
dies hard.) But the stated reason is ethical: postmodernism is
seen as a nihilistic threat to what is good in our way of life, as a
loss of moral compass that reinforces the moral wasteland of
contemporary culture rather than challenging
it.
Lundin, in particular, sees Derrida as providing philosophical
aid and comfort to the therapeutic ideals so devastatingly analyzed by Rieff, Bellah, and MacIntyre. According to the last
named, the implicit moral philosophy of a therapeutic cultureis
emotivism,” the view ”that all evaluative judgments and more
specifically all moral judgments are nothing b ~ expressions
f
of
preference, expressions of attitude or feeling, insofar as they are
moral or evaluative in character.””
Id

Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 2nd ed. (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of
Notre Dame Press, 19841, p. 11. Cf. Philip Rieff, The Triumph of the Tlrerapelrtic:
Usrs of Faith after Frerd (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), and Robert Bellah et
‘I
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We are familiar with emotivism from the
logical positivism of
the forties and fifties (even if most denizens of our therapeutic
culture are not).?But postmodernism is not positivism.Both traditions are skeptical, tobe sure, of the grand claims to absolute
of
knowledgethataccompanythemetaphysicalfoundations
morality in much of the philosophical tradition. But beyond
their irreverence toward metaphysical pretensions, there are at
least two striking differences. The postmodern critique applies
to all human knowledge, and not just to ethics and metaphysics.
It is miles removed from the scientism
of the positivist tradition.
More importantly, in the present context, the positivists were the
ones who insisted that their theories entailed moral
subjectivism, while in the case of the postmodernists, it is their enemies
who make this claim.
At least some postmodernists continueto think that while the
Enlightenment project of providing absolute justifications for
our ethical beliefs has self-destructed, their own work still has
the character of morally significant critique, both of theory and
of practice. Like almost everyoneelse these days, theyreject the
positivists’ all or nothingapproach: either we have absolute
knowledge inethics, or we have nothing atall and ethics is nothing but personal preferences, any oneof which is as good as any
other. Moreover, echoing Kierkegaard’s lament that ”thesystem
has no ethics” and paraphrasing Kant’s claim “I have had to
deny knowledge in order to make room for faith,” they argue,
in effect, ”We have had to deny absolute knowledge in order to
make room for moral responsibility.’’ Then they add, ”If we are
to oppose the physical violence of political totalitarianism, we
must oppose the epistemic or ’interpretative’
violence of totalizing discourse.”H
al., Habits of the Heart: Itrdividudisrn and Cornrnitn~er~t
in Americmr Life (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1985).
For classic statements, see A. J. Ayer, Lanprage, Truth atrd Logic (New York:
Dover, 1946);Charles L. Stevenson, Elh~csm d Lang~rage(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1944); and Paul Edwards, The Logic of M o d Discourse (New York:
Free Press, 1955).
An especially lucid presentation of the first of these claims is to be found
in John D. Caputo, Against Ethics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1993). On the notion of “interpretative violence,” see Jacques Derrida, “Force
of Law: The ’Mystical Foundation of Authority,’ ” in Deconstmction arld the
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In this context, to assimilate the postmoderniststo the positivists is doubly problematic. First, it attributes to them a position
they explicitly repudiate; second, by assuming that since they
deny we can have everything they mustmean we have nothing,
it invites the suspicion that one accepts the positivists' all or
nothing approach, that one's own ethics stands or falls with
claims to absolute knowledge that wouldhave made the apostle
Paul's hair stand on end. But why should a seriously Christian
ethics be tiedin this way to the epistemological extravagances
of
the not noticeably evangelical projects of Plato, Descartes, and
Hegel? Why not agree with Paul that we see "through a glass
darkly"?
I do not wish to claim that my account fits every thinker to
whom the postmodern label has
been applied. Perhaps there are
some for whom the parallel with the positivists is perceptive.'J
Surely there are epigones whorelish the image of local intellectual terrorist and who pose as moral nihilists. But I believe my
account does fit, among others, Foucault and Derrida, the two
French poststructuralistphilosopherswith
the widestNorth
American influence. (Derrida, it will be remembered, was the
one assimilated first to Hitler and thento Stalin above.)
In his famous essay "What Is Enlightenment?" Foucault insists that his own brand of critique is "rooted in the Enlightenment." But, he says, "I have been seeking to stress that the
thread that may connect us with the Enlightenmentis not faithfulness to doctrinal elements,but rather the permanentreactivation of an attitude-that is, of a philosophical ethos that could
be described as a permanent critique of our historical era."
Possibility of Jzlsfice, ed. Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld, and David Gray
Carlson (New York:Routledge, 19921, especially pp. 6-7 and 13-14. Given as a
lecture at Cardozo Law School, 1989.
"Caputo suggests as much in distinguishing heteromorphic from heteronomic postmodernism.See especially chapter3 of Against E t h m and Demythologizing Heidegger (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), p, 59, where
he speaks of "a certain prophetic postmodernism." Cf. pp. 187 and 201-5. A
similar distinctionis found in Peter Sloterdijks Critique of Cynical Renson, trans.
Michael Eldred (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987).I suggest
a Kierkegaardian reading of the distinction in "Pastmodernism and Religious
Reflection," International Journal for Philosophy of Religiorz 38, nos. 1-3 (December 19951, pp. 127-43. Reprinted in God, Reason and Religions: New Essays in the
Philosophy of Religion, ed. Eugene Thomas Long (Dordrecht: Kluwer,1995), pp.
127-43.
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Seeking to characterize that ethos positively, he writes, ”But
if the Kantian question was thatof knowing what limits knowledge has torenounce transgressing, it seems to me that the critical question today has to be turned back into a positive one: in
what is given to us as universal, necessary, obligatory, what
place is occupied by whatever is singular, contingent, and the
product of arbitrary constraints? The point, in brief, is to transform the critique conducted in the form of necessary limitation
into a practical critique that takes the form of a possible transgression.”’[)
If we ask, What are we being invitedto transgress? the answer
is clear: the arbitrary constraintsin which the singular and contingent, for instance, the Germanwill to empire andfascist antiSemitism, are taken to have ultimate validity. This genealogical
form of critique is not emotivismbut thehermeneutics of suspicion developed by Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud as an (unintended but theologically profound) commentary on the Pauline
notion that sin produces distorted truth. It highlights one way
this happens: the confusingof our particular interests with the
universal good. And, like the Pauline version of this theme, the
postmodern version resists the comforting assurance that this
happens to ”them” but not to ”us.”
In a similar fashion, Derrida takes his stand with theEnlightenment, at least with regard to the necessity of critique: “We
cannot and we must not-this is a law and a destiny-forgo the
ArrfiIiirwrg, in other words, what imposes itself as the enigmatic
desire for vigilance, for the lucid vigil, for elucidation, for critique and truth, but for a truth that at the same time keeps
within itself some apocalyptic desire . . . to demystify or, if you
prefer, to deconstruct apocalyptic discourseitself.”ll
Michel Foucault, “What Is Enlightenment,” in The Fozlcndt Readrr, ed. Paul
Rabinow (New York: Pantheon Books, 1984), pp. 42-45. Cf. “The Subject and
Power,” Foucault’s afterword to Hubert L. Dreyfus and Paul Rabinow, Midrel
Fozrctllll!: B ~ y ~ r rStnlcturalisrn
d
and Hru~nmt~zltics,
2nd ed. (Chicago: University
of Chicago Press, 1983).
‘ 1 Jacques Derrida, “Of an Apocalyptic Tone Newly Adopted in Philosophy,”
in Derridlz m d Negative Theology, ed. Harold Coward and Toby Foshay (Albany:
SUNY Press, 1992), p. 51. The French original was first given as a lecture in
1980 and published in 1981. On p. 59 Derrida writes, “So we, Azlfiliirer of modern times. . , .”
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Even more dramatic is the claim that what is at work in the
negations of deconstruction is nothing other than justice. In a
lecture given at Cardozo Law School in 1989, Derrida argues that
although positive law at its best seeks to be the embodiment
of justice, it is always a human construction and thus liable to
deconstruction: “The fact that law is deconstructible is not bad
news. We may even see in this a stroke of luck for politics, for all
historical progress.” Historical progress! So much for the notion
that since nothing historical is absolute and final, everything historical is of equal value. Derrida continues, “Justice in itself, if
such a thing exists, outside of beyond thelaw, is not deconstructible. No more than deconstruction itself, if such a thing exists.
Deconstruction is justice. . . . The undeconstructibility of justice
also makes deconstruction possible, indeed is inseparable from
it.”I2
The language of “justice in itself” evokes both Plato’s and
Kant’s notions of what is truly transcendent. Derrida finds such
a notion highly problematic-hence the “if such a thing exists.’’
But he also finds that he cannot work without
it. What is important to notice here is that he is working with a distinction between positive law and a justice to which it is responsible. He is
claiming, in effect, that the natural law tradition survives the
collapse of excessive epistemological claims (”we holdthese
truths to be self-evident”) traditionally accompanying it.” Perhaps this is why Derrida can say, ”Nothing seems to me less
outdated than the classical emancipatory ideal,’’ teasing Habermas, as it were, to see deconstructionas akin to his own critical
theory, a parallel attempt to salvage the Enlightenment commitment to philosophy as critique after the fall of absolute knowl-

edge.I4
Like the laws, I am responsible as an individual to thatwhich
precedes my desires and even my insights. In another recent
essay, Derrida invokes Levinas’s notion of the trace. The trace
-

Jacques Derrida, “Force of Law,” pp. 14-15.
For an analysis of Derrida’s relation to this tradition,see “Derrida as Natural Law Theorist’’ (ch, 11 below). In this essay the similarity and difference
between Derrida’s justice in itself and Kant’s regulative ideas 1s briefly explored.
”Force of Law,” p. x x x .
Ii
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arcade image is meant to evoke the frustration rather than the
pleasure of the
player who is at the controls
but unable to control
what happens on thescreen, it is highly misleading.
More specifically, in Derridean diction the human subject is
not the subject of the verb to play. Thus, in the essay cited by
Lundin, Derrida speaks of ”the play of the structure” and “the
play of the world” but not of the play of the subject of desire.24
Ironically, Lundin quotes both of these passages,” one of them
twice; but this does not keephim from offering an interpretation
of Derridean play wholly at odds withtheir import.
For Derrida as for Gadamer, play is out there. The game is
happening, andif we become players it is because we are drawn
we
did
not
originate
and
cannot
Derrida
into a game
does indeed bring the ”play of the structure” into relation to
human desire. But instead of speaking of the freeplay of desire,
he portrays desire ashostile toward the play of the structure and
the play of the world. Desire is for ”a reassuring certitude, which
itself is beyond thereach of play,” This certitude is to be the cure
for the anxiety that is “invariably the result of a certain mode of
being implicated in the game, of being caught by the game, of
being as it were at stakein the game from the outset.” The subject for whom the controls are a means to personal pleasure is
not the postmodernistwho rejects the notion of ”a full presence
which is beyond play,” but the devotee of the metaphysics of
presence, one name for the tendency of the philosophical tradition to seek a fixed center for every structure that ”permits the
play of its elements . . . [but] also closes off the play.” In short,
play is not the fulfillment of the subject’s desires but precisely
14 Jacques Dernda, ”Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human
Sciences,” in Writ1128 and Difference, pp. 278, 292.
? 5 Lundin, Cdtlrre of hferprufnfron,
pp. 190, 194, 200.
2‘. For Gadamer’s interpretation, see Hans-Georg Gadamer, Trufh and Mrflzod,
trans. Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall, 2nd ed. rev. (New York
Crossroad, 1991), especially pp. 101-31.For discussion see Fred Dallmayr,
“Hermeneutics and Deconstruction: Gadamer and Derrida in Dialogue,” and
Neal Oxenhandler, “The Man with Shoes of Wind: The Derrida-Gadamer Encounter,” in Dialogue a m i Decomfrllcfion: The Gndatner-Derrida EIzcoullter, ed.
Diane I-l Michelfelder and Richard E. Palmer (Albany: SUNY Press, 1989). Cf.
Martin Heidegger, The Pnnciyle of Reason, trans. Reginald Lilly (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1991>,p. 14.
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what must be brought to a halt if those desires for control and
security are to be f~lfilled.’~
Similarly, when Derrida speaks of the “play of the world” it
is to presentplay as ”the disruptionof presence” and whatpresence signifies, the “reassuring foundation” in which we can assume the godly position above the play of the world, standing
at “the origin and the end of play” as its Alpha and Omega. In
short, the play of the world, so far from putting the postmodern
player at the controls, is what deprivesus of the security of being
in control. It is ~ul-ratmakes it clear that we are m t Godz8
Among the other early essays of Derrida that reinforce this
understanding of play is “Plato’s Pharmacy.”’” There one finds
reference to the play of schemas, of thematic oppositions, of
traces or supplements, of differences, of chains of signification,
and of language. Writing will be the subject of the verb to play,
but the subject of desire whowould be seated at the controls of
the worldshows up only as the Platonism thatis “the repression
of play?
It can come as no surprise that Derridais no friend of Plato’s
demand and promise of absolute, pure presence, meanings and
truths apprehendedin an eternal now above the possibility and
need of revision that comes in the wakeof time. But it will come
as a surprise to those who read Derridean play as a commentary
on the ”God is dead-everything is permitted” theme to hear
(whoever has ears to hear, let them hear) how emphatically he
denies that he is engaged in some “back-to-the-sophists” proj27 “Structure, Sign, and Play,” pp. 278-80. These passages are the immediate
context of the passage about the “play of the structure” that Ltlndin quotes.
IH Ibid., p. 292. Again, these passages are the immediatecontext of the cited
passage about the “play of the world.”
2‘’ JacquesDerrlda,
“Plato’s Pharmacy,’’ in Dmwwinatiotl, trans. Barbara
Johnson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981).This essay was first published in 1968. I emphasize theearly dates of these two essays (see n. 19 above)
because some would suggest that the reasonably tame, Enlightenment, and
responsibility-loving Derrida of the eighties (see nn. 8, 21, and 15) is a move,
under pressure, away from the dangerous, wild, irresponsible Derrida of the
sixties. My countersuggestion is that this latter Derrida is a figment of the
imagination of those whose readings of his work from the sixties is wildly
irresponsible. This is wonderfully ironic, for whatever one ultimately makes
of his work, one cannot deny that he is a meticulous reader of the texts he
deconstructs.
Ibid., p. 156.
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ect. What interests himis the possibilityof "some entirely-other
of both sophistics and Platonism, some resistance having comno
mon denominator with this whole [opposition between Platonism and
Derrida explicitly rejectsassumption,
the
apparently shared by his critics and attributed to him against
the evidence, that we have to choose between Platonic absolutism (in some form, the history of metaphysics) and sophistic
relativism. From the very beginning, his project, whether one
calls it humanism or anti-humanism, is the attempt to find an
we are not God.
alternative to sophistry that does not forget that
For he sees the history of metaphysics as a set of variations on
the Platonic theme, each of which demands and promises an
absolute knowledge in which
we would be able to
see the world
sub specie aefernifafis,to peek over God's shoulder from a standpoint securely outsidethe play of the world, above the temporal
flow of both signifiers and signifieds that, like a rolling stream,
bears all its sons (and daughters)away. It is ironic that this flight
of the
from incarnation is sometimes carried out in the name
Word who became flesh and lived among us.
At the outset 1 spoke of the possibility of appropriating postmodern insights in the service of a Christian interpretation and
critique of contemporary culture.If the argumentto this pointis
convincing, it has shown that whatwe might call the immoralist
objection to even the possibility of such appropriation is unsound, at least, first, with reference to the general posture of
somepostmodernists,whopresent
themselves asmoralists
rather than immoralists,and, second, morespecifically with reference to the Derridean theory of play, which is sometimes seen
as evidence that deconstruction reduces
all morality to arbitrary
preference.
the
But even if this and other a priori arguments against possibility of learning something from postmodernism
can be deflectedf3I there remains the question whether there is anything
Ibid., p. 108.
My own sense is that the other attempts to dismiss postmodernism or,
more specifically, Derrida wholesale are variations on the immoralist objection
and rest on the same kind of misreading. This is not to suggest that Derrida
and company should be considered immune from critique, but that such critique will have to occur at the retail level and on the basis of careful reading.
v
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worth appropriating. If I am asking whether a certain food wilI
be good for me, I need a stronger answer than “Well, it won’t
kill you.” Since the focus to this point has been
on Derrida, I will
stay with himas I suggest an affirmative answerto the question.
Derrida regularly insists that the issues he is discussing are
theological, and we have already seen that decu~zsfruction is the
denial that we are divine. At the heartof the metaphysical tradition
Derrida seesa HeracIitophobia that begins with Parmenides and
Plato. Like both Nietzsche and Kierkegaard, he sees the flight
from flux and flow as endemic to the speculative impulse of
Greek and Hellenized Christian thought, aflight rooted in anxiety in the face of a world, whether factual or semantic, too
changeable to be under our control. The longing for Absolute
Knowledge, which presents itself as the love of Truth, is less a
desire to submit one’s thought to the way things are than a desire to compel the world to submit to our conceptual mastery.
The attempt to put a halt to the play of the world or the play of
our structures of signification is the attempt to find a location
for our own discourses outside of that play that is primarily,
but not exclusively, the flow of time. This is a theological issue,
because the identityof Thought and Being that is both required
and promised as Absolute Knowledge is one of the classical
definitions of God, who sees everything in an Eternal Now unconditioned by either past or future. As the desire and demand
to see things sub specie neternitafis, metaphysics is the not terribly
subtle desire and demand to be God: and deconstruction is the
co~ztinuousrevzider thnf we m e not God. In fact, it claims, we cannot even peek over God’s shoulder.
Derrida’s argumentsarequasi-transcendentalarguments
about the conditionsof the possibility of human meaning. They
are Kantian arguments in the sense that theyshow, when they
are successful (whichI think is quite frequently), thatwe cannot
have Absolute Knowledge, cannot stand at the Alpha or Omega
points that look in on time from the securityof a you sfo outside
of it. Properly construed, they have Kantian limits. They show
us something about human thought and language, but nothing
about what else, if anything, there may be. Derrida ought to
speak like Kierkegaard‘s Johannes Climacus, who knows that
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divine revelation that,properlyformulated,would
go something like this: ”It is not that the voice of God is nowhere to be
heard, but only that thisvoice [if there is such a thing] is always
and already couched in human terms.”’ihThis distinction, which
echoes Barth’s between religion and revelation and Levinas’s between the saying and thesaid,37is the stubborn refusal to allow
the objector’s “however fallibly” to function as a vacuous shibboleth. It is the reminder that even if God has spoken to us,
whenever we try to say what we have heard the formulation is
our own, and thus human, all too human. Just as thelegislation
that sincerely seeks to enact justice results in positive law that is
deconstructible, so the theology that sincerely seeks to echo the
Word of God may be a somewhat muffled sound. It is a bit like
is whispered from one person to
that game in which a statement
another to see how it gets transformedin the transmission.
The distinctionbetween those who seek to speak on the basis
of the Word of God and those whodo not is beyond challenge.
The problem is that it is no reliable index of who is right. The
secular critics of Christian anti-Semitism, slavery, and apartheid,
for example, were right. And those who purported to speak on
the basis of the infallible Word of God but tolerated or championed these evils were wrong. As Allen Verhey puts it, secular
culture
may challenge and judge certain claims made on the basis of
Scripture. Scripture has, after all, been used to justify racial and
sexual discrimination; it has been used to justify ’hoIy wars,’ crusades, and inquisitions; it has been used to justify the abuse of
power and the violation of the rights and integrity of others in
order to pursue what has been taken to be God’s cause. Secular
moral wisdom, and especially the principle of justice, has sometimes challenged such uses of Scripture and led the churchto consider particular practices and to repent of them. We must note
Caputo, Denzythologizrrlg Heldegger, p. 100. This formulation derives from
against Heidegger, but I believe it fits just
Caputo’s attempt to read Heidegger
as well into my attempt to read Derrida against Derrida.
17 Karl Barth, Church D o p a f i c s , vol. I, p. 2, trans. G. T. Thornson and Harold
Knight (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1956), p. 17, ”The Revelation of God as the
Abolition of Religion”; Ernmanuel Levinas, Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991).
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that it is not the authority of Scripture itself that comes under
criticism and review here, but authorizations for the use of Scripture in moral argument and moral claims made employing such
authorizations. In the churches Scripture itself has sometimes finally corroborated the judgments of secular morality and has
been vindicated against both its detractors and its so-called defenders in suchcases.3x

Perhaps we once learned from a rather Kierkegaardian Karl
Barth, ”It wastheChurch,
not the world,which crucified
Today we can be reminded of this by a somewhat
Nietzschean Derrida.He is a thinker, in the Enlightenment tradition, for whom interpretation and critique cannot be separated,
and for whom the culture of the critic is just as vulnerable to
critique as anyother culture thecritic may wish to critique.
we are not God is a double
So far the Derridean argument that
of contemreminder that a Christian interpretation and critique
porary (secular) culture is an open invitation to the critique of
Christian culture itself, its theories, practices, and institutions.
First, there is the distinction between the propositional content
and the performativemode of saying that humanbeings are not
God. Second, there isobservation that the sincere attempt to express some transcendent Truth or Justice does not elevate us
above the human condition. We do not becomeGod by purporting to base our discourse on divine revelation. Nor are we anything but confused when we act as if our attempt topoint to the
Absolute somehow made our pointingabsolute. This confusion
is perhaps the greatest temptationof Christian intellectuals. And
there stands St. Jacques, working his hardest to protect us from
Wormwood and Screwtape!
This second point canbe phrased as a gloss on the (in)famous
M Allen Verhey, The Great Rewrsnl: Ethics and the New Testament (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1984), p. 193.
is
Karl Barth, The Epistle to the Ronzarzs, trans. Edwyn C. Hoskyns (New York
Oxford University Press, 1977), p. 389. In the preface to the fourthedition (pp.
20-21), Barth notes that ”the literary organ of the Dutch Reformed Church”
warned its readers against his book on the grounds that itwas ”foreign to their
piety.” For an interesting juxtaposition of Barth and Derrida, see Walter Lowe,
Theolog?! and DiJfErence: The Wound of Reasor1 (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1993).
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Derridean claim "There is rzotlzing 014tsidc of the text.''40It would
go something like this: if there is anything, such asGod or Justice in itself, that mightbe said tobe outside thetext, saying that
or anything else about it would bring it within the text. This is
the Kantian point that we have only phenomenal language for
talking about any possible noumenal world, and itis the reason
for the discussion about the relation of deconstruction to negative
But the textuality of Derridean thought means more than that
anything we talk about thereby gets incorporated into human
discourse, explosive as that truismmay be. Derridean textualism
is an extension of the notion of text beyond language in the
usual sense? Like Paul Ricoeur, who extends thenotion of text
so as to treat meaningful action as text:3 Derrida extends the
notion of writing so that "things" we would not normally refer
to as texts can be seen tohave textual structures.
One advantage of this strategy €or cultural theory is that it
provides a common frame of reference for discussing such different cultural artifacts as theories, practices, and institutions;
and, within cultural theory in the narrower sense, it provides a
common grid for discussing explicitly textual practices such as
philosophy, literature,and history, alongside practices that transcendtextuality in the usual sense,such as theater, cinema,
music, painting, sculpture, and architecture?
But what especially concerns me here is the relational or contextual character of textual structure. To be (in) a text is to be
inextricably interrelated, and in many directions at once? Here
w Jacques Derrida, Of Gmmlnnfology,trans. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), p. 158.
I ' For an introduction to this issue, see "Faith as the
Overcoming of Ontological Xenophobia" (ch. 12 below).
After quoting "Tlzerc. IS n o f h i q alltslde uf fhc text" in its immediate context,
Barbara Johnson makes this point nicely in her introduction to Dlssemimzfiorz,
p. xiv.
See "The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action Considered as a Text," in
Paul Ricoeur, Hevrnewlfics a ~ l the
l Hmratl Sciemcs, trans. John B. Thompson
(New York:Cambrldge University Press, 1981).
+ I There 1s also the danger of neglecting the import of the differences among
the various forms of cultural expression.
.G Simon Critchley's reading of "There ts nothing outside of tlzc fexf" makes it
equivalent to "There 1s nothing outside of some context." See TIw Ethics of
Deuorrstrllctim: Derrrda nrzd L e v z ~ n s(Oxford: Blackwell, 1992).

we meet a third way in which Derrida's way of saying that we
are not God deserves the careful attention of Christian scholars.
He joins Hegel andstructuralismindenying
the maxim of
Bishop Butler that G. E. Moore liked to quote, "Everything is
what it is, and not another thing."4hThe semantic principle of
Spinoza, that every determination is a negation, becomes the semantic/ontological principlethat everything (at least everything
finite) has its meaning and its being by virtue of its relation to
the others that it is not; these others, consequently, enteressentially into the meaning and thebeing of the selfsame. The same
does not merely stand over against the other but has the other
essentially within it. Nothing stands alone. Nothing (at least
nothing finite) is a Spinozistic substance that exists in itself and
is conceived through itself. Everything is and is understood
through its others.47
The importance of this for cultural theory is that it helps to
underscore theradical relativity of everything finite, and thus of
all cultural processes and artifacts. They are andthey mean only
in contexts they neither create norcontrol. And since these contexts are in continuous
historical flux, the being and themeaning
of culture and its components is never final or finished.4sThe
term 'cultural relativity' is pleonastic, for to be or belong to a
culture isto be inextricably related.
But Derrida refuses to identify this relativity with relativism.
He does not withdraw his repudiation of the sophists. He sees
that unless one distinguishes the relativity ("textuality") of all
phenomena from the relativism that seeks to render arbitrary
preference immune from critique (and thus reduce human life
to a conflict among various wills to power), one will have no
4 t G.
~
E. Moore quotes this maxim on thefrontispiece of Prrrlciyra E t h m (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962), and again on p. 206.
For classical theism finite creatures are relative because they are essentially
related to God; but God is absolute because the divinebeing is not essentially
related to creatures, sincecreation IS a free act, and thus contingent. Hence the
qualifier "at least nothing finite." This notion that the other is internal to the
same is developed by Levinas in Ofllrrmse t l m Bemg and by Ricoeur In O~zcs,sclf
CIS Alzofher, trans. Kathleen Blarney (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1992).
IxOn this point Derrida is more Hegelian than structuralist. This is one reason why he can describe himself as an Hegelian without closure or totality.
See Of Grrzrnrnatology, p. 26.
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alternative to thatrelativism but some variety of Platonism. Absolute Knowledge (in some form) will become such a necessity,
that its impossibility will be overlooked, no matter how much
bad faith that takes. Even when we deny it propositionally, we
will affirm it performatively. If we wish to escape nihilism, we
will have to play God. But, Derrida says, we are not God, and
of nihilism will have to be honestabout
any genuine overcoming
the human condition. Does this preclude grace? No, but it does
preclude realized eschatology, the claim that we have reached
the heavenly city, have put the journey behind us, and now see
Truth face to face.
The deconstructive theory of textuality is, perhaps above all
else, an attemptto point toward an overcoming of nihilism that
is wiIling to remain human.To that end it seeks to articulatethe
coexistence of relativity and critique. In terms of its own critique
of finality it can hardly expect to be or be taken to be the last
word on this problem. But it is not a theory that Christian cultural theory needs to fear and to demonize. There just may be
some gold to be mined in them thar
hills.

10

Laughing at Hegel
EARLYIN Of Grrrmnzatology, Derrida tells us that he is an Hegelian-of sorts:
The horizon of absolute knowledge is the effacement of writing
in the logos, the retrieval of the tracein parousia, the reappropriation of difference, the accomplishment of what I have elsewhere
called the rnetqdzysics of fhe proper.
Yet all that Hegel thought within thishorizon, all, that is, except
eschatology, may be reread as a meditation on writing. Hegel is
nlso the thinker of irreducible difference.'

One of the places where Hegel is a thinker of difference is in
his critique of immediacy. The famous chapter on Sense Certainty in the Phctzomelzolugy contains one version of this critique.
The beginning of his Lectures oft the Proofs of the Exisfelzce of God
contains another.2For present purposes, however, we can direct
our attentionto Thc Encyclopedia Logic?
There mediation is defined as "having already left a first behind, to go on to a second" (EL 86R). Thus the pure concept of
being lacks determination, "for determination requires both one
and another; but at the beginning we have as yet no other" (EL
MA). Mediation involves otherness; immediacy is its absence.It
is as a philosopher of mediation that Hegel is a philosopher of
difference.
Jacques Derrida,Of Grcznrrnatology,trans. Gayatri Chakravorty
Spivak (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 19761, p. 26.
2These lectures are found in vol. 17 of Werke in zwnnzig Bunden, ed. Eva
Moldenhauer und Karl Markus Michel (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1969), and in
vol. 3 of Hegel's Lectures on the Philosophy of Rdigion, trans. E. 8.Spiers and J.
Burdon Sanderson (New York: Humanities, 1942). I have discussed their critique of immediacy in chapter 11 of Hqel, Freedom, and Modernity (Albany:
SUNY Press, 1992).
.3 The EncycIopedia Logic (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1991). Citations in the
text
will be to EL, followed by the paragraph number. A = Addition (Zrlsafz),and
R = Remark (Annrerkung). An earlier version of the present critique of Jacobi
can be found in Faith u r d Kmzuledp (Albany: SUNY Press, 1977).
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full seriousness, "the immediate knowing of God" turns out to
be the claim "that God is, not what God is . . . and the content of
religion is reduced to aminimum'' (EL 72).
Or worse. Either Jacobi's faith has a specific content, in which
case its intuitions are mediated by the concepts in which they
are articulated, or it is "so indeterminate" that it becomes undecidable whether the Christian trinity or "the Dalal Lama, the
bull, the ape,etc., is God" (EL 63R). The door of truth is opened
to "all superstition and idolatry"-a dangerous tolerance since
"natural desires and inclinations automatically deposit theirinterests in consciousness, and immoral purposes are found in it
quite immediately. . . . Being totally abstract, [immediacy] is indifererzt to every content and, just for thatreason, it is receptive to
any content; so it can sanction an idolatrous and immoralcontent just as easily as the reverse" (EL 72, 74). Immediacy's altar
"to the unknown God" does not only reflect "the poverty of the
times" (EL 73R);6it stands as an openinvitation to ideology, the
. ~ immediacy is
religious sanctification of a 1 that is ~ n h o l ySheer
not only immune to doubt but also to critique.
Does Hegel's critique of immediacy justify Derrida's claim
that he "is also the thinker of irreducible difference" (emphasis
shifted)? Well, yes and no. Yes, because there is no sheer immediacy. Immediacy is "abstract self-relation and hence it is abstractidentity"
(EL 74A) because it abstractsthings
and
and thoughts through which
thoughts from the other things
they are mediated. It suppresses difference. But difference and
otherness are everywhere present, and neither ontologically nor
semantically does anythinghave the characteristics of Spinoza's
substance, "that which is in itself and is conceived through itself?
But we must also say No. There is an eschatology (closure,
totality, parousia) in which difference, while not disappearing,
loses its irreducibility: "Only the insight that the content is not
independent, but is mediated through an other, reduces it to its
Cf, ibid., pp. 7-8, on the poverty of the times.
Here Hegel sounds very much like the Hume of The Natural Histony of Religion. See my discussion in chapter 4 of Suspicion and Faifh: The Religious Uses of
Modern Afheisrn (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1993).
The Efhics, part I, def. 3.
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finitude and untruth” (EL 74). This means that only for finitude
is difference irreducibleand thata philosophy of irreducible difference, like Derrida’s, wouldbe a philosophy of irreducible finitude. But Hegel proceedsimmediately (as if we werein
doubt!) to point in a different direction: ”But a content can only
be [relcognized as what is true, inasmuch as it is not mediated
with an other, Le., is not finite, so that it mediates itself with
itself, and is in this way both mediation and immediate selfrelation all in one” (EL 74). As self-mediating totality beyond
the finitude of mediation through an other, the Infiniteis a new
immediacy, achieved through the colnpletiolr of mediation rather
than through its strppressiolz. This Infinite is substance in Spinoza’s sense, even if,as Spirit, it is more than substance. Neither in
its being nor in its intelligibility does it refer beyond itself. As
both ontological and semantic totality, there is no beyond to
which it could refer? If abstract immediacy occurs when (it
seems) ”we have as yet no other,” true rational, immediacy occurs whenwe have no longer any other.
If there is any truth to the notion of thesis, antithesis, and
synthesis in Hegel’s thought, it is to be found in the following,
rathermore complex triad:abstractself-relation,mediation
of the totality.
through an other, and the self-mediation
For Kant, it was precisely the attempt toachieve the Unconditioned in the form of Totality that led to the expulsion of metaphysics
from
the
Eden
where
physics
and mathematics
luxuriated. And his name for the paralogisrns and antinomies
of Eden so barren and desolate was
that made the landscape east
dialectic.
But Hegel is a h the philosopher of dialectic, and thus once
again, it would seem, of irreducible difference.Kant’s discovery
of the antinomies ”has to be considered one of the most important and profound advancesof the philosophyof moderntimes’’
(EL 48R). But he spoiled his discovery in two ways. First, in an
excessive ”tenderness for the things of the world” he insisted
‘I Accordingly Hegel sustains an unrelenting polemic against philosophies
that imply a “beyond.” EL 28A, 36A, 38A, 38R, 45A, 60A1,94A, 213A. Closely
related to this is the polemic against the “ought.” See 6R, 38R, 45A, 60,94,94A
and my discusson in “Hegel‘s Angst vor dem Sollen,” The Ozd of Minevva 25,
no. 2 (spring 1994).
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that ”the stain of contradiction” could not belong to the world
~
reason.” Second, Kant could
but “has to belong O F Zto~ thinking
only find four antinomies, whereas they are rather to be found
”in a2l objects of all kinds, in all representations, concepts, and
ideas” (EL 48R) .lo
Things and thoughts are not only externally conditioned or
mediated; they are internally incoherent. Accordingly, ”the finite is not restricted merely from the outside; rather it sublates
itself by virtue of its own nature, and passesover, of itself, into
its opposite. Thuswe say, for instance, that manis mortal . . . the
proper interpretation is that life as such bears the germof death
within itself, and that the finite sublates itself because it contradicts itself inwardly” (EL 81A1). I don’t have to be murdered
to die. Dialectic shows us “what everything finite is; its own
sublation” (EL 81R).
In addition to human mortality, Hegel cites the following examples of what he means: “‘SluwmtFn iris szimrnn illizirio,‘ which
means thatif abstract justice is driven to the extreme
it overturns
into injustice. Similarly, in politics, it is well known how prone
the extremes of anarchy and despotism are to lead to one another . . . we find the consciousness of dialectic in those universally familiar proverbs: ’Pride goes before a fall’, ’Too much wit
outwits itself’, etc.” (EL 81A1).
With origins in both Plato and Kant, dialectic is the properly
negative moment of reason, the true form of skepticism (EL
8lR). It is not merely a matter of doubt; ”rather, it is completely
certain about its central point,
i.e., the nullity of everything finite.
. . . Skepticism proper . . . is complete despair about everything
to be firm” (EL 81A2).11By contrast
that the understanding holds
with modern, Humean skepticism that holds fast to the sensible
in order to place the supersensible in question, dialectic is akin
earlier he had united these points: “But the usual tenderness for things,
whose only care 1s that they d o not contradict themselves, forgets here as elsewhere that in this way the contradiction is not resolved but merely shifted
elsewhere, into subjective or external reflection generally”; Scieme of Logic, p.
423.
I ’ This passage echoes Hegel’s earlier account of the phenomenological dialectic as a journey of doubt (Zzwifel) and despair (Vc.rz7~ciflrcng)that brings
“conscious insight into the untruth of phenomenal knowledge”; Pl~emnze~rology of Syivif, pp. 49-50.
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to "the high ancient skepticism" of Sextus Empiricus, for exam(EL 81A2; cf.
ple, which puts the (common) sensible in question
39R and 24A31.I'
Everything finite is its own sublation. Thusdialectic shows the
might, or even the wrath, of God: "We say that all things he.,
everything finite as such) come to judgment, and in that saying
we catch sight of the dialectic as the universal, irresistible might
before which nothing can subsist, however firm and secure it
may deem itself to be" (EL 81Al).
Contrary to appearances, this is good news, and doubly so.
First, it is only the finite that is thus brought to judgment; the
Infinite has analibi. Second, the verdict is guilty, but the punishment is sublation, Aufhebrrlzg. This is cancellation, to be sure;but
it is also preservation in something higher. The finite does not
simply disappear; it is recontextualized as part of the whole. It
is not the organizing principle of this whole, but it plays an essential part.
Dialectical skepticism is thus the ally and propadeutic to philosophy. It is "only the finite and abstract thinkingof the understanding thathasanythingto
fear from skepticism . . .
philosophy, on the other hand, contains the skeptical as a moment within itself-specifically as the dialectical moment. But
then philosophy does not stop at the merely negative result of
the dialectic" (EL 81A2), but rather goeson to the positive mode
of reason whose nameis speculation.
The new triad is Understanding, Dialectic (reason in its negative, skeptical mode), and Speculation(reason in its positive
mode). It is the movement from the affirmation of the finite, to
the denial of the finite, to the Azij7zebz;lIzg of the finite in the Infinite. Once again thetruth of thesis-antithesis-synthesis turns out
to be more complex than that formulacan adequately express.
More importantly, once again Hegel shows himself both to
be and not to be a philosopher of "irreducible difference." The
dialectical stage corresponds to the stage of mediation through
another. Here internal difference complements external differI 2 Hegel first developed this contrast In the journal he co-edited with Schelling. See "Relationship of Skepticism to Philosophy," B e f 7 r w t l Km7f and l i ~ g e l :
Tuxfs it1 the Desleloprnetlt of Post-Kmtinn Zdealisrn, trans. George di Giovanni and
H. S. Harris (Albany: SUNY Press, 1985).
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ence, and abstract self-identity proves as chimerical as abstract
self-relation. The difference that emerges here, which Derrida
might call the improprietyof the proper, is irreducible
by being
inescapable. Contrary to the assumptionof Bishop Butler and G.
E. Moore, no thing is what it is and not another thing.
Except the Infinite. The semantic totality of thoughts is the
truth, and theontological totality of things is the rationally real.
If the dialectical moment (like other-mediation) is the Hegelian
version of what Derrida calls writing, the trace, and difference,
the speculative moment (like self-mediation) is the metaphysics
of the proper, the eschatalogical event in which judgment becomes salvation. Hegel is also, but only penultimately,a philosopher of irreducible difference.
This is why Hegelian skepticism is only penultimate. Nothing
breedsskepticism,includingmoral
and religiousskepticism,
quite as effectively as an experienced pluralism of beliefs and
practices. But the movement in which other-mediation becomes
self-mediation and dialectical difference becomes speculative totality allows Hegel to affirm skepticism in the confidence that it
will be mfgehoben in absolute knowledge, scientific system, the
Idea. Eschatological closure is the secret to a pluralism that begins but does not end in skepticism and to an historicism that
begins but doesnot end in relativism.
We see this movement concretely at work in Hegel’s treatment
of philosophical differences. Sounding a bit like Richard Rorty,
if only for a sentence, he says that the “external history” of philosophy
gives the formof a contingent succession to the stages of the Idea’s
development, and itgives a kind of mere diversity to the principles
and their exposition in the various philosophies of these stages.
But the master workman of this labour of thousands of years is
the One living Spirit. . . . With regard to philosophies that appear
[emphasis added] diverse, the h i s t o r y of pl~ilosophyshows, on the
one hand, that there is only One philosophy at diverse stages of
its formation, and, on the other, that the particular prilzciyles on
which each system is grounded one by one are only bmnches of
one and the same whole. . . . The science of [the Idea or the Absolute] is essentially asystem, since what is concretely true is so only
in its inward self-urzfolding [emphasis added] and in taking and
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holding itself together in unity, i.e., as totality. Only through the
distinguishing, and determination of its distinctions, can what is
concretely true be the necessity of these distinctions and the freedom of the whole. (EL 13-14; cf. 15-19)13

This freedom of the whole is distinctively Spinozistic. “Freedom
is only present where there is no otherfor me that is not myself”
(EL 24A2); it ”consists precisely in my not having any absolute
other over against me, but in my being dependent upon a content that is just myself” (EL 38A; cf. 161A). In response to “Love
means never having to say you’re sorry,” Hegel says, ”Freedom
means never having an other.”
But he qualifies this so as to cut short any hint of isolationism,
of abstract identity and immediacy achieved through absolution
of the finite from all relationship. If I am to be free, my other
cannot be absolute; it must be myself. This is why, in goodSpinozistic fashion, finitude lives under the sign of necessity, and
only the Whole is free. For it is only the Whole thatis “the activity of positing itself over against itself, in order to be for-itself,
and to be, in this other, only at home withitself” (EL 18).While
the ”spurious infinity” is the endlessprogression through space,
or time, or the sequence of integers, the ”genuine Infinite . . ,
consists rather in remaining at home with itself in its other, or
(when it is expressed as a process) in corning to itself in its
other” (EL 94A).l4
This home is apparently not a homeon the range, where never
is heard a discouraging word. Other-mediationand dialectic are
discouraging words, even despairing words in relation to finitude’s aspirations toward autonomy. But they are like the emotions generated by a James Bond movie in whichwe know that
This repeats an argumentgiven in the Phenomenology of Spirit, pp. 1-4,
It is in terms of this language ofbeing at home in one’s other that Hegel
regularly expresses his view of the relation of thought to being. See EL 20R,
23, 24A2, and 28A. The phenomenological journey achieves ”the totality of
its moments” as absolute knowledge and as the infinity of Spirit when selfconsciousness is “in communion withitself in its otherness as such“; Phemmetzology of Spirit, p. 479. Hegel’s text says that self-consciousness “also in seinem
Anderssein als solchem bei sich kt”; Phiinornenologre des Geistes,ed. Johannes
Hoffmeister (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 1952), p. 549. Like EL, the Baillie translation renders bei slch as ”at home.” See The Phenomenology of M i n d (London:
George Allen & Unwin), p. 790.
I4
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however hopeless the situations seems, our hero will not only
escape but end up in the arms of his lady love. We love being
scared, but all the time we know, as the Germans say, that die
Geschichte isf happy geetldef. l 4
How can we escape the securityof such narratives?This question immediately evokes another, Why would anyone want to
run away from so reassuring a home toa world in which thebad
guys so frequently win?In the aftermath toHegel there has been
no shortage of prodigalsons who have foundthe Hegelian
homestead inhibiting. Each of these runaways has had his own
motivation and, correspondingto it, his own strategy, for showa tyrant and the manor house at once
ing the paterfamilias to be
a dungeon anda house of cards: Hegel as the Wizard of 0 2 .
But the different strategies have in common the charge that
Hegel’s alleged totality has left out something too important to
ignore. In the case of Marx, the fatal omission is the suffering
and hope of the proletariat, while in the case of Kierkegaard it
is the suffering and hope of the knight of faith, to cite only two
of the most familiar prodigals. Hegel’s defenders can, of course,
point to texts in which economic and religious suffering are
mentioned; but the charge is not that Hegel failed to mention
them but that hefailed to do justice to them, that in his hurry to
get to the place where JamesBond and his damsel-no-longer-indistress can live happily ever after, he defined real problems out
of existence. He confusedthe real worldwith a Hollywood
screenplay of which he was the author. This retreat to fiction
leaves the real world in the hands of the spirit, to be sure, but
this Weltgeisf is the satanic spirit “that is now at work among
those who aredisobedient” (Eph. 2:2), whether this Pauline language is cashed inin terms of the spiritof capitalism or the spirit
of complacent, bourgeois, Christendom.
While it is true that for Kierkegaard and Marx die GeschicJ?tc
k t m c h lziclrf happy geerrdef, they agree that there
is a happy ending to be awaited and that ”the sufferings of this present time
are not worth comparing with theglory about to be revealed to
us” (Rom. 8:18). Their challenge to the eschatology by which
Hegel moves from other-mediation to self-mediation and from
-

”

Is

This comes verbatim from a German TV guide.
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dialectic to speculation concerns its timing. They do not share
Hegel’s allergic fear of any Jelzseits and the “Angst vor dem Solled’ that is the trembling that accompanies this fear.’” For this
reason they have no qualms about placing “the glory about to
be reveaIed to us” in the future or about describing the arduous
tasks and inescapable suffering that accompany, in each case,
this hope.

Hope. Ay, there’s the rub. As different as they are from each
other and as deep as their disagreements with Hegel’s realized
eschatology may be, Marx and Kierkegaard are eschatological
thinkers. Since Derrida says that it is the eschatological move
that separates deconstruction from speculation, we must
ask,
Which eschatology? Is it precisely the realized eschatology of
Hegel? Or is it eschatology as such, meaning that between
Hegel
and these two Oedipal sons of Hegel Derrida sees only nine
cents and not a dime’s worth of difknvzce?
In his essay on Bataille, Derrida seems to give the second,
more radical answer. Derrida’s concern is that we take Hegel too
lightly: ”Misconstrued,treated lightly, Hegelianism only extends its historical domination, finally unfolding its immense
enveloping resources without
~bstacle.”’~
Derrida does not identify this historical domination of Hegelianism, but given Hegel’s
persuasion that the Owl of Minerva flies from east to west, he
of itself that the West
may very well have in mind those features
sees as making it the goal of history: capitalism, democracy,and
the moralorder that undergirds these practices, with special emself-evidence of
phasis on the rightsof individuals.13 Perhaps the
Iiberal society to Richard Rorty would be an example of Hegel’s
hegemony extending itself among those who treat it toolightly.
This includes, Derrida fears, even “the best readers of Bataille” insofar as they think they can dissipate Hegel’s self-eviSee n. 9 above.
“Jacques Derrida, “From Restricted to General Economy: A Hegelianism
without Reserve,” in Wvifing nnd Differetzce, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 19781, p. 251. Subsequent page numbers 111 the text are
to this essay, even where Derrida is quoting Bataille or Hegel.
t H Such a reading would not be without Irony, given
Hegel’s highly qualified
enthusiasm for Capitalism, democracy, and individual rights.
lh
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dence with a casual reference to Nietzsche orMarx or, we might
add, Kierkegaard (p. 251). So listen up! Derrida will give us a
reading of Bataille and his "aneschatology" (p. 271) even better
than those offered by his "best" readers, one that will offer a
more genuine escape from the tentacles of Hegel's "historical
domination."
Like other prodigals, Derrida's Bataille points to what Hegel
has left out, what he regularly refers to as Hegel's blind spot.
His anti-Hegelian strategy wilI be first to locate this blind spot
and then to laugh--loudly. Ought we to associate this laughter
with the satirical wit with which Kierkegaard's Johanneses (de
Silentio and Climacus) skewer the System?lq
At first it seems so, when this laughter is equated with awakening from dream.Hegelian reason (with its passage from othermediation to self-mediation and from dialecticto speculation) is
a kind of sleep, "the slumber that engenders monstersand then
puts them to sleep. . . . The slumber of reason is not, perhaps
reason put to sleep, but slumber in the formof reason, the vigilance of the Hegelian logos. Reason keeps watch over a deep
slumber in which it has an interest. . . . To laugh at philosophy
(at Hegelianism)-such, in effect, is the form of the awakening''
(p. 252). There can be little questionbut that Johannes Climacus
would have loved this notion that Hegelian reason dialectically
generates monsters only to put them speculatively to sleep in
order to be able to remain asleep itself.
But if Bataille's laughter is to free us from the eschatology that
Kierkegaard shares with Hegel, in spite of their far from trivial
quarrel over the timing of the parousia, it must distance itself
from Kierkegaard as well as from Hegel. This happens when
Bataille equates his laughter not only with awakening but also
with anguish (pp. 252, 257, 259). For this anguish is not the unhappiness of the
Unhappy
Consciousness,
the
fear and
I" For the intimate relation between these two pseudonyms, see my "Johannes and Johannes: Kierkegaard and Difference,'' in Infemafiorzal Kieukqpard
Colnrnrlztnry: Philosophical Frngmerlts rrnd \uhanrles Clin~rzcrls,ed. Robert L. Perkins
(Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 1994). Climacus refers us to "a thesis
propounded by Lord Shaftesbury that makes laughter the test of truth"; Concldirlg Unscientific Postscript, trans. Howard V. and Edna H. Hong (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1993, vol. I, p. 512.
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trembling constitutiveof Silentio’s knight of faith and the suffering that is the essential expression of religious passion for Clirnacus. Hegel’s Unhappy
Consciousness
and the two
Kierkegaardian versions of it just mentioned are miles removed
from a crisis of meaning. They intenda meaning they take to be
Absolute Meaning. The pain in their lives comes from the fact
that this intention is not fulfilled in intuition. They are walking
by faith and not by sight (2 Cor. 5:7). They are nomads, sojourners, pilgrims. They have a home; they just aren’t there. Yet.
For Bataille, bycontrast, ”Absolute comicalness is the anguish
experienced when confronted by expenditure on lost funds, by
the absolute sacrifice of meaning: a sacrifice without return and
without reserves” (p. 257). It is in terms of an economy of expenditure without return thatBataille seeks to distinguish thesovereignty of postmodernlaughter from thelordship of Hegel’s
phenomenological divine comedy, the key, as he sees it, to everything Hegelian. As we look at the difference between sovereignty and lordship, it becomes clear that it is eschatology as
such and not just the realized eschatology of the Hegelian system that is the object, not of mirth, but of an anguished laughter
that sounds a lot like “Eli, Eli, lema sabachthani?” (Matt. 27:46;
see p. 262).20
In the background of Bataille’s reading of Hegel is his own
notion of sacrifice as unproductive expenditure.Over against the
”pecuniary interest” thatseeks ”expenditure regularly compensated for by acquisition,’’ Bataille places the yoflatch, where the
ideal ”would be to give a potlatch and not have it returned.”21
Here I do not give in order to get, and my expenditure is not an
investment in search of a profitable return, This is the meaning
of an expenditure ”without reserve.”
Jesus’ cry from the cross is a quotation in Hebrew of Psalm 221, ”My God,

my God, why have you forsaken me?” On p. 262 Derrida quotes a reference
by Bataille to this text.
21 ”The Notion of Expenditure,” in Visiorzs of Excess: SeIected Writings, 29272939, ed. Allan Stoekl (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985), pp.
116-22. For Bataille, the pointis that ”human life cannot in any way be limited
to the closed systems assigned to it by reasonable conceptions. The immense
travail of recklessness, discharge, and upheaval that constitutes life could be
expressed by stating that life starts only with the deficit of these systems” (p.
128).
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We know fromMarx that thereare two formsof profit-seeking
investment. One is quantitative and spends a given amount of
exchange value in search
of a greater amount of exchange value.
This is the M-C-M form of exchange. The other, which Marx
labels the C-M-C form, is qualitative and exchanges a use value
for a different and more highly desired use value.22Bataille interprets Hegelian Az@zebwzg as an instance of the latter.The moment of negativity is the sacrifice, giving up, expenditure of
something valued, but with an eye to getting something
different but even more valuable in return. Thus in the famous strug(Hevrsclzoff) over
glefor recognition thatgenerateslordship
against bondagein the Plzenomenology, the risk of death is a rational risk in the C-M-C form. Life is the risk capital ventured in
search of something better than mere
life, namely, recognition.
Bataille is less concerned with the particularsof this phenomenological moment than with the very structure of every phenomenological experience (p. 256) and beyond this, to the very
structure of negativity and Azrfhebrmg in Hegel’s thought in general. As both cancellation and preservation, dialectic is a negativity in the service of positivity. ”The putting at stake of life is a
moment in the constitution of meaning” (p. 254), whether the
life that is risked is biological, phenomenological, or logical. The
task of the negative is to “collaborate” in the genesis of meaning
(p. 259). It is clear that Bataille uses ’meaning’ as the generic
term for the profitable return promised in the investment brochures from Hegel, Inc.
Hegel is careful to exclude death itself from being philosophically significant. So we read:
To rush headlong into death pure and simple is thus to risk the
absolute loss of meaning. . . . One risks losing the effect and profit
of meaning which were the very stclkcs one hoped to r o k . Hegel
called this mute and nonproductive death, this death pure and
simple, a b s f r ~ncgntivity,
f
in opposition to ”the negation characteristic of consciousness, whichcancels in such a way that it preserves and maintains what is sublated . . . and thereby survivesits
being sublated.” (p. 255)23
zSee C a y i f d , vol. I, ch. 4, “The General Formula for Capital.’’

I n the Plzerm??zerrologyHegel gives philosophical slgnificance to the deathof
Jesus as the death of divine transcendence, but dismisses his own death and
Y
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Bataille laughs. The ”absolute loss of meaning” associated
with death as abstract negativity Hegel’s
is
blind spot, andhaving foundit, Bataille breaks into a deep
belly laugh. Sovereignty
distinguishes itself, in the anguish
of this laughter, from the serious work of lordship, the labor of the negative that gives birth
to new meaning. The difference between sovereignty and lorda
ship is ”theunique interval which separates meaning fromcertain non-meaning” (p. 254). Sovereign laughter is ”an absolute
renunciation of meaning,’’ and its burst “is the almost-nothing
into which meaning sinks, absolutely” (p. 256). Or should we
call it the absolute-nothing into which meaning sinks, almost?
In any case Hegelian Aufhebung is laughable in itsWinding itself to thebaselessness of the nonmeaning from which the basis
of meaning is drawn, and in which this basis of meaning is exhausted” (p. 257). The Alpha-and-Omega of meaning is nonmeaning. The Grund of meaning isan Abgrund.
If death is one ”sign” of nonmeaning as thehorizon of even
dialectically constituted, Hegelian meaning, play isanother.
Here, as elsewhere in Derrida’s writings, play is not something
so much against our
will that
we do but something that happens
we are always looking
for ways to control it. Hegelian Aufhebung
is one sucheffort to master play, ’limiting it and elaborating it
by giving it form and meaning” (p. 255). But sovereign laughter
makes ”the seriousnessof meaning appear as anabstraction inscribed inplay’’ (p. 256).
Now, an abstraction, inHegelian terms, is something isolated,
removed, from its proper context. To (relinscribe an abstraction
in something is to return it to its proper
home, to (re)contextualize it. In this (re)inscriptionof meaning within play ”I absolve
myself of absolute knowledge, putting it back in its place as
such, situating it and inscribing it within a space which it no
that of his reader as an abstract negativity that is of no concern to philosophy.
from the Phenomenology is found on pp.
114-15
The passage quoted by Derrida
of the Miller translation. Speaking of the “power of the negative” shown by
the analytic Understanding, Hegel writes, “Death,if that is what we want to
call ths non-actuality, isof all things what is most dreadful.. . But the life of
Spirit is not the life that shrinks from death and keeps itself untouched by
devastation, but rather the life that endures it and maintains itselfItinwins
it.
its truth only when, in utter dismemberment,
it finds itself”;Phenomenology, p.
19.
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longer dominates” (p. 270). If that space is the abyss of nonmeaning of which Bataille has been speaking, this would be the
AtrJhebung of the Aujhebmg. For Hegelian preservation always
recontextualizes finite meanings in larger and more inclusive
networks of meaning until one arrives at the all encompassing
network that can be caIled Idea, System, or Absolute Knowledge. If this dtimate network of meaning must be recontextualized within the horizon of nonmeaning from which its exitus
arises and to whichits redittrs returns, this wouldbe a negativity
that is not exactly a moment in the constitution of meaning?
Is play, like death, such a horizon of nonmeaning? It would
seem so:
In interpreting negativityas labor, in betting for discourse, meaning, history, etc., Hegel has bet against play, agnizzst chmzce [emphasis added]. He has blinded himself to the possibility of his
own bet, to the fact that the conscientious suspension of play . . .
was itself a phase of play; and to the fact that play includes the
work of meaning or the meaning of work, and includes them not
in terms of krzowledge, but in terms of imcriytion: meaning is a
fimctjon of play [ = chance], is inscribed in a certain place in the
configuration of a meaningless play [ = chance]. (p. 260)25

Derrida is interested in a discourse ”which can open itself up
to the absoIute loss of its sense, to the (non-)base of the sacred,
of nonmeaning, of un-knowledge or of play, to the swoon from
24 This paragraph perhaps
best indicates where my reading of Derrida’s
essay differs from that of Joseph Flay in “Hegel, Derrida, and Bataille’s Laughter,” in Hegel a d His Critics, ed. William Desmond (Albany: SUNY Press,
1989).Fhy rejects the view that “theAuFcbrlng rules all and proscribes rupture
of any sort’’ on the grounds that “a particular ’taking up’ of a negation would
rupture the previous economy” (p. 167). Thus the transition from Self-consciousness to Reason is a rupture that goes beyond the dialectic of master and
slave. ”The ’economy’ of mastery is here broken” (pp. 168-69). But Derrida’s
Bataille does not denythis or presentus with a ubiquitous master-slave dialectic. What 1s ubiquitous is the structure of that dialectic, the movement from
one meaningto a new andricher meaning. That the ultimate movement might
be to nonrneaning is, for Derrida’s Bataille, the significance of death and the
contingency signified here by play.
2i In case we missed the point, Derrida repeats it: ”Far from suppressing the
dialectical synthesis, it inscribes this synthesis and makes it function within
the sacrifice of meaning. It does not suffice to risk death if the putting at stake
is not permitted to take off,11s chance or accident, but is rather invested as the
work of the negative” (p. 261, emphasis added).
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which it is reawakened by a throw of the dice" (p. 261). He has
reversed his metaphors.This swoon is not the complacent slumber of Hegelian meaning, butstands in appositionto "nonmeaning" and "un-knowledge." Hence this
awakening
is not
sovereign laughter butthe (forgotten) passage from the darkness
of nonmeaning to the sunlight of meaning. In saying that this
happens "by a throw of the dice,'' Derrida reiterates his earlier
equation of play with chance.Play signifies the contingency that
(shall we say necessarily?) underliesall the necessities of dialectical meaning.
This explains, of course, why the logic of A u f i e h q is an attempt to control and limitplay (p. 255). Sovereignty resists this
attempt, but so far is its laughter from being a carte blancheto
"play without rules" that "given over to 'play without rules,'
poetry [or writing in general] risks letting
itself be domesticated,
'subordinated,' better than ever. This risk is properly nzodern"
(p. 261). In other words, the radicalsubjectivism often attributed
to deconstruction in particular and postrnodernism in general
is
better conceived as the flip side of modernity's objectivism. Logical positivism, where scientific objectivism and moral/metaphysicalsubjectivism become Siamesetwins, is amodern,
perhaps fhe modern, ideology.2h
There are things that even the wisefail to do,
While the fool hits the point.
Unexpectedly discovering theway to life in the midst of death,
He burst out in hearty

If we cannot equate Bataille's laughing at Hegel with Kierkegaardian satires because the former expresses a more radical
crisis of meaning, perhaps it is akin to Zen laughter, which has
been described as "loud, uproarious, unrestrained" and
even
"near-demonic."2HChristmas Humphreys says, "There is more
2h Cf. the similar argument in the opening chapters
of Maclntyre's After
Virtue.
?7 Quoted from Sengai in Conrad Hyers, Zen a r d the Comic Spirif (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 19731, p. 37. For other discussions of Zen laughter,
see R. H. Blyth, Oriental H~tmour(Tokyo: Hokuseido, 19591, pp. 87-97, and D.
T.Suzuki, Selrgrri, the Zen Masfer (New York: New York Graphic Society, 1971),
pp. 1-17.
2R Hyers, Z m arzd the Comic Spirit, pp. 35 and 27.
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honest ‘belly laughter’ in a Zen monastery than surely in any
other religious institution onearth”-and the faithful chant before Maitreya, the Messianic Buddha whose avatar is a clown:
When the big belly thunders with loud roars of laughter,
Thousands of white lotuses rain through all the worlds.2q

Is Bataille’s laughter an ”expression” of sntori? Very possibly,
but we must proceed carefully. Although we are dealing with
an “absolute unknowledge” thatis ”the absoluteexcess of every
cpisfeme” (p. 268), we are sternly forbidden to construe sovereignty as a new mysticism (pp. 269, 272). In the first place, although ”sovereignty can enounce nothing,except in theform of
zzcithcr this, 170~fhnt” (p. 273), it is not a kind of negative theology
that posits in and through its negations”a ’superessentiality’ . . .
a supreme being and an indestructible meaning’’ beyond ”the
categories of beings” (p. 271). Its rejection of mediation is not a
retreat to an immediacy where it can ”pleasurably consume an
absolutely close presence” (p. 273)?
Still, sovereign laughter is intimately related to “thesovereign
silence which interrupts articulated language.’’ Is this a mystical
silence? Not quite. “Since it excludes articulated language, sovereign silence is therefore, in 0 cevfaiu fnslzior?, foreign to difference as the source of signification.” In what fashion? In the
fashion of ”a sovereign operation transgressing the limit of discursive difference” (p. 243). The loud silence of sovereign laughter is the transgression rather than the erasure of meaning. To
be more precise, the mode of writing that points to this laughing silence is the
interruption
of articulated languagelinguistically.
of writing in terms of excess,
Derridadescribesthiskind
(re)inscription, and dislocation or displacement. Sovereignty is
to be inscribedin discourse, but the only writing that
can do this
will be one that ”exceeds the logic of philosophy” (p. 259). But
?“Quotedin ibid., pp. 35 and 48.
X Derrida develops this argument in relation to his own work in ”Differance,” in Mrrrguzs of Phi2usuyhy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982) and in “How to Avoid Speaking: Denials,” in Devrida nnd
Ncgrrtive Theology, ed. Harold Coward and Toby Foshay (Albany: SUNY Press,
1992).

just as Johannes de Silentio sees faith as the paradox that " n f f ~
having been in the universal [the single individual]as the single
individual isolates hinlself as higher than the universal,"" so
Derrida's BataiIle interrupts the prevailing
logos only after graduating from itsschools. "Unknowledge is, then, superkistorical,
but only because it takes its responsibilities from the completion
of history and from the closure of absolute knowledge, having
first taken them seriously and having tlrcrl betrayed them by exceeding them" (p. 269, emphasis added).The question posed by
Bataille is this: "how, crjtcr. having exhausted the discourse of
philosophy, can one inscribe in the lexicon and syntax of a language, our language, which was also the language o f philosophy, that whichnevertheless exceeds the oppositionsof concepts
governed by this communal logic?" (pp. 252-53, emphasis
added).
The answer to the question How is this exceeding or transgression possible? is in terms of dislocation or displacement and
reinscription. In Bataille,
a complicity without reserve accompanies Hegelian discourse,
"takes it seriously" up to the end, without an objection in philosophical form, while, however, a certain burst of laughter exceeds
it and destroys its sense, or signals, in any event, the extreme
point of "experience" which makes Hegelian discourse dislocate
ilsc!f. . . all of Bataillc's concepts are Hegelian. We must acknowledge this without stopping here. For if one does not grasp the
rigorous effect of the trembling to which he submits these concepts, the new configuration into which he displaces and reinscribes theln . . . one would conclude . . . that Bataille is Hegelian
or anti-Hegclian, or that he has muddled Hegel. One would be
deceived each time. (p. 2S3)12

Dislocation, displacement, reinscription-are thesenot the
very sorts of recontextualizing that constitute Hegelian A@cbl r q ? 'If so, we could speak (as we did earlier in this essay) o f
Bataille as the Alrfl~eblmgof the Hegelian Arrflrcbrrug. At the end
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ply affirmed, not quite postulated, but ineluctably presupposed,
is something beyond theecstasy of construction and the agony
of deconstruction.
Derrida has become a species of Unhappy Consciousness
along with Marx and Kierkegaard. He intends a meaning he
takes to be absolute (not deconstructible), though he insists not
only that it is not fulfilled in intuition, but also that it cannot
even be clearly and distinctly intended. Derridean thought remains without hope, anticipating no future time in which we
will be simply present toa fully just world or even a definitive
concept of justice. But his despair is not a despairover meaning,
and we might describe his morerecent thought as a moralargument for meaning, the reflection of a moral faith seekingunderstanding.
This moral faith is not the faith of the intelIectuaIly elite, but
the faith of all who assume that thedistinction between justice
and injustice is not merely convention and construct. It is by siding with common sense (and Plato) against the sophists on this
issue, formulated in this limited way, that Derrida associates
himself with the natural law tradition. By virtue of his lack of
hope he remains further from
Hegel than either Marx or Kierkegaard. But if Hegel stands for the ultimacy of meaning and Bataille for the ultimacy of nonmeaning, Derrida would seem to
have moved beyond laughing atHegel to a place where he and
Hegel work together, however differently, in the vineyard of
meaning.17In this respect the prodigal son is a chip off the old
block. It is just possible that Hegel has the last laugh.

37Thlsway of putting it would narrow rather than widen the gap between
Derrida and Gadarner.

Derrida As Natural Law Theorist
POSTMODERN
PHILOSOPHY in general and Derridian deconstruction in particular are rightly perceived as the most sustainedcritique of metaphysics since logical positivism. Since it is within
the natural law traditions, ancient, medieval, and modern, that
ethics is most unabashedly metaphysical, the title of this essay
will appear to many as simply oxymoronic.
But there is a difference between positivismand postmodernism that must not belost sight of. In the former case it was the
proponents and practitioners of the position who insisted that
the overthrow of metaphysics was also the end of ethics in any
objective sense, leaving ethics to be a matter of personal preference and ethical language to be the expression or evocation of
emotion. In the latter case this double negation, or, more precisely, the claim that the critiqueof metaphysics entails theoverthrow of ethics, is to be found all but exclusively among the
opponents of the position. Its practitioners frequently talk as if
they are engaged in a morally significant critique of a variety of
theories, institutions, and practices. Levinas combines a dramatic and creative account of how ethics is possible with a devastating critique of western ontology, and even Derrida goes so
far as to say, "Nothing seemsto me less outdated than the
classical emancipatory ideal."' He insists that "a deconstructivist approach . . . does not necessarily lead to injustice, nor to the
effacement of an opposition between just and unjust." It is not
"a quasi-nihilistic abdication before the ethico-politico-juridical
Jacques Derrida, "Force of Law: The 'Mystical Foundation of Authority,' "
in Decorlsfruction nnd the Possibility oflustice, ed. Drucilla Cornell, MichelRosenfeld, and David Gray Carlson (New York: Routledge, 19921, p. 28. Page references in the text will be to this essay. In addition to this very important essay
by Derrida, this volume of over four hundred pages contains thirteen diverse
and illuminating essays on its title topic by scholars in law, government and
political science, African American studies, comparative literature, and philosophy.
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question of justice” in spite of the fact that ”certain people have
an interest in spreading this confusion”(p. 19).
No one has ever doubted that Derrida hasethical or ethically
significant political Commitments. But it has often been claimed
that these are externally or contingently related to deconstruction, understood as a strategy of reading linked to a kind of
Giidelian epistemology or semantics of finitude thatcan be read
as a kind of skepticism.’ A ”weak defense” of Derrida would
try to show that his ethical commitments are not undercut by
deconstruction, that it is not the ”everything is permitted” open
invitation to ethical nihilism or cynicism that it has sometimes
been said to be. A “strong defense’’ would try to show that there
is an affirmative ethical significance to deconstruction.
The strong claim has been recently developed in books by
Simon Critchley and Drucilla Cornell. Critchley claims both that
deconstruction as a certain way of reading texts “can, and indeed should, be understood as an ethical demand,” and that
there is “an unconditional ethical imperative, which . . . is the
source of the injunction that produces deconstruction.”? Derrida
himself seems closer to the second formulationwhen he says, “I
mean that deconstruction is, in itself, a positive response to an
alterity which necessarily calls, summons or motivates. Deconstruction is therefore vocation-a response to a call.”4
Critchley himself quotes at length from another passage in
which Derrida responds to a question about the relation of his
critique of apartheid to deconstruction:
In the different texts I have written on (against) apartheid, I have
on several occasions spoken of ”unconditional” affirmation OT of
”unconditional” ”appeal.” This has also happened to me in other
”contexts” and each time that I speak of the link between decon2 Derrida hlrnself calls attention to the Codelian aspect of his thought. See
Disss~rrirlations,trans. Barbara Johnson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1981), p. 219; WrifrrrR and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 7978), p. 162; Rodolphe Gasch6, The Tnin of fhe Mirror: Derrrdlz
m l i l the Philosophy of Reflrctiorl (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
19861, pp. 240 ff.
Simon Critchley, The Efhrcs of Decorrstrrlction: Dcrrrlln ntrd Lem11s (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1992), p. xi.
-I Richard Kearney, Diologrws with Contelnporor!y C w t i m m t a l Thinkus (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984), p. 118.
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struction and the "yes." Now, the very least that can be said of
unconditionality (a word that I use not by accident to recall the
character of the categorical imperative in its Kantianform) is that
it is independent of every determinate context. . . . Not that it is
simply present (existent) elsewhere, outsideof all context; rather,
it intervenes in the determination of a context from its very inception, and from an injunction, a law, a responsibility that transcends this or that determination of a given context. Following
this, what remains is to articulate this unconditionality with the
determinate (Kant would say, hypothetical) conditions of this or
that context; and this is the moment of strategies, of rhetorics, of
ethics, andof politics. The structure thus described supposes both
that there areonly contexts, that nothing exists outside context,as
I have often said, but also that the limitof the frameor the border
of the context always entails a clause of nonclosure. The outside
penetrates and thus determines the inside.?

That this notion of a law that transcends every context and
renders hypothetical every contextualized expressionof the Iaw,
whether in a written code or oral tradition, belongs to the natural law tradition is clear in Drucilla's attempt to articulate the
"ethical aspiration'' at the heart of Derrida's thought. She portrays deconstruction as the philosophyof the limit that "exposes
the quasi-transcendental conditions that establish any system,
including a legal system . . . [and] demonstrates how the very
estabhshment of the system as a system implies a beyold to it,
precisely by virtue of what it excludes.'' It is precisely this limit,
this beyond, that "serves as the limit to any attempt to collapse
justice into positive law."f7
This opposition tolegal positivism as well as to any communitarianism that seeks"to resolve ethical, political, and legal questions of the day by invoking the current conventions of a given
society" is what permitsCornel1 to speakof the "shared presuppositions" that link Derridato the liberal jurisprudence of Rawls
ii "Toward an Ethic of Discussion," afterword to Lzrrzited Znc, trans. Samuel
Weber and Jeffrey Mehlman (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 19881,
pp. 152-53. Critcldey suggests that this "nothing cG$s outside context" 1s the
best commentary on the infamous Derridian "There is mtlrzng outside of the
text"; The Efhics of Decorlsfnrcfion, pp. 31-44.
Drucilla Cornell, Tho Philosophy of the Linrif (New York: Routledge, 1992),
pp. 1-2.
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and NageL7 If we remember that Dworkin has astutely shown
how Rawls's theory of justice "presupposes a deep theory that
assumes natural rights,"x and that natural rights
theory is a
branch of natural law theory, the title of this essay may begin to
sound, if not yet plausible, at least not totally perverse.
If sympathetic interpreters are right in giving what
1 have
called the "strong defense'' of Derrida, it can only be because
there are groundsfor such an interpretationin his own text. Nowhere are such grounds more explicit than in his essay "Force
o€ Law.''L)He realizes that to speak of "Deconstruction and the
Possibility of Justice"1ois to raise the question "Does deconstruction insure, permit, authorize the possibility of justice?" (p. 4).
He points to texts in which he overtly thematizes ethical and
political matters, discussing, for example, Levinas, Hegel's Philosophy of Right, or Nelson Mandela and apartheid. But he realizes that this will constitute only a weak defense unless he can
show that deconstructive employments
of such notionsas undecidability, singularity, and difference are "at least obliquely discourses onjustice" (p-7). If deconstruction destroys the spacein
which ethical commitments can be anythingmore than subjective preferences, it will be the enemy of justice no matter how
politically correct its practitioners are with reference, for example, to apartheid.
Derrida seeks to show that deconstruction is not such a destruction. The most pervasive assumption of the entire essay is
that justice cannot be identified with positive law (droit). He
wants "to insist right away on reserving the possibility of a justice, indeed of a law that not only exceeds or contradicts 'law'
(droit)but also, perhaps has no relationto law, or maintains such
a strange relation to it that it may just as well command the
'droit' that excludes it" (pp. 5-6). This assumption, which links
Derrida to the natural law tradition(s), is what enables him to
Ibid., p. 8.
Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rlghts Seriously (Cambndge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977), p. 177 in the context of pp. 168-83.
See n. 1 above.
l o The title of the conference at which he first gave his paper as a lecture,
which was held in 1989 at Cardozo Law School, as well as of the volume growing out of the conference-
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say that deconstruction perhaps belongs more
to the fieIds of
law and theology than to literature, where it has become most
popular (p. 8). But the question remains:Is this naturallaw posture contingently, even perhaps inconsistently, added on to deconstructive theory and practice, or does it find a rationale for
itself precisely in them?
Derrida's claim that the latter is
the case is bold: "Deconstruction is justice" (p. 15).But this is not to say that it is natural law
theory in its usual guise.In its most familiar forms, natural law
theory is, first, the ontological claim that there is a higher law,
rooted in that which ismost truly real, by which all human encodings or inscriptions of law are to be judged, and, second,
the epistemologicalclaim that human reason has the capacity to
know this Iaw in the strong sense that philosophy has traditionas episteme, scielztia, Wissenschnft,
ally designated with such terms
and self-evidence, as in "we hold these truths to be self-evident."
Any claim to knowledge of this sort is problematic for Derrida. He sees it as expressing a metaphysics of presence that
presupposes both an atomistic semantics that isolates meaning
from context and an intuitionist epistemology that promises the
human knower directand complete presence to such meanings.
Derrida seeks to deconstruct this Platonism, to which so much
of the western tradition isbut a series of footnotes, by showing
both the unsurpassable contextuality
of meaning and the closely
intertwined temporality of understanding that leaves the allpresentness of pure presence as a wish-fulfilling illusion."
This is why, when Derrida says that "Deconstruction, while
seeming not to 'address' the problem of justice, has done nothing but address it," he immediately adds, "if only obIiqz4ely . . .
one cannot speak directly about justice, thematize or objectivize
justice, say 'this is just' OT even less 'I am just,' without immediately betraying justice, if not law (droit)" (p. 10; cf. pp.7, 17, 23).
There are two quite different claims here. Plat0 would have no
' I See, for example, "Diffkrance," in Margins of Philosoyhy, trans. Alan Bass
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982); Speech and Phenanzetza, trans.
David B. Allison (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1973); and Lrmited
Inc, noting especially the essay "Signature Event Context,'' which is also found
in Margms.

problem with the notion thatwe can never call anything oranyone just, since participation is always partial. But just to the degree thathe thinks the soulcan free itself of the bodyin order to
”contemplate things bythemselves with the soul byitself,”12he
believes it is possible to speak directly aboutjustice i t s e l P
But suppose he is wrong. Suppose there is something profoundly right about the
varied but widespread arguments,
going
back not just to Kierkegaard and Nietzsche but even to Hume
and Reid, that call into question the foundationalism, the intuitionism, and the totalism so dear to tradition, and,in each case,
cast doubtonthe
transcendence of human temporality by
human knowledge. One can tie the notion of natural law so
tightly to theclassical ideals of eyisfeme, scierztilz, and Wissenschnft
that every attempt to articulate the situated finitude of human
knowledge will become, in effect, the ally of legal positivism and
ethical relativism; or one can seek to articulate the idea of a
higher law to which every human code is answerable in a conceptual framework not constituted (or constricted)
by those ideals. It is clearly the latter alternative that Derridahas embarked
upon.
Because he is a natural law theorist he cannot ignore the crucial distinctions between lzonms and physis or, more particularly,
between “positive law and natural law.” But he cannot simply
help himself to them either, since the assumption of an unarnbiguous boundary between them presupposes our directaccess
or pure presence to nature as that which is outside or independent of every human text or context. So deconstruction will be
an ”interrogation” or a “problematization of the foundations of
law, morality, and politics,” directed toward ”destabilizing or
complicating” these distinctions (p. 8). To show that the difference between nature andconvention or artis not as neat as tradition would have it, Derrida will seek to showhow muchof what
we take to benature is the product of convention a m i how what
we recognize as convention is not devoid of nature atwork in it.
In making the first of these moves, Derrida links himself with
Phaedo 66e.
This is an important reason why John Wild is right to include Plato as one
of the founding fathers of the natural law tradition. See PIdo’s Moderr1 Ellerr1ic.s
nnd fha T11eur-y of Nntltrnl Ln7u (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, ‘1953).
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the sophists.By refusing tostop at that
point and by insisting on
thesecond move, Derrida decisively distances himself from
them. In this way he rejects the classical either/or (thatbears the
name of Plato) between sophistry, subjectivism, conventionalism, emotivism, relativism, and so forth, on the one hand, and
Knowledge as epistcmc, scierztia, and Wissenschaff,on the other.’“
Since Derrida‘s account of how nature is at work in convention presupposes his accountof how convention often masquerades as nature, we must look at both moments. First the latter.
The laws and customsof a people,at least their most basic ones,
are often taken to be expressions of nature-discoveries, not inventions. But in the beginning of these laws and customs is an
“originary violence” that marks them indelibly as inventions
and conventions (p. 6).
Derrida is not simply repeating, though of course he is not
denying, the Augustinian point about the violent origin of the
state. He recognizes ”the differential character of force” (p. 7)
and knows thatforce can be ”direct or indirect,physical or symand hermebolic, exterior or interior, brutal or subtly discursive
neutics, coercive or regulative, and so forth” (p. 6), and his focus
is on the non-physical, the hermeneutical violence at the origin
of law, He is engaged in linguistic rather than military analysis,
which is why he calls the founding violence ”mystical. Here a
silence is walled u p in the violent structure of the foundingact”
(p. 14).
The point is not that physical violence is extra-linguistic, but
rather that language itself has a limit: ”The very emergence of
justice and law, the founding and justifying moment that institutes law implies a performative force, which is always an ilztcvyvctrztive force . . . theoperationthatamountsto
founding,
inaugurating, justifying law (dvoif), making law, would consist
of a coup de furce, of a performative and therefore ir1kvpretatiue
viulclzce” (p. 13, my emphasis). What makes the original interpretation an act of violence? The fact that it has force without
justification. Rather than being a direct reading of the nature of
I In The Corzc~pfof Irony Kierkegaard presents the negativity of Socratic ignorance and Socratic irony as a third possibility over against Platonic speculation
on the one hand, and sophistic nihilism on the other.
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things, this act occurs in an epistemic state of nature where ”no
justice and no previous law . . . could guarantee or contradict or
invalidate [it]. No justificatory discourse could or should insure
of inthe role of metalanguage in relation to the performativity
stitutive language orto its dominant interpretation” (p. 13).
In other words, law is a construct. But just because it is constructible, it is deconstructible:”The fact that law is deconstructible is not bad news.We may even see in this a stroke of luck for
politics, for all historical progress.” How so? “Deconstruction is
justice” (pp. 14-15). In other words, the disruptive force that
reveals the originary violence thatconstitutes“the
mystical
foundation of authority” is not sophistry trying to pry itself
loose from the constraints of nature, but justice unmasking the
claims of contingency to be necessity, of convention to be nature,
and of positive law to be justice. This is how Derrida seesnature
to be at work in convention, precisely by countering its claimsto
be nature.
To say that deconstruction is justice at work in the world,justice as judgment, we mightsay, is to present an alternative to the
Platonic account according to which justice in itself is first directly apprehended (but definitely not constructed) by thephilosopher king and then applied to the construction of social
institutions, functioninglike an artisan’s blueprint. On the alternative account nature is at work in convention not through the
pure insight that justifies the construction but through the insightinto impurity that deconstructsthe justifications.15 The
Derridean battle hymn goes something like this:
No eyes have had a vision of the glory of the Lord;
But he’s trampling out the vintage where the grapes of wrath are
stored;
He hath loosed the fateful lightning of his deconstructive sword;
His justice marches on.

Of course, Derrida does not speak of God as the source of
justice. Still, while it is clear that his version of natural law theory
I i Drucilla Cornell sees Adorno as a founding father of philosophical postmodernism. The chapterof The Philosophy uf fhe Limit devoted to him bears the
title ”The Ethical Message of Negative Dialectics” and expresses the Derridean
argument very succinctly.
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is an alternative guided by epistemological disagreement with
the tradition, we can ask about its ontological dimension. Just
before he says, “Deconstruction is justice,” he says, ”Justice in
itself, if such a thing exists, outside or beyond law, is not deconstructible” (p. 14). Derrida is careful about language, and just as
he speaks of an ”unconditional” appeal in order deliberately to
evoke Kant, here he speaksof ”justice in itself”in order to evoke
Plato. He wants to express his agreement with Plato that while
positive law is constructible and therefore deconstructible, justice itself is not.
But Derrida is not quite a Platonist, anda ringing ”if” interrupts what might have been part of a Platonic credo: ”Justicein
itself is not deconstructible.” The qualification is explosive: ”if
such a thing exists, outside or beyond law.” For in the deconstructive texts that are at issue here, he makes clear that this
assumption is counterfactual. We have already seen him say,
speaking of that Kantian ”unconditional” imperative, “Not that
it is simply present (existent) elsewhere, outside of all context;
rather, it intervenes in the determination of a context from its
very inception. . . . The structure thus described supposes both
that there are only contexts, that nothing exists outside context,
as I have often said, but also that the limit of the frame or the
border of the context always entails a clauseof nonclosure. The
outside penetrates and thus determines the inside.” In other
words, the outside is at work inside, but does not simply exist
outside.
Derrida, it would seem, is clearly committed to saying that
justice in itself does notexist. But, in keeping withhis search for
an alternative to both Plato and the sophists, he makes it clear
that he cannot do without the idea of justice in itself. Deconstruction as a challenge to “the self-authorization of [positive]
Iaw” is possible”as an experience of theimpossible,there
where, even if it does not exist (or does not yet exist, or never
does exist), there is justice” (p. 15).
IS Derrida perhaps gropingfor the notion of a regulative idea,
an idea we cannot do without but that does not correspond to
He does
anything thatcan be given in our experience? Not quite.
not find this a welcome suggestion (pp. 25-26). For Kant, the
problem with a regulative idea was not that we could not give a
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clear and stable definition of it, but rather that nothing
was capable of both being experienced and satisfying the concept. For
Derrida there is no such confidence at the conceptual level. Deconstruction is rather ”an interrogation of the origin, grounds
and limits of our conceptual, theoretical or normative apparatus” (p. 20). It is not just our practices and institutions, but our
concepts and theories as well that are perennially penultimate.
Still, the idea of justice in itself functions as a quasi-regulative
idea for Derrida. It is not some thing that exists outside of every
human context, and it is not an ideal essence to which we can
give a fixed and final meaning. It is a bit like what Kierkegaard
had in mind when he spoke of “thoughts which wound from
behind.”’” Thoughwe cannot get them out in front of us where
they are fully present to us andwe can master them, they nevertheless insinuate themselves into our thinking, disturbing its
complacency in ways we can neither predict nor control. They
ambush our absolutes. On Derrida’s view it is precisely as deconstruction that the idea of justice in itself wounds our legal
systems, both astheory and as practice, from behind.
The current philosophical scene is largely dominated by the
search on many different frontsfor an alternative to the classical
either/or: Plato or the sophists. Caught between an absolutism
that seemsto many no longer theoretically defensible and a relativism that seems to many to be morally intolerable in its flirtation with cynicism and nihilism, much of contemporary
philosophy is the quest for an escape from this dilemma. In
terms of ethics in generaland of legal theory, more specifically,
Derrida’s theory of natural law represents a serious contribution
to the ongoing conversation. His essay ”Force of Law’’ and the
collection of essays published with it deserve the careful attention of those engaged in this pursuit, as well as of those happily
perched on one horn of the traditional dilemma.

‘ I r The title of part I11 of Kierkegaard’s Chrrstm DIscuurst‘s, trans. Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971), is “Thoughts Whlch Wound
from Behind-for Edification.”
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Faith As the Overcoming of
Ontological Xenophobia
"MYPA CAN LICK YOUR PA!" Thus, once upon a time, did aspiring machismoseek vicarious victory over its enemies.
There is something of an echo of this boast in the claim "My
God is more radically other than your God!" The wording may
not be as fully explicit in the second case, but the transfer of
excellence from the greater to the lesser is, if anything, more
satisfying. For when I make this claim I not only bask in the
transcendent glory of this glorious transcendence-I take credit
I claim
for seeing and saying this otherness better than you. Thus
to be holier than thou when I claim, throwing grammar to the
winds, that my God is wholier other than thine.
Philosophically speaking, nothing is quite as PC today as alterity. The result is that when we present our God as the e m
a l f c r i s s i m m , we may feel compelled to write e m with a krcuzrueise D w d z s f r e i c h n q or sous ratwe; but the term alterissimm is
that than which a more literal and univocal term cannot be conceived.
By pointing to the trendiness of our theme I do not mean to
dismiss it. It has been around too long and has engaged too
many thinkersof the first order to be nothing buta contenzyomry
blip on the scene of history, condemned to disappear like hula
hoops and leisure suits. But in the life of the mind fads and the
lure of the avant-garde are always at least as dangerous as the
resistance to new ideas, minimally by wasting time reinventing
the wheel, and maximally by naively taking as self-evident what
is merely contclnyorary orthodoxy.
One danger at thepresent moment is that in our hurry to define the otherness of the indefinable we may forget what is at
issue. Or, to put the point more precisely, in our eagerness to
attain the philosophicalgoals of overcoming onto-theo-logy, the
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metaphysics of presence, logocentrism, and so forth, we may forget to reflect on the religious significance of the project. When
and to the degree that we do this, we make our philosophical
goals at onceautonomous andabstract and invite the Pascals of
the world to ask whether we have not madeourselves irrelevant
to the believing soul, whether we have not made ourselves into
a Socrates whom Euthyphro has no reason to take seriously.
Accordingly, I want to pay attention not only to how we spell
out the othernessof God but also to the kindof religious life that
goes with each spelling. In this context otherness often means
unknowability, and I will begin by focusing onways of speaking
of the ineffability of God. Hegel and Feuerbach remind us of
two ways in which this themecan be highly problematic from a
religious perspective. In response to the idea that we can know
with certaintyflzaf God exists but have no articulable knowledge
of 7uhat God may be, Hegel claims that this is an openinvitation
to fill in the content arbitrarily so that, as he is fond of saying,
the Dalai Lama or even a cow can be said to be God. Thus he
accuses Jacobi, with whom he associates this form of the unknowability thesis, of a "deification of the subject."' Others
might call this subjectivism fideism or decisionism.
is a bit
Feuerbach's reading of theunknowabilitythesis
darker. He suspects that moral faultmay underlie such a philosophical fallacy. Declaring God unknowable permits those who
wish both to forget God and to salve their religious conscience
to have their cake and eat it too. They affirm God's existence:
"But this existence does not affect or incommode [them];it is a
merely negative existence, an existence without existence, a selfcontradictory existence,-a state of being which,as to its effects,
is not distinguishable from non-being. . . . The alleged religious
horror of limiting God by positive predicates is only the irreliG. W. E Hegel, Faith nnd Knozdedge, trans. Walter Cerf and H. S. Harris
(Albany: SUNY Press, 1977), p. 149. Cf. p. 97 and TT 63 and 72 of the "Lesser
Logic." Hegel's most sustained discussion of this matter comesin the first four
of his "Lectures on the Proofs of the Existence of God," found in vol. 111 of his
Lectltres 011 the Philosophy of Religiw, trans. E. B. Spiers and J. Burdon Sanderson
(New York:Humanities, 1962). Cf, my discussion in He@, Freedom, and Moderrlity (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992), ch. 11, and, for context, Hegel's Lectures on the
Philosophy of Religion, ed. Peter Hodgson (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1984), vol. I, pp. 159-63,260-68, and 407-13.
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gious wish to know nothing more of God, to banish God from
the mind.”*In short, negative theology isas inherently ambivalent as the Freudian symptom. Its dialectic is not simply that
of theoretical affirmation and denial. In the context Feuerbach
describes the theoretical negationis in the service of a practical
denial that renders the theoretical affirmation hollow
and impotent.
Without denying theforce of these warnings,we can acknowlof the following prayer:
edge the genuinely religious meaning
I shall never want to define You, 0 God, for I cannot worship what
I comprehend?

It reminds us both that one of the important religious concerns
we need to keep front and center is the question of what is worthy of worship, and that negative theology or, more generally,
epistemological expressionsof the otherness of God can have as
their motive and proper function the protectionof the believing
soul from idolatry, from domesticatingthe divine by rendering
it too easily and too fully at the disposal of our conceptual
schemes.
Although Heidegger’s critique of onto-theo-logy belongs primarily to a thinking of Being he is careful to distinguish from
the life of faith, he is not unaware of its religious import. The
”onto-theo-logical constitution of metaphysics,” as he understands it, means that God enters into philosophy, but only on
philosophy’s terms. God must be the unity of the universal and
the highest in order tobe das Ersfe and das Lefzfeas ratio and as
Ludwig Feuerbach, TIrr Esserlce uf Chnstmrify, trans. George Eliot (New
York Harper & Brothers, 19571, p. 15, Cf. Derrida’s discussion of the possibility
that “those who have nothing to say or don’t want to know anything” might
mimic negative theology: “How to Avoid Speaking: Denials,” in Devridn nnd
Neptive Theulugy, ed, Harold Coward and Toby Foshay (Albany: SUNY Press,
19921, p. 75. In this passage he both acknowledges the possibility Feuerbach
describes and suggests that thenegative theology he wants to discuss is u p to
something else.
Leslie F. Brandt, Psulnrs/Nou~(St. Louis: Concordia, 1973),p. 175. Cf. Meister
Eckhart, “If I had a God whom I could understand, I should never consider
him God”; Sermon 83 in Meister Eckhart: The Essellfial Sermons, Comner~tnries,
Treatises, u r d Defense, trans. Edmund Colledge, O.S.A., and Bernard McGinn
(New York: Paulist Press, 19811, p. 207. Eckhart purports to be quoting, but
seems to be paraphrasing, with evident approval.
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Aoyos. In other words, God must not merely be an all-encompassing principlein and for Godself, but in andfor the totalizing
project of human thought. God must be Alpha and Omega in
order that the human thinker can stand at the beginning and
end of all things, including all in a comprehensive gaze. Thus
the problem with causal talk about God is not that it reduces
God to a kind of cosmic billiard ball; for, especially in the ex
nihilo tradition, metaphysics hasby no means forgotten thedifference between infinite, creative causality and finite, efficient
causality. The problem is rather that God is conceived as camn
p r i m and causa stdi in order to satisfy demands of a particular,
human intellectual project, one thatculminates, anything butinnocently, in modern technology.4
I needn't remind you that Heidegger sees thisproject as danger. But it may be worth recalling the degree towhich he identifies this danger as religious. In thismisinterpretation of the
unconcealed, "even God can . . . lose all that is exalted and holy,
the mysteriousness of his distance? When the will to power
becomes the project of total dominion of a world totally at its
disposal, God and the gods are indeed dead: "God is still not a
living God when we persist in trying to master thereal without
taking God's reality seriously." In the "insurrection" or "uprising" in which humankind claims "unlimited" and "unconditional" dominion over the earth, not onlyBeing but God as well
is reduced to a value in Nietzsche's sense of the term-namely,
whatever serves as means or condition for the enhancement and
preservation of human life: "The ultimate blow against God and
against the suprasensory world consists in the fact that God, the
first of beings, is degraded to the highest value. . . not that God
is held to be unknowable, not that God's existence is demonstrated to be unprovable, but rather that the god heldbetoreal
is elevated to the highest value." Heidegger reminds us that this
'This paragraph IS an interpretative summary of Heidegger's Zderztity and
Difference, trans. Joan Starnbaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 19691, pp. 55-61.
' "The Question Concerning Technology," in The Quesfron CUFZCCt7llHg Tech~~ology
a~lclOther Essays, trans. William Lovitt (New York: Harper & Row, 1977)'
p. 26. Heidegger adds, "in the light of causality, God can sink to the level of a
cause, of c n l m efficr~m.He then becomes, even i n theology, the god of the
philosophers.''
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"elevation," which often occurs in the name of intelligibility,
does not come from atheism, but "from the believers and their
theologians who discourse on the being thatis of all beings most
in being . . . seen from out of faith, their thinking and their talking is sheer blasphemy if it meddles in the theologyof faith.""
Sounding a lot like Luther, Pascal, and Kierkegaard, Heidegger interprets theonto-theo-logical constitution of metaphysics,
or, if you like, the metaphysical constitution of onto-theo-logy,
as a degradation of God and a danger to the life of faith; and, in
a crucial passage, he frames this analysis as
a plea for a rediscovery of the divine alterity.
As he articulates the danger, including
the religious danger, of Enframing, the project in which humans
become at once lordsof the earth andraw materials or standing
reserve, he speaks of "one final delusion: It seems as though
man everywhere and always encounters only himself. . . . 111
truth, however, precisely m w J w e does m a u todcly amy lmrger e m m m
fer himself, i.e., his esscmc [or true self]." Even Enframing is a
"claim," but in failing to recognize this being spoken to, exhorted, addressed, he fails to see that he "cmz l t e z w encounter
only himself .''7
This is one point at which the difference between Heidegger's
critique of metaphysics and Nietzsche's comes most sharply into
focus. While confessing his Dionysian faith, Zarathustra claims
that "in the end one experiences only oneself."x In Heidegger's
view one could not more eloquently express thedanger that the
metaphysical tradition represents; and by leaving Zarathustra's
"The Word of Nietzschc: 'God Is Dead,' in The Qmstion C o m w l n g Tkhpp.
07.
"The Question Concerning Technology," p. 27. On the issue of humanity
as answer or response to claims placed upon it, cf. l d m t i f y and Differem., pp.
"

I I O ~ O ~ ~ 99-1
,

31-34.

Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Syokc. Zaraflzustra, part 111, "The Wanderer." Derrida calls attention to a passage where Kant raises the question whether the
voice of the moral law "comes from man, fromthe perfected power of his own
reason, or whether it comes from an other, whose nature is unknown to us
and speaks to man through this, his own reason," only to dismiss the question
as "only speculative." "Of an Apocalyptic Tone Newly Adopted in Philosophy," in D f r v d n m d Nafzlral Theology, p. 47. The passage, which comes from
the essay whose title Derrida transposes, is at the very heart of Kant's philosophy of rtliglon, and it shows how much his moral theology resembles Nietzsche's immoralist anti-theology in its allergy to alterity.
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credo unchallenged, Nietzsche shows that he more nearly belongs to the onto-theo-logical tradition than to its overcoming.
To use language to which I shall return, Nietzscheis a Neoplatonist in the grips of ontological xenophobia, while Heidegger is,
if not an instance of the Augustinian faith that overcomes this
fear of meeting a stranger, at least someone who deliberately
holds open the spacefor such a possibility.
I want to present this Neoplatonist/Augustinian typology as
an alternative and corrective to the Augustinian/Thomistic distinctionpresentedby Tillich in his famous essay "The Two
Types of Philosophy of Religion."" But first I want to limit the
field of discussion to positions that are genuinely religious and
thus are directly concerned with the otherness of God. Not all
theological negation is negative theology. To try to clarify this
point I turn more specifically to Derrida's insistence that deconstruction is not negative theology, a claim I find to be both well
grounded and of surprising import.
There is no mystery as to why such a linkage has been suggested. When Derrida says that di@rancc is neither a word nor a
concept, that it belongs neitherto sensibility nor tointelligibility,
neither to existence nor to essence, neither to presence nor to
absence, neither to activity nor to passivity, and that it is neither
originarynor final, etc., hemakes a gesturethatinevitably
evokes negative theology.1oYet, while acknowledging the basis
of the allegation, he denies that heis a theologian of any sort.
Two of my friends, whose understanding of Derrida I envy,
have quite different views about his relation to religion. One
says, "Derrida doesn't have a religious bone in his body." The
other finds his thought tobe profoundly religious. Derrida himself identifies, while repudiating, oneway of coming to the second conclusion. He notes that the study of negative theology
could lead us to discover
the becoming-theological of aII discourse. From the moment a
proposition takes a negative form, the negativity that manifests
'' Paul Tillich, "The Two Types of Philosophy of Religion," in Theology of
Culfrtre (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964).
"'Jacques Derrida, "Diff&ance," in Margms of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), pp. 3-9. Cf. "Denials," p. 74.
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itself need only be pushed to the limit, and it at least resembles
an apophatic theology.Every time I say: X is neither this nor that
. . . I would start to speak of God. God's name would suit everything that may not be broached, approached, or designated, except in an indirect and negative manner. , . . If there is a work of
negativity in discourse and predication, it will produce divinity.
. . . God would be not merely the end, but the origin
of this
work of the negative. Not,only would atheism not be the truth of
negative theology; rather, God would be the truth of all negativity. One would thus arrive at a kind of proof of God-not a proof
of the existence of God, but a proof of God by His effects. . . , 'God'
would name tlznt witlmrt which one would not know how to account for any negativity.

Derrida's comment on this line
of thought is brusque to the
point of being icy: "This reading will always be possible. Who
could prohibit it?"I1
But if Derrida cannot prohibit this reading,he does not adopt
it either; instead he vigorously resists the suggestion that
we
construe the whenceof negativity and alterityas divine. In 1968
he insists that deconstruction should be distinguished from
negative theology on at least two grounds. First, it does not affirm
the "superessentiality" according to which "God is refused the
predicate of existence, only in order to acknowledge his superior, inconceivable, and ineffable mode of being."'* Second, it
does not include that"mstalgia" and "hope" for presence that he
finds, for example, in Heidegger's "quest for the proper word
and theunique name," the mystical momentthat is always
united with the skeptical moment in negative theology?
his thinking does not rest
In 1987 he repeats his insistence that
on "that ontological wagerof hyperessentiality that one findsat
work both in Dionysius and in Meister Eckhart."14 And once
again he links this theme with the nostalgiaand hope for presence that is the mystical side of their negative theologies, and
which he describes as "a silent intuition of God," as "the prom"Denials," pp. 76-77.
"DifMrance," p. 6 . Cf. p. 26: "This unnameable is not an ineffable Being
which no name could approach:God, for example."
I n fibid., p. 27. Cf. "The Ends of Man," in Margttzs of Philosophy, pp. 123-34.
Cf. "Of an Apocalyptic Tone," pp. 33-34/53.
lJ "Denials," p. 78. Cf. p. 74.
I'

ise of that presencegiven to intuition or vision . . . the immediacy
of a presence . . . union with God,'' and as a mystic union "that
is not an adequation but an unveiling. . . contact or vision, that
pure intuition of the ineffable, that silent union with that which
remains inaccessible to speech.""
To these themes he adds a new one. Not only does PseudoDionysius, the paradigmaticnegative theologian, affirm the reality of a God beyond being with whom he seeks union, but he
does so in a prayer addressedto this God.'" This prayer is "not a
preamble, an accessory mode of access, It constitutes an essential
moment . . . by addressing itself from the start to the other, to
you. But to you as 'hyperessential and more than divine Trinity.' Derrida's essay becomes a long reminder that prayer (and
its partner, praise or encomium) addressed to a hyperessential
you are not a part of deconstructive negativity. In Derrida's
texts, where skepticism is not in the service of mysticism, the
only vocatives are addressed to his readers."
Thus does Derrida protest that he does not have a religious
bone in his body. My point is not that his critique of the metaphysics of the sign could not be takenu p into a genuinely theological reflection. It may be, for example, that a deconstructive
analysis of undecidability can be helpful in developing a theological account of mystery, but that would not justify the identification of indeterminacy and mystery.I8
It might be argued that religion does not require the structure
of I and Thou (the youto whom Derrida does not pray), that the
idea of a personal God or gods to whom prayer and encomium
can be addressed in the second person belongs to theistic and
polytheistic forms of religion but notto other forms that,for the
sake of convenience if not precision, we might label pantheistic.
Have we not reminded our students atleast as often as we have
"

Ibld., pp. 74/79-80.
For this prayer, see The M~ysticalTheology, in Pserrdo-Dlorl~siJts:The Cornylcfe
Works, trans. Colm Luibheid (New York: Paulist Press, 19871, p. 135.
The quotation is from "Denials," p. 110. Cf. p. 112, where the necessity is
linked to the desired union with God, and pp. 108-1 11, 117, and 129, where
the theme 1s repeated.
I s Roger Lundin is so eager to make the second point that he seems afraid to
acknowledge the first. See The Clrlhue of ilrterpretdiorl (Grand Rapids, Mich.:
Eerdmans, 19931, pp. 204-5.
1'
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been reminded ourselves that Buddhism, too, is a religion? But
in Derrida's argument prayer does not stand alone; it comes on
the scene as a moment in the pursuit of union with the superessential, a pursuit that lies at the heart of Buddhism. There is a
promise of salvation, not to be found in Derrida, in the Buddhist
assurance "There is, monks, an unborn, not become, not made,
uncompounded."'" In this context we could reformulate his insistence that he is not a negative theologian by saying that he
gives a rather Buddhist account of Samsara that is m t part of a
theory of Nirvana. He has a kinship with the skepticism
of Buddhist logic, but not with themysticism of Buddhist hoped2"
Finally, it might be argued thatwhen Derrida says in another
context, "Justice in itself, if such a thing exists, outside or beyond
law, is notdeconstructible. . . . Deconstruction is
he is
at least leaving open a space for the hyperessential; for everything that is not beyond being or essence is deconstructible. If
the whence of ethico-political negationcanbedescribed
as
something initseIf, outside every text or context that might render it deconstructible," why should we not say, as suggested
above, thatthewhence
of meta-predicative negation is also
something beyondBeing, something hyperessential?
Once again Derrida's response will be, "This reading will always be possibIe. Who could prohibitit?" But this timethe situaUdrrnn, 80-81, in BlrilAhist Texts tllrorlgh t h A p ~ sed.
, Edward Conze et al.
(New York: Harper & Row, 1964), p. 95.
Derrida may stand closer to the Buddhist than to the Christian tradition
a challenge to predithat sterns from Pseudo-Dionysius. The former represents
cation and naming as such, while the latter challenges them only in relation to
the infinite. Cf. "Dends," p. 77. On the interface between Derr~da andBuddhism, see David Loy, "The Deconstruction of Buddhism," in Derrrda alld Negn t i w Tl~colosy.But unlike the negative theologians of every religious tradition,
he stands with the Sartre who says, "Human reality therefore is by nature an
unhappy consciousness with no possibility of surpassing its unhappy state";
Bern8 a m i Nothingness, trans. Hazel Barnes (New York: Philosophlcal Library,
1956), p. 90.
Jacques Derrida, "Force of Law: The 'Mystical Foundation of Authority,'
in Deconsfmcfmu m d the Possibility of Jmticp, ed. Drucilla Cornell, Michel Rosenfeld, and David Gray Carlson (New York: Routledge, 19921, pp. 14-15.
Here I am following the suggestion of Simon Critchley that the best reading of "There is nothing outside the text" is "There is nothing outslde of context." See section 1.6of The Ethics of Drcorrstrrrctiorl: Dcrrrdn m d Lwinns (Oxford:
Blackwell, 1992).
"
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tion is different. I don’t know whether we should describe the
Derrida who speaks of a possible justice in itself as under pressure from or under the spell of Levinas. But in either case, he
has opened the door to the hyperessential. Still, it is not clear
that wehave anything religious enoughto be called God, or even
the sacred. Derrida surely does not address justice in itself as
”you,” either in prayer orpraise; nor is there either nostalgia or
hope for soteriological union withit on some mystical or eschatological journey outside of text or context? Others may have
argued that the ethical ultimately unfolds into the religiouswho could prohibit them?-but he does not. We do not have to
take his interpretation of his own work as final and absolute in
order to recognize that he interprets deconstructionas not having a religious bone in its body.Moreover, he has givenus strong
reasons not to conflate undecidability with sacred mystery or
difkrmzce with the God beyond Being to whom Dionysius and
Eckhart pray.
My thesis to this point might seem to be that to find genuine
reflection on the othernessof God we must shake free from Derrida and turn directlyto Dionysius and Eckhart, who pray to the
hyperessential Trinity. But the suggestion I want to make is
more nearly the opposite. Although they
clearly fit the Derridean definition of the negative theologian, it might be Derrida
who brings us closer to a genuine otherness of the divine. For
their thought is substantially governed by a Neoplatonism that
to the realm of appearance, denying
relegates the divine alterity
its reality. To the degree that this is the case, they suffer from
what I call ontologicalxenophobia,the
fear of meeting a
stranger, even if the stranger shouldbe God.
This phrase”meeting a stranger” comes fromthealready
mentioned essay by Tillich. In it he distinguishes two types of
encounter with the divine and, correspondingly, two types of
philosophy of religion. On the one hand is the “Augustinian”
23 That Derrida is sensitive to the close linkage between the mystical and the
eschatological in terms of the nostalgia and hope for pure presence is clear
from “Of an Apocalyptic Tone.” Their virtual interchangeability is nicely illustrated in Gershom Scholem’s The Messimrc Idea ill Judaism (New York:
Schocken, 1971>.
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type whose way of approaching God he describes as ”overcoming estrangement,” while on the other hand is the Thomistic
way, described as “meeting a stranger” (p.
“In the first
way man discovers himself when he discovers God; he discovers
something that is identical with himself although it transcends
him infinitely, something from which heis estranged, but from
which he never has been and never can be separated”(p. 10).
This would be a good description of many Hindu accounts of
the relation of the finite self to Brahman or Atman, as in the
Charzdogyo Uymzishad, with its refrain “That is Reality. That is
Atman (Soul). That art thou, Svetaketu.”’5 And it would be a
good description of the Mahayana Buddhist claim that the Buddha nature is the true natureof everyone and everything:
The Lord Buddha on his lion-throne
Dwells in each particle of sand and stone.2h

It would equally be a good interpretation of Meister Eckhart,
to whom I shall turn rather than to Pseudo-Dionysius. In the
two sermons quoted by Derrida to illustrate the ”ontological
negative theology, Eckhart
wager of hyperessentiality”in
stresses that it is the task of the intellect to apprehend God
naked: ”The intellect pulls off the coat from God and perceives
him bare, as he is stripped of goodness and of being and of all
“But if all images are detached from the soul, and it
names.1127
contemplates only the Simple One, then the soul’s naked being
finds the naked, formless being of the divine unity, which is
there a being above being . . . how noble is that acceptance, when
the soul‘s being can accept nothing else than the naked unity of
X Page references to Tillich in the text are from Th~‘oIqy
of Culturc. See n. 9
above.
2 5 The Thirteen Principal Upanishads,
trans. Robert Ernest Hume (London:
Oxford, 19211, 6.8-6.16, pp. 244-50. The same idea, expressed in the formula,
”one only, without a second,” so central to the thought of Shankara, is found
nearby in the same Upamshad at 6.2, p. 241.
Quoted by Edward Conze In B u d d h m r Its Essemx a m i Devclopnrerzt (New
York: Harper & Row, 19751, p. 149. Conze adds by way of commentary: ”The
Mahayana came to the conclusion that it is really the Buddha in us who does
the seeking and that it is the Buddha nature in us which seeks Buddha-hood.”
X Sermon 9, Q ~ sstella
i
nrnflrfim, m Mcister E ~ k h - fEndrrv
:
m d Prcnchcv-, ed.
Bernard McCinn (New York: Paulist Press, 1986), p. 258.
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speech, that awaits my entry into any and every language game,
is clear enough. What I want to call attention to is that these
remarks are directed specifically against Eckhart and Hegel.34
Derrida's quarrel withnegative theology is not just that it begins
and ends in prayer, or that it makes a mystical/eschatological
wager of hyperessentiality heis unwilling tomake, but also that
it is allergic to that alterity, "what theology calls God" (who
could prohibit it?) though he does not, which makes obligation
and responsibility possible.
When Derrida says that "diffe'vnnce instigates the subversion
of every kingdom. Which makes it obviously threatening and
infallibly dreaded by everything within us that desires a kingdom, the past or future presenceof a kingdom,""" we must ask
what he means by this desire for a kingdom. And what if the
answer were that to desire a kingdom is to desire that perfect
presence to the True or the Real that makes autonomy possible,
that turns knowledge intorecollection, obligation intoself-legislation, and me intomy own eternal creator-that this is what he
opposes?
It is possible (who could prevent it?) to read this threat to
every kingdom as the deconstructive anarchism that revels in
destroying every structure in order to be able to play without
rules. Derrida would bewhat Aristophanes took Socrates to be.
No doubt there aretexts in Derrida and in other postmodernists
that could be cited in supportof such a reading. But the diagnosis of Eckhart and Hegel as suffering from ontological xenophobia, and it is hardlyan isolated text, points in exactly the
opposite direction. It is in order to preserve genuine obligation
that it is necessary to subvert every kingdom; for every human
kingdom, and Derrida knows no other kind, is the attempt to
render itself self-sufficient and in this way absolute, to locate
itself at that eternal, divine origin that wills creation. Needless
to say, as the Alpha, every such kingdom can present itself as
the Omega, which is what Levinas means by theviolence of his.7d Among others, including Neoplatonic Christian apophaticism in general,
Bruno, Nicholas of Cusa, and, of course, Kant. See "Denials," p. 100.
"Differance," p. 22.
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tory and politics? Like Heidegger, and against Nietzsche, it
seems that Derrida, without affirming the Wholly Other as Divine, holds open thespace for such a possibility.
It might be objected that by linking Eckhart to Hegel Derrida
has moved the discussion away from negative theology. A first
reply might point out that so far as the Understanding and the
Vorstellzuzgelz of everyday religiousdiscourseareconcerned,
Hegel is a negative theologian, and that he finds in the rational
mysticism and realized eschatology of the Begriff or Idee that
presence that is reserved, in traditional apophaticism, for only
occasional or future vision and union.
A second reply, perhaps more to the point, would note that
what is at issue here is not negative theology as such but the
pantheisticontologythatunderlies
sorne of itsparadigmatic
forms. It is widespread, not only in the apophaticisrn of much
Hindu, Buddhist, and Neoplatonic Christian thought, also
but in
the cataphatic logocentrismof thinkers like Spinoza
and Hegel.”
Tillich has insisted that the term ‘pantheism’ ”should
be defined
before it is applied aggressively.”3HThis strikes me as a good
idea. Since 1 employ the term ”aggressively,” that is, as something less than a compliment,I will offer a definition drawn from
Tillich himself. Those systems of thought are pantheistic in
which “man discovers himself when he discovers God; he discovers something that is identical with himself although it transcends him infinitely, something from which he is estranged,
but from which he never has been and never can be separated”
(p. 10). My point in using this label to side with Derrida in his
?lbIn the opening paragraphs of the preface to Totality am’ Infinity, trans, Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh:Duquesne University Press, 1969). The argument of
this paragraph wouldn’t be a bad summary of the argument of John C. Caputo’s Against Ethics (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993).
’7 Hegel says, “to be a follower of Spinoza is the essential commencement of
all Philosophy. . . - You are either a Spinozist or not a philosopher at all”;
Hegel’s Lectures U ~ the
I History of Plrilosophy, trans. E. S. Haldane and Frances H.
Sirnson (New York:Humanities, 1955),vol. 111, pp. 257 and 283. For the same
idea in the critically edited lectures of 1825-26, see Hegel‘s Lectures on the History of Philosophy: The Lectltrrs of 2825-26, ed. Robert E Brown (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), vol. 111, p. 154.
7n Paul Tillich, Systematic Theolugy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1951), vol.I, p. 233.
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critique of Eckhart and Hegel is not to deny that pantheism can
be religious. It is rather to suggestthat religion turns to pantheistic modes of thought out of ontological xenophobia, out of fear
of meetingastranger. In both its apophatic and logocentric
forms, theology that roots itself in pantheism loses touch with
the otherness of God. The divine may infinitely transcend the
believing soul in such contexts, but the soulso related to God is
illusory or accidental. In my essential being God and I are identical. I can stand at the origin and end ofa11 things and of all
knowledge becauseI am the Alpha and Omega.
The conceptual groundfor the pantheistic absorptionof alterity
is an emanationist or illusionist account of the relation of the
One to the Many, the Infinite to the Finite, of Being (or Emptiness) to beings. So it might seem that the othernessof God might
be recovered on the path from pantheism to monotheistic creationism. Where God creates the world ex nihilo, the believing
soul in its finitudemay be an image andlikeness of God but not
an effulgence or extension of Deity; and yet the finite self is real.
It may not be the C I Z S recrlissimzm, may not be, in the words of
Josiah Royce, so very damn real; but it is not the productof ignorance or rnisperception. In this context I do not meet God as
myself or as identical with myself but as an Other to myself. But
perhaps the break with pantheism is not as great as it seems;
perhaps it can still be said that God is ”something from which
[I can be] estranged, but from which [I] never [have] been and
never can be separated”(p. 10).
In the Bible of Jewish and Christian monotheism there i s a
portrait of pure createdness. It is called Eden. There the human
self can be neither estranged nor separated from God. Though
they are not identical, they dwell together in a peace and harmony that might well evoke, when we think of it, nostalgia and
hope for a presence we cannot now enjoy. And yet the possibility of both estrangement and separation is there. It lies in the
command that comes to Adam and Eve, not as the voice of their
own insight or their own deepest inner self, but as the voice of
an Other. Eden is heteronomy from the outset. As Derrida reminds us, if autonomy were first or absolute, therewould be no
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obligation.‘3‘’
Innocence here is a double absence. It is the absence
of any estrangement or separation from God; and it is the absence of any ontological guarantees that this presenceis permanent. In this fairy tale there are as yet no trolls or wicked witches;
but neither canwe simply say, And theylived happily ever after.
The command is the possibility of distance and disaster, its
violation their actuality. With disobedience come both estrangement and separation, which, it turns out, cannot themselves be
separated. Presence is now something to be avoided rather than
enjoyed. Henceforth even my religion will be impiety, for my
pursuit of God will be in the service of my flight from God.
This is the site where Kierkegaard’s Climacus meditates on
the absolute paradox: ”This, then, is the ultimate paradox of
thought: to want to discover something that thought itself cannot think. . . . What, then, is the unknown? It is the frontier
that is continually arrivedat, and therefore when thecategory of
motion [time]is replaced by the category of rest [space] it is the
different, the absolutely different.”4”
In answer to the question What might be the absolute paradox, the absolutely different, Climacus explores the hypothesis
that it is the god who is teacher and savior, the god who must
not only give us the truth but the capacity to recognize it as the
we may once have
truth as well, the assumption being that while
had this capacity, we have now lost it through our ownfault. It
is this second hypothesis that leads to the crucial point: “But if
the god is to be absolutely different from a human being, this
can have its basis not in that which man owes to the god (for to
that extent they are akin) but in that which he owes tohimself
or in that which he himself has committed. What, then, is the
difference? Indeed, what else but sin. . . . We stated this in the
foregoing by saying that the individual is untruth and is this
through his own fault.” This thought experiment renders the
paradox ”even more terrible , . . by bringing into prominence
the absolute difference of sin.”Jl
‘’‘I

See n. 33 above.

Smen Kierkegaard, PIIiIosoyhmI Fr~~nrentsllohrrr~lles
Climnclls, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985),
pp, 37/44.
Ibld., pp. 46-47.
Jo
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The claim here is that apartfrom sinGod is not Wholly Other.
God becomes Wholly Other only when theself-estrangement of
fault renders God a stranger. Henceforth, to Tillich’s chagrin,
religion can only have the form of meeting a stranger. Thecorollary is that the creation motif is labile and Janusfaced. By itself
it does not posit the identity of the human and the divine but
rather just the opposite. Still, by itself it hasno defenses against
being absorbedinto a philosophy of identity that provides ontological guarantees against thepossibility of our being separated
from God, and, apparently, against the
possibility of the kind of
human fault that would effect such separation.No doubt that is
why Kierkegaard’s Anti-Climacus describes “as pantheistic any
out to be something merely
negadefinition of sin that [makes] it
tiveweakness, sensuousness,finitude, ignorance, etc.”42 As
long as theology has only the categories of cause and effect or
infinite and finite to work with, it is vulnerable to the loss of
divine alterity that pantheism represents.
and fall motifs are
On the other hand, when the creation
united, the mild otherness
of the former ispreserved in the wild
otherness of the latter. Such a radical alterity is by no means
unproblematic for reflection, but at least theology has been rescued from beingtheself-congratulations
of those whoare
pleased with their own divinity in spite of their total fear of
meeting a stranger.
Climacus does not try to hide thefact that his thought experiment is a plagiarism, that it derives from a particular historical
tradition, that it is, in the language of Hegel and the Enlightenment, a paradigm of positivity. In fact, he welcomes the charge
of plagiarism and particularity as an indication that this ”theory” is not the product of philosophical speculation.43
What is philosophy to do in the face of this challenge to its own
motifs of autonomy, identity, recollection, etc? Without assuming that the question
of what happensto philosophy is the most
important question in the world, we can recall two traditional
42 Saren Kierkegaard, The Sickrwss Mnfo Death, trans. Howard V. Hong and
Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 96. Cf. pp. 82,
117. See n. 59 below.
47 Plrilosoyhical Frag~nenfs,
pp. 35-36, 53-54.
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responses. Theone has been to
identify philosophy, moreor less
explicitly, with what is here called the pantheistic option, either
’by replacing creation themes with identity themes or by giving
what Anti-Climacus calls pantheisticinterpretations of fault,
leaving the creation motif to signify continuity over discontinuity by overriding moral distance with ontological kinship. The
other has been tosee philosophy as faith seeking understanding,
to give it an ancillary role in a reflection that, with Climacus,
sees sin as the source of God’s radical alterity.
It is the either/or between these two alternatives that Climacus tries to set up in Fraglneltts with his thought experiment
about what it would taketo go beyond Socrates.44There is something wonderfully honest about these two positions, neither of
which is rehctant to admit thatit is offended by the other. One
has but to think, for example, of Augustine’s contrast between
Christian confession and Platonist presumption at Cmfcssiolzs
VII, 20, and of Lessing’s ”ugly, broad ditch which I cannot get
across” because that leap would involve something“against
which my reason rebels.”15
I am not foolish enough to suppose that1 can bring to an end
thelongstanding conflict betweenfaith and reason, so conceived, either by declaring one the victor or by trying to spell
out some newtype of Hegelian Az$hrbung, whichusually
I do, however, want
amounts to the same thing, minus candor.4h
to makeboth an historical and a philosophical observation about
the alternative that Augustine
describes as ”confession,” that
Climacus describes as ”going beyond Socrates,” and that Tillich
describes as “meeting a stranger.”
And that Hegel seeks to overcome. See, for example, his treatment of Faith
and Enlightenment in chapter 6 of the Plmotnetwlogy. Neither Socrates nor
Lessing, whom Kierkegaard greatly admlres, is the prlmary target of the Ciimacus writings, but Hegel, just as it is he and not Kant who 1s the target in
Fear m d Trelnbling. See my essays ”Johannes and Johannes,” In Infernntmal
k‘icrkepurd Comrrre~ttar!y:Philosophicd Frnpjerlts and Jolratznes Clilnncus, ed. Robert L. Perkins (Macon, Ga.: Mercer University Press, 1994), and “Abraham and
Hegel,” In K i u k y w d ’ s Cri1rq-w of R c n s o ~arid Society (University Park, Penn,:
Penn State Press, 1991).
Lessins‘s Thologicnl Writitlgs, trans. Henry Chadwick (Stanford: Stanford
University Press, 19571, pp. 54-55.
I believe this to be the case with Tillich’s concept of theonomy. That it is
also the case with Hegel is perhaps best seen by reading his accounts of the
Fali in Thr Eucyclopddin Logic and in his Lectures on the Philosophy of Rrligiorz.
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city through the gates (Apoc. 22:14)." It would be futile to rely on
"endeavor without divine grace," and it would be presumptuous to look for grace without first exercising oneself "in remorse
of conscience."4')
Corresponding to the six stages of the journey are six stages
in the powers of the soul: "We have these stages implanted in US
by nature, deformed by sin and reformed by grace. . . . In the
initial state of creation, man was made fit for the quiet of contemplation. . . . But turning from the true light to changeable
good, man was bent over by his own fault. . . . As a result, man,
blinded and bent over, sits in darkness and does not see the
light of heaven unless grace with justice come to his aid against
concupiscence and unless knowledge with wisdom come tohis
aid against ignorance. All this is done through Jesus Christ.''5o
Bonaventure is indeed an Augustinian, but this means that the
motifs of creation and the fall are intertwined so as to make it
clear that all union with God is mediated by a grace that comes
to us from beyond ourselves in order to bridge a gulf we dug
but cannot leap over.
The philosophical observation I want to make about the Augustinian tradition, as I have just described it, is that it receives
a measure of support from certain phenomenological analyses
in the work of Sartre and Levinas. Sartre argues that the reality
of other selves cannot be established by arguments that presuppose a Cartesian subjectivity for which everything but the "1
think" is an object whose reality and nature is problematic. But
this never was how the Other has
been given tous. We are aware
of the Other,not as a putativeobject whose reality and subjectivity are hypotheses for which we seek evidence; rather, we are
aware of the Other in the Look, when we are the object being
looked at by the Other assubject.
But Sartre does not leave his description of the Look at the
abstract level of subject and object. He describes three concrete
modes of being seen: fear, pride, and shame. Insofar as I am a
body, to be seen is to experience fear, for the Other is one who
can hurt me. Insofar as I am ego or self, to be seen is to experi,W

w

Ibid., pp. 53-56.
Ibid., p. 42.
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ence pride or shame, for the Other’s look is a value judgment
that can be eitheran affirming or condemning one.The negativity of this analysis, easily dismissed as part of Sartre’s congenital
gloominess, is evident. Two of the three modesof being seenare
painful, and at the physical level, the positive correlate of fear
does not even merit mention. But we need to notice that we are
dealing primarily with a spiritual negativity. The
analysis of
shame is more extensive than that of fear and pride combined,
and the most memorable image of the entire analysis, that of
getting caught looking and listening at the keyhole, makes the
shame analysis the most intensive as well.
J. N. Findlay has written,”Sartre may be able to conjure eidetic
meaning into two eyes regarding each other through the same
keyhole, but such confrontations are for the most part best seen
as embarrassing accidents, over which no great eidetic pother
should be made.’’si That is exactly what one would expect a
Neoplatonist to say. But a secular Augustinian, like Sartre, is
willing to make ”great eidetic pother”over such anincident for
a very good reason. It plays a key role in the phenomenological
argument that goes beyond the claim that we experience the
Other in being looked at to the strongerclaim that we experience
the otherness of the Other most fully in the lookof moral condemnation.52
The look of praise that inspires pride comes from the Other,
but since it simply repeats what I say about myself, or would
like to say, it does not go very far in revealing the otherness of
the Other.What we have here is perhaps the Other as
Echo. The
look that inspires fear goes further. Here we have the Other as
Threat. But here the otherness is experienced only as potential
rather than as actual, and it is directed toward my body rather
than my soul, or,to use Kantian language, towardmy happiness
rather than my worthiness to be happy.
It is in the lo& that
evokes shame that the otherness of the Otheris most fully given.
The Other as Judge, in thejudgment before which I stand
ashamed, having been caught in the act of eavesdropping and
J. N. Findlay, Plrrto: The Written a d Unwriftelz Dodriues (New York Humanities, 1974), p. 410.
See Being a d Nofhiqyess, part 3, ch. I, especially section Iy ”The Look.”
j2
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peeping at the keyhole, is an actual, not merelypotential, negativity; and that negativity is directed toward what, for an Augustinian like Sartre, is the innermost core of my being.
The theological correlate of this phenomenological description is the claim of Climacus thatit is sin that makesGod Wholly
Other. In this context to speak of God as Wholly Other is not to
make the ontological claim that there is no continuity whatever
(which would be to deny creation) or that there is no basis for
recognition whatever (which wouldbe to deny the possibility of
conscience). Tt is to say that in a relation with enough continuity
and recognition to make the Other matterto me (would aMartian’s disapproval of my behavior bother me?) the deepest
possible difference hasemerged. We cannowseethat
Tillich’s
category of the strangeris not really adequate to the Augustinian
understanding of the situation.Hosea’s notion that God and the
sinner are related like a faithfuland an adulterous spouse or the
Pauline notion that God and the sinner have become enemies
(Rom. 5:lO) is more to the point. Ontological xenophobia is not
just the attempt to use linkages of being to defend myself from
the anxiety of meeting a stranger; it is the attempt toavoid meeting the kind of stranger whose moral presence is sufficient to
undermine the ultimacy of ontological categories as such, the
kind of stranger who might lead me to ask, ”Is Ontology Fundamental?” and to answer my own question by exploring the possibility of ”Ethics as First Philosophy.’’53
These references to Levinas are meant tosuggest that he provides the same kind of phenomenological Augustinianism that
we have found in Sartre. It might seem that while Sartre directs
us to the look that condemns, Levinas points to the look that
commands. But the difference is superficial, for the commandis
a possible judgment of blame that becomes actual the moment
we violate it. Thus Levinas writes
Freedom is put into question by the Other, and is revealed to be
unjustified, only when it knows itself to be unjust . . , guilty.<’
5 3 Emmanuel Levinas, ”Is Ontology Fundamental?” Philosophy Todrry (summer 1989), pp. 121-29, and ”Ethlcs as First Philosophy,” in Thr Lezrinas X m d ~ r ,
ed. Sein Hand (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989).
’‘Emmanuel Levinas, ”Philosophy and the Idea of the Infinite,” in Adriaan
Peperzak, 73 fhc Ofher: An I~trodlrctionto the Philosophy of E m n m u e l Levirrns
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But Being . . . is a Neuter . . . which hardens the will instead of
making it ashamed. [In ontology the consciousness of finitude1 is
not revealed as an imperfection, does not refer to the Good, does
not know itself to be wicked. . . . Heideggerian ontology subordinates the relation with the other to the relation with the Neuter,
Being, and it thus continues to exalt the will to power, whose
legitimacy the Other (Alrtrui) alone can unsettle, troubling good
conscience. . . . Anonymous, neuter, [Being] directs [existence],
ethically indifferent, as a heroic freedom, foreign to all guilt with
regard to theOther.55
But then the other is not simply another freedom; to give me
knowledge of injustice, his gaze must come to me from a dimension of the ideal.".
. , . the idea of the infinite means the collapse of the good conscience of the Same. . . . The Other's face is the revelation not of
the arbitrariness of the will but its injustice. Consciousness of my
injustice is produced when I incline myself not before facts, but
before the Other, . . . It is a shamc freedom has of itself, discovering
itself to be murderous and usurpatory in its very exercise. . . .
Existence is not condemned to freedom, but judged and invested
as a freedom. . . . The life of freedom discovering itself to be unjust, the life of freedom in heteronomy, consists in an infinite
movement of freedom putting itself ever more into question. . . .
The face-to-face situation in which this freedom is put into question as unjust, in which it finds it has a master and a judge, is
realized prior to certainty, but also prior to ~ n c e r t a i n t y . ~ ~

It seems that Levinas and Sartre share the phenomenoIogica1
judgment that it is not in fear but in guilt or shame that we
experience the otherness of the Other.SH
It is not in finitude, created or otherwise, but in fault thatGod becomes Wholly Other.5y
(West Lafayette, Ind.: Purdue University Press, 1993), p. 99. This essay is also
found in Levinas's Collected Philosoyhml Puyers, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987).
To the Other, pp. 102-104.
6
i Ibid., p. 111.
57 Ibid., pp. 115-18.
in In section 4B of God, Guilt, r r t d Dmth (Bloomington: Indiana University
Press, 1984), I have argued that at least one standard way of distinguishing
guilt and shame 1s not very convincing. See especially n. 11.
~Kierkegaard arguesthat creation ex nihilo is a sign of the omnipotence
necessary to produce a being who is genuinely free: "It is incomprehensible
that omnipotence is not only able to create the most impressive of all things-
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A world without the possibility
of sin would be a kind
of cosmic
Michael Jordan or Mikhail Baryshnikov, a body of God that always expressed the divine purpose, if God is infinite, or that
failed to doso perfectly onlythrough someinertial force such as
the Platonic recalcitrance
of matter, if God is finite. Such a world
would be an organic whole, a Plotinian/Spinozistic/Hegelian
totality in which inner differentiationcan occur, but inwhich it
is always already aufgehoben in anaccord beyond alterity. Genuine otherness would be found only in the illusory perception
that fails to see the whole story. Gnosticism, with or without
myth, becomes the flip side of pantheism.
For the Augustinianism that represents the other
path our experience of God might take, the religious and the ethical are
inseparable, not in the Kantian sense, in which
"morality leads
inevitably to religion,"6'J as if religion werethe necessary condition of morality, but in the opposite sense thatmoral
the experience of fault is thenecessary condition of religion.
This was theexperience of Augustine himself, who discovered
that he had not
come to faithby gaining clarity about such ontological issues as the origin
of evil andthe possibility of an incorporeal substance (Confessions, VU), but only when he became
reconciled through repentance to awill conspicuously different
from his own (book VIII).In this context, faith involves overcoming ontological xenophobia, or, to speak more precisely, the
xenophobia that takesplace as ontology.
Tillich is right to note that on this path, which he misleadingly
labels Thomistic, the reconciliation that overcomes otherness is
contingent (p.10). Just as thereis no ontologicalnecessity to the
emergence of real difference, there is no ontological guarantee
of its being bridged.61This does not mean thatreconciliation is
the whole visible world-but is able to create the most fragile
of all things-a
being independent of that very omnipotence." See allof 71251 in S0ren Kierkeguard's Papers and Journals, trans. Howard V. and Edna H. Hong (Bloomington:
Indiana University Press, 1970), vol.
2. llus is an mportant commentary on the
passage cited above(seen. 42), in which Kierkegaard(as Anti-Climacus) labels
"pantheistic" those definitionsof fault that reduce it to finitude.
Immanuel Kant, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, trans. Theodore
M.Greene and HoytH. Hudson (New York Harper & Brothers, 19601, p.7 n.
61 As Tillich rightly notes, this has epistemological ramifications. That
is the
whole point of the thought experiment in Kierkegaard's
Philosophical Frag-
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impossible, or that somehow it is second class. But it does mean
that it can occur only when the grace and generosity that give
forgiveness are met by the humility and contrition that are willing to receive it. For one type of philosophy of religion this language generates a certain anxiety, possibly a phobia, perhaps
even a xenophobia. For the other type it leads to the exclamation
0 felix culpa!

merzts, to see how it might be possible to go beyond the Socratic assumption
that knowledge is recollection, that the truth is within us.

13

Divine Excess: The God
Who Comes After
What, then, is the God I worship? . . . But what do I
love, when I love my God?
Augustine, Colzfrssiam, I, 4 and X, 6

THE TITLE of Calvin Schrag’s splendid little book Tlzc Serf a j k r
Postnzodev~zity~
makes explicit his assumption that the postmodern assault on the self as conceived by major strands within the
western philosophical traditionis not an abolition, not a annihilation without remainder.Schrag’s work is inspired in large part
by Paul Ricoeur’s attempt, among the shards of the ”shattered
cogito,” to develop a “hermeneutics of the self [that] is placed at
an equal distance from the apology of the cogito and from its
overthrow . . . at an equal distance from the cogito exalted by
Descartes and from the cogito that Nietzsche proclaimed forfeit.”2The ”arduous detours” of this hermeneutics pass through
a series of questions: ”Who is speaking of what? Who does
what? About whom and about whatdoes one construct a narrative? Who is morally responsible for what? These are but so
many differentways in which ’who?’is stated.”? To answer these
questions is to answer the question of a selfhood that survives
the legitimate deconstructionof its illegitimate pretensions.
The same assumptionis at work in another enticing title, Who
Comes after the S u b j e ~ f The
? ~ essays in this volume address ”the
Calvin 0. Schrag, The Self uffer Postmodenlit!y (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1997).
Paul Ricoeur, Oneself ns Another, trans. Kathleen Blarney (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992)’ pp. 11,4,23.
Onesclf, p. 19.
Wlm Comes nfter the Subject?, ed. Eduardo Cadava, Peter Connor, and JeanLuc Nancy (New York: Routledge, 1991).
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critique of thedeconstruction of subjectivity." But Jean-Luc
Nancy tells us that with his question he wanted "to suggest a
whole range-no doubt vast-in which such a critique or deconstruction has not simply obliterated its
object (as those who
groan or applaud before a supposed 'liquidation' of the subject
would like to believe). That which obliteratesis nihilism.""
In the same spirit, Jack Caputo has posed the question, Who
comes after the God of metaphysics, after the critique of ontotheology? In disseminating this question he doubtless joins
Nancy in saying, "I did not send my question . . . to those who
would find no validity in it, to those for whom it is on the contrary more important to denounce its presuppositions
and to
return, as though nothing had happened, to a style of thinking
that we might simply call humanist.lrh Or, in the present instance, metaphysical. Or onto-theological. Still, the assumption
is that after the deluge we have the need, the desire, and the
ability to speakof God. Somehow.But how, and of whom?
I shall reply to this question, but first it is necessary to be as
clear as possible about the "after." We are to think and speakof
God after . . . After what, precisely? For present purposes the
critique thatcomes before is threefold: the critiqueof onto-theology in Heidegger, and the closely related critiques of ontology
in Levinas and Marion.
If one wereto gather an understandingof Heidegger's critique
of onto-theology secondhand one might easily think that it is
directed primarily at Augustine and Aquinas, Luther and Calvin, Pascal and Kierkegaard-against anyone whoaffirms a personal creator and redeemer. It is not always sufficiently noticed
that his paradigms are Aristotle' and Hegels and that the target
of his analysis of "the onto-theo-logical constitution of metaphysics" is atraditionthatstretchesfromAnaximander
to
Nietzsche," which isn't quite the sameas the tradition that stretches from Augustine to Kierkegaard.
Ibld., p. 4.
h d . , p. 3.
In the 1949 introduction to W h n t Is Metaphysics entitled "The Way Back into
the Ground of Metaphysics," in Pafhlnnvks, ed. William McNeill (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1998).
x In "The Onto-theo-logical Constitution of Metaphysics'' in Identity a m i Differrrrce, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 1969).
Putlmarks, p. 280.
')

258

OVERCOMlNG ONTO-TI IEOLOGY

Heidegger derives his term from themove by which Aristotle’s metaphysics becomes theology. First philosophy starts out
as ontology, as the theory of being qua being, but finds that in
order to complete itself it needs to posit a highest being, the
Unmoved Mover.’” This ontology that becomes theology Heidegger calls onto-theology. Its fundamentalassertion is that
there is a Highest Being that is the key to the meaning of the
whole of being.
But this affirmation is not obviously incoherent or self-refuting. If there is a critique here, if an overcoming of metaphysics
in its onto-theological character
is necessary, we shall have to ask
what is wrong with this gesture, most overt and unambiguous
in its Aristotelian form, but anticipated by Anaximander and
reiterated by Hegel and Nietzsche.
Heidegger gives his answer to this question as the answer to
another, ”How does the deity enter into philosophy
. . . ?” to
which he replies that for metaphysics ”the deity can corne into
philosophy only insofaras philosophy, of its ownaccord and by
its own nature, requires and determines that and how the deity
enters intoit.”1L
In order to enter this discourse, God must first get an imprimatur or theGood Housekeeping Seal of Approval from philosophy. This scene in which God makes a (not so) grand entry
suggests two others that can help us state why Heidegger thinks
this move makes for bad philosophy and bad theology.The first
scene occurs in the preface to the second edition of the Critique
of Pure Reasolz, where Kant is praising Galileo and others, who
”learned that reason has insight only into that which
it produces
after a plan of its own, and that it must not allow itself to be
kept, as it were, in nature’s leading-strings,but must itself show
the way . . . collsfrailzillg nature to give answer to qlresfions of reasods ow11defermilzing.” IZ
Heidegger lacks Kant’s enthusiasm for this insistence on being
lil Assummg that we can speak here in the singular. In Hegel‘s version, we
begin with a logic that is an ontology and end with an account of Absolute
Spirit as the Highest (because, in this case, the all inclusive) Being, which is the
key to the whole of being.
I I Zderztify and Diffeverm, pp. 55-56.
B xiii, emphasis added.

DIVINE EXCESS: THE GOD WHO COMES AFTER

259

in charge of the questioning. What Is Metaphysics? (1929) contains a polemic against science and logic (philosophy’s logos)
because they are of no help in asking the truly metaphysical
question about the nothing (which is the flip side of the question
of being). In the postscript to What Is Metaphysics? (19431, ‘metaphysics’ has become a dirtyword, and the task is now the overcoming of metaphysics; for posing the question of the nothing
(and thus of being) is already to go beyond metaphysics as the
truth (foundation?) of objectivising, calculating science. In the
introduction to What Is Metclplzysics? (1949), the metaphysics that
needs to be overcome is set forth as onto-theology.
These three essaysI3 make it clear why onto-theology is bad
philosophy. It converts what might have been the question of
being into the question of a being, albeit the Highest Being. In
their focus on beings, science and metaphysics together, preoccupied with their own questions, are Seilzsversessel2heit. When
they compel beings to answer questions of their own determining, they desecrate being by depriving it of its mystery and become agents of that will to power that flourishes as modern
technology. One needn’t be as impressed with the ontological
difference as Heidegger is to think there may be something to
the charge that in various modes metaphysics has contributed
to an arrogant humanism that has helped to create and sustain
a very inhuman modernworId.
But Heidegger thinks it obvious that when philosophy makes
God a theme of discourse on its own terms, theology and not
just philosophy is affected.I4And not for the better. Here a second scene is evoked by Heidegger’s analysis, this one from the
book of Job. Job refuses to “curse God and die” (2:9-IO), but he
has a subpoena for God that he would deliver if only he could
find him:
Oh, that I knew where I might find him,
that I might come even to his dwelling!
.-

Along with Identity a d Differeme, of course. All three componentsof W h l z f
Is Metaphysics? are to be found in Pathmarks. They also appear in EmstelrtiaIism
from Dostoeusky to Snrtt-e, ed. Walter Kaufmann, rev. ed. (New York: New American Library, 1975).
14 Identity and Difference, p. 56.
l1
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gives itself to be understood: ”Truth canconsist only in the exposition of being to itself.” In the process by which being comes
to consciousness by means of ideality and essence, ”being thus
carries on its affair of being.” That we can think being means
that the appearingof being belongs to itsvery movement of being,
that its phenomenalityis essential, and that being cannot
do without consciousness, to which manifestation is made. . . . The thinking subject . . . is then, despite the activity of its searching . . . to
be interpreted as a detour that being’s essence takes to get arranged and thus to truly appear,to appear in truth. Intelligibility
or signifyingness is part of the very exercise of being, of the iysum
esse. Everything is then on the same side, on the side
of beingzo

When everything is on the same side we have the totality
against which Totality nstd h f i n i f y is a protest. Ontology is that
allergic reaction to alterity that is the reduction of the other to
the same.21A very early (1951), very brief presentation of this
critique of ontology is found in the essay “Is Ontology Fundamental?” It states the theme whosemany variations are the later
writings and gives the exposition of a motif immediately taken
u p into the massive development section that completes Levinas’s authorship. Perhapswe should speak of a first and second
subject, of two contrasting themes ormotifs. For first there is the
presentation of ontology, then, as its critique, the presentation
of an alternative, the “relation which is irreducible to comprehension.’12’
The essay begins in praise of Heidegger for his break with the
intellectualist tradition of western philosophy. Recognizing the
contingency and facticity at work in our thought, he points to
the rootednessof thought in a comportment beyondtheory and
contemplation, to what mightbe called the priority of existence
~ O t l z e r w i s ethan Bemg, or Beyond Essence, trans. Alphonso Lingis (Boston:
Kluwer, 1991), pp. 61/99! 131, 134. These statements come at the beginning of
chapters 111, IV, and V. In Of Gad Who Comes to M i d , trans. Bettina Bergo (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), this activity of being is translated being‘s ”gesture.” Thus, “The intelligibility of being, which is also its ’gesture of
being’ [ln geste d’itre]”; p. 36. Cf. pp. 45, 112. In the latter passage, this gesture
is the “essmce” or the “insistnnce” of being, terms designed to highlight the
verbal character of being, its fundamentalself-assertion.
Y TI pp. 47/42.
IOF pp. 5,7-8.
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to our conscious intentions. But this radicality is immediately
tamed, brought back into the ontological languagegame, when
Heidegger interpretsexistence as cornprehension, openness,understanding, and truth. Thus Heidegger
sees the beingof beings
in their intelligibility.23
Since Plato cornprehension and intelligibility have meant the
subjection of the particular to the universal. For Heidegger, this
occurs as the horizonal character
of understanding: “The understanding of a being will thus consist in going beyond that being
into the opemess and in perceiving it upon the horizon uf beirzg.
That is to say, comprehension, in Heidegger, rejoins the great
tradition of Western philosophy: to comprehend the particular
being is already to place oneself beyond the particular. To cornexists through
prehend is to be related to the particular that only
knowledge, which is always knowledge of the universal.”24
This is not merely a nominalist or an atomist protest. In Levinas’s view the purchaseof intelligibility through universalityor
of comprehension through horizonal context
is not innocent.
Like the universal concept of the intellectualist tradition, the
phenomenological horizon allows us to pigeonhole beings into
a semantic totality that has a
place for everything and correspondingly puts everything in its place. This is the ”overcoming” of the object, and notmerelyinthesensethat
it is
conceptually masfered and grasped, revealing as that language
may be. Levinas associates this overcoming withpossession,
consumption, power, property, assimilation, and violence. Possession, in particular, implies that since things belong
to me and
not to themselves, they are either to be used for or enjoyed by
another. We encompass things within our conceptual horizons,
thereby enabling us to incorporate them into our practical projects.2’i
Since ontologydoesthis
to every being,includingother
23 bid., 3-5. In TI pp. 28, 65,67,71,75,
Levinas will make this latter point In
terms of Heidegger’s account of disclosure. “The Thinking of Being and the
Question of the Other,” in Of God Who Colnes to Mind, has essentially the same
dyadic structure as IOF, but there the critique is extended to the Derrida of
Speech m d Phenolnenn.
2 4 iOF p. 5.
25 Ibid., pp. 7-9. Cf. Heidegger’s linkage of metaphysics with modern technology.

human beings, it is not surprising that Levinas associates himself with Kantian ethics as a plea for respect."' But how does he
make the transition from theory to practice, agreeing in effect
with Heidegger that western philosophy culminates in the will
to power? Why does he see ontological reason as "a ruse of the
hunter who ensnare^"?^^ Levinas's answer comes in a single sentence: "If things are only things, this is because the relation with
them is established as comprehension.''2KIn other words, it is
the very nature of comprehension to treat itsobjects as one of a
kind or as part of a whole in such a way as to deprive them of
the respect, to speak with Kant, that forbids my reducing them
to the ways I can use or enjoy them. Thus, in Totality and l~lfi~zity,
just after he attributes to Heidegger the thesis that"Being is inseparable from the comprehension of Being," Levinas writes,
"To affirm the priority of Beirrg [as horizon] over existelrts is to
already decide theessence of philosophy; itis to subordinate the
relation with someom, who is an existent, (the ethical relation) to
a relation with theBeilzg of existents, which, inryersorznl [emphasis
added], permits the apprehension, the domination of existents
(a relation of knowing), subordinatesjustice to freedom."*"
The fly in the ointmentis the essentially impersonal character
of comprehension, which reduces everything to
only a thing. Its
form is that of a subject seeing or intendingan object. If there is
to be roomfor something like Kantian respect, there will have to
be a "relation which is irreducible to
one that
involves more than subsuminga particular under a universal or
apprehending some foregroundagainst
a horizonal background. Such a relation is impossible. "Unless it is the other
(Azltrrri).Our relation with the other( n u f u u i ) certainly consists in
wanting to comprehend him, but this relation overflows cornprehensiolCql
Wherein consists this overflow? Quite simply, in speech, for
2f> Ibid., pp. 8, 10. Needless to say, Levinas does not associate himself with
Kant's attempt to preserve autonomy in ethics.
X Ibld., p. 8.
Is Ibid., p. 9.
?') TI p . 45.
See n. 22 above.
.I' IOF p. 6.
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the impersonal objects of comprehension are mute. Respect and
justice-in short,theethicalrelation
becomes possiblewhen
sight is alrfgehobeln or teleologically suspended in speech? Especially important are those speech acts that go beyond informaoverflows
tion sharing. If it is as interlocutorthattheother
comprehension, it is especially by virtue of such speech acts as
summoning, invocation, calling, greeting, and imploring, as in
Such acts, and not physiognomyas such, constitute the
face of the other, the face that is at once the possibilityand impossibility of murder. The voice/face of the other overflows
cornprehension by refusing to be captured without remainder
by any horizon of understanding. It signifies itself, and it does
so immediately?
There is a link between Heidegger's critiqueof onto-theology
and Levinas's critique of ontology. Onto-theoIogy,as Heidegger
understands it, is the project of rendering the whole of being
intelligible to human understanding. Since it has no room for
that which overflows comprehension, it distorts our understanding of God (as well as of ourselves and the world of nature).
Similarly, ontology, as Levinas presents it, identifies being with
its inteIligibiIity to theory, to contemplation, to representatiorQ5
to intentionality? Thereby it excludes the voice and the face of
Thus, in TI pp. 33-35, desire for the transcendent other is deslre for the
invisible, and "The face speaks. The manifestation of the face is already discourse" (p. 66; cf. pp. 39,51). The transcendent "cuts across the vision of forms
and can be stated neither in terms of conternplation nor in terms of practice It
is the face; its revelation is speech" (p. 193).
37 IOF pp. 6-8. Here the other is the one to whomI speak. In later writings,
in order to emphasize the asymmetry of the relation, the focus is more on the
fact that the other speaks to me. There 1s an important andlargely unexplored
relation to Habermas in this notion that we are fundamentally related to each
other as performers of speech acts.
'.IIbid., pp. 9-10. In TI pp. 23,51-52, 65, 67,74, and 77, Levinas will develop
this nonhorlzonal immediacy as the claim that the face IS "slgzificatlorr 70itl1out
a context," that it expresses itself KUO' adto. I have discussed thls theme in
"Levinas and theImmediacy of the Face," Fclith and Philosoply 9, no. 4 (October
1993), pp. 486-502.
See "TheRuin of Representation," in Discovering Exisfmcc 7oith Hussrrl,
trans. Richard A. Cohen and Michael B. Smith (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1998).
3t3 See "Intentionality and Metaphysics'' and "Intentionality and Sensation,"
in Discovcrrq Esrstmct 7uifl1Hrrsserl; "Hermeneutics and Beyond" and "Nonintentional Consciousness," in Erlf re N o w : O n Tlzillking-oJ-th4-Other, trans. Mi-
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the other who is my neighbor and, a fortiori, the voice of the
God who commands us to
love our neighbor. We must think God
as the voice that exceeds vision so as to establish a relation irreducible
to comprehension.
Levinas insists that his critique is not an assault on reason but
an attempt to go beyond reason as "a ruse of the hunter who
ensnares" to an "order of reason . . . where the resistance of
beings qua beingsis not broken but pacified."37 Bad reason (ontology) is to be superseded (aufgehoben) by good reason (metaphysics). Similarly, Marioninsists thathisquest
for "God
without being" and thus aGod beyond onto-theologyand prior
to ontology isthe search for a"conceptual thought of God (conceptual, or rational,and not intuitive or'mystical' in the vulgar
sense)."%
Marion charges that onto-theology "imposes" its metaphysical names, such as causa sui, on God and in doingso hides "the
mystery of God as
Andhecharges the ontologicaltradition that makes Being the first name of God with "chaining"
God to Being, asking whetherGod is not betterconceived in the
first instance as charity, as ugape, as the good, as gift.4oWhen
Marion speaks of "the failure of the metaphysical concept of
God" and looks for a mode of God-talk that "allows the emergence of a God who is free from onto-theology," it seems that
the question concerns the priority
of various categoriesor names
"I am
in relation to others. But Marion has already just told us,
chael B. Smith and Barbara Harshav (New York Columbia University Press,
1998); and "Beyond Intentionality," in Philosophyin France Today, ed. Alan
Montefiore (New York Cambridge University Press, 1983).
37 IOF pp. 5,8.
3 God without Being, trans. ThomasA. Carlson (Chicago: Chicago University
Press, 19911,p. xxiv. Henceforth citedas GWB.
39 Ibid., p. xxi. Marion follows Heidegger rather than Levinas in the use of
the term 'metaphysics'. In "Metaphysics and Phenomenology: A Relieffor
Theology," Critical Inquiry 20 (Summer 1994), pp. 572-91, he explicitly adopts
and provides historical validation for Heideggefs onto-theological concept
of
metaphysics. For him phenomenology is the philosophical alternative to metaphysics. Hence the importance of Reduction and G i m n e s s , trans. Thomas A.
Carlson (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 19981, in which he distinguishes his phenomenology from that
of Husserl and Heidegger.
4" GWB pp. XX--XX~V.
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attempting to bring out the absolute freedom of God with regard to all determinations.”41 If certain names are privileged
over Being, it will be because they protect this freedom better.
This they accomplish by being icons rather than idols. AIthough he is interested in conceptualintelligibility, Marion turns
(briefly) to sensible visibility for this analysis, retracing the path
by which the tradition has modeled ”seeing” intelligibles with
the mind’s eye on seeing sensibles with the body’s eye. What
distinguishes an icon from an idol is the how rather than the
what of perception. In other words, a given visible can function
as either idol or icon depending on the nature of the intentional
act directed towardit.
It becomes an idol when the gaze that intends
it is satisfied or
(ful)filkd with what it sees, when it stops, freezes, settles, or
comes to rest at itsvisibleMarionseemsto
have inmind
Husserl’s account of adequation as fulfilled intention, the situation where what is given in experience corresponds exactly to
what would otherwisehave been an empty intention? Since one
didn’t aim at more than is present, one can be satisfied with
what is given, can be at rest with the results. When ”every aim
is exhausted,” the gaze ”admits no beyond,’’ or, in this case,
“allows no i n v i ~ i b l e . ” ~ ~
Idolatry means that thehuman gaze has become the measure
of the divine being; God is now equated (hence adequation)
with “what the human gaze has experiencedof the divine.” In
this way the idol becomes an ”invisible mirror,” invisible beBut of what is it the
cause its role as mirror is not n0ticed.~-5
mirror, the carbon copy, theexact duplicate? Not of the divine,
unless God should just happen to fit, without remainder, into
the confines of what is humanly visible. Rather, the idol is the
invisible mirror of the gaze, the human capacity by which it is
experienced, and it is this that accounts for the perfect fit (adequation, correspondence, identity) between the aimof the gaze
Ibid., pp. xx-xxi, emphasis added.
Ibid., pp. 10-15.
43 See especially the Fifth and Sixth Investigationsof Husserl’s Logical Invesfigatzons, 2 vols., trans. J. N. Findlay (London: Routledge& Keegan Paul, 1970).
GWB p. 13.
Ibid., pp. 13-16.
JI
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and thetarget on which it lands andat which it rests. Idolatryis
this preestablished harmony.
The same visible becomes an icon when it is looked at differently, in the spirit, perhaps,of Andrea delS a r t ~ : ~ "
Ah, but a man's reach should exceed his grasp,
Or what's a heaven for?

The gaze is not satisfied or fulfilled. It does not stop and rest.
Instead it never ceases to "transpierce visible things" in an
awareness of the essential invisibility of the divine. But this is
only possible to a gaze thatis always "transpiercing itself."47 The
iconic gaze Iooks beyond a11 visible things to the invisible because it refuses to make its own capacity the measureof what it
intends. Knowing itself to be inadequate to that atwhich it aims,
it does not equate whatis given to sight with the
God who gives
sight.4s
As the measure of the divine (whichin turn becomes the mirror of its human measure), the idolatrousgaze "still remains in
possession of the idol, its solitary master."49 By contrast, the
iconic gaze is not the director of the scene in which it plays a
supporting role. Its double aim of transpiercing its object and
itself to that which is beyond both is triggered by the discovery
that it is aimed at. In iconic intention, "the gaze of the invisible,
in person, aims atman . . . the icon opens in a face that gazes at
our gazes'' with the result that"the human gaze is engulfed . . .
[and] does not cease, envisaged by the icon, there to watch the
tide of the invisible come in. . . . [The icon] offers an abyss that
the eyes of men never finish probing.""'
In the poem by Robert Browning that bears his name.
GWB pp. 11, 17.
Like Levinas, Marion alludes to Descartes's discussion of the idea of the
infinite as the idea that exceeds our capacity to think it as an instance of iconic
thought; ibid., pp. 23,202.
J''%id., p. 24.
i'' Ibid., pp. 19-21. There are two Levlnasian motifs here: the passive "intentionality" of our awareness of the infinite, and the notion "that only the icon
gives us a face (in other words, that every face is given as an icon)." In "L'Interlope," in Who Comes after the Subject, Marion develops the linguistic thesis,
that we areaddressed (not as Dasein, which "appeals only to itself,'' but as der
Alrgesprochcne), that the one who says I 1s the one who has already been
claimed as me.
.i7
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The ontological tradition is not embarrassed by the apeironic
abyss of sensibility. Armed with the concept, it knows how to
introduce some order into chaotic infinity, to dam up the engulfing ocean. Marion's critique of ontology is designed to rescue our God-talk from this move. So he applies the very same
idol/icon analysis to the concept that he has developed in relation to vision. When we assume the adequacyof our concepts to
of
the divinereality, we make ourselves the measure and master
that reality and convert it intothe invisible mirror of our intellectual capacities. It is not surprising that Marion mentionsFeuerbach at this point."
At the level of sense perception, the idolatrousaim is satisfied
and thus at rest with the visible, while the iconic gaze transpierces it toward the invisible of which it is a trace. At the conceptual leveI, the invisible becomes the incomprehensible, that
which we aim at bytranspiercing not only our images but also
our concepts. Now, idolatry is contentment withwhat the rnirzd's
eye can see, the assumption (oris it the demand?) that our concepts and the propositions in which we embed them can be
equal to (adequnfio) divine being. As Gregory of Nyssa puts it,
"Every concept, as it is produced according to an apprehension
of the imagination in a conception that circumscribes and in an
aim that pretends to attain the divine nature, models only an
idol of God, without atall decIaring God himself."52
We already know that Marion is interested in fleeing idolatry
but not conceptuality,so we are not surprised to find him saying
that "the icon also can proceed conceptually, provided at least
that the concept renounce comprehending the incomprehensible, to attempt to conceive it, hence also to receive it, in its own
excessiveness."53 Inother words, we must thilzk God ns tile gjft of
51 GWB p, 16, cf, pp. 29-31.For
a phenomenology of that which exceeds
adequation, see Marlon's "The Saturated Phenomenon," Philosophy Tonmy 40,
no. 1 (sprmg 1996), pp. 103-24. Also published in Dominique Jan~caudet al.,
Ph~nomerzology and tlrr "Theological Turn" (New York: Fordham University
Press, 20001, pp. 176-216.
52 Quoted in GWB p. 203. See Gregory of Nyssa, The Lift of Moses, trans.
Abraham J, Malherbe and Everett Ferguson (New York: Paulist Press, 1978),
pp. 95-96, for context and a different translation.
"GWB pp.22-23.
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love who exceeds not merely the images and but also the concepts with
which we aim at God.
Like Levinas, Marion points us toward a "relation which is
irreducible to comprehension." But this is not just a call for epistemic humility, a kind of via analogia following upon a via negat i m and based on the "absolute freedom of God with regard to
all deterrninati~ns?~As with Levinas, it is a challenge totheory
as the primary mode of God-talk. It isn't simply that we have a
goal, adequation, that we cannot achieve. It is that we have a
higher goal than making accurate assertions about God. This is
why, in the final analysis, "predication must yield to praisewhich, itself also, maintains a discourse." There is a silence appropriate to the God relation, not just because our language
limps, but because God is love, and love "is not spoken, in the
end, it is made. Only then can discourse be reborn, but as an
enjoyment, a jubilation, a praise.'155Marion follows Pseudo-Dionysius in following a "wise silence" with "songs of praise."5h
Praise is the language in which love welcomes the decentering
presence of the Divine Other, recognizing the'of' in 'gift of love'
as at once an objective and subjective genitive.s7
We mrlst think God as the mystery that exceeds the wisdom of fhe
Greeks.
We wurst think God as the voice that exceeds vision so as to establish
a relation irreducible to compreherzsiolz.
We rntrst think God as the gift of love u)Jzoexceeds not merely the
images but nlsa the coszcepts with which we aim nt God.
Who comes "after" the critiques that can be summarized in
See nn. 22 and 41 above.
"GWB pp. 106-7.
Pseudo-Dionysirls: The Complete Wurks, trans. Colm Luibheid (New York:
Paulist Press, 19871, pp. 50-51. Cf. GWB pp. 76-77, where the theme of praise
is linked to the priority of goodness to being as the name of God in PseudoDionysius. I have discussed this theme in Dionysius and Cyril of Jerusalem in
"Overcoming Onto-Theology," in God, the Gifr, and Postmodernism, ed. JohnD.
Caputo (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999). See ch. 1 above.
ii The absence of a personal otherwho could be respected, loved, welcomed,
even praised is what sets Heidegger off from Levinas and Marion. See John
D. Caputo, Demythologizi~gHeidegger (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,
1993)' chs. 2-3, and NormanWirzba, "Love's Reason: From Heideggerian Care
to Christian Charity," in Postmodem Philosophy and Christian Faith, ed. Merold
Westphal (Bloomington: Indiana University Press,1999).
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these three imperatives? What sort of God can withstand the
scrutiny they encapsulate? Heidegger,
Levinas, and Marion have
replied to this question, which does not require only a single
answer. I promise once again to give my own response, but only
after reflecting briefly onthe "must" of thesecommands.
Whence this obligation? With
what right( p i d juris) does philosophy, or, moreprecisely, these philosophies (for these critiques
make it clear that "philosophy" does not speak with a single
voice, even when seeking to overcome onto-theological metaphysics) dictate howwe shall thinkand speakof God? Is not the
arrogance of onto-theology reenacted when the critique thereof
a tsar for
assumes the same hegemony? Are we not exchanging
a Stalin, a shah for an Ayatollah?
Under the heading of "Double Idolatry" Marion has raised
this very question in relation to Heidegger? It is a legitimate
question, and, given the substantia1 overlappingconsensus
among our threecritiques and the sternness with whichwe are
told how we "must" think about God, we cannot restrict the
question to Heidegger.
of thesecommandmentscancometo
have
Oneormore
normative force for us in one of two ways. They can be philoany (apparent) theological assophicallypersuasivewithout
sumptions, in other words, independently (it would seem) of
how we think, affirmatively or negatively, about God. Or they
can be philosophically persuasive in significant part precisely
because they highlight, or reinforce, or make explicit what we
already think about God.
In either case we are dealing with cognitive dissonance and
reflective equilibrium. Even if with our trio we deny primacy to
theory in the God relation, we want ourphilosophical theorizing
about God-talk to be at peace with our pre- and-post-reflective,
everyday thinking about God. So we seek reflective equilibrium.
If we do not achieve it at first, we experience cognitive dissonance. One side or the other (or perhaps both) needs revision.
We have learned in other contexts that there is no single, selfevident solution to the problem. Faced with an anomaly, we can
revise our theory or question either our data or our intuitions.
is GWB ch. 2. i have tried to sort out the issues raised by hls critique in
"Overcoming Onto-Theology" (ch. I above).
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I suggest two principles, or better, warnings, for dealing with
situations of cognitive dissonance between our philosophical
and theological persuasions (meaning bythe latter our God-talk
habits, whether academically formed or not and whether they
are affirmative or negative). I believe, though I shall not try to
show, that one can find support for them in all three of our
thinkers.
The first of these I shaIl call the Warning against Philosophical
Arrogance. This warning is implicit in the quid juris questions
just posed and in Marion’s “Double Idolatry” charge. It is the
reminder that the days of Absolute Monarchy are over in philosophy, that no philosophy is Absolute Knowledge or possesses
Absolute Authority, that no theology should be expected automatically and a priori to bow the knee before philosophy’s correction? If cognitive dissonance arises, it may be my
philosophical theory that needs to be revised to accommodate
my theology.
The second is like unto the first and is called the Warning
against Theological Arrogance. It is the reminder that my theology does not cease to be human, all too human, just because it
purports to be about God. In a variety of ways, both formal and
substantive, it can be more idolatrous than iconic.””The days of
Absolute Monarchy, AbsoIute Knowledge, and Absolute Authority are over in theology too, and in the search for reflective
equilibrium, it may be my theology that needs revision in the
light of a philosophical critique. All the more so if that critique
has it roots, consciously or unconsciously, in a theological horizon in which I also stand. Thesuspicion of idolatry originates in
prophetic belief ( e g . , Kierkegaard) as well as in skeptical unbelief (e.g., Nietzsche).h’
x.

x-

x

w Marion takes offense especially at Heidegger’s essay “Phenomenology and
Theology,’’ in The Piety of Thlrrking, trans. James C. Hart and John C. Maraldo
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), in whlch phenomenology is repeatedly asslgned the task of ”correcting” theology.
Substantive idolatry wouldoccur when myGod is the invisible mirror, not
of my cognitive capacities, but of my (our) unholyinterests.
In Susyicim and Fuifh: The Rrligio~rsUses of Modem Afhe~sm(New York: Fordham University Press, 1998), I have accused Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud of
plagiarizing the Bible, suggesting that their hermeneutics of suspicion has its
true origin in prophetic biblical faith.
‘lo
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So, then, who comes "after" the overcoming of onto-theologically constituted metaphysics? I shall not try to say how we
"must" think, for while I take the triple Thou Shalt developed
above very seriously, I also think there are many ways to think
and talk about God that remain within the parametersspecthey
ify. So I shall speakof how we "may" think and talk aboutGod.
Who am I to say how we "must" think about God?
I began this essay by posing its questionin words taken from
Augustine's Confessium Now I want to answer that question
quite simply anddirectly. The God who comes after onto-theology, who would be overcome by metaphysics (in Heidegger's
sense) and whose flourishing is thus the overcoming of metaphysics, can be the God of Augustine. I believe the reader can
confirm at each stage of its development that nothingin the triple critique presented above precludes the affirmation of a personal creator and redeemer who speaks to us as gift and as
command and who evokes from us the sacrifices of prayer,
praise, song,and even, perhaps dance (though
each critique precludes certainways of understanding suchGod-talk, in particular certain epistemic metaclaims about it). Without trying to
defend everything Augustinesays about God, I will try to show
how hisGod, especially as presentedin the Coufessions, not only
can withstand the scrutiny encapsulated in threefold
the
"must"
we have been exploring, but even can be seenas part of its prehistory, an origin (by no means absolute) from which thesecritiques might emerge. Heidegger has
affirmed what Levinas and
Marion have enacted, namely, that faith requires and thus can
motivate the critique of onto-theology. That critique is not the
monopoly of atheistic postmodernism, and, a fortiori, not of cynical nihilism.
This triple critique, sometimes called postmodern, just might
help us to recover premodern resources that an arrogant modernism taught us we had outgrown."2 But only if postmodern
I find it of no small interest that at the second Villanova conference on
postmodernism andreligion, held in October 1999, papers by Jean Grelsch and
Graham Ward focused sympathetic attention on Augustine. Recent scholarship
has reminded us of the Christian texts that belong to the prehistory of Heidegger's thinking. See especially John van Burcn, The Y o u q Heideggm R m o r of the
Hidden King (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), and Theodore Kisiel, The Gerzesis o f Hedegger's Bang and Time (Berkeley: University of CaliforrlZ
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thinking does not simply continue what is in effect the Enlightenment myth of progress by excluding from discussion a priori
(”we’re past that”) all conceptsof a transcendent, personal Creator and Savior. I am not suggesting that we try to go back sixteen centuries. Apartfrom the fact that we couldn’t if we wanted
doesn‘t, indeed
to, I, for one, wouldn’t wantto.Augustine
couldn’t, address many of the issues that a contemporary theology needs to bring into contact with our God-talk. Even when
he does address issues that we are still facing, his solutions are
sometimesplainlyunacceptable.(Need
I mentiontheDonatists?)
But Augustine’s God transcends Augustine and Augustine’s
time. With the help of an essentially Augustinian God, Luther
and Kierkegaard raised powerful protest against the totalizing
thinking of their times (and the social systems attached thereto,
in both cases “Christendom”). On close examination, postmodern critiques so far from making the world safe from intrusion
by this God look more like an invitation to reconsideration and
possibly reacquaintance. Those whose God-talk is Augustinian,
in the ways spelled out below, need not be allergic to postmodern critique nor intimatedby postmodern atheism and/orminimalism (ethicswithoutontologypresented
as religion). Nor
should those who are allergic to Augustinian God-talk assume
that theistic discourse can responsibly be ignored. We all have
our ”in-house” discussions and debates, but only ghetto thinking is willing to restrict itself to preaching to thechoir.
Augustine begins his Coujessims with two citations from the
Psalms: ”Can any praise be zuurthy of the Lord’s majesty? HOZO
magrlificent his strength! How inscrutable his wisdom“ (I:1).63 Already
he is ”lost in wonder, love, and praise”64-especially praise.
nia Press, 1993). Levinas is not the least bashful about the “moreancient
volcano” of Hebralc “prophetic speech” and “messianic eschatology” from
which his thought emerges (as described by Derrida in “Violence and Metaphysics,” in Writitzg and Difference, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 19781, pp. 82-83.
Quotations from the Confessio~swill be from the Pine-Coffin translation
(Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1961) by book and chapter number. I follow his
practice of placing biblical phrases in italics.
The phrase comes from Charles Wesley’s hymn ”Love Divine, All Loves
Excelling.’‘
I*
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Having read his Marion, he remembers that "predication must
yield to praise"--so he immediately reminds himself that any
predications implicit in the psalmist's questionshave their telos
in praise: "Man is one of your creatures, Lord, and his instinct
is to praise you. . . he is part of your creation, he wishes to praise
you. The thought of you stirs him so deeply that he cannot be
content unlesshe praises you, because you made us for yourself
and our heartsfind no peace until they rest in you" (1:l). For the
time being, at least, the best antidote torestless anxiety is praise.
Three times in this brief passage Augustine affirms God as
creator, and this will bea constantly recurring theme in whatis
to follow. It would not be difficult to show that his creator
is an
uncaused cause, a c a z m sui, if you please. But this is conspicuously not the causa sui Heidegger has in mind, before whom
there is no prayer or sacrifice, no awe, music, or dance.The Confessions are indeed one long prayer, addressed continuously to
God. We see how ontology is teleologically suspended in prayer
when Augustine writes,"In you are the first causes of all things
of all things that suffer
not eternal, the unchangeable origins
change, the everlasting reasonof all things that aresubject to the
passage of time and have no reason in themselves. Have pity,
then, on me, 0 God, for it is pity that I need" (16).
Augustine opens book VI11 with the words of the psalmist,
"You have broken the chains that bound me; I will sacrifice ill yow
honour," and he opens book IX by linking sacrifice to praise as
appropriate responses toGod's grace. Nor are prayer and sacrifice unaccompanied by awe, as we see, for example, when he
describes hisencounterwiththe
Uncreated Light that "was
above me because it was itself that Light that made me, and I
was below because I was madeby it." (N.B. Here again we have
the affirmation of God as creator,as causa sui.) "I gazed on you
with eyes too weak to resist the dazzle of your splendour. Your
light shoneupon me in itsbrilliance, and I thrilled withlove and
dread alike. I realized that I was far away from you. It was as
though I were in a land where all is different from your own"
(V11:lO).
A few pages later we find Augustine looking for the immutable source (an unoriginated origin) of his own changeable reason, which somehow knows "the immutable itself. For unless,
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by some means, it had known the immutable,
it could not possibly have been certain that it was preferable tothe mutable. And
SO, in an instant of awe, my mind attainedto the sightof the God
who is. Then, at last, I caught sight of your illvisible m f w e , as if is
known flzrough your creafwes" (VIL17).
Unlike the caz~snsui of onto-theology, "who" is religiously otiose, Augustine's Creator evokes prayer, sacrifice, and awe. What
about singing and dance? I must confess (a good thing to do
when writing on the Colzfessions) that I have not found Augustine dancing. But he sings, and thereby hangs a tale. As he recounts in book X how far he has come and how far hestill has
to go in the life of faith, he writes, "Let my brothers draw their
breath in joy for the one and sigh with grief for the other. Let
hymns of thanksgiving and cries of sorrow rise together from
their hearts, as though they were vessels burning with incense
before you" (X:4).b5This does not come as easily to Augustineas
it might to others: "Without committing myself to an irrevocable
opinion, I am inclined to approve of the custom of singing in
church, in order that by indulgingthe ears weaker spirits may
be inspired withfeelings of devotion." His hesitancy stems from
the fearof finding "the singing itself more moving than the truth
which it conveys" (X:33)? Yet in the very next chapter we find
him saying, "But 0 my God, my Glory, for these things too I
offer you a hymn of thanksgiving. I make a sacrifice of praise to
him who sanctifies me" (X:34).And he complains that thebooks
of the Platonists "make no mention of tears of confession or of
the sacrifice that you w i l l never disdailr. . . . In them no one sings"
(VIk21).
Although he affirms a Highest Being who is the clue to the
meaning of the whole of being, it is clear (and will become
clearer) that Augustineis not an onto-theologian in Heidegger's
sense. Yet he, and the whole theistic tradition of which he is a
"i
Like the psalms of Israel, Chrlstian liturgies regularly include both hymns
of praise and prayers of confession. Incense is a psalmic image of the offering
of these to God.
O h One can appreciate the nature of Augustine's concern by comparing meditative, devotional settings of the Sfabat Mafu by Palestrina, Vivaldi, or Part
with the operatic versions by Verdi and Rossini. No doubt Augustine would
classify the Pergolesi with the latter, though I would place it with the former.
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major representative, are widely thought to be paradigms
of that
incomplete reading
heresy. One reason for that, no doubt, is an
of Heidegger. But that is not the whole story. Insofar as there is
a great deal of Platonism in Augustine, there surely are ontotheological themes and possibilities. His preoccupation with immutable truth and the role
of the vision metaphor inhis account
of knowledge are buttwo conspicuous examples. Are not these
the seeds from which the metaphysicsof presence grows? It is
regularly acknowledged that thereis a continuous Allfhebmg or
recontexhralizing of Augustine’s Platonism in his Christianity.
He is both ”the greatest disciple and the profoundest critic of
PI~tinus.’’(~~
We need to see the teleological suspension of Neoplatonism in Christianity as his continuous resistance to the
temptations of onto-theology.
When we hear Augustine panting, ”Truth! Truth! How the
very marrow of my soul within me yearned for it” (111:6), we
might think him engaged in the ”metaphysical” project of rendering thewhole of reality intelligible to human understanding.
But a closer look reveals something quite different. In the first
place, inspired by Cicero’s Hurtemirrs, his heart ”began to throb
with a bewildering passionfor the u%doyIz of eternal truth” (III:4,
emphasis added), and henever forgets the essential linkage, already present in Cicero and thePlatonists, between wisdom and
truth.
In the second place, he subordinates propositional truthto its
ultimate object, the source of all wisdom and knowledge. He
complains of the Manichees, ”Much of what they say about the
created world is true, but they do not search with piety for the
Truth, its Creator” (V:3). This is why Augustine can say to God,
”you are Truth itself” (IIMl), and can speak of the ”Word made
flesh” as ”Truth in person” (VIIA9).
Finally, just because truth is not ultimately our mastery of the
world’s form but the personal God on whom we are dependent
for the whole of our life, including its knowledge, it is God’s
agendathathaspriority;
and God’s highest priority is love.
When we encounter Truth itself in person, we find, not the an‘>;John Burnaby, Amur Dei: A Stud!/ of the Religion of Sf. Alrgtlstiw (London:
Hodder & Stoughton, 1938), p. vi.
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swer to all our questions or a possession that gives us power,
but the command to transcend ourselves in love for the Other
(1:5). Thus, ”Blessed are those who love you, 0 God, and love
their friends in you and their enemies for your sake” (IV:9). In
the final analysis, knowledge is aufgehoben in its proper telos,
love of God (of which praiseis a part) and neighbor (both friend
and enemy). Although there is a good deal of Platonic eros in
this-the‘blessed’
above signifies aeudaemonismAugustine
shares with Plato-Augustine insists that charity is not one of
the Platonist books (VII:20).hX
thethings to belearnedfrom
Christian caritas is more than Platoniceros. No doubt part of the
reason lies in the personal character of that for whom theheavenly eros longs and in
an ethic that goes beyond justice and
friendship within the polis to love of enemy, commanded by
”Truth itseIf” and modeled for us by “Truth in person.”
The vision metaphor is central to Platonism and to the metaphysics of presence that constitutes so many of the footnotes to
Plato. It suggests an immediate, intuitive presenceto the world’s
essential intelIigibility. Augustine is anything but skittishabout
the vision metaphor, and his illumination theory of knowledge
mirrors Plato’s account of the subject, the object, and the light
that enablesthe subject to ”see” the object, whether it be a sensible or intelligible object. Of course, the light is a personal God
and not an impersonal Good or One. But what is to keep this
God from being reduced to the means by which philosophy
carries out its onto-theologicalproject of bringing everythingto the
presence of direct insightin which the totalityof being becomes
the transcendental signified for a mind that is its perfect mirror,
a resting place that idolatrously calls forth no transpiercing?
The first thing to notice is that vision is not the only sense to
play a metaphorical role in Augustine. For example, just after
telling us in a passage alreadycited how he caught sight of the
God who is, he describes his inability to maintain that moment
by saying he “had sensed the fragrance of the fare but was not
yet able to eat it” (VIL17). Thus he prays, ”Let us scent your
h$This is also why Augustine speaks of “the Light that charity knows”
(V1I:lO) rather than the Light that the soul detached from the body knows. Cf.
the contrastbetween the biblical kardir.2 and the Heideggerian Kanrpf in Caputo,
Demy/hulugizing Heldegger.

fragrance and taste your sweetness”W111:4). In the famouspassage in which he describes the mystical ascent he shared with
his mother, Monica, he tells us that ”for one fleeting instant we
reached out and touched it” (1X:lO). And in an astonishing passage, he includesall five senses: ”You called me;YOU cried aloud
to me; you broke my barrier of deafness. You shone upon me;
your radiance enveloped me; you put my blindness to fligl~t.
You shed your fragrance about me; I drew breath and now I
gasp for your sweet odour. I tasted you, and now I hunger and
thirst for you. You touched me, and I am inflamed with love of
your peace” (X:27).
Et might be argued that all the senses signify immediate presence. But while there was alreadyfor Augustine a long tradition
of interpreting conceptual knowledge as a kind of seeing, neither for him nor €or us is there that kind of linkage between
intelligibility and smell, taste, or touch. To this it might be argued that these are the senses of mystical, trans-conceptual immediacy andthat mysticism isjust another version of the
metaphysics of presence.h9
Two responses seemto me in order. First, mysticism, of which
there is plenty in Augustine, may well be a version of the metaphysics of presence, but it is not the onto-theological version.
Mysticism, so far from being the demand thatthe whole of reality be intelligible to representational, calculative thinking is the
conscious, even insistent, realization that it cannot
be.70
Second, and more important, in the
all-five-senses passage just
cited, hearing relates not merely to sound but to speech; ”YOU
called me.” The continuous arlfhebuTrg of vision in the voice is
Derrida speaks of “a certain complicity” between rationalism and mysticism. See Of Grarnrnatology, trans.GayatriChakravorty
Spivak (Baltimore:
Johns Hopkms University Press, 1976)’ p. 80. Hegel’s philosophy is often called
t+’

a rationalized mysticism.
This is why Derrida is right to recognize the affinity as well as well as the
discontinuitybetweennegativetheology
and deconstruction. See “Differance,” In Jacques Derrida, M a r p n s of Philosophy, trans. Alan Bass (Chicago:
University of Chlcago Press, 1982); Derrida a m i Negative Theology, ed. Harold
Coward and Toby Foshay (Albany: SUNY Press, 1992); “Sauf le nom (PostScriptum),” in Jacques Derrida, 012the Name, ed. Thomas Dutoit (Stanford:
Stanford Unlversity Press, 1995); and the very helpful discussion by john D.
Caputo in The Prayers and Pars of Jacques Derrida (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997).
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We have seen that for Augustine predication yields topraise,
truth is in the
service of love, and vision isaufgehoben in thevoice
that precedes and supersedes all our intentional a d s (in both
senses of intentional, cognitive and volitional). It would appear
that Augustine has flunked Metaphysics 101. For metaphysics,
in itsonto-theological constitution, "the deity can come into philosophy only insofar as philosophy,
of its own accord and by its
own nature, requires and determines that and how the deity
enters into it."74 But the tradition of which Aristotle and Hegel
are paradigms is not about praise, or commanded love, or the
decentering voice. It has other work for God to do, namely, to
make the wholeof reality intelligibleto human understanding.
Augustine relates to this tradition, not by providing sacred
texts
for its canon but by being a howitzer aimed at its central assumptions.
We can see this in one final way by noting that
God remains
for Augustine an ultimately ineffable mystery. He is not shy
about predication when it comes to God. He regularly affirms
that God is creator, unchangeable, and omnipresent.
In response
to the question "What, then, is the God I worship?' he writes,
"You, my God, are supreme, utmost in
goodness, mightiest and
all-powerful, most merciful and most just." But this is not catea
chetical Q&A on the attributesof God. For he immediately conus and yet the most
tinues, "You are the most hidden from
present amongstus, the most beautifuland yet the most strong,
ever enduring and yetwe cannot comprehend you.. . . For even
those who are most gifted with speech cannot
find words to
describe you" (14).
This question, the epigraph for this
essay, is repeatedtwice, in
slightly altered form, in book X: "What do I love when I love
God?' (X6-7). Given the intensely personal character of Augustine's God, it may seem strange that threetimes, once at the
beginning and twice at the end of his story, he acknowledges
of another. I have suggested that because he assumes that God speaks and
analyzes some of the ways in whlch this might be understood, Wolterstorff
is "engaged in the very Heideggerian task of overcoming metaphysics in its
ontotheological sense." See my "Theology
as Talking abouta God Who Talks,"
Modern Theology 13, no. 4 (October 1997), p. 526.
74 See n. 11 above.
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the divine mystery with aWhat question. To be sure, the third
time he follows it up with a Who question: “Who is this Being
who is so far above my soul?” (X:7), but he seems to prefer the
What form. Perhaps the reason is simply this. Through intense
conversation over a long period of years, Augustine has a fairly
good idea Who God is, although that question has not
been satisfied and silenced. But in terms of the essence of this Interlocumore deeplypuzzled.The
Wesensschmr that
tor,heremains
philosophy requires is, for Augustine (asfor Aquinas), precisely
what he does nothave.75
Be that as it may, Augustine points to two reasons why none
of the many answers
he can give to the What? or the Who? question is adequate to the question. First, there is the temporary
I know, although
limitation of his earthly condition: ”This much
nt present I nm looking r z f II canfirsed reflection in [I mirror, not yet
f i x e to face, and therefore, as long as I am away from you, during
my pilgrimage, I am more aware of myself than of you.” This
will continue ”untilI see you face to face and my dusk is to on day"
(X:5). The illumination of which Augustine is currently capable,
compared to what it will be in the life to come, is as dusk to
noonday. Augustine, bishopand theologian nonpareil, is still in
the cave.
Perhaps, however, this limitation is permanent, as we learn
from a passage that at first sounds like a Platonic reflection on
God as i y s m esse and c a w x sui:
“We exist,”[heaven
andearth]
tell us, ”because we were
made.” . . . It was you, then, 0 Lord, who made them, you who
are beautiful, for they too are beautiful, you who are good, for
they too are good; you who are, for they too are. But they are not
beautiful and good as you are beautiful and good, nor do they
have their being as you, their Creator, have your being. In comparison with you they have neither beauty norgoodness nor beingat
all. This we know, and thanks be to you for this knowledge.

Up to this point we have classic onto-theology. God earns a living by gathering all things into an intelligible whole and by
making it possible €or us to understand this totality.
7i For Aquinas’s consistent denial that we can grasp the essence of God, see
John E Wippel, ”Quidditative Knowledge of God,” in Mefnyh!ysical [SKI Themes
in T l ~ o ~ t ~Aquinns
ns
(Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press,
1984).
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Everything is turned topsy-turvy, however, by the brief sentence with which the chapter ends: ”But our knowledge, compared with yours, is ignorance” (XI:4). The deficiency of our
knowledge, vis-a-vis God’s, is not quantitative but qualitative.
Like everything about us, it is participatory, not originary, dependent on a Light that we ourselves are not and therefore cannot supply.76It is far from evident that this deficiency will be
eradicated even when, according to Augustine’s confident hope,
we see God face to face in the life to come. Because the soul is
created, itis not divine. Even w h e n it is lifted out of the cave into
the immediate presence of the Uncreated Light, its knowledge
will remain human and not divine.77
But if the HighestBeing, who is the clue to the meaningof the
whole of being, remains a mystery that continues to elude our
cognitive grasp, the whole of being, no matter how many facts
we can learn about it, remains mysterious. If philosophy begins
in wonder for the Greeks, it ends in wonder for Augustine. And
love. And praise.
We might say that Augustinehas carefully read his Heidegger,
his Levinas, and his Marion and has learned that w e midst think
God as the mystery that exceeds the wisdom of the Greeks, that we
must thiuk God as the voice that exceeds vision so as to establish a
relatiolz irreducible to comprehension, and that we must thinkGod as
the giftof love who exceeds not merely the images but also the concepts
with which weaim at God.

”

7h It is in an Augustinian tone of voice that Gabriel Marcel says ”that the
more I actually participate in being, the less I am capable of knowing or saying
in what it is that I participate”; Creative Fidelity, trans. Robert Rosthal (New
York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 19641, p. 56.
7; Speaking of mystical union with God, The Cloud of Unknowing promises “a
real knowledge and experience of God as he is. Not as he is in himself, of
course, for that is impossible to any save God” (New York: Penguin Books,
1978, ch. 14). Following the same logic, Gregory Palamas teaches that our
knowledge does not transcend its finitude even in heaven. See The Triads, trans.
Nicholas Gendle (New York: Paulist Press, 19831, pp, 32-39 and p. 123 n. 45.
And Aquinas holds that when in rapture or in the beatific vision we are supernaturally enabled to see the very essence of God, we still do not comprehend
God. See Summa TheoIogine 1.12.1.3 and De Veritate VIII.2 and XVIII.l.
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Nietzsche As a
Theological Resource
ONTO-THEO-LOGY
AND ITS TWIN
NOTEVERY CONSTRUAL of the theological enterprise will be able
to entertain the possibility of Nietzsche as a resource, if not exactly an ally.For example, if theology interpretsitself onto-theologically, it will be unable to see any ambiguity or irony in his
self-designations as immoralist and anti-Christ. They will simply be the literalconfessions of a loathed enemy. The possibility
of Nietzsche as ancilla theolugiue presupposes at least an interruption of the interpretation of theology in onto-theo-logical terms.
Heidegger himself suggests that there might be
theological
motives for such an interruption. Speaking in
a Pascalian tone of
voice about the godof philosophy, he writes, "Man can neither
pray nor sacrifice to this god. Before the c u t m sui, man can neither fa11 to his knees in awe nor can he play music and dance
before this god."' Metaphysics, when constituted onto-theo-logically, is a totalizing thinking that like itssuccessor, technological, calculative thinking, "reduce[s] everything down to man"
(ID p. 34). The "god-less thinking" that abandons thegod of the
philosophers "is thus perhaps closer to the divine God" (ID p.
72). This way of looking at things obviously opens the door at
least a crack to Nietzsche and his deathof God announcements.
But how do we get to this pointof view?
Heidegger's account of the onto-theo-logical project takes its
point of departure from Aristotle's attempt to unite ontology,
the study of being as such, with theology, the study of the highest being. The particular object of theology, according to ArisI Martin Heidegger,
Identity a d Difference, trans. Joan Starnbaugh (New
York Harper & Row, 19691, p. 72. Henceforth citedas ID.
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totle, belongs to the general concerns of ontology because the
unmovable substancehe takes to be the highestbeing would not
be merely one being among others.In relation toall other beings
it would be at once the prima cazlsa and lrlfinzcr ratio. Consequently thisscience would be first philosophy ”and universal in
this way, because it is first” (Mefaphysics 1026a30).
This notion that all being is tobe understood from the highest
being has a natural attractiveness to monotheists who hold that
every being (as substance or asessence) is either God or created
by God. So it is not surprising to find historical examples of
theologies that interpret the God of Abraham in onto-theo-logical modes, with or without helpfrom Aristotle.
But Heidegger’s account of this metaphysical marriageof ontology and theology raises a red warning flag. It is obvious that
in the onto-theo-logical project “the deity enters into philosophy.” But Heidegger asks howthis happens and on whose
terms; he answers that in this project ”the deity can come into
philosophy only insofar as philosophy, of its own accord and by
its own nature, requires and determines that and how the deity
enters into it” (ID pp. 55-56). And what is the task that philosophy assigns to the deity? It is the ontological task of gathering
the whole of being into an intelligible totality. God has become
a means to a human end. Philosophy’s demand that the world
should be entirely intelligible to human thought becomes the
demand that God be philosophy’s phactotum in carrying out
this project. This total intelligibility requires that ”Being manifests itself as thought,” the central theme of the Logos tradition
in western metaphysics, if not in the Gospel of John. It is along
this trajectory that we move, ever so quickly, from the book of
Genesis toHegel’s Scierzce of Lugic (ID pp. 57-60).
It may be worth our while to descend from these global descriptions to see onto-theo-logy at work in its everydayness. At
a colloquium not longago I heard a speaker defendinga certain
Thomism. Along the way she made two interesting moves that
were picked u p by a questionerduring the discussiontime. First,
she presented AlasdairMacIntyre’s critique of the secularization
and impoverishment of theology from within in the attempt to
address Christianitytothesecular
mind. She quoted MacIntyre’s claim ”Nothing has been more startling than
to note
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how much contemporary Christian theology is concerned with
trying to perform Feuerbach’s work all over again” with the result that Christianitybecomes “a way o€life in accordance with
the liberal values and illiberal realities of the established order.”*
With specific reference to Tillich’s theology, MacIntyre was
quoted as saying, “When Feuerbach explained that he did not
believe in the God of orthodoxy because God could at best only
be a name for man’s ultimate concerns, he was not regardedby
theologians as being a particularly subtle defenderof the Christian religion.”3
The second move was the portrayalof Protestant and Jansenist
(and eventually nominalist) theologies as ”a deviated Christian
tradition” because of their ethical views, especiaIly in relation to
the corruption of human nature by sin. Once again MacIntyre
was quoted as finding the consequenceof such views to be ”that
from any human standpoint the divine commandments do become arbitrary fiats imposed on us externally; our nature does
not summon us to obey them, because we cannot recognize
them as being for our good.”4
The questioner asked whether the brand of Thornism being
defended was not an instance
of the Feuerbachianism whose denunciation prefaced the defense. According to the “deviated”
views in question, divine commands do not make sense to us
humans; at least sometimes we find them to be ”arbitrary fiats
imposed on us externally.” Our nature doesnot welcome them
because at least sometimes “we cannot recognize them as being
€or our good.” But how could this be an objection against the
views in question unless there were already operative
an a priori
requirement of total intelligibility, the demand that God should
always make senseto our humanintellects in their present(finite
and fallen) condition? Would not any God who accepted these
ground rules be one created in our image rather than the other
way around? Would not such a God be but a projection of what
Alasdalr MacIntyre, Marxism crnd Christiarzify (Notre Dame, Ind.: University
of Notre Dame Press, 1968), p. 2.
Alasdair MacIntyre, Semlnrisrn nlzd MomI Chnngc (London: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 69.
Alasdair MacIntyre, “Atheism and Morals,” in The Religiorrs Silynifi’cancr of
Afheisrn (New York: Columbia University Press, 7967), p. 39.
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makes sense to our current fashion of thinking? Wouldn't we
have here a historicized (Marxian) version
of Feuerbach? Would
of thinking, however traditional
the fact that the current fashions
or revolutionary, to which God would
have to conform are those
of religious rather than secular people makethe project any less
Feuerbachian?
It seems to me that the onto-theo-logical
project has a shadow,
a flip side, a cousin, a (fraternal) twin. If, in its presence, one
looks for signs of a socio-theo-logical project, one is seldom disappointed. In this instance God enters into social theory rather
to human
than ontology, but on the same terms, as a means
ends. In the first case the demand isto render the world (including God as its Alpha and Omega) fully
intelligible. In this second
case the demand is to render the world fully ours,to legitimate
the politicaI, economic, and technological hegemoniesfrom
which the faithful in any given case benefit, including compassionate,paternalistichegemonies(whichusedto
be called
benevolent despotisms), from which the faithful
benefit psychoof
1ogicalIy without having to pay too high a price in terms
power or wealth.
In both cases the will to power, carefully hidden from itself,
puts God to work as its man Friday (or perhaps in these liberated days, as its girl
Friday-for a femaleGod is no less likely to
be co-opted by human will to power). In either of these modes,
theology has everything tofear and nothing to gain from Nietzsche. But if theology has anothervocation, one that includesvigilance against its own onto-theo-logical and socio-theo-logical
tendencies, the story mightbe different.
We can put it this way. If Nietzsche is right in his interpretation of Spinoza's conatzrs as the will to power, then everything
tends to absolutize itself, to treat the world as its oyster, as the
collective means to its own flourishing. In its content, monotheistic religion provides a powerful challenge to this tendency
among human selves and societies. Thus Kierkegaard (as AntiClimacus) can write, "Every human being is to live in fear and
trembling, and likewise no established order is to be exempted
from fear and trembling. . . fear and trembling signify that there
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is a God-something every human being and every established
order ought not to forget
for a moment.”5

A FALLACYAND

A

PROPHYLAXIS

But monotheism also representsan all but irresistible temptation
to slide (without noticing the non sequitur involved) from the
confession that theobject of the believer’s thinking is absolute to
the confusion that takes that thinking
itself to be ipso factoabsoa name for this slidlute. If philosophical theology were to need
ing, we might call it cognitive transubstantiation;forwhat
happens is that the intentional
act, which remains to all appearances human, takes on the ontological perfections of its divine
intentional object.
Of course, this has all the cogency of assuming that to think
of the Grand Canyon is to think deeply. But onto-theo-logians
and socio-theo-logians who have more or less lost their footing
on this slipperyslope do not like tobe reminded of this. It takes
a certain perversity to want be
to reminded of the fallacy of misplaced transubstantiation. It takes thinkers more committed to
the truth, whatever it may be, than to the truth as we think we
have discovered it so far. It takes thinkers caught up in what is
for Nietzsche the last of the ascetic ideals. Ironically, it is just
such theologians for whom Nietzsche can be a resource.
A prophylactic resource.A protection, not against the theological equivalent of unwanted pregnancy, but against the theological equivalent of syphilis or AIDS, a deadly virus that kills
theology by transforming what would be discourse about God
into discourse about ourselves and by transforming altruistic
virtues into egoistic vices.
In other words, I am not suggesting that Nietzsche is a theological resource in the way in which scripture andtradition are.
Still, there is something quasi-scriptural and quasi-traditional
about his relationto the theologian. For he performs, if we will
Saren Kierkegaaxd, Practice in Chvistianify, trans. Howard V. and Edna H.
Hong (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 88.
j
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let him, the task of prophetic protest, the ad hominem critique
of theology by its own professed standards. And for Jewish and
Christian monotheism, if I am not mistaken, both scriptureand
tradition include important strands of prophetic protest. Amos
and Jesus are quite different fromNietzsche, but all three managed to get very religious people angry at them in strikingly
similar ways.
The first Nietzschean prophylaxis is his perspectivism.This i s
his version of the hermeneuticsof finitude, and as suchit should
be of interest to theologians. For finitude is a theological theme
that standsin intimate connection with the doctrineof creation.
Just to the degree thatNietzsche’s account of human finitude is
Compelling, it can illumine the theologian’s understanding of
creation, even if it comes wrapped in theassurance that there is
no Creator afterall (or should we say “before all”?).
Nietzsche’s perspectivism is one of the negative footnotes to
Plato in the history of philosophy. Both the Platonism of antiquity and the Cartesianism of modernity, along with all their legitimatechildren, have beenthe flight from perspective, the
attempt toreflect oneself out of one’s situation so as to see reality
sub specie aeterrritatis. Theology has often been a fellow traveler
on these flights, tempted, in part, by the fallacious assumption
mentioned above, that since it speaks of the Absolute it must
speak absolutely. This is part of the reason, incidentally, that
Nietzsche doesn’t see muchdifference between Christianityand
Platonism and describes the former as Platonism for the masses.
Against both the philosophical and the theological forms of
this flight, Nietzsche is a constant reminder thatwe see the world
from a particular historical, sociological, and even physiological
perspective. In the presence of the metaphysics of presence that
thinks it possible to reflect oneself out of perspective altogether
and obtain ”the view from nowhere,’’ Nietzsche keeps quoting,
as it were, from St. Paul. No matter how badly we want to see
reality face to face, we can only see ”in a mirror, dimly,’’ even
“in a riddle” (1 Cor. 13:12). So he speaks of truth as “linguistic
legislation,” as “customary metaphors, and as ”illusions about
which one has forgotten that this is what they are.’’h
Frledrich Nietzsche, The Povflzble Nietzsche, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New
York: Viking Press, 1954, pp. 44-47.
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Perhaps thereis an element of rhetorical overkill here. But perhaps very strong languageis needed to remind us thatour truth
is human, all too human, and for that reason it is always meaningful to ask, Whose truth? There is a lot of sense in the claim
that if God is real, in somethinglike the traditional theistic sense,
then reality is intelligible. But it does not follow that it is intelligible to us, since we are not God. As Kierkegaard’s Climacus
reminds us, ”Existence itself is a system-for God, butit cannot
be a systemfor any existing ~ p i r i t . ” ~
Objectiorr: ”This is your second reference to Kierkegaard. Perhaps by reminding usof the important affinities between these
two, once the fathers of existentialism but now seen more often
as proto-pomos, you hope to render more plausible yourclaim
that Nietzsche might be useful to the theologian. But why not
just turn to Kierkegaard, who, afterall, is something of a theologian himself ?”
Reply: (a) By all means, turn to Kierkegaard. I am the last one
to discourage you, I myself spend more time reading and writing about Kierkegaard than Nietzsche. (b) Nietzsche is also
something of a theologian-of which more hereafter.
(c) I am making no claim for Nietzsche’s indispensability.
There are many thinkers from whom there
is much to learn
about the finitudeof human knowIedge. Hume and Sextus Empiricus, Kant and Kierkegaard, Marx and Freud, Peirce and
Dewey, Heidegger and Wittgenstein, Rorty and Derrida-the
list can be extended withease. But Nietzsche (along withseveral
others just mentioned) has this advantage.
By virtue of his atheism he has built in a special protection against the fallacy of
misplaced transubstantiation.Of course, he and his descendants
need to be reminded that from the
fact that we are not the absolute point of view it does not follow that there is no absoIute
point of view; and Kierkegaard’s “Existence is asystem for
God” is important as such a reminder.But 1believe there is real
value in looking at human finitude in a landscape from which
God has been entirely removed.Uncreated finitude is doubtless
different from created finitude, so such a mise-en-scene cannot
Serren Kierkegaard, C o l ~ I ~ d i l rUrzscmtific
g
Postscripf, trans. Howard V. and
Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), vol. I, p. 118.
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be ultimate from atheological standpoint. But it can be part of a
much needed system of checks and balances for the theologian
who seeksto claim divineorigin but notdivine nature for
human thought, to remember thatwe are made, not begotten.
Objection: “But there‘s aproblem of self-referential consistency here. Is it not a performative contradictionto present as an
absolute truth the claim that all human insight is relative to its
perspective?’’
Reply: No doubt. But that is to read Nietzsche in the worst
possible Iight and to invite the suspicion that is
one
desperate to
discredit him. There are
at least two other possibilities. One
more charitable reading would have him saying something like
this: “All human truth is relative to the believer’s perspective,
except the truth that this is so; this latter truth is the one insight
we have that transcends perspective.”So far as I can see, thereis
nothing self-contradictory about this claim.But while it has the
virtue of being charitable, it does not strike meas plausible, either in itself or as areading of Nietzsche.
An interpretation that is both charitable and plausible,
at least
as a reading of Nietzsche, would go like this: ”All human truth
is relative to the believer’s perspective, including the truth of
perspectivism. While we may find perspectivismcompelling, no
formulation of it can claim to be final, certain, and beyond revision.” Perspectivismneed not be presented as anabsolute truth;
it can be presented as an account of how reality looks from
where one is situated. It does not thereby cease to be of value.
The account of the game given by the winning coach cannot
claim to be the truth about the game; other accounts must be
taken into account, including those from the losing coach, the
players, thereferees, the radio and TV announcers, thefans, and
the people selling hot dogs. But that does not mean that we do
not listen with attention to what the winning coach has to say
about the game.
Objection: ”That may all be OK for games and even for philosophical theories. But for the theologian to talk thatway would
be to abandon the kerygmatic mission of theology, to cut the
gospel out of the gospel. Within the American Academy of Religion it may be OK for the theologian to be no more than a purveyor of opinion (so long as that opinion is politically correct);
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but real theology needs to sustain a relation to the faithful and
not just the curious,to church, synagogue, mosque, etc.
We cannot ask the clergy to say, 'This is how it looks from where 1
stand.' "
Reply: But St. Paul talks that way, and he was not, to the best
of my knowledge, a memberof the AAR. He sought to relate to
both synagogue and church.
Yet he insists that our knowledgeis
precisely of "the light
partial, thatwe see as in a riddle. Speaking
of the gospel of the glory of Christ, who is the image of God,"
he insists that "we have this treasure in clay jars, so that it may
be made clear that this extraordinary power belongs to Godand
does not come from
us" (2 Cor. 4:4 and 7). It was in reference to
the epistemological dimension
of the clay jarmetaphor, I believe,
thatan evangelical Protestanttheologianoncedescribedthe
Bible as "the divinely revealed misinformationaboutGod."
Coming from a staunch defender of biblical inerrancy, that is
a profound, almost Nietzschean appreciation of our cognitive
finitude. Not even in giving us a divinely inspired and inerrant
biblical self-revelation could God transcend our finitude and enable us to see realityas it truly is, that is, as God sees it.
Objection: "Let me try again. Doesn't Nietzsche's perspectivism lead to theological silence, to a negative theology cut off
from all positive theology? And isn't Feuerbach right in warning
us against theologians of this sort? They affirm the existence of
God: 'But this existence does not affect or incommode [them]; it
is a merely negative existence, an existence without existence, a
self-contradictory existence,-a state of being which, as to its effects, is not distinguishable from non-being. . . . The alleged religious horror of limiting God by positive predicates is only the
irreligious wish to know nothing more of God, to banish God
from the mind.' "x
Reply: It was a deep appreciation of human finitude that generated negative theology in the first place. So it would not be
surprising if one path outof Nietzschean meditationson human
finitude leads in the direction of negative theology. I think it is
on this path that Derrida has foundhimself discussing the relaLudwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christianity, trans. George Eliot (New

York:Harper and Brothers, 1957),p. 15.
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tion of deconstruction to negative theology.YBut it does not follow that the
negative theoIogy for which one gainsa new respect
by the serious reading of Nietzsche needs to be cut off from
positive theology. Nietzsche himself was something of a positive
theologian and prophet. He is quite kerygmatic about hisDionysian faith and about the metaphysics of eternal recurrence that
undergirds it.
Is he inconsequent in this regard? I think not. What Nietzsche’s positive theology suggests to meis that his perspectivism
places no constraints on 74lhat we can say about the sacred, but
only on how we say it. I want to suggest two things about that
how. First, if we cannot have the absolute knowledge thatphilosophy has often demanded and professed, our theological discourse will have to embody the appropriate humility. But it is
important that we not
confuse humility with timidity (especially
in thepresence of Nietzsche, who sees throughthatfraud
quicker than anyone else). Should we betentative in our beliefs
about God? Not if that means we should hold them without
conviction, but only if it means we should hold them without
arrogance, the arrogance that is wiIling to impose them on others but unwilling to learn from others.
The second adverbialconstraint placed on theological discourse by perspectivism is a bit more complicated. It relates to
the onto-theo-logical project. That project, it will be recalled, was
to call upon God as the highest being to bring intelligibility to
the totality of being. To this end God was presented as p r i m
cntlsn and as zdfilnlz uafio. I believe perspectivism requires us to
abandon this project because it challenges the slide from claiming that reality is a system for God to claiming that it can be a
system in and for our knowledge. If reality cannot be a system
for us, then whether or not there i s a God for whom it can be, it
cannot be a system for us. (P (Q v Q>>3 P
Does this mean we must give up speaking of God as creator?
Not if I am right about thewhat and the how.What it requires us
to give up is the assumption that whenwe speak of God as cre-

-

The key texts are “DifMrance” In Margins of Philosoply, trans. Alan Bass
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982), and the entire volume Derrid~
arrd Negatlz7~Theuhgy, ed. Harold Coward and Toby Foshay (Albany: SUNY
Press, 7992), but especially “How to Avoid Speaking: Denials.”
‘)
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ator we have explained the world.A colleague of mine whois a
very creative philosophical theologian once put it this way: ”The
only thing you can get out of a cosmological argument is the
conclusion that there is an explanation of the world.You haven’t
thereby given that explanation.” My suggestion is that this applies to creation talk, whether its origin is in revealed or natural
theology.
It is in the doctrine of analogy that Aquinas qualifies his positive theology with the radical finitism of his negative theology.
Although Nietzsche does not thernatizehis doctrine in thisway,
my suggestion is that its truth and his practice come down to
the same thing, thatnegative theology places no constraints on
whaf we can say about God but only on the how. When he insists,
as he regularly does, that we do not know God through the divine essence, he says, in effect,
Philosophical theology gives us the rationally revealed misinfor~
gives us the scripturally remation about God, and S R C doctrim
vealed misinformation about God.We can say whatever reason or
scripture lead us to say about God, andwe can hold the resultant
beliefs with deep conviction. What we cannot say is that in them
we know either God or the world as they truly are. Thus we cannot say that our beliefs are final or that they embody the intelligibility of reality. That finality and that intelligibility are only to be
found in the mind of God.

You’re preaching to the wrong congregation.To beat u p on ontotheo-logy at the AAR is truly an exercise in carrying coals to Newcastle. We are not the Christian Coalition, dogmatically confident
in a metaphysics and corresponding ethics to the point of being
willing to impose it on everybody else. Our problem is, if anything, just the opposite.We are so sensitive to the situated character of thought that we have no gospel at all, unless it is the gospel
of finitude. There is next to nothing we are willing to say about
God with conviction, and we are the last place on earth to refer
anyone with spiritual hunger.The only topic about which we are
confident is the situated relativity of whatever we say.

F i m l reply (fur as long CIS you c e ~ s elawrchirzg objecfiom):
(a) There are fundamentalisms of the left as well as of the
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right, theologically, politically, and culturally speaking. Nor is
the AAR free from the kind
of dogmatisms of which Nietzschean perspectivism is a critique. Its dominant culture has an
orthodoxy, or perhaps several orthodoxies, that are quiteas intolerant of dissent as the orthodoxies theyhave replaced. Oneof
these orthodoxies is a dogmatic Nietzscheanism that needs
be to
subjected to Nietzschean critique.
(b) An important aspect of this latter point concerns thewhat
and the how. Theologians within the dominant culture
of the
AAR are frequently perspectivists, whether they get this from
Nietzsche or elsewhere. But they construe finitism to be a constraint on what may be said. Fully aware of the difficulty, if not
impossibility, of providing unsituated warrant for this or that
theological notion,theysometimescontinue
to assumethat
since they are in the university rather than the church, only what
is capable of universal warrant, untiedto any particular community of belief and practice,is permitted. The result is the thinnest
of theological soups. Or, perhaps, one of the new orthodoxies,
whose universal warrant consistsin being unchallenged by any
but fringe groups in the AAR. To take seriously that universal
warrant may be both impossibleand unnecessary might be liberating in more places than one suspectson a superficial view.
In short, my sense is that when Nietzsche’s ox goes a-goring,
there are more than enough oxen to go around.

A SECOND
PROPHYLAXIS
In addition to his hermeneutics of finitude, Nietzsche has an
hermeneutics of suspicion. He believes that the philosopher ”has
a duty to suspicion today, to squint maliciously out of every
abyss of suspicion.”1oThe reason is that “the decisive value of
an action lies precisely in what is unintentional in it, while everything about it that is intentional, everything aboutit that can be
seen, known, ’conscious,’ still belongs to its surface and skinwhich, like every skin, betrays something
but corzceds even more.
“’Friedrich Nietzsche, B e y o d Good nnd Evil, trans. Walter Kaufmann (New
York: Random House, 1966), 834.
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In short, we believe that the intentionis merely a signand symptom that still requires interpretation.”” Needless to say, the actions spoken of here include, but are not restrictedto, cognitive
acts: believing, presupposings, questionings, not questionings,
and so forth.
Although Nietzschean suspicion operates
in the epistemological as well as in the ethical realm (and belongs, in fact, to what
we might today call the vice squad of virtue epistemology), he
is careful to distinguish it from skepticism. ”In former times,”
he writes, “one sought toprove that there is no God-today one
indicates how the belief that there is a God could arise and how
this belief acquired its weight and importance: a counter-proof
that there is no God thereby becomes superfluous.””
Strong skepticism says, ”The evidence shows that God does
not exist.”13 Weakskepticism (agnosticism) says, “The evidence
for God’s existence is insufficient to warrant belief. We do not
know that God does not exist, but it would be irrational to believe so.” Suspicion does not ask about the evidence at all. The
question is not whether the belief in question is true but how it
has arisenand whatgives it its survivalvalue as a belief. Inother
words, it asks both what motives give rise to thisbelief and what
functions it performs to pay, so to speak, for its upkeep. These
two questions, of motive and of function, we can subsume under
the concept of interest. Whereas skepticism asks about the evidence that supports a belief, suspicion asks about the interests
that support a belief. N.B. In this shift the concept of support
has changed. Evidence supports a belief epistemically; interests
support abelief psychologically. One concerns the truth ofa belief, the other its usefulness.
Here, as is often the case, skepticism gives rise to suspicion.If
I am convinced that a belief is false or insufficiently warranted,
I may become curious about how people come to hold and to
bid., 7732. For a fuller account, see my “Nietzsche and thePhenomenological Ideal,” The Monist 60, no. 2 (April 1977), pp. 278-88.
I ? Friedrich Nietzsche, Daybreak: Thalrghfs on the Prejudices of Morality, trans.
R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Cambridge Unwersity Press, 19821, book I, 795.
‘?The immediateissue here is theexistence of God, but the distinctions are
quite general and can be applied to beliefs of all sorts. For nonreligious examples, see ”Help from Gilbert and Sullivan,’’ chapter 3 of my Suspiciou and Faith:
The Rdigious Uses o f f u d e r n Afkeism (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdrnans, 1993).
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sustain sucha belief. But while the questionof interest may presuppose a negative judgment about evidencepsychologically, it
does not do so logically; and Nietzsche is clear about this. He
tells us explicitly that the discourseof suspicion is an alternative
to the discourse of skepticism. It represents a different way of
discrediting beliefs. Or, to speak moreprecisely, of discrediting
believings. For, as Nietzsche clearly sees, suspicion as such is
neutral with respect to objccfi-rlcquestions about the truth of beliefs or the evidence supporting them. It is directed, sthjecfively,
toward the believer’s interests. It addresses the irc~hatonly indirectly, the how directly.
Like the hermeneutics of suspicion to be found in Kierkegaard, Marx, and Freud (once again, no claim for utter uniqueness is made here), Nietzsche’s rests on two importantpremises.
The first is a distinction between latent and manifest content, a
theory of the unconscious. Because consciousness conceals, beliefs are signs and symptoms in need of interpretation.
Second, the theory of the unconscious is a theory of repression, bad faith, and self-deception. The fundamental project that
gives rise to the interests in question is the will to power, and
while Nietzschewants to restore innocence rather than blame to
this core of our being, he recognizes that it is at odds with currently prevailing moralities, with our operative superegos.Selfdeception occurs, not simply because there are interestswork
at
in our believings, but because these interests so often are those
we cannot acknowledge without shame.
Elsewhere I have compared Nietzsche to Marx and Freud in
this way. What is religion most essentially according to these
theories of bad faith?
For Freud-ontologid weakness seekingconsolation.
For Marx-sociological power seeking legitimation.
For Nietzsche-sociological weakness seekingrevenge.’.‘

For Freud what is shameful is not our weakness before the cruelty of nature (death) andsociety (guilt), but thedishonesty involved in allowing wish fulfillment to provide consolation not
supportedby
reason.Although
Nietzsche does notshare
IJ

Ibicl., p. 229.
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Freud’s confidence in reason, the dishonesty themeis central to
his critique as well. In other words,for Nietzsche religiousbelief
involves lapses from both moral and intellectual virtue.
It is now possible to see three ways in which thedoor is open
to a religious appropriation of the hermeneutics of suspicion.
They take us from seeing how it is a possible tool in the theologian’s tool kit to seeing how itis a necessary tool.
First, because it is neutral with regard to the truth of the beliefs in question, the theologian’s commitment to those beliefs is
not a barrier. Asking questions about whatmotives lead to various beliefs and what role they play in the lives of the believing
soul and the believing community (and Nietzschemoves easily
back and forth between the I and the We, between psychology
and sociology) does not presuppose either that the beliefs are
false or that the one asking the questions takes them
to be.
There is an important consequenceto this. Thereis no a priori
reason why the interests supporting a true belief should not be
disreputable. Just as it is possible, as Aristotle and Kant have
insisted so vigorously, to do the right thing for the wrong reason, so it is possible to believe the truth in ways that are shameful. It may be true that God will judge the wicked, but if I hold
this belief in a spirit of hateful vengeance and use it to establish
my (or our) moral superiority in ways that blind me to my (or
our) own faults, my believing is discredited by what suspicion
reveals.
There are two corollaries to this consequence: (a) It would be
to commit the geneticfallacy to assume that a belief is shown to
be false by showing that believers (sometimes, often, always)
employ shameful interests in the support of that belief. (b) It
would be to commit something like the same fallacy in reverse
to defend oneself or one’s community againsta suspicion-generated critiqueby trying to show that the
beliefs in question are in
fact true, or that theyhaven’t been shown to be false. Since truth
is not the point, truth is not an adequate defense. Both sides
need to be reminded, frequently and forcefully, what the logic
of the situation is.
The second openingto a theological appropriation of the hermeneutics of suspicion derives from its parallel with the hermeneutics of finitude. Just as finitude is a theological theme in
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relation to the doctrine of Creation, suspicion is a theological
theme in relation to the doctrine of the Fall. In the theologian’s
language, it traces the noetic effects of human sinfulness, Nietzsche didn’t intend his doctrineof the will to power to be a secular, phenomenological account of original sin or his practice of
suspicion to be an extension of the Pauline, Augustinian, and
Lutheran employmentof sin as anepistemological category; but
he can be fruitfully read in that way. When he is, it begins to
look as if suspicion is not simply an optional tool for the theologian but an indispensable one for any theologian who takes sin
seriously.
We might note the following ironyinvolved in the caseof the
theologian who does not take sin seriously. This usually happens out of the desire to take modern secular thought seriously,
to avoid keeping theology in an ecclesiastical ghetto; but in the
aftermath of secular suspicion, as developed by Marx, Freud,
and Nietzsche, any theologian who does not take sin seriously
loses touch thereby with some
of the most powerful secular
thinkers of the modern (and postmodern) world.
The third theological opening to suspicion is perhaps nothing
but the flip side of the second. The theologian’s work is in the
For this reason the theoservice of the truth about the true God.
logian shares,if in a somewhat more reflective mode, the prophet’s abhorrence of idolatry. But just to the degree that human
interests play a controlling role in the way we think and speak
about God, thatGod becomes an idol, aGod made with human
hands. Conceptual and linguistic hands, to be sure; but since
they are not less human thanthose that makegraven images, the
gods that result are no less idols. Of course, idols need not be
new constructions out of whole cloth; they can be produced by
editing, revising, taming.
A theology that wishesto be sensitive to such tendencies, not
only in the work of its adversaries, but most importantly in its
own work,will find the hermeneuticsof suspicion an indispensable part of its methodology. Perhaps ‘methodology’ is not the
right name for this practice, for we are not dealing here with the
proper relation of a subject to its epistemic object. It is rather a
question of the relation of the episternic subject to itself, to its
own shameful interests, which it does not always manage to
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keep unemployed. Seen in this light, suspicionis more nearly a
spirituality than a methodology. So perhaps we should call it a
than a tool. But it remains an obligpractice and a posture rather
atory and not an optional part of the theologian's art.
To this point
A final observation about Nietzschean suspicion:
I have spoken of it in relation to theology proper, beliefs about
God. But we need to know very little about Nietzscheto realize
that he is concerned with ethics at least as much as with metaphysics. He reverses the charge of Lactantius, that the virtuesof
the pagans are splendidvices, and argues that thisis true of the
altruistic virtues that the Jewish
and Christian traditionssum up
in the notion of neighbor love.
Now is not the time for a detailed tour of Nietzsche's moral
inventory: (a> of his discovery of the spirit of revenge behind
ideals of justice; (b) of his discovery of the desirefor moral superiority behind ideals of pity or compassion; or (c)of his discovery of laziness, timidity, cowardicewhat Zarathustra calls the
"wretchedcontentment"
of those "weaklings whothought
no claws"lS-behind all
themselves good becausetheyhad
kinds of goodness. But such a tour, and it does take time, is
an integral part of the spirituality mentioned above. Among its
potential benefits to the theologian I mention but two. First, it
counters the idealisticand existentialist withdrawals from metaphysics to ethics by suggesting that the latter is as problematic
as the former.Second, it reminds the theologian that in ethics as
well as in metaphysics, thehow must never be rendered peripheral by thewhat. The heart of the matter is the heart.
Nietzsche wouldn't put it quite thisway, but he shows us that
whether it is a matterof metaphysics or of ethics, thetheological
project betrays itself when it abstracts the project of getting it
right from the task
of becoming righteous. Norhave we avoided
by abandoningdogmatic, objectivistic,
thisproblemsimply
foundationalist, totalizing conceptionsof getting it right in favor
of pluralistic and perspectival understandingsof understanding.
However necessary the hermeneutics of finitude may be, it remains in bad faith without an equally serious hermeneutics of
suspicion.
Ii

The Portable Nietzsche, p. 230.
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